FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 257441. July 27, 2022.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. XXX, 1accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 27, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 257441(People of the Philippines v. XXX).2 filed by accused-appellant XXX (accused-appellant), challenging the December 14, 2020 Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03035, which affirmed with modification the June 2, 2015 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of ______, 5 in Criminal Case No. H-2028 finding accused-appellant guilty of Qualified Statutory Rape.
The Factual Antecedents
Accused-appellant was charged with Rape under the following Information:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2011, at _______________________ , and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with threat, force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge [of] his step-daughter, [AAA], 6 a nine (9)-year old girl, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. 8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The victim, AAA lived with her mother and accused-appellant in _________________________. 9
AAA was seven years old and was barely in first grade in 2008 when accused-appellant started sexually abusing her. She recounted that the abuse would happen whenever her mother, BBB was not in their house. Accused-appellant would bring her to the mango plantation where she would be told to lie down after which, accused-appellant would abuse her. Accused-appellant assaulted her in that place three times and once inside their house. Every time she was molested, accused-appellant would place a bolo beside her and threaten to kill her and her mother if she told anyone about it. 10
BBB previously tried to file a case against accused-appellant, but she was eventually dissuaded by the barangay captain, YYY, because they supposedly have no evidence. 11
In the year 2011, when AAA was nine years old and in third grade, another rape incident ensued. At around 7:00 a.m. of April 15, 2011, BBB brought AAA's younger brother, CCC, to the health center for vaccination, leaving her and accused-appellant alone in the house. 12
As the doctor was not yet around at that time, BBB decided to head home, leaving CCC with the barangay councilor. 13
When BBB arrived in their house past 7:00 a.m. that day, she saw accused-appellant standing naked before AAA, who was seated on a chair with a rug under her thighs. 14
Shocked at what she saw, she asked accused-appellant what he had done to AAA. Thereafter, BBB and AAA left the house since accused-appellant threatened to kill them. They initially went to a neighbor's house and, thereafter, to a barangay councilor who accompanied them to the Department of Social Welfare and Development. 15
AAA then told BBB that accused-appellant raped her that day and stopped only when he noticed her (BBB) arrival. She did not shout or say anything while being abused because accused-appellant had placed a bolo and a knife beside her. In addition, accused-appellant warned her not to tell anybody, otherwise he would kill them both. 16 CAIHTE
AAA was examined at the Rural Health Unit of ____________ by the municipal health officer, Dr. Antonia Uy (Dr. Uy). The medical certificate 17 issued thereafter revealed healed lacerations on AAA's genitals. 18
AAA and BBB then went to the police station to report the incident. 19
Version of the Defense
The defense refuted the charges through the lone testimony of accused-appellant. 20
He testified that he is the live-in partner of BBB. He acknowledged that AAA is his stepdaughter. 21
Accused-appellant narrated that on April 15, 2011 at about 7:00 a.m., he went fishing. After three hours, he went home. AAA was inside the house lying down because she had a stomach ache. While he was preparing the fish, AAA requested him to apply ointment on her abdomen. It was also about that time when BBB arrived. She got angry and asked him what he was doing to AAA. He told her that he was merely applying ointment on AAA's abdomen. AAA and BBB then filed a rape case against him. He vehemently denied the charge filed against him. 22
On cross examination, he averred that the accusation against him is not true. He claimed that BBB accused him of raping AAA because she already has a paramour. 23
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its June 2, 2015 Decision, 24 the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused [XXX] is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, and [is] hereby sentenced to suffer the imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the victim [AAA] the sum of [P]75,000.00 (sic) as indemnification, [P]75,000.00 as moral damages, [P]30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 25
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed an appeal arguing that the RTC gravely erred in giving much weight and credence to the inconsistent, highly incredible and improbable testimonies of AAA and BBB. 26
However, in its December 14, 2020 Decision, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC's ruling. The dispositive portion of CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 2, 2015, of the Regional Trial Court of ________________________ in Criminal Case No. H-2028 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant is sentenced to suffer the imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA without eligibility for parole and the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages are all increased to P100,000.00 each.
