SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 251439. June 16, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. XXX, 1accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated16 June 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 251439 (People of the Philippines v. XXX). — On appeal is the Decision 2 dated July 11, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 10413, which affirmed with modification the Decision 3 dated November 17, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of _______________, Branch 172 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2103-V-16, convicting XXX (accused-appellant) of Simple Rape.
ANTECEDENTS
In an Information dated October 18, 2016, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Rape under paragraph 1 (a), 4 Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), 5 as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 8353, 6 as follows:
That on or about October 16, 2016, in __________ City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation upon minor complainant AAA, 13 years old (DOB: _______________), that is, by choking her, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously insert his finger inside the vagina of complainant and then have sexual intercourse with the said minor complainant, against her will and without her consent.
Contrary to Law.
The prosecution's evidence established that AAA 7 was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Accused-appellant is the cousin of the husband of AAA's sister. AAA testified that around 6:20 p.m. of October 16, 2016, she went to her sister's house, adjacent to where she lives, to cook rice. At that time, AAA's sister went to the market while AAA, her nephew, her brother-in-law, who was drunk and asleep, and accused-appellant were left in the house. While waiting for the rice to be cooked, accused-appellant asked AAA for a glass of water. AAA heeded the request, but upon handing the glass of water, accused-appellant locked the door and pushed her. Her nephew cried so she asked accused-appellant to let her nephew out of the house. Accused-appellant opened the door to allow the nephew to step out. AAA then took the opportunity to run out of the house, but accused-appellant was able to grab her shirt to pull her away from the door, causing her to fall on a wooden chair. Accused-appellant locked the door again, forcibly laid AAA down on the floor, and inserted his finger and then his penis into her vagina. AAA averred that she was too terrified to shout for help, but she tried to struggle and wake her brother-in-law, who was too drunk and sleeping next to them, to no avail. After satisfying his lustful intentions, accused-appellant apologized to AAA and told her that he will take responsibility if she gets pregnant. He, however, threatened AAA with a knife to warn her not to tell anyone about the incident or he would kill AAA's sister. Thereafter, accused-appellant left the house. AAA told her friend about the incident, who, in turn, immediately relayed it to AAA's parents, which led to accused-appellant's arrest. At around 11:00 a.m. of the next day, Police Chief Inspector Jocelyn P. Cruz (PCI Cruz) examined AAA. PCI Cruz's Initial Medico-Legal Report indicated that there was a deep fresh laceration at 5 o'clock position on AAA's hymen, which is a clear evidence of a penetrating trauma caused by a blunt object such as an erect penis or finger, inflicted within 24 to 36 hours before the examination. 8
Accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He alleged that he stayed at his cousin's house only until 4:00 p.m. on the day of the incident and then went home. At around 7:00 p.m. of the same day, while he was sleeping, barangay officials came to his house to question him about a rape complaint. Thereafter, he was brought to the police station. 9
In its Decision 10 dated November 17, 2017, the RTC found AAA's testimony, together with the medical findings, and the other evidence of the prosecution, credible and sufficient to establish accused-appellant's guilt of the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC also appreciated the qualifying circumstance of "use of a deadly weapon," 11 albeit the dispositive portion of the Decision did not indicate a conviction for Qualified Rape, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused xxx guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Rape, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay AAA the amount of [P]75,000.00 as civil indemnity, [P]75,000.00 as moral damages, and [P]75,000.00 as exemplary damages, which shall bear interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the time of the finality of the decision until fully paid.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 12
The CA affirmed the conviction, but clarified that the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon as it was not alleged in the Information. At any rate, the CA noted that the decretal portion of the RTC Decision simply declared accused-appellant guilty of Rape, not of Qualified Rape. The CA, however, modified the RTC Decision to emphasize that accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 13 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, 14 thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
The assailed Decision dated November 17, 2017 of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole.
SO ORDERED. 15
Hence, this appeal. In our Resolution 16 dated June 23, 2020, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. Accused-appellant manifested that all the matters pertinent to his defense were adequately discussed in his Appellant's Brief 17 filed before the CA, and adopted it as his supplemental brief in this appeal. 18 The filing of the appellee's brief was likewise dispensed with. 19 The case is now for our resolution.
ISSUE
Was accused-appellant correctly convicted of Simple Rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended?
RULING
The appeal lacks merit.
The Information charged accused-appellant with Rape by carnal knowledge under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, the elements of which are that: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act under the circumstances mentioned in the provision, e.g., through force, threat or intimidation. 20 More often than not, the nature of the crime of rape entails reliance on the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is clear, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. 21 Here, we do not find sufficient reason to deviate from the uniform factual findings of the RTC and the CA with regard to the clarity and credibility of AAA's testimony that she was forcibly threatened by accused-appellant to engage in sexual intercourse. Jurisprudence dictates that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses' testimonies is accorded great respect on appeal because of his or her unique position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which is denied the appellate courts. The trial judge has the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, in the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is bound by the former's findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court, like in this case, has concurred with the trial court. 22
Auspiciously, the conviction in this case is based, not only upon AAA's testimony, but also from the corroborative medical findings of PCI Cruz, who examined AAA the following day after the incident. PCI Cruz testified as follows:
Q: [x x x.] Will you tell us your findings?
