People v. XXX
This is a criminal case in the Philippines, involving the crime of qualified statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accused-appellant was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) for raping a mentally deficient victim, with the penalty of death, which was reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole due to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346. The Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the conviction, but modified the nomenclature of the crime to qualified statutory rape and increased the monetary awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to P100,000.00 each, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until full payment. The SC ruled that the victim's mental disability was sufficiently alleged in the information and proven during trial, which qualified the crime to statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC. The competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses were also upheld, and the victim's testimony was sufficient to convict the accused-appellant.
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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 244836. June 30, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. XXX, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 30, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 244836 (People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, v. XXX, accused-appellant).
After a review of the records, this Court resolves to DISMISS the appeal for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in upholding the conviction of XXX 1(accused-appellant) for the crime of Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). HTcADC
The competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by this Court where it was shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant's accusations, such mental deficiency even lends greater credence to her testimony that someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she had not, in fact, suffered such crime at the hands of the accused. Moreover, it is settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. 2
In this case, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 225 (RTC) found AAA's 3 testimony as straightforward, convincing, and unflawed by any material of significant inconsistency. In the absence of substantial reason to justify the reversal of the RTC's assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's finding. The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court concurs with the trial court. 4 In this case, the CA correctly upheld the conviction of accused-appellant.
Records also show that accused-appellant's knowledge of the victim's mental disability was sufficiently alleged in the information. This, coupled with the findings of Dr. Joseph Mauro Sayo — a duly licensed child, adolescent, and adult psychiatrist — and the RTC's own observation of the victim's deportment in court, 5 proves the victim's mental retardation. It is settled that the offender's knowledge of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. 6 As such, the CA also correctly ruled that accused-appellant's knowledge of the victim's mental disability aggravated the crime to qualified rape, and that the appropriate penalty is death. However, the penalty shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole, pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346. 7
Given that the victim's mental disability was sufficiently alleged in the information, and it was proven during trial that she had the mental age of a child of six or seven years old, 8 accused-appellant should be convicted of qualified statutory rape punishable under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC. This is pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Castillo, 9 where it was reiterated that when the victim is a mental retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years old, the rape should be classified as statutory rape under the said provision, and not under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (b).
As to the monetary awards, there is a need to modify the amounts in compliance with the guidelines set forth by this Court in People v. Jugueta. 10 Where the penalty imposed for simple or qualified rape is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. No. 9346, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages should be P100,000.00 each, respectively.
All told, no reversible error was committed by the CA in upholding accused-appellant's conviction, except as to the nomenclature of the crime and the increase of the monetary awards in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals in its October 3, 2018 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09403. Accused-appellant XXX is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of QUALIFIEDSTATUTORYRAPE punishable under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. He is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are MODIFIED to the amount of P100,000.00 each, respectively, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until full payment.
SO ORDERED."Inting, J., designated Additional Memberper Raffle dated June 29, 2021 vice Carandang, J.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. In accordance with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, the identities of the parties, records and court proceedings are kept confidential by replacing their names and other personal circumstances with fictitious initials, and by blotting out the specific geographical location that may disclose the identities of the victims.
2.People v. Pitalla, Jr., 797 Phil. 817, 826 (2016); People v. Castillo, 641 Phil. 570, 588 (2010).
3. The true name of the victim has been replaced with fictitious initials in conformity with Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 (Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation,Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders UsingFictitious Names/Personal Circumstances). The confidentiality of the identity of the victim is mandated by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,Exploitation and Discrimination Act); R.A. No. 8505 (Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Actof 1998); R.A. No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003); R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-ViolenceAgainst Women and Their Children Act of 2004); and R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice andWelfare Act of 2006).
4.People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 242276, February 18, 2020; People v. XXX, G.R. No. 225793, August 14, 2019.
5. In People v. Monticalvo, 702 Phil. 643, 661 (2013), this Court, emphasized the ruling in People v. Dalandas, 442 Phil. 688, 697 (2002), and People v. Dumanon, 401 Phil. 658, 669-670 (2000), where it was held that mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.
6. See People v. Suansing, 717 Phil. 100, 116 (2013), which held that:
Paragraph 10 of Article 266-B of the RPC expressly provides that the penalty of death shall be imposed "when the offender knew of the mental disability x x x of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime." The supreme penalty of death should have been imposed on the appellant due to the special qualifying circumstance of knowledge at the time of the rape that "AAA" was mentally disabled.
However, the enactment of RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. In lieu thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in accordance with Section 2 of RA 9346. In addition, as provided under Section 3 thereof, appellant shall not be eligible for parole.
7. Entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines."
8. CA rollo, p. 51.
9. G.R. No. 242276, February 18, 2020.
10. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
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