The rest of the Decision not inconsistent with this pronouncement STANDS.
SO ORDERED. 27
Hence, this appeal. 28
Issue
The fundamental issue in the instant case is whether accused-appellant is guilty of the offense charged against him.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, We affirm with modification the ruling of the CA.
The elements of Statutory Rape
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed. —
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
"Statutory rape is committed by [having] sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act." 29 Thus, the absence of free consent in cases of Statutory Rape is conclusively presumed and as such, proof of force, intimidation or consent is immaterial. 30
In the instant case, We find that the prosecution satisfactorily established the elements of the crime of Statutory Rape, namely: "(1) the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of [the victim], regardless of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation x x x or grave abuse of authority." 31 It is sufficient that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. 32 It was established by the evidence on record, specifically AAA's Birth Certificate, 33 that she was only nine years old at the time she was raped. The pertinent portion of AAA's straightforward testimony detailing said rape incident is quoted below: DETACa
Q: Going back to that rape incident according to you inside your house and during that time your mother was not around, how did [XXX] rape you?
A: He ordered me to lie down and ordered me to lie over the pillow.
Q: After you were told to lie down, what did [XXX] do to you?
A: He undressed himself and when he was already undressed he also undressed me and positioned himself over me.
Q: You mean he was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: While [XXX] was on top of your, (sic) what did he do to you?
A: He again raped me.
Q: Did you see his penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where did he put his penis in your body?
A: In my vagina.
Q: While his penis was inserted into your vagina, what did [XXX] do to you?
A: He was stretching his arms sideward.
Q: How long was the penis of [XXX] inside your vagina?
A: Until my mother arrived.
Q: What did you feel at the time when the penis of [XXX] was inserted into your vagina?
A: My vagina was bleeding.
Q: Did you not feel pain?
A: I felt pain. 34
All told, the evidence on record established that AAA was a minor, being then just nine years old when accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her. Clearly, all the elements of Statutory Rape are present.
AAA's testimony is worthy of
This Court gives great weight to the findings of both the RTC and the CA on AAA's credibility. Time and again, We have ruled that:
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction. 35
In the case at bar, both the RTC and the CA held that AAA categorically and consistently identified accused-appellant as her assailant and persuasively narrated her ordeal. Also, AAA's testimony was rendered more persuasive as it was corroborated by the testimonies of BBB 36 and Dr. Uy. 37
The testimony 38 of Dr. Uy who examined AAA after the commission of the rape, and the medical certificate 39 she issued revealed healed lacerations on AAA's genitals. 40 Even without the testimonies of BBB and Dr. Uy, accused-appellant may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated testimony of AAA, which is clear, convincing, and consistent with human nature. 41
There is no cogent reason to depart from the foregoing consistent findings. "Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on the credibility of witnesses should be best addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of [the] witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts." 42 Thus, this Court upholds the credibility of AAA and accords credence to her testimony.
Accused-appellant's arguments
Accused-appellant's claim of denial and improper motive fails to persuade Us. He denies the offense charged against him and imputes improper motive upon BBB who is allegedly involved in another relationship. 43 However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, accused-appellant did not present any evidence other than his bare contention that BBB had ill motive to testify against him because she was already living with another person and wanted him imprisoned. 44
Moreover, the defenses of denial and improper motive can only prosper when substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. 45 There being no such evidence in this case, the said defenses are no more than self-serving assertions that deserve no weight in law. Certainly, they cannot prevail over AAA's positive and categorical testimony. 46 Thus, accused-appellant's defenses of denial and imputation of improper motive fail to convince Us. aDSIHc
Accused-appellant further attempts to discredit the testimony of the prosecution witnesses by pointing out that AAA failed to shout during the alleged molestation. 47
This Court holds that the failure of AAA to sob, struggle, or at least offer resistance during the rape incidents does not diminish her credibility. We have previously held that "[p]hysical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed[,] and the victim submits herself to her attackers because of fear." 48 As has been held, "the failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim's submission to the criminal act of the offender." 49 Victims of sexual abuse react differently during and after the occasion of rape." 50 Thus, an older victim may have shouted for help under similar circumstances, but a minor victim, such as AAA, may easily be overcame by fear and may not be able to cry for help. In the instant case, every time AAA was assaulted, accused-appellant would place a bolo beside her and threaten to kill her and BBB if she told anyone about it. 51 We note the following explanation of AAA which forced her to remain quiet:
Q: Because you felt pain, what did you say to [XXX] if there was any?
