FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 252294. May 5, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. XXX, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated May 5, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 252294 (People of the Philippines v. XXX). — XXX (accused-appellant) assails the Decision 1 dated October 29, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08990, which modified the Decision 2 dated November 17, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 40, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in Criminal Case Nos. 12337 and 12338.
Facts of the Case
Version of the Prosecution
In the evening of December 25, 2003, AAA 3 was at home with accused-appellant, the live-in partner of her mother BBB. 4 AAA stood by the door of the room where accused-appellant was, and asked him for money. Instead of giving her money, accused-appellant pulled AAA into the room and undressed her, removing her shorts and panties. Then, accused-appellant took off his pants and underwear, and masturbated until his penis was erect. He tried to insert his penis into AAA's vagina, but was only able to insert the tip. AAA felt pain as accused-appellant moved his penis in and out of her vagina. She tried to scream, but accused-appellant covered her mouth. A moment later, she noticed a white substance come out of accused-appellant's penis. Accused-appellant used AAA's shorts and panties to wipe the white substance off. Thereafter, accused-appellant inserted his finger into AAA's vagina. AAA tried to scream but he covered her mouth. He used AAA's shorts and panties to wipe her vagina and the place where she lay down. Then, he gave AAA P2.00, and threatened to kill her siblings, CCC 5 and DDD, 6 if she told anyone about the incident. 7
On October 1, 2004, accused-appellant defiled AAA once more. He told her not to attend classes because he was going to take her to Jollibee. Thus, AAA stayed home. Accused-appellant and BBB left AAA at home at around 1:30 p.m. Soon after, accused-appellant returned. Upon returning, he closed the doors and windows of the house. Then, he undressed AAA and inserted his finger into her vagina. Afterwards, he removed his pants and underwear, masturbated until his penis became erect and made AAA lie down. Then, he positioned himself on top of her and repeatedly thrust his penis into her vagina until a white substance came out. Once again, he used AAA's shorts to wipe off the white substance and reiterated his threat that he would kill AAA's siblings if she told anyone about what happened. 8
BBB returned home at around 2:30 p.m., right after the incident. Accused-appellant instructed AAA to hide inside a big styrofoam box and to tell BBB that she was just about to take a bath. Upon arrival, BBB saw accused-appellant putting on his pants. She asked him where AAA was. He said that AAA was in the children's room. BBB checked the room but did not find AAA. In the course of her search, BBB noticed that the cover of the styrofoam box moved. She opened the box and saw private complainant inside. Upon lifting AAA, BBB observed that she was not wearing any underwear, that her buttocks were wet, and that her vagina was slightly swollen. AAA confided in her mother after that she asked her what happened. 9
On the same day, AAA and BBB went to the Department of Social Welfare and Development to report the incident. Subsequently, they went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. 10 The attending physician made the following findings:
1. No extragenital physical injury noted.
2. Hymen, intact.
3. Hymenal orifice small (0.6 cm diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an average sized Filipino male organ in full erection without producing hymenal injury. 11
Ultimately, the State filed two Informations charging the accused-appellant with violations of Article 266-A of the RPC:
That in the evening of December 25, 2003 at x x x and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd design, motivated by bestial lust and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with his step daughter [AAA], 7 years old, against her will and to her damage. 12
That on or about 2:30 in the afternoon of October 1, 2004 at x x x and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd design, motivated by bestial lust and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with his step daughter [AAA], 7 years old, against her will and to her damage. 13
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant waived his right to present evidence. 14
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, relying on the credible testimony of AAA and finding no improper motive for her to falsely charge accused-appellant of rape. 15
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court considered AAA as a child below seven years of age. Accordingly, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of qualified rape, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The trial court also ordered accused-appellant to pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. 16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
While the CA agreed with the trial court that accused-appellant was criminally liable, 17 it found that the trial court erred in considering AAA as a child below seven years of age because the Informations alleged that she was exactly seven years old. 18
The CA also concurred with the trial court that the relationship of the accused-appellant to AAA cannot be appreciated. The Informations both allege that accused-appellant is the step-parent of AAA. However, the marriage of accused-appellant and BBB was not established during trial. Neither can accused-appellant's common-law relationship with BBB be appreciated because it was not alleged in the Informations. Hence, accused-appellant could not be convicted of qualified rape. Consequently, the CA found him liable for two counts of statutory rape and sentenced him to two reclusion perpetua. 19
Pursuant to People v. Jugueta, 20 the CA modified the amounts awarded by the trial court. For each count of statutory rape, civil indemnity was increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, and exemplary damages from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00. The CA declared that all awards were subject to six percent interest per annum from the finality of its Decision until full payment. 21
In the Court's Resolution 22 dated August 26, 2020, the parties were directed to file their supplemental briefs.
