People v. XXX

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 259221. September 28, 2022.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.XXX, 1accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 28, 2022, which reach as follows:

"G.R. No. 259221 (People of the Philippines v. XXX). — Accused-appellant XXX appeals 2 the November 23, 2020 Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 11875, which affirmed the July 11, 2018 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of ______________________ in Criminal Case No. 4445-M-2012 finding accused-appellant XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in relation to Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 5 or the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

The Factual Antecedents

On November 26, 2012, an Information 6 was filed charging accused-appellant with the crime of Rape in relation to RA 7610, to wit:

That on or about the 10th day of November 2012, in _____________________________, 7 Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, threat and intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of [AAA], 8 a 12-years [sic] old minor, against her will and without her consent, which badly affects the psychological, physical and emotional well-being of the latter and demean her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being.

Contrary to law. 9

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 10 After the termination of the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. CAIHTE

Version of the Prosecution

At around 8:00 p.m. of November 10, 2012, private complainant AAA, a 12-year old minor 11 was sleeping on the papag (wooden bed) in their house beside her 5-year old sister. 12 Their parents were not at home because they attended a birthday party. 13

Later that night, AAA felt pain as she was awakened with accused-appellant on top of her and his penis inserted in her vagina. 14 The accused-appellant told her "Huwag kang magsumbong, mahal kita." 15 The accused-appellant proceeded to remove AAA's panty and shorts as well his own underwear, 16 pulled AAA towards him and forcibly spread her legs. 17 Accused-appellant attempted to penetrate her again but was not able to do so because she kept kicking him. 18 He bit and licked her thighs instead. 19 While accused-appellant was doing these to AAA, she exclaimed, "Kuya [XXX], huwag po." 20 AAA recognized accused-appellant because he was the kumpare of her mother. 21

Shortly after, the accused-appellant went to urinate. Upon his return, AAA asked permission to also use the bathroom. When accused-appellant agreed, AAA used the opportunity to escape. She proceeded to the barangay hall to report the incident. 22 Afterwards, the police and barangay tanods came to AAA's house to arrest accused-appellant who was then found sleeping on the papag. 23

AAA and her mother then proceeded to the police station to blotter the incident and execute a Sinumpaang Salaysay. 24 They also went to the _______________ Crime Laboratory Office for physical examination. 25 Per Medico-Legal Report No. BMLC-R12-418, it was concluded that the presence of a "healing contusion at the middle third of the right thigh" was a "clear evidence of a blunt, penetrating trauma to the hymen." 26

In the August 8, 2016 hearing, the parties additionally entered into the following stipulations of fact for the prosecution's documentary evidence: (a) the police blotter exhibit is a faithful reproduction of its original copy; (b) the due execution of the Medico-Legal Report, thus dispensing with the testimony of Police Chief Inspector Editha Martinez (PCI Martinez) who executed the same; and (c) the existence of the Birth Certificate of private complainant AAA. 27

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant denied the accusations against him. He alleged that he was on a drinking spree on the night of the incident. 28 He first attended the birthday party of his brother where he consumed about seven liters of brandy and proceeded to drink some more at the house of the chief of barangay tanods. 29 He was apparently left at the side of the road by said chief despite the latter's promise to accompany him home. 30 YYY, the stepfather of AAA, brought him to the former's place which was near the road where he was found, and made him sleep on the papag. 31 He was awakened by the sight of police officers instructing him to pull up his shorts as he was surprised to find them pulled down to his knees. He was then arrested and brought to the police station. 32

Accused-appellant further alleged that he was only framed as he heard AAA admit to her mother and sibling — while in his presence, his sister, sister-in-law, and a police officer on the way back after medical examination — that it was YYY who actually molested her, but that she was afraid of him. 33 HEITAD

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its July 11, 2018 Decision, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape in relation to RA 7610. It found that the testimony of AAA narrating that she was raped by accused-appellant, was straightforward, convincing, and substantially corroborated by other evidence. 34 The trial court thus ruled:

WHEREFORE, accused [XXX], having been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape in relation to R.A. 7610, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay victim [AAA] the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages, and the amount of P75,000.00 as exemplary damages with interest at the rate of six (6) percent per annum, from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 35