A: [x x x.] On the genital findings, presence of deep fresh laceration at 5:00 o'clock position.
Q: What could have caused this deep fresh laceration to the hymen?
A: The deep fresh laceration to the hymen is cause by blunt objects, examples are an erected penis, finger, fingers or any blunt object similar as I have mentioned.
Q: When we say laceration, when could have the laceration been inflicted?
A: Within 24 to 36 hours.
Q: It is like the laceration was inflicted around 6:00 in the evening of October 16, 2016?
A: Yes, sir, it is compatible with the result that I have[.] 23
As aptly observed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, PCI Cruz's findings concur with AAA's testimony that she suffered molestation through sexual intercourse at around 6:20 p.m. on October 16, 2016. Time and again, we have held that when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge. Also, we have previously held that laceration is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. 24
Pitted, therefore, against AAA's clear, straightforward, and convincing testimony, coupled with the medical findings, accused-appellant's uncorroborated denial and alibi cannot prevail. Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the identity of the accused and his involvement in the crime attributed to him. 25
Accused-appellant, however, insists that it is unbelievable that his cousin was not awakened by the commotion caused by the molestation as testified to by AAA. We are not swayed. Case laws support the conclusion that rapists are not deterred from committing the odious act of sexual abuse by mere presence of people nearby. 26 This is especially true in this case because it is undisputed that accused-appellant's cousin was too intoxicated with alcohol to be awakened by any commotion at the time of the incident. Thus, the presence of his cousin alone cannot prejudice the credibility of AAA's testimony.
We likewise agree with the CA that the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon despite being proven in the trial. Sections 8 27 and 9 28 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure state that for qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be appreciated, it must be alleged in the complaint or information. This is in line with the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 29 In this case, since the use of the knife was not alleged in the Information, the CA correctly ruled that the crime alleged and proved is Simple Rape punishable by reclusion perpetua under the first paragraph of Article 266-B of the RPC. The amount of P75,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, as well as the six percent (6%) interest per annum on the total monetary award, was also appropriate in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 30
We, however, take this opportunity to clarify that it was not necessary for the CA to modify the RTC Decision to state that accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole. This is because simple rape is only punishable by reclusion perpetua, not death. In Administrative Matter No. 15-08-02-SC, 31 we explained that "[i]n cases where the death penalty is not warranted, the phrase 'without eligibility for parole' does not need to describe and be affixed to reclusion perpetua; it is understood that convicted persons penalized with an indivisible penalty are not eligible for parole." 32 "[T]he qualification of 'without eligibility for parole' shall be used [only] to qualify reclusion perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for RA No. 9346." 33
In all, we resolve to dismiss the appeal there being no reversible error in the assailed CA Decision.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 11, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 10413 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant XXX is found guilty of Simple Rape and is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellant XXX is also ordered to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Resolution until full payment.
SO ORDERED." (Lopez, J.Y., J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Modified pursuant to SC Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017, Re: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.
2.Rollo, pp. 3-14. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (now a retired Associate Justice of the Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas and Louis P. Acosta.
3. CA rollo, pp. 37-40. Penned by Judge Nancy Rivas-Palmones.
4.Id. at 37.
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
xxx xxx xxx
5. Entitled "AN ACT REVISING THE PENAL CODE AND OTHER PENAL LAWS," approved on December 8, 1930.
6. Entitled "AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on September 30, 1997.
7. The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation and for Other Purposes," approved on June 17, 1992; RA No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes," approved on March 8, 2004; Section 40 of Administrative Matter No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the "Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children," effective November 15, 2004; People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006); and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017, Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.
8.Rollo, pp. 5-6.
9.Id. at 6; and CA rollo, pp. 37-40.
10. CA rollo, pp. 37-40.
11. The RTC Decision stated that "[i]n this case, the rape was committed by [accused-appellant] against AAA with the use of a deadly weapon, which [accused-appellant] used to threaten AAA not to tell anyone about what happened. Whenever rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be [reclusion perpetua] to death." (Citations omitted, id. at 40.)
12.Id.
13. SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
14. Entitled "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES," approved on June 24, 2006.
15.Rollo, p. 14.
16.Id. at 20-21.
17. CA Rollo, pp. 25-35.
18.Rollo, pp. 22-26. Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief).
19. See Minute Resolution dated February 15, 2021.
20.People v. XYZ, G.R. No. 244255, August 26, 2020.
21.People v. Ronquillo, 818 Phil. 641, 649-650 (2017).
22.People v. Barcela, 734 Phil. 332, 342-343 (2014).
23.Rollo, p. 11.
24.People v. Manaligod, 831 Phil. 204, 212-213 (2018).
25.People v. Tubillo, 811 Phil. 525, 532 (2017).
26. See People v. Agudo, 810 Phil. 918, 929 (2017); People v. Barberan, 788 Phil. 103, 110 (2016), citing People v. Corial, 451 Phil. 703, 709 (2003).
27. SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (8a)
28. SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. (9a)
29.People v. Lapore, 761 Phil. 196, 203 (2015).
30. See People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 848 (2016).
31. GUIDELINES FOR THE PROPER USE OF THE PHRASE "WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE" IN INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES dated August 4, 2015.
32.Id., Section I (Underscoring in the original.)
33.Id., Section II, par. (2). (Emphasis in the original.)