A: He placed his bolo beside me and told me not to tell to (sic) my mother what he had done to me.
Q: You mean you were threatened by [XXX]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why did you not shout?
A: Because I was afraid beside me was a bolo and a knife.52
Besides, as mentioned above, the absence of free consent in cases of Statutory Rape is conclusively presumed, and as such, proof of force, intimidation, or consent is immaterial. 53 We also underscore that no minor daughter would desire to have sexual intercourse with her own stepfather, regardless of how she responds during the commission of their sexual act. 54
Thus, AAA's failure to shout for help during the commission of the rape is not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge, or that her harrowing ordeal was untrue. It must be noted that aside from accused-appellant's threats on AAA, he also had moral ascendancy on her being her stepfather. Undoubtedly, the threat issued to AAA, coupled with his moral ascendancy, is enough to cow and intimidate her. Being a minor and a "stepdaughter" of her own assailant, it instilled tremendous fear in her mind. In People v. Nievera, 55 We ruled that the effect of fear and intimidation instilled in the victim's mind cannot be measured through a standard form of behavior, such that it must be viewed in the context of the victim's perception and judgment during and after the commission of the crime. 56
The modifications by the CA on the
At the outset, We note that the Information alleged that AAA is accused-appellant's stepdaughter. 57 However, during trial, both accused-appellant 58 and BBB 59 admitted and proved that they were each other's common-law spouse. A perusal of the records also do not show that the couple were legally married to consider accused-appellant the stepfather of AAA. In any event, this Court finds that both lower courts properly appreciated the relationship of accused-appellant as the common-law spouse of BBB to qualify the crime of Statutory Rape. 60
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is below 12 years of age constitutes Statutory Rape. 61 The crime is Qualified Statutory Rape if the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present.
The terms "stepfather" (of the victim) and "common-law spouse" (of the victim's biological parent) are certainly different from each other and may not be interchanged. The term "stepfather" presupposes that a valid marriage exists between him and the victim's biological mother. On the other hand, a common-law relationship exists if the couple are living-in together but are not legally married. 62
Rape is qualified whether an accused is the stepfather of the victim or the common-law spouse of the victim's mother. Thus, Article 266-B of the RPC provides for the instances when rape is qualified, hence, punishable by death, viz.:
Article 266-B. Penalties. — x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, rape is qualified when: a) the victim is under 18 years of age; and b) committed by the victim's parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or by the common-law spouse of the victim's parent. 63
However, in order to successfully prosecute the accused for Qualified Rape, the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must both be properly alleged in the Information and duly proven during trial. The purpose of this is for the accused to be fully informed of the charges against him and to prepare for his defense. 64 The Constitution guarantees the right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 65 ETHIDa
There are two existing schools of thought when there is a variance between the allegation of relationship of the accused and rape victim in the Information, and that which is proven during the trial.
The first view is that an indictment for Qualified Rape may not prosper if the Information alleges that accused is the stepfather of the victim but evidence during the trial only showed that he is a common-law spouse to the victim's mother. A review of relevant jurisprudence supporting this view is in order.