The Public Attorney's Office filed a Manifestation in Lieu of a Supplemental Brief 23 dated October 29, 2020, stating that accused-appellant has exhaustively discussed his arguments in his Appellant's Brief 24 dated July 13, 2017, filed with the CA. Likewise, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated December 23, 2020, declaring that it is adopting the discussion in the Appellee's Brief 25 dated November 21, 2017, and waiving its right to file a supplemental brief.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is unmeritorious.
At the outset, the Court acknowledges that accused-appellant waived his right to present evidence. 26 We have held that the right may be waived as long as the waiver is voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made 27 and that failure to observe this requirement renders the trial court's judgment infirm for violating the accused's right to due process. 28 However, when facts are adequately represented, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either party as a result of the waiver, a guilty verdict may be upheld where the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. 29
After a painstaking review of the records, We find that the CA correctly found the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of statutory rape 30 instead of qualified rape because the Informations, 31 which alleged that AAA was "7 years old" 32 and that she was the "step daughter" 33 of accused-appellant were insufficient to support a finding of qualified rape.
As a rule, an Information must allege the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances applicable, if any. 34 In rape cases, minority and relationship are qualifying circumstances that must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information 35 and proved during trial. 36
In People v. Iluis, 37 We refused to convict the accused of qualified rape because the Information only alleged that the victim was "below twelve (12) years old" and did not specifically assert that the victim was below seven years of age. We explained that the failure to properly plead the victim's age as a qualifying circumstance violated the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him, despite the prosecution having established that the victim was, in fact, barely six years of age. 38 The same rationale applies here. Although the prosecution proved during trial that AAA was below seven years of age when the offenses were committed, 39 the Informations merely state that she was exactly seven years of age, 40 and not that she was below seven. Hence, AAA's age cannot be considered in upgrading the charge to qualified rape.
Similarly, the circumstance of relationship cannot be appreciated against the accused-appellant. The Informations allege that AAA is accused-appellant's step-daughter. 41 The relationship between a step-father and step-daughter presupposes a legitimate relationship, that is, the former should be legally married to the latter's mother. 42 Here, the prosecution failed to adduce proof, such as a marriage certificate, to establish the relationship between accused-appellant and AAA's mother, BBB — on the contrary, BBB claimed that accused-appellant was her live-in partner. 43 Thus, accused-appellant cannot be considered the step-father of AAA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Informations and the prosecution's evidence are sufficient to convict accused-appellant of statutory rape. The prosecution alleged and proved that AAA was under 12 years of age when the events transpired, and that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her. 44 As regards the first element, AAA's Certificate of Live Birth 45 indicates that she was born on December 12, 1997, establishing that she was six years of age during the rapes.
As regards the second element, AAA's testimony revealed that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her on two separate occasions. 46 When asked about the December 2003 incident, AAA testified as follows:
Q: After he removed his pants and brief, what did he do next?
A: He masturbate his penis and when it was already hard, he tried to insert it to my vagina.
Q: Was it inserted into your vagina?
A: Only the tip of his penis.
Q: And when he inserted the tip of his penis into the vagina, what did he do?
A: He was inserting his penis in and out and then I saw a white substance coming out of his penis.
Q: And while he was doing that, what did you feel if any?
A: It was painful.
Q: What did you do when you felt pain while he was doing that?
