People v. XXX

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 250644. May 5, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.XXX, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMay 5, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 250644 (People of the Philippines v. XXX). — Accused-appellant assails 1 the Decision 2 dated July 19, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01853-MIN, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated January 3, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Medina, Misamis Oriental, Branch 42, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, in Criminal Case No. 153-M (2016).

Facts of the Case

Version of the Prosecution

On September 2015, AAA, 4 a 16-year-old girl, 5 was sleeping in a house located in ___________________________ Misamis Oriental. Accused-appellant, her father, was sleeping at a nearby waiting shed. 6 At around 3:00 a.m., 7 accused-appellant lay beside AAA, and touched her genitalia. Eventually, he inserted his finger into her genitalia while embracing her, and let it stay there for a while, rousing her from sleep and causing her pain. 8 AAA resisted, but accused-appellant reprimanded her and said "[b]ugok ka! Kabalo ko anak taka, tambal lang ka sa akong uwag"9 ("[s]tupid! I know you are my child, but you satisfy my lust"). 10 Thereafter, accused-appellant removed his finger without saying anything, and slept beside AAA. During the ordeal, AAA's siblings, BBB 11 and CCC, 12 were sleeping in the same area as her. 13 CAIHTE

In October 2015, accused-appellant molested AAA once more. When she was in the house at around 4:00 a.m., accused-appellant told her to go upstairs. She obeyed but expressed her displeasure by stomping her feet knowing that accused-appellant would do something to her. True enough, accused-appellant forced her to lie down beside him on the bed. Then, accused-appellant, who was wearing only his underwear, positioned himself on top of her. He removed her shorts, leaving her underwear on. Thereafter, accused-appellant rubbed his penis on the front part of her genitalia, while restraining both her hands and feet. There was no penetration. Accused-appellant also kissed AAA on the neck five times without saying anything. AAA also did not say anything. She felt pain in her vagina and chest. After the assault, accused-appellant wore his shorts. At the time of the incident, BBB and CCC were at a computer station 20 meters from the house. 14

AAA reported the incident to the police and sought assistance from the local government. 15 DDD, 16 a duly licensed social worker from the Municipal Social Welfare & Development Office of ______________ Misamis Oriental, attended to her and prepared an Initial Assessment 17 of her situation on January 4, 2016. The assessment based on the information DDD gathered from AAA, EEE, 18 AAA's maternal aunt, and FFF 19 revealed that AAA was sexually abused from September to December 2015. 20

DDD noted that AAA had a sad expression and was secretive during their first encounter. He also observed that it was difficult to extract information from her. By the fourth interview, DDD was able to gain AAA's trust prompting the latter to divulge the sexual abuse perpetrated by accused-appellant against her in the afternoon of September 2015. Thereafter, DDD prepared a Social Study Case Report 21 based on information he gathered from AAA, AAA's relatives, and their neighbors. The Social Study Case Report amplified DDD's findings from the Initial Assessment. 22

Accordingly, the State filed an Information 23 charging accused-appellant with a violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610:

That sometime in September and October 2015, at x x x and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the father of the victim, taking advantage of the victim's minority and having moral ascendancy over her, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously subject [AAA], a sixteen-year-old minor (Birthday: x x x), to other sexual abuse by inserting his finger into her vagina, kissing her on her neck and rubbing his penis on her vagina, which acts of the accused degrade, demean and debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of the aforenamed victim as a human being, to her damage and prejudice. 24

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant denied the accusation and averred that the charges were initiated by the younger sister of his wife, GGG, 25 out of spite, because he told AAA that her mother had already died. He also claimed that he stopped sleeping beside AAA beginning September 2015 as their house was very "weak." As a result, he allegedly had to sleep at the nearby waiting shed, making it impossible for him to commit the crime which he is charged with. His denial was corroborated by his sons, BBB and CCC who both averred that no untoward incident occurred between accused-appellant and AAA during September and October 2015. 26

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, considering that no sexual intercourse took place between accused-appellant and AAA. 27 The trial court also gave credence to AAA's affidavit and her testimony in open court, and found it unthinkable for her to concoct a charge of sexual abuse against her father. 28 DETACa

Because the prosecution established that accused-appellant was AAA's biological father, the trial court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, as prescribed under R.A. 7610. The trial court also ordered accused-appellant to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and a P20,000.00 fine. 29

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA upheld the trial court's decision and affirmed the latter's reliance on AAA's statements, as nothing in the record appears to have been overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated. 30

Pursuant to Quimvel v. People, 31 which involved lascivious acts committed upon a seven (7) year old minor, 32 the CA reduced the penalty to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as minimum to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The CA also reduced the amount of moral damages, exemplary damages, and the fine to P15,000.00, respectively. Civil indemnity was likewise reduced from P75,000.00 to P20,000.00. The CA declared that all damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of its judgment. 33

In the Court's Resolution 34 dated February 12, 2020, the parties were directed to file their supplemental briefs.

