FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 251146. March 3, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. XXX, *accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 3, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 251146 (People of the Philippines v. XXX). — XXX (accused-appellant) assails the Decision 1 dated November 27, 2018 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09518, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated February 24, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 70, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in Criminal Case No. RTC-8429-I.
Facts of the Case
Prosecution's Version
In the evening of January 7, 2015, AAA, 3 a 13 year-old girl, was roused from her sleep by her father, accused-appellant herein. 4 At that time, AAA was living in her father's house, 5 where they slept in the same room. 6 When AAA awoke, she noticed that she was undressed and that accused-appellant was on top of her. 7 Accused-appellant then inserted his penis into AAA's vagina ("Kinantot po niya ako"). 8 AAA shouted and tried to push accused-appellant away, but the latter covered her mouth and overpowered her. 9 Accused-appellant also threatened to hurt AAA with a piece of wood in case she resisted. 10 Ultimately, AAA was unable to impede accused-appellant's wicked design. 11
At around 3:00 p.m. the next day, AAA reported the incident to her uncle, BBB. 12 Together, AAA and BBB went to the Sta. Cruz Municipal Police Station to formally file a complaint against accused-appellant. 13
AAA was examined at the Municipal Health Office by Dr. Milagrina M. Mayor (Dr. Mayor). 14 After the examination, Dr. Mayor found that AAA's hymen was broken with four deep old healed lacerations at the 2 o'clock, 4 o'clock, 8 o'clock, and 10 o'clock positions. 15
Accordingly, the State filed an Information 16 charging the accused-appellant with a violation of Article 266-A of the RPC:
The on or about the 7th day of January 2015 in the evening, in Barangay Gama, Sta. Cruz, Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with lewd design and through force and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his own biological daughter thirteen (13) years old AAA, against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of said minor AAA. 17
Accused-appellant's Version
Accused-appellant merely denied the charge against him, 18 and claimed that AAA was not living with him when the incident occurred. 19 He also claimed that he went fishing on the night that AAA was raped and returned only at dawn which made it impossible for him to rape her. 20 Accused-appellant also imputed ill-motive on the part of BBB because of a pending land dispute 21 and alleged that BBB had a history of inducing AAA to file criminal charges against him. 22
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, 23 upholding the credibility of AAA and finding no improper motive for her to falsely accuse her father of the crime. 24 Conversely, the trial court found accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi to be weak. 25 He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. 26
The trial court did not treat AAA as a minor because it found that the prosecution failed to establish her minority. 27
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that accused-appellant's denial paled in comparison to AAA's positive identification that her father defiled her. Moreover, the CA determined that accused-appellant failed to show that AAA harbored any ill-motive against him. 28
Pursuant to developments in jurisprudence, the CA increased the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, and the award of exemplary damages from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00. 29 The civil indemnity of P75,000 was retained. 30 Also, the CA declared that the civil indemnity awarded and all damages imposed be subject to interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the date of finality of its Decision until fully paid. 31
Proceedings before the Court
In the Court's Resolution 32 dated March 9, 2020, the parties were directed to file their respective supplemental briefs.
The Public Attorney's Office filed a Manifestation 33 (in Lieu of a Supplemental Brief) dated September 7, 2020 stating that the accused-appellant has sufficiently refuted the appellee's arguments in its Appellant's Brief, filed with the CA. Similarly, the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation In Lieu of Supplemental Brief 34 dated October 5, 2020, stated that it had exhaustively discussed its position in its Appellee's Brief, filed with the CA.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is unmeritorious.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court and the CA both gave credence to the testimony of AAA over the denial and alibi interposed by the accused-appellant. 35 It has been long-established that:
When the question is raised as to whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial court's choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand and the manner in which they gave their testimonies, and therefore could better discern if such witnesses were telling the truth. 36
The rule is more stringently applied when the appellate court concurred with the trial court, 37 as in this case. 38
After a meticulous review of the records, We find no reason to reverse the trial court's assessments and conclusions as to the credibility and truthfulness of AAA, as her testimony was sufficiently straightforward, candid, and worthy of belief. 39 She was also steadfastly alleged that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her. 40
We consider the testimony of AAA, an unlettered young Filipina, 41 as true and sincere 42 absent any showing that she was driven by improper motive. Indeed, it is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. 43