A: I was about to shout but he was covering my mouth. 47
As to the October 2004 incident, AAA testified as follows:
Q: After he removed his pants and underwear, what did he do next?
A: He again masturbated his penis and when his penis was already hard he inserted it to my vagina.
Q: What was your position in relation to the accused when he inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: I was lying down, he asked me to lie down.
Q: What was his position when he inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: He was on top of me.
Q: How many times did he inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: For several times, it was repeatedly inserted in and out.
Q: After he inserted his penis in and out from your vagina, what did you notice from his penis?
A: There was a white substance coming out from his penis. 48
Moreover, the trial court found AAA's testimony to be credible. 49 It has been long-established that:
[The] credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand x x x." "[A]bsent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which would have affected the outcome of the case." 50 (Citations omitted.)
The rule is even more stringently applied when the appellate court concurred with the trial court, 51 as in this case. 52
In this regard, We agree with the trial court's assessment of AAA's credibility and truthfulness, as her testimony was sufficiently consistent, candid, and straightforward. 53 She identified accused-appellant in open court and steadfastly maintained that it was he who had sexual intercourse with her on two separate occasions. 54
Settled is the rule that the testimony of a child-victim is given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. 55 We consider the testimony of AAA true and sincere 56 as the prosecution failed to show that she was driven by any improper motive. Indeed, it is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. 57
In a bid to exonerate himself, accused-appellant points to alleged inconsistencies between AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay58 and her testimony in open court. We are not convinced. In People v. XXX, 59 We upheld a rape victim's in-court testimony despite its apparent inconsistencies with her affidavit:
The general rule is that contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness in contrast with what was stated in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit her. Affidavits given to police and barangay officers are ex parte. Ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for varied reasons. In any case, open court declarations take precedence over written affidavits in the hierarchy of evidence. Testimonies given during trials are much more precise and elaborate than those stated in sworn statements. 60
Furthermore, affidavits are prepared by an administering officer and cast according to the latter's understanding of what the affiant has said. 61 In turn, the affiant would simply sign the affidavit after it has been read back to him. 62 In the case of AAA, who was six years old when the Sinumpaang Salaysay was taken, inconsistencies may have resulted from the administering officer's imprecise understanding of AAA's statements, an imprecise declaration by AAA, or AAA's imprecise understanding of the affidavit as it was read back to her. Thus, AAA's in-court testimony, which is more precise and elaborate, must prevail over her affidavit.
In another attempt to discredit AAA, accused-appellant avers that her willingness to skip class and go to Jollibee with him even after the December 2003 incident belies her claim that she was raped. 63
The contention is untenable. AAA was only six years old when the events transpired. Like other children her age, she would have been easily influenced or morally coerced to go to Jollibee. Moreover, the person who invited her, i.e., accused-appellant, was someone who she looked up to as her own father and whom she called "papa." 64 Stated differently, AAA's willingness to go to Jollibee was a result of her tender age. It was not a disavowal of the December 2003 incident.
Accused-appellant also cites purported inconsistencies between AAA's testimony and the NBI Preliminary Medico-Legal Report. 65 He stresses that the NBI did not find any physical injuries on her body and that the NBI found her hymen intact, and of such a size as to preclude complete penetration by a fully-developed penis, making it highly unlikely, if not impossible, for him to have raped her. 66
Accused-appellant's position deserves scant consideration. In a long line of cases, 67 We have ruled that:
x x x [F]or rape to be consummated, rupture of the hymen is not necessary, nor it is necessary that the vagina sustain a laceration especially if the complainant is a young girl. The medical examination merely stated that the smallness of the vaginal orifice only precludes complete penetration. This does not mean that rape has not been committed. The fact that there was no deep penetration of the victim's vagina and that her hymen was intact does not negate rape x x x. 68 (Citations omitted.)
Carnal knowledge, as an element of rape, is consummated by the mere touching of the woman's labia of the pudendum by the male sex organ. 69 AAA's testimony that accused-appellant moved the tip of his penis in and out of her vagina on December 2003 70 and October 2004 71 established beyond doubt that accused-appellant's organ came into contact with her vagina 72 on both occasions.