In People v. Arcillas 66(Arcillas), the Court underscored that "[t]he rape of a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of her mother is Qualified Rape. Yet, the crime is only simple rape, although the State successfully proves the common-law relationship, where the information does not properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the [victim]. This is because the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is inviolable. 67 In this case, the trial court convicted the accused of Qualified Rape. Upon appeal, the defense raised the issue that the "court a quo gravely erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death despite the defective allegation of relationship in the Information." 68 Consequently, the appellate court downgraded the crime to Simple Rape on the ground that the Information did not allege that the accused was the common-law spouse of the victim's mother, instead of the victim's stepfather. In said case, this Court cited in agreement the appellate court's ruling in downgrading the crime from Qualified to Simple Rape, to wit:
In order that the accused may be convicted of qualified rape, the circumstances of relationship and minority must be jointly alleged in the Information and proved during trial. Thus, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape where the information alleges that the accused is the step-father of the victim but the evidence shows that he is merely the common-law husband of the natural mother of the victim.
In People vs. Escultor, the Supreme Court held:
Nevertheless, the death penalty is not the correct penalty for the two counts of rape committed by appellant because the two informations in Criminal Case No. CEB-BRL-478 and CEB-BRL-479 failed to correctly state appellant's relationship with [the victim]. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender. The information must jointly allege these qualifying circumstances to afford the accused his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly mandate that the qualifying circumstance should be alleged in the information.
Although the prosecution proved that appellant was the common-law spouse of (AAA's) mother, what appears in the informations is that the victim is the stepdaughter of appellant. A stepdaughter is the daughter of one's spouse by a previous marriage. For appellant to be the stepfather of (AAA), he must be legally married to (AAA's) mother. However, appellant and the victim's mother were not legally married but merely lived in common-law relation. The two informations failed to allege specifically that appellant was the common-law spouse of the victim's mother. Instead, the two informations erroneously alleged the qualifying circumstance that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. Hence, appellant is liable only for two counts of simple statutory rape punishable with reclusion perpetua for each count. 69 (Emphasis in the original; Citations omitted)
Similarly, in People v. Barcela, 70 the Information alleged that accused was the stepfather of the rape victims, but during trial it was shown that accused was the common-law spouse of the victims' mother. In downgrading the offense from Qualified Statutory Rape to Simple Statutory Rape, the Court held:
In the crime of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender is a special qualifying circumstance and raises the penalty to the supreme penalty of death. It is essential that this circumstance must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The aforesaid qualifying circumstance, however, could not be appreciated in Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL. To begin with, AAA was under 12 years old (only 7 years old) when she was raped in 2002. More importantly, the prosecution failed to prove the allegation in the information that Barcela was the step-father of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime. It bears stressing that a stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship, which in this case is the valid marriage between Barcela and the natural mother of AAA (also of BBB), and the best evidence to prove the same is the marriage contract. Nowhere in the record, though, does it show that such certificate of marriage was submitted in evidence by the prosecution. In People v. Manggasin, the Court held that the qualifying circumstance was not proved because there was no proof of the allegation that the accused-appellant was the stepfather of the complainant as the evidence showed that he was not married to the complainant's mother. cSEDTC
xxx xxx xxx
Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common-law spouse or live-in partner of the mother of victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not alter the crimes in their qualified form inasmuch as the two separate informations did not specifically allege such relationship as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him. The relationship alleged in the informations is different from that actually proven. Verily, the CA erred in convicting Barcela of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL and qualified rape by sexual assault in Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL.
There being no qualifying circumstance attendant to the commission of rape in Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, Barcela should be convicted of simple statutory rape and should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of damages should also be modified in line with prevailing jurisprudence. x x x. 71 (Emphasis supplied; Citations omitted)
Likewise, in People v. Salvador, 72 the Information alleged that the victim was the stepdaughter of accused, but during trial it was proven that the latter was the common-law spouse of the victim's mother. The Court ruled:
Accordingly, there is a need to specifically allege in the information (1) the age of the victim, and (2) the relationship of the victim to the offender. The information in this case alleged that AAA was a "thirteen (13)-year old virgin." AAA's age at the time of the incident was sufficiently alleged in the information and established during the trial.
The information likewise alleged that AAA is Salvador's "step-daughter, living with him in the same house." However, a perusal of the records shows that Salvador is only the common-law husband of BBB. No evidence was adduced that BBB and Salvador legally married after the former separated from CCC. The information failed to allege that BBB and Salvador are common-law spouses.