Moreso, the prosecution was able to demonstrate the elements necessary for a rape conviction. Through the testimony of AAA, the prosecution established that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her. Settled is the rule that the testimony of a child-victim is given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. 44
Second, the accused-appellant employed threat, force and intimidation satisfy his lust. In this case, AAA testified that accused-appellant threatened her with a piece of wood in case she tried to resist. 45 Regardless, when the offender is the victim's father, such as in this case, there need not be actual force, threat or intimidation because the father's moral ascendancy over the victim substitutes for violence or intimidation. 46
In a bid to exonerate himself, accused-appellant avers that AAA's testimony was too general and thus insufficient to convict him 47 relying on Our pronouncement in People v. Laguerta, 48 among others. Accused-appellant's reliance on Laguerta is misplaced. In that case, the Court considered the victim's allegation to be lacking in detail because:
There is nothing on record to show how the alleged rape took place. There is not even the slightest hint as to how accused-appellant approached her, what time of day the rape occurred, whether or not he threatened her, what he said to her, which part of the house he raped her (if inside the house), what she was doing before she was raped, what happened after she was raped, how she reacted while being raped, whether she saw his penis. These are details that would validate her charge that there was sexual intercourse. 49
In contrast, AAA testified on several matters pertaining to accused-appellant's dastardly act. AAA's testimony revealed that accused-appellant: (1) roused her from her sleep; 50 (2) raped her in the evening 51 in a room inside their house; 52 (3) threatened to hurt her with a piece of wood; 53 (4) positioned himself on top of her; 54 and (5) put his penis inside her vagina. 55 AAA also recounted that: (1) she and accused-appellant slept in the same room, but not beside each other; 56 (2) when she awoke, accused-appellant lay down beside her; 57 (3) she wanted to scream while she was being raped; 58 and (4) during the rape, she and the accused-appellant were unclothed. 59 Hence, AAA's testimony does not suffer the infirmity of generality.
Accused-appellant also interposed the defense of alibi. 60 Time and again, We have ruled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof. 61
Apart from the declaration that he could not have committed the crime due to "impossibility under the circumstances," 62 accused-appellant did not furnish any clear and convincing proof to bolster his claim. Thus, accused-appellant's defense must fail in the face of the positive identification and categorical testimony of AAA. 63
Finally, accused-appellant asserts that the presence of old lacerations, and the absence of fresh lacerations in AAA's hymen belie her claim that she was raped on January 7, 2015. 64 He also claims that the absence of spermatozoa in AAA's cervico-vaginal canal, contradict AAA's claim that she was raped prior to the medical examination conducted by Dr. Mayor. 65 The arguments fail to convince.
It is well-settled that carnal knowledge is consummated by the mere touching of the woman's labia of the pudendum by the male sex organ. 66 Consequently, lacerations in the hymen of the victim, whether fresh or healed, are not material for a rape conviction. 67 Contrary to accused-appellant's assertion, the existence of old healed lacerations does not negate the claim that a victim was raped recently. 68 A female's hymen is lacerated only once, and as a rule this happens during the first sexual act, unless attributable to other causes. 69 Thus, We find the old healed lacerations in AAA's hymen — absent any alternative explanation as to their origin — to be consistent with her claim that she has been abused by her father several times.
As regards the absence of spermatozoa, We have held that the slightest penetration of the female genitalia even without the presence of ejaculate is sufficient for a rape conviction. 70 The apparent inconsistency raised by accused-appellant has also been explained by Dr. Mayor. On cross-examination, she testified that spermatozoa can be washed off, and that its absence does not contradict AAA's claim that she was recently raped. 71
Because an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, 72 and considering that the elements of minority and relationship were alleged in the Information 73 and sufficiently proved by the prosecution during trial, We find it proper to modify the CA's Decision dated November 27, 2018, and find the accused-appellant guilty of qualified rape.
To sustain a conviction of qualified rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, the prosecution must allege and prove that: (1) accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim; (2) such act was accomplished through force, threat or intimidation; (3) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape; and (4) the offender is a parent of the victim. 74
As previously discussed, the prosecution established that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA by means of force, threat or intimidation. Thus, the first two elements of qualified rape are present. As to the third element, accused-appellant entered into stipulation as to the minority of AAA. 75 Also, AAA's Certificate of Live Birth, 76 which was admitted into evidence, 77 indicated her birthday as June 05, 2001. Therefore, at the time of the rape, AAA was 13 years of age.
As to the fourth element, accused-appellant, in open court, admitted 78 that AAA is his daughter.
Direct examination of accused-appellant conducted by Atty. Maria Efelin C. Adaoag: 79
Q: But you are the father of (AAA), why is it that you did not object to [AAA living with your cousin BBB]?
A: I was not able to object anymore, Ma'am and besides my daughter [AAA] would not listen.
Because the prosecution was able to demonstrate the presence of all elements of qualified rape, the accused-appellant must be convicted accordingly.
