FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 243019. November 23, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.XXX, 1accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 23, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 243019 (People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, v. XXX, accused-appellant).
After review of the records, this Court resolves to DISMISS the appeal for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in its April 27, 2018 Decision 2 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09321, as to warrant the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction.
XXX (accused-appellant) was charged with the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, in an information which reads:
[T]hat sometime in August, 2011, in the City of Y, 3 province of Z, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with lewd designs, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, lay with and have carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA 4 against her will and consent which is aggravated by the fact that the accused is the father of the private complainant AAA. 5
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 6
Here, accused-appellant attempts to discredit AAA's testimony for her failure to remember the actual date of the incident. It must be pointed out that AAA's failure to specify the exact date when the rape occurred does not, standing alone, cast doubt on accused-appellant's guilt. Neither date nor time of the commission of rape is a material element of the crime. The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female through force or intimidation against her will. Precision as to the time when the rape is committed has no bearing on its commission. 7
Moreover, accused-appellant's argument — that AAA's testimony is incredible because she did not even ask for help or at least offer any resistance in defense of herself — is