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the trial court, XXX elevated the case to the CA. 36

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Accused-appellant raised the following errors on appeal: the court a quo gravely erred when it (a) exclusively relied on the incredible testimony of the private complainant as basis in finding the accused-appellant guilty; and (b) did not consider the accused-appellant's defense of denial despite being sufficiently substantiated by evidence. 37

In its November 23, 2020 Decision, the CA denied accused-appellant's appeal for being unmeritorious. 38 The appellate court gave weight to AAA's straightforward, credible, and positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime as against accused-appellant's bare denial. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, ________________, Branch 18 dated 11 July 2018 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. 39

Aggrieved by the CA's affirmation of his conviction, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. 40

Issue

The sole issue to be resolved in the present case is whether accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape under the RPC, in relation to RA 7610.

Our Ruling

We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit but modify the designation of the crime committed.

After a judicious examination of the records, this Court finds no cogent reason to vacate the RTC's appreciation of the evidence, which was affirmed in toto by the CA. The Court agrees with both the RTC and CA's conclusions that the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of Rape through the straightforward, positive, and convincing testimony of the minor victim, AAA. 41

The accused-appellant insists that the trial court erred in exclusively relying on the incredible testimony of AAA due to its inconsistencies on material points. 42 Specifically, accused-appellant alleges that (a) AAA was even unsure on whether accused-appellant successfully inserted his penis or was just trying to insert it when she awakened; and (b) what was only clear was the fact that AAA woke up with accused-appellant attempting to spread her legs without successfully inserting his penis. 43 Contrary to these assertions, AAA unequivocally and repeatedly confirmed that she was awakened with accused-appellant already having carnal knowledge of her: ATICcS

Q: After the accused was able to remove your shorts and panty, what else transpired, [AAA]?

A: He inserted his penis into my vagina and at that time I was awaken[ed] and after that I kicked him and I said "huwag po."

Q: So, at the time you woke up, he was already about to insert his penis into your vagina?

A: No sir, his penis was already inserted into my vagina.

Q: And what did you feel during this time?

A: It was painful, sir. 44

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Ms. Witness, you said that when you were awaken[ed], the male organ of the accused was already inserted in your organ, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You also testified that, Ms. Witness, that the accused bit you on your thigh, Ms. Witness, was this before or after he inserted his sex organ in you?

A: After he inserted his penis into my vagina, sir. 45

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Q: You said then, Ms. Witness, to the question of Prosecutor Ramos on page 5 of the transcript, "so at the time you woke up he was about to insert his penis in your vagina" and you said "no sir, his penis was already inserted in my vagina," do you remember having said that?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And right now you are confirming that [this] is what really happened when you woke up his penis was already in your vagina?

A: Yes, sir. 46

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Ms. Witness, when you testified on November 18, 2013 during your initial direct testimony as found on page 4 of the transcript you said that before the accused inserted his penis into your vagina, he first bit and licked your thigh and caressed you and also [a while ago in] your Sinumpaang Salaysay containing the same allegation but on page 5 of your direct testimony you said that at the time you woke up the penis of the accused was already inside your vagina. Now which is correct between the contrasting allegation of your testimony?

A: All of those are true, sir.

Q: To make this matter clear, Madam Witness, at the time you woke up, was the accused already penetrating your vagina?

A: Yes, sir. 47

xxx xxx xxx

Q: So why did you give that kind of answer during your direct testimony that the penis of the accused was already inside your vagina at the time you woke up when according you just right now he still forced you [to open your legs] before he was able to do that?

A: His penis already penetrated my vagina, however, I was able to kick him [when] he again forced me and forcibly inserted his penis into my vagina. TIADCc

Q: So the accused was able to penetrate your vagina twice, Madam Witness, once while you were sleeping and second, at the time you woke up?

A: Just once sir, because when I kicked him, he was not able to penetrate my vagina.

Q: And why did [sic] he not able to do that after you kicked him?

A: Because I kept on kicking him, sir, but what he did instead he bit my thighs and kissed them. 48

xxx xxx xxx

Q: So, do you mean to say [that when] you woke up his penis according to you was already penetrating your vagina, was his short then up and your short also, are they still up or you were still wearing them?