In view of the foregoing, the CA correctly found the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of statutory rape, sentencing him to two reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay civil indemnity of P75,000.00, P75,000.00 in moral damages, and P75,000.00 in exemplary damages. 73
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 29, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08990 is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant XXX is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of statutory rape. He is sentenced to suffer two (2) reclusion perpetua to be served successively. He is further ORDERED to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of statutory rape. All monetary awards are subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, with the concurrence of Justices Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin and Walter S. Ong; rollo, pp. 3-21.
2. Penned by Judge Evan D. Dizon; CA rollo, pp. 52-62.
3. The real name of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" and A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names."
4.Id.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Rollo, p. 5; records, p. 139; TSN dated September 17, 2010, pp. 6-12.
8.Id. at 5-6; records, pp. 139-140; TSN dated September 17, 2010, pp. 17-20.
9.Id. at 6; records, pp. 139-140; TSN dated September 17, 2010, pp. 21-22.
10. TSN dated September 17, 2010, p. 23.
11. Records, p. 5.
12.Id. at 1.
13.Rollo, p. 4.
14. Records, p. 129.
15. CA rollo, pp. 58-60.
16.Id. at 60-62.
17.Rollo, p. 17.
18.Id. at 18-19.
19.Id. at 18-20.
20. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
21.Rollo, pp. 19-20.
22.Id. at 29.
23.Id. at 35-36.
24. CA rollo, pp. 35-49.
25.Id. at 90-109.
26. Records, p. 129.
27.People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838, 856-857 (2003).
28.Id. at 851.
29.Id. at 858.
30.Rollo, p. 20.
31. Records, p. 1; rollo, p. 4.
32.Id.
33.Id.
34. Section 8, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
35.People v. Ubiña, 554 Phil. 199, 211 (2007), citing People v. Esperanza, 453 Phil. 54, 75-76 (2003).
36.People v. Tampus, 607 Phil. 296, 321 (2009).
37. 447 Phil. 517 (2003).
38.Id. at 529-530.
39. TSN dated September 17, 2010, pp. 5-6, 16-17; records, pp. 120-120-A.
40. Records, p. 1; rollo, p. 4.
41.Id.
42.People v. Daño, 458 Phil. 439, 452 (2003).
43. TSN dated July 31, 2007, p. 5.
44.People v. Francica, 817 Phil. 972, 986 (2017).
45. Records, pp. 120-120-A.
46. TSN dated September 17, 2010, pp. 7-14, 16-23.
47.Id. at 8-9.
48.Id. at 19-20.
49. CA rollo, pp. 58-60.
50.People v. Laog, 674 Phil. 444, 457 (2011).
51.Id.
52.Rollo, pp. 14-15.
53.People v. Dominguez, Jr., 650 Phil. 492, 520 (2010).
54. TSN dated September 17, 2010, pp. 4, 7-14, 16-23.
55.People v. Brioso, 788 Phil. 292, 307 (2016).
56.People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 526 (2013).
57.People v. Basmayor, 598 Phil. 194, 208 (2009).
58. Records, pp. 7-9.
59. G.R. No. 236562, September 22, 2020.
60.Id.
61.People v. Avergonzado, 445 Phil. 311, 320 (2003).
62.Id.
63. CA rollo, pp. 42-43.
64.Id. at 59.
65. Records, p. 121.
66. CA rollo, p. 43.
67.People v. Opong, 577 Phil. 571, 594 (2008); People v. Gabayron, 343 Phil. 593, 607-608 (1997); People v. Palicte, 299 Phil. 576, 582 (1994); People v. Castro, 274 Phil. 80, 88 (1991).
68.People v. Gabayron, 343 Phil. 593, 607 (1997).
69.People v. Mahinay, 362 Phil. 86, 108 (1999).
70. TSN dated September 17, 2010, p. 9.
71.Id. at 20.
72.Supra note 68 at 608.
73.Rollo, p. 20.