The Public Attorney's Office filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief 35 dated September 11, 2020 stating that accused-appellant had sufficiently discussed the issues in his Appellant's Brief 36 dated May 17, 2018, filed with the CA. The Office of the Solicitor General, likewise, filed a Manifestation (Re: Supplemental Brief) 37 dated August 20, 2020, stating that the Appellee's Brief 38 dated August 22, 2018, filed with the CA, adequately addressed the arguments raised in the Appellant's Brief.

Ruling of the Court

Generally, appeals of criminal cases must be brought to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; 39 except when the CA imposes a penalty of "reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment," in which case appeal shall be made by a notice of appeal before the CA. 40 Here, accused-appellant availed of a wrong mode of appeal by filing a notice of appeal before the CA 41 despite the latter court imposing a penalty less than reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 42 Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court shall resolve this case on the merits. 43

To sustain a conviction under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, the prosecution must establish that: (i) the accused committed an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (ii) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (iii) the child is below 18 years old. 44

As regards the first element, AAA testified that on September 2015 accused-appellant touched and inserted his finger into AAA's genitalia. 45 AAA also testified that on October 2015 accused-appellant rubbed his penis on her vagina. 46 Both the trial court and the CA lent credence to AAA's account of her harrowing ordeal. 47 It has been long-established that: aDSIHc

[T]he x x x credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand x x x [A]bsent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial court's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which would have affected the outcome of the case. 48 (Citations omitted)

The rule is even more stringently applied when the appellate court concurred with the trial court, 49 as in this case. 50

After a thorough examination of the records, We find no reason to deviate from the trial court and the CA's assessment of AAA's credibility and truthfulness, as her testimony was sufficiently consistent, candid, and straightforward. 51 In her testimony, AAA identified accused-appellant in open court and steadfastly maintained that it was he who had sexual1y abused her on two separate occasions. 52 Furthermore, We consider the testimony of AAA true and sincere 53 as the prosecution failed to show that she was driven by any improper motive.

As regards the second element, this Court, in People v. Tulagan54 elaborated on the import of the phrase "other sexual abuse":

x x x [T]he term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, should be construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse" under Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. Thus, the term "other sexual abuse" is broad enough to include all other acts of sexual abuse other than prostitution. Accordingly, a single act of lascivious conduct is punished under Section 5 (b), Article III, when the victim is 12 years old and below 18. 55 (Citations omitted.)

Therefore, even if the records do not disclose any sexual assaults prior to the incidents raised in the information, accused-appellant may still be held liable under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610.

As regards the third element, the prosecution established that AAA was 16 years of age at the time that the offenses were committed, through the presentation of her birth certificate which indicated her birth date as May 1, 1999. 56

In a bid to exonerate himself, accused-appellant argues that he could not have sexually abused AAA on the dates stated in the Information because he started sleeping at a waiting shed on September 2015 due to the weakened stability of their house. 57 Time and again, We have ruled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. 58 Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places. 59 Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof. 60

Accused-appellant did not furnish any clear and convincing proof to bolster his claim. On the contrary, his son BBB testified that the waiting shed was just beside the house where they lived. 61 ETHIDa

In addition to his alibi, accused-appellant denied that he sexually abused AAA and posited that the case against him was only concocted by EEE, AAA's aunt. 62 BBB and CCC, his sons, were presented to corroborate his denial. 63 As for the allegation that EEE fabricated the charge against him, accused-appellant failed to present proof to support his claim. All told, the accused-appellant's alibi, denial and imputation of ill motive must fail in the face of the positive identification and categorical testimony of AAA. 64

Another defense raised by the accused-appellant is the prosecution's failure to demonstrate the accused-appellant's use of coercion or influence upon AAA. 65 In Quimvel v. People, 66 We ruled that Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 covers a situation where a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in lascivious conduct. The words "coercion," "influence," or "exploited in prostitution or subject to other abuse" need not appear in the Information as long as synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged are present. 67 Here, the prosecution used the phrase "moral ascendancy," which was also used in the case of Malta v. People68 and People v. Ursua69 where the Court found the accused guilty of violating Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. 70 In Ursua, the Court intimated that the father's moral ascendancy over his 14-year-old daughter was a source of coercion. 71

Accused-appellant also avers that there was a significant delay between the occurrence of the incidents of sexual abuse and when the incidents were reported. 72 The contention is untenable.

Human reactions are unpredictable when it comes to horrifying experiences such as sexual assault. 73 Although immediate reporting of sexual assaults, such as rape, strengthens a victim's credibility, delays in reporting are not necessarily viewed as detrimental. 74 Delay is not and should not be an indication of a fabricated charge because, more often than not, victims of rape and sexual abuse choose to suffer alone and "bear the ignominy and pain" of their experience. 75 Moreover, the delay of more or less two months between the occurrence of the sexual assaults and the filing of the complaint 76 is too unsubstantial to warrant consideration.