A: No, sir.

Q: Then why did the accused have to still pull down your short and pulled down his own short?

A: Because his short was already pulled down to his mid-thighs, sir. 49

Notably, both the RTC and CA gave weight to AAA's testimony. This Court, too, has no reason to disbelieve the victim and is convinced of her credibility. Nowhere in the records does it show that the lower courts had overlooked, misunderstood, or mis-appreciated any fact or circumstance of weight and substance, which, if properly considered, would have changed the outcome of the case. 50

Jurisprudence has held that "testimonies of rape victims who are young and of tender age are credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence." 51 This Court has also consistently given full weight and credence to a child's testimony and has regarded "youth and immaturity as badges of truth and sincerity." 52 Any perceived disparity in AAA's statements during trial vis-à-vis her Sinumpaang Salaysay53 is irrelevant. Variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 54 Here, AAA's account of how accused-appellant — whom she recognized as her mother's kumpare55 — sexually abused her was categorical and natural. 56

Anent accused-appellant's argument that it was highly doubtful that unconsented sexual intercourse occurred in a relatively small house and with other members of the household inside or not far away, 57 We affirm the CA in ruling that "rape is no respecter of time and place," as it can be committed in small, confined places, or in places which many would consider as unlikely or inappropriate, or even in the presence of other family members. 58

Next, accused-appellant faults the prosecution for not bothering to offer the testimonies of AAA's sibling, mother and barangay tanods as "vital corroborating witnesses" who could have clarified AAA's narration. 59 Accused-appellant further argues that the trial court erred in giving weight to the Medico-Legal Report given the following: (a) PCI Martinez who issued the same failed to testify on the matter; (b) although the report is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, PCI Martinez should have been presented as an expert witness with her qualifications established, before the report may be given weight; and (c) the report neither isolated the accused-appellant as AAA's partner nor indicated a suggested cause for the injury to the hymen. 60

We reject all of accused-appellant's arguments.

First, the records would show that the presentation of PCI Martinez as issuing officer of the Medico-Legal Report was dispensed with precisely because the defense agreed to stipulate on the due execution of said report. 61

Second, the Medico-Legal Report is admissible inasmuch as it had probative weight. True, the report is admissible because entries in official records are recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. 62 However, accused-appellant is mistaken in then arguing that the report should not be given weight for failure to present its issuing officer and to qualify such as an expert witness. The Court has held that "a medico-legal report shall be given weight and credence, even if the physician who examined and prepared it was not presented in court." 63 The medico-legal report must be accorded probative weight because as a public document consisting of entries in public records, it is already prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 64 In Republic v. Unabia, 65 this Court further explained:

Petitioner questions the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Labis, Medical Officer III of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center under the Department of Health, claiming that it failed to include a certification that respondent "has not undergone sex change or sex transplant" as required by Section 5 of RA 9048 as amended, and that Dr. Labis was not presented in court in order that his qualifications may be established and so that he may identify and authenticate the medical certificate. However, the said Medical Certificate is a public document, the same having been issued by a public officer in the performance of official duty; as such, it constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court "[d]ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter." AIDSTE

There was therefore no need to further identify and authenticate Dr. Labis' Medical Certificate. "A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court." (Emphasis supplied) 66

Third, this Court has also held that, "hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. And when the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established." 67 Thus, the Medico-Legal Report need not specifically identify accused-appellant as the cause of the injury nor indicate a suggested cause for that matter, where (a) its finding of injury in the hymen already corroborates AAA's testimony that she woke up with accused-appellant's genitalia inside her; and (b) while its finding of contusion on her thigh supports AAA's claim that he bit and licked her thigh when he failed to penetrate her a second time.