Salvador's being the common-law husband of BBB at the time of the commission of rape, even if established during the trial, could not be appreciated since the information did not specifically allege it as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, Salvador would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him. Accordingly, Salvador is only guilty of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Considering that Salvador is only liable for simple rape, there is a need to modify the monetary awards granted to AAA. It is settled that the victim in simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages of P75,000.00, and exemplary damages of P75,000.00. 73 (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. XXX, 74 the Court reiterated that "[i]n a criminal case where the life and liberty of the accused are at stake, every qualifying circumstance alleged in the Information must be proved as much as the crime itself. Thus, in the crime of rape and lascivious conduct under Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, 75 an allegation that the accused is the common-law spouse of the victim's mother must be sufficiently established. Equally noteworthy, the terms 'common-law spouse' and 'step-parent' are distinct terms bearing different legal meanings, which may not be used interchangeably." The Court further explained:
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the supreme penalty of death shall be imposed against the accused if the victim of rape is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. However, to justify the imposition of the death penalty, it is essential that the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship are properly alleged in the Information and duly proven during the trial.
The RTC convicted XXX of qualified rape, in view of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship — XXX being the common-law spouse of AAA's mother. A perusal of the Informations, however, reveal that what was alleged was that XXX was the "stepfather" of AAA. Because of this, the Court agrees with the CA that XXX may only be convicted of simple rape, due to the absence of proof that he was in fact AAA's stepfather. It does not help that the prosecution was able to establish that XXX was the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, as this circumstance was not alleged in the Information. SDAaTC
It cannot be gainsaid that the terms "stepfather" and "common-law spouse" are two distinct terms that may not be used interchangeably. In People v. Hermocilla, the Court explained that "a stepdaughter is a daughter of one's spouse by previous marriage, while a stepfather is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken is the offspring." As such, the allegation that the victim is the stepdaughter of the accused requires competent proof and should not be easily accepted as factually true. The bare contention that the accused was married to the victim's mother is not enough, in the same manner that the victim's reference to the accused as her stepfather will not suffice. Remarkably, in People v. Abello, the Court stressed that the best evidence of such relationship will be the marriage contract. This stricter requirement is only proper as relationship is an aggravating circumstance that increases the imposable penalty and hence must be proven by competent evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the foregoing, pronouncements to the instant case, the qualifying circumstance of relationship cannot be used against XXX. The allegation in the Information that he was AAA's stepfather was not proven during the trial, and hence, shall not be used against him. In the same vein, although the prosecution proved that he was in fact CCC's common-law spouse, this too shall not be appreciated against him, as this circumstance was not specified in the Information. Accordingly, the CA correctly downgraded the offense to simple rape for both Criminal Case Nos. IR-7957 and IR-7958. (Emphasis supplied; Citations omitted).
Lastly, in the most recent case of People v. XXX, 76 this Court echoed the foregoing pronouncements.
On the other hand, the second view espouses that an accused is deemed to have waived the defect in the Information if he/she fails to timely question the same.
In the instant case, this Court is inclined to rule based on the first view. The Information inaccurately alleged that AAA is the stepdaughter of accused-appellant. But as proven during trial, BBB was the common-law spouse of accused-appellant.
An examination of BBB's Affidavit of Complaint shows that it indicated the relationship of accused-appellant as the "live-in partner," otherwise known as common-law spouse, of the private complainant's mother. The abovementioned Affidavit of Complaint of BBB was one of the documents transmitted 77 by the police station to the prosecutor's office in order for accused-appellant to be fully apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Consequently, the crime committed by accused-appellant is Statutory Rape since the qualifying circumstance of step-parent-step-daughter relationship as alleged in the Information was not properly proved during trial. Consequently, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, accused-appellant should pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Moreover, legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum will be imposed on the total amount of damages awarded from finality of this judgment until fully paid. 78
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The December 14, 2020 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03035 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant XXX is found GUILTY of Statutory Rape. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to PAY AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until full payment.
The Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation and motion, pursuant to the Resolution dated February 14, 2022; and the letter dated May 23, 2022 of CSO4 Cesar T. Grecia, Chief Admin, Inmate Documents and Processing Division, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, in compliance with the Resolution dated February 14, 2022, informing the Court that the accused-appellant was received for confinement at Leyte Regional Prison, Abuyog, Leyte, on January 2, 2019, are both NOTED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Initials were used to identify the accused-appellant pursuant to the Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017 entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances."
2. CA rollo, pp. 97-98 and 143.
3. Id. at 73-96. Penned by Associate Justice Lorenza R. Bordios and concurred in by Associate Justices Emily R. Aliño-Geluz and Gabriel T. Ingles.
4. Id. at 31-37. Penned by Presiding Judge Ephrem Suarez Abando.
5. Geographical location is blotted out pursuant to Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, supra note 1.
6. See records, Certificate of Live Birth, p. 4. "The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence against Women and their Children, effective November 15, 2004." (People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 [2011]).
7. Records, p. 5.
8. Id. at 22.
9. CA rollo, p. 75.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 75-76.
13. Id. at 76.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Records, p. 81.
18. CA rollo, pp. 76-77.
19. Id. at 77.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 22 and 77.
22. Id. at 77-78.
23. Id. at 78; See TSN, March 13, 2014, pp. 6-7.
24. CA rollo, pp. 31-37.
25. Id. at 37.
26. Id. at 79.
27. Id. at 95.
28. Id. at 97-98 and 143.
29. People v. Loma, G.R. No. 236544, October 5, 2020. Citation omitted.
30. People v.___________, G.R. No. 229836, July 17, 2019.
31. People v. HHH, G.R. No. 248245, August 26, 2020.
32. Id.
33.See records, Certificate of Live Birth, p. 4.
34.TSN, September 4, 2013, pp. 6-7. Emphasis supplied.
35. CICL XXX v. People, G.R. No. 246146, March 18, 2021.
36. TSN, November 27, 2013, pp. 7-13.
37. TSN, January 29, 2014, pp. 5-6.
38. Id.
39. Records, p. 81.
40. CA rollo, pp. 76-77.
41. People v. Nievera, G.R. No. 242830, August 28, 2019.
42. People v. XXX, G.R. No. 225793, August 14, 2019.
43. CA rollo, p. 78; See TSN, March 13, 2014, pp. 6-7.
44. CA rollo, p. 89.
45. People v. XXX, G.R. No. 246194, November 4, 2020.
46. Id.
47. CA rollo, p. 24.
48. People v. Nievera, supra note 41, citing People v. Joson, 751 Phil. 450, 460 (2015).
49. Id., citing People v. Palanay, 805 Phil. 116, 124 (2017).
50. Id.
51. CA rollo, p. 75.
52. TSN, September 4, 2013, pp. 7-8. Emphasis supplied.
53. People v. __________, supra note 30.
54. See also People v.________, id.
55. Supra note 41.
56. See also People v. XXX, G.R. No. 240441, December 4, 2019.
57. Records, p. 5.
58. TSN dated March 13, 2014, p. 3.
59. TSN dated November 27, 2013, p. 4.
60. CA rollo, p. 93.
61. People v. Fetalco, G.R. No. 241249, July 28, 2020.
62. People v. XXX, G.R. No. 252351, July 7, 2021.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id., See also Section 14, Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution.
66. People v. Arcillas, 692 Phil. 40 (2012).
67. Id. at 42.
68. Id. at 47.
69. Id. at 48.
70. 734 Phil. 332 (2014).
71. Id. at 347-349.
72. 790 Phil. 782 (2016).
73. Id. at 792.
74. G.R. No. 240441, December 4, 2019.
75. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved on June 17, 1992.
76. G.R. No. 252351, July 7, 2021.
77. Id. at 1. The Affidavit of Complainant of private complainant's mother, among others, were received by the Office of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor on May 10, 2011. Eventually, an Information was issued on April 10, 2012 (see Records,pp. 5-6).
78. People v. XXX, G.R. No. 236562, September 22, 2020; People v. Gaa, supra.