As to accused-appellant's claim that leading questions were propounded to AAA during trial, 77 it is now too late in the day for him to object to the line of questioning employed by the prosecutor. He should have interposed his objections during the oral examination of AAA, as soon as the grounds therefor became apparent. 78 The record bares that not once did accused-appellant object to the questions asked of AAA. 79

In view of the foregoing, the trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty of lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, for which the law prescribes a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua when the victim is over 12 years of age but under eighteen 18 years.

Because accused-appellant is AAA's father, as borne by the records 80 and admitted by him in open court, 81reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. 82 Consequently, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. 83 He is likewise meted a fine of P15,000.00. 84 All awards shall be subject to 6% legal interest counted from the finality of this resolution.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 19, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01853-MIN is SET ASIDE and the Decision dated January 3, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court of Medina, Misamis Oriental, Branch 42, in Criminal Case No. 153-M (2016) is REINSTATED. Accused-appellant XXX is found guilty of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (8) of Republic Act No. 7610 and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

He is ORDERED to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P15,000.00 as fine to AAA. All monetary awards are subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid. cSEDTC

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

by:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 19-20.

2. Penned by Justice Florencio M. Mamauag, Jr., with the concurrence of Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Walter S. Ong; id. at 4-17.

3. Penned by Presiding Judge Judy A. Sia-Galvez; records, pp. 153-163.

4. The real name of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" and A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names."

5. Records, pp. 1, 104.

6.Id. at 155.

7. TSN dated September 28, 2016, p. 8.

8. Records, p. 155.

9.Id. at 6; TSN dated September 28, 2016, p. 12.

10.Id. at 155.

11. The real name of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" and A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names."

12.Id.

13. Records, p. 155.

14.Id.; TSN dated September 28, 2016, pp. 13-19.

15.Id. at 156.

16. The real name of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" and A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names."

17. Records, p. 106.

18. The real name of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" and A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names."

19.Id.

20. Records, p. 156.

21.Id. at 107-108.

22.Id. at 156.

23.Id. at 1-2.

24. The word "rubbing" originally appeared as "robbing." The letter "o" was replaced with the letter "u" pursuant to the trial court's Order dated June 29, 2016.

25. The real name of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" and A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names."

26.Rollo, p. 8.

27. Records, p. 161.

28.Id. at 159-161.

29.Id. at 162-163.

30.Rollo, pp. 10-11.

31. 808 Phil. 889 (2017).

32.Id. at 930.

33.Rollo, p. 17.

34.Id. at 25-26.

35.Id. at 36-37.

36. CA rollo, pp. 24-32.

37.Rollo, pp. 27-28.

38. CA rollo, pp. 53-67.

39. Section 3 (e), Rule 122, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

40. Section 13 (c), Rule 124, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

41.Rollo, p. 25.

42.Id. at 17.

43.People v. Estonilo, G.R. No. 248694, October 14, 2020.

44.People v. XXX, G.R. No. 240441, December 4, 2019; People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019; People v. XXX, G.R. No. 235662, July 24, 2019.

45. TSN dated September 28, 2016, pp. 7-9.

46.Id. at 12-16.

47. Records, pp. 159-160; rollo, pp. 10-15.

48.People v. Laog, 674 Phil. 444, 457 (2011).

49.Id.

50.Rollo, pp. 10-15.

51.People v. Dominguez, Jr., 650 Phil. 492, 520 (2010).

52. TSN dated September 28, 2016, pp. 7-16.

53.People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 526 (2013).

54. G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019.

55.Id.

56. Records, pp. 104, 111.

57.Id. at 156.

58.People v. Ambatang, 808 Phil. 236, 243 (2017).

59.People v. Padlan, 817 Phil. 1008, 1023 (2017), citing People v. Viojela, 697 Phil. 513, 529 (2012).

60.People v. Mosquerra, 414 Phil. 740, 750 (2001).

61. TSN dated July 26, 2017, pp. 6-7.

62. TSN dated June 28, 2017, pp. 6-7.

63. Records, pp. 157-158.

64.People v. Orande, 461 Phil. 403, 416 (2003).

65. CA rollo, p. 29.

66.Supra note 31.

67.Quimvel v. People, supra note 31 at 919-920.

68. 560 Phil. 119, 127, 137 (2007).

69. 819 Phil. 467, 479 (2017).

70.Id. at 482; Malto v. People, supra note 68 at 145.

71.Id.

72. CA rollo, p. 31.

73.People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 675 (2011).

74.People v. Udang, 823 Phil. 411, 439 (2018).

75.Id.

76. Records, p. 8.

77. CA rollo, p. 29.

78. Revised Rules on Evidence, as amended, Rule 132, Section 36.

79. TSN dated September 28, 2016, pp. 6-17.

80. Records, pp. 1, 104-105.

81.Id. at 38-39.

82. Section 31 (c), Republic Act No. 7610.

83.People v. Tulagan, supra note 54.

84. Section 31 (f), Republic Act 7610; records, p. 163.