In any event, a medico-legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case as it is an evidence that is merely corroborative in nature. 68 Lastly, neither the non-presentation of other witnesses nor issues in the Medico-Legal Report harms the prosecution's case, as it is well settled that a conviction for rape may be based on a victim's lone testimony, provided that its clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature. 69

All told, accused-appellant's defense of denial, when pitted against a categorical and straightforward testimony as to the fact of rape, does not hold water. Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, cannot overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim regarding the identity of the accused as well as his involvement in the crime attributed to him. 70 Contrary to accused-appellant's claims that he had no sexual inclination towards his kumare's daughter, that he was too drunk and asleep at the time of the incident, and that his claim of frame-up was supported by corroborating evidence, 71 this Court affirms the CA's disposition that these were self-serving and in fact, uncorroborated. 72 Notably, the accused-appellant did not bother to present any evidence other than his own judicial and extrajudicial statements, despite his claim that his sister, sister-in-law, and a police officer were all present when AAA confessed that it was YYY who raped her. 73

In fine, accused-appellant's conviction is proper. However, while the RTC and CA held that accused-appellant must be convicted of "Rape in relation to RA 7610," further citing paragraph 5 (b) of the special law in its disposition, 74 this Court has clarified in the recent case of People v. Tulagan75 that the proper designation of the offense should be "Rape under Article 266-A (1) 76 in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC," 77viz.:

On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7160 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the RPC. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right to double jeopardy might be prejudiced. Besides, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7160, because under Section 48 of the RPC x x x, [it] cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by special law.

xxx xxx xxx

x x x, We now clarify the principles laid down in Abay, Pangilinan and Tubillo to the effect that there is a need to examine the evidence of the prosecution to determine whether the person accused of rape should be prosecuted under the RPC or R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18. AaCTcI

xxx xxx xxx

Second, when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18, and the charge against the accused is carnal knowledge through "force, threat or intimidation," then he will be prosecuted for rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC. In contrast, in case of sexual intercourse with a child who is deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape and the victim indulged in sexual intercourse either "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or group," which deemed the child as one "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse."

xxx xxx xxx

Assuming that the elements of both violations of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 and of Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC are mistakenly alleged in the same Information — e.g., carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse was due to "force or intimidation" with the added phrase of "due to coercion or influence," one of the elements of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610; or in many instances wrongfully designate the crime in the Information as violation of "Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610," although this may be a ground for quashal of the Information under Section 3 (f) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court — and proven during the trial in a case where the victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not consent to the sexual intercourse, the accused should still be prosecuted pursuant to the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more recent and special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also strengthens the policies of R.A. No. 7610. Indeed, while R.A. No. 7610 is a special law specifically enacted to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development, We hold that it is contrary to the legislative intent of the same law if the lesser penalty (reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua) under Section 5 (b) thereof would be imposed against the perpetrator of sexual intercourse with a child 12 years of age or below 18.

Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, is not only the more recent law, but also deals more particularly with all rape cases, hence, its short title "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997." R.A. No. 8353 upholds the policies and principles of R.A. No. 7610, and provides a "stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse," as it imposes a more severe penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC, or even the death penalty if the victim is (1) under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; or (2) when the victim is a child below 7 years old.

x x x, Hence, Article 266-B of the RPC must prevail over Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. (Emphasis supplied. Citations omitted). 78

Notwithstanding the erroneous specification of the law violated, the information is not vitiated if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged, for what controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. Errors in the designation of the specific statute violated do not vitiate the information as long as the accused is afforded the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 79 Considering (a) that the Information still indicated the specific statute violated and sufficiently alleged the facts of carnal knowledge by force; and (b) that accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty without moving for the quashal of the Information, 80 then accused-appellant may be properly convicted of the crime of Rape, albeit under the corrected designation. The RTC and CA are nonetheless correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

With regard to the award for damages, the RTC's imposition, which the CA affirmed, is in accordance with the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta. 81 Thus, this Court likewise affirms the same. EcTCAD

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed November 23, 2020 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 11875 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-Appellant XXX is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Article 266-A, Paragraph 1 (a), in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code and is thus sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, accused-appellant shall pay the victim AAA the following amounts: (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P75,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All amounts are subject to the legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Initials were used to identify the accused-appellant pursuant to the Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017 entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances."

2. Rollo, p. 3.

3. Id. at 8-22. Penned by Associate Justice Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig and concurred in by Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser and Tita Marilyn B. Payoyo-Villordon.

4. Id. at 25-32. Penned by Presiding Judge Victoria C. Fernandez-Bernardo.

5. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved: June 17, 1992.