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, an offender who commits rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. If the victim is under 18 years of age, and the offender is a parent, then the penalty imposed shall be death. Under Republic Act No. 9346, reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole shall be imposed, in lieu of death penalty. 80
For crimes where reclusion perpetua is imposed in lieu of death, jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages at P100,000.00, respectively. 81 When qualifying circumstances are present, as in this case, exemplary damages of P100,000.00 shall also be imposed. 82 All awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the finality of the Resolution, until paid in full. 83
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated November 27, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09518 is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant XXX is found GUILTY of Qualified Rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
He is further ORDERED to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards are subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Pursuant to Supreme Court amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, the real name of the accused-appellant is replaced with fictitious initials by reason of his relationship to the minor victim.
1. Penned by Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., with the concurrence of Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig; rollo, pp. 3-14.
2. Penned by Judge Marifi P. Chua; records, pp. 150-155.
3. The real name of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" and A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names."
4.Rollo, p. 4.
5. TSN dated May 4, 2016, p. 6.
6.Id. at 5.
7.Id. at 17.
8.Id. at 11.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 18.
11.Id.
12. The real name of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" and A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names."
13.Rollo, p. 4.
14.Id. at 4-5.
15.Id. at 5.
16. Records, p. 2.
17.Id.
18.Id. at 152.
19.Id. at 131.
20.Id. at 152.
21.Rollo, p. 5; TSN dated December 20, 2016, p. 8.
22. Records, p. 152.
23.Id. at 154.
24.Id. at 153-154.
25.Id.
26.Id. at 154-155.
27.Id. at 154.
28.Rollo, pp. 11-12.
29.Id. at 13.
30.Id., citing People v. Caoili, G.R. Nos. 196342 & 196848, August 8, 2017.
31.Id.
32.Id. at 21-22.
33.Id. at 23-24.
34.Id. at 30-31.
35.Id. at 7, 10-11; records, p. 153.
36. 596 Phil. 847, 853 (2009).
37.People v. Dominguez, 650 Phil. 492, 520 (2010).
38.Rollo, pp. 7, 10-11.
39.Supra note 35.
40. Records, pp. 4-5, TSN dated May 4, 2016, p. 17.
41.Id. at 151; TSN dated May 4, 2016, p. 2.
42.People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519 (2013), citing People v. Araojo, 616 Phil. 275 (2009).
43.People v. Basmayor, 598 Phil. 194, 208 (2009).
44.People v.Brioso, 788 Phil. 292, 307 (2016).
45.Rollo, p. 4.; TSN dated May 4, 2016, p. 18.
46.People v. DDD, G.R. No. 243583, September 3, 2020, citing People v. Bentayo, 810 Phil. 263 (2017).
47. CA rollo, p. 40.
48. 398 Phil. 370 (2000).
49.Id. at 379.
50. TSN dated May 4, 2016, p. 16.
51.Id. at 15.
52.Id. at 15-16.
53.Id. at 18.
54.Id. at 17.
55.Id. at 10-11, 17.
56.Id. at 15.
57.Id. at 16.
58.Id. at 18.
59.Id. at 17.
60. CA rollo, p. 41.
61.People v. Desalisa, 451 Phil. 869 (2003); People v. Abundo, 402 Phil. 616 (2001).
62. CA rollo, p. 41.
63.People v. Orande, 461 Phil. 403 (2003).
64. CA rollo, p. 42.
65.Id.
66.People v. Mahinay, 362 Phil. 86 (1999).
67.People v. Esteban, 735 Phil. 663 (2014), citing People v. Dimanawa, 628 Phil. 678 (2010).
68.See People v. Esteves, 438 Phil. 687 (2007).
69.People v. Ngo, 279 Phil. 602 (2002); citations omitted.
70.People v. Lozano, 423 Phil. 20 (2001).
71. TSN dated June 30, 2015, pp. 20-21.
72.People v. Sandiganbayan. 637 Phil. 147, 158 (2010), People v. Madsali, 625 Phil. 431 (2010) and People v. Comboy, 782 Phil. 187 (2016); citing Manansala v. People, 775 Phil. 514 (2015).
73. Records, p. 2.
74.People v. DDD, supra note 44.
75. TSN dated May 4, 2016, p. 18.
76. Records, p. 127.
77.Id.
78.See Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 129, Section 4.
79. TSN dated December 20, 2016, p. 7.
80. Republic Act No. 9346, Sections 2 (a) and 3; seePeople v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 229714, June 19, 2019.
81.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016); see People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 229714, June 19, 2019.
82.Id.
83.People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 229714, June 19, 2019, citing People v. Salaver, G.R. No. 223681, August 20, 2018.