6. Records, p. 2.

7. Geographical location is blotted out pursuant to Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015.

8. "The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence against Women and their Children, effective November 15, 2004." (People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 [2011]).

9. Records, p. 2.

10. Id. at 39 and 40.

11. Id. at 10.

12. TSN, November 18, 2013, p. 3.

13. Id. at 4.

14. TSN, November 18, 2013, p. 5; TSN, June 11, 2014, p. 6; TSN, December 3, 2014, pp. 3, 8.

15. TSN, November 18, 2013, p. 5.

16. TSN, December 3, 2014, p. 10.

17. TSN, November 18, 2013, p. 5; TSN, December 3, 2014, p. 4.

18. TSN, December 3, 2014, p. 8.

19. TSN, June 11, 2014, p. 6; TSN, December 3, 2014, p. 8.

20. TSN, November 18, 2013, p. 5.

21. Id.

22. TSN, November 18, 2013, p. 6; TSN, June 11, 2014, p. 5; TSN, December 3, 2014, pp. 5-6.

23. TSN, November 18, 2013, p. 6.

24. TSN, November 18, 2013, p. 7; Records, pp. 6-8.

25. Records, p. 13.

26. Id. at 14.

27. Id. at 74.

28. TSN, September 6, 2017, p. 4.

29. Id. at 3.

30. Id. at 4 and 5.

31. Id. at 6.

32. Id. at 6 and 7.

33. TSN, September 6, 2017, pp. 7-8; TSN, December 6, 2017, p. 4.

34. Rollo, p. 30.

35. Id. at 31 and 32.

36. CA rollo, p. 22.

37. Id. at 24.

38. Rollo, p. 16.

39. Id. at 22.

40. Id. at 3.

41. Rollo, pp. 20, 30.

42. CA rollo, pp. 7-10.

43. Id. at p. 30.

44. TSN, November 18, 2013, p. 5.

45. TSN, June 11, 2014, p. 6.

46. TSN, December 3, 2014, pp. 2-3.

47. Id. at 7 and 8.

48. Id. at 8.

49. Id. at 10.

50. People v. De Jesus, 695 Phil. 114, 122 (2012), citing People v. Jubail, 472 Phil. 527, 546 (2004).

51. People v. YYY, 839 Phil. 1147, 1164 (2018); People v. Udtohan, 815 Phil. 449, 463, 465 (2017), both citing People v. Baraga, 735 Phil. 466, 472 (2014).

52. People v. Entrampas, 808 Phil. 258, 268 (2017), citing People v. Dimanawa, 628 Phil. 678, 689 (2010).

53. CA rollo, p. 31.

54. People v. Appegu, 429 Phil. 467, 477 (2002).

55. TSN, November 18, 2013, p. 5.

56. Rollo, p. 18.

57. CA rollo, pp. 9-10.

58. People v. Gunsay, 813 Phil. 381, 387 (2017), citing People v. Gopio, 400 Phil. 217, 239 (2000).

59. CA rollo, p. 31.

60. Id. at 31 and 32.

61. Records, p. 74.

62. RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 46.

Section 46. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the performance of his or her duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

63. People v. Tuyor y Banderas, G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020.

64. RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Section 23.

Section 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. x x x

65. G.R. No. 213346, February 11, 2019.

66. Id., citing Patula v. People, 685 Phil. 376, 397 (2012).

67. People v. Sabal, 734 Phil. 742, 746 (2014).

68. People v. Labraque, 818 Phil. 204, 213 (2017), citing People v. Agudo, 810 Phil. 918, 929 (2017).

69. See People v. Rapiz, G.R. No. 240662, September 16, 2020.

70. People v. Udtohan, supra note 51.

71. CA rollo, p. 32.

72. Rollo, p. 21.

73. TSN, September 6, 2017, pp. 7 and 8; TSN, December 6, 2017, p. 4.

74. Rollo, pp. 22, 25, 31.

75. G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019.

76. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 266-A.

Article. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed — 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

77. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 266-B.

Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. x x x;

78. People v. Tulagan, supra note 75.

79. Id., citing People v. Ursua, 819 Phil. 467, 479 (2017).

80. See RULES OF COURT, Rule 117, Section 9.

81. People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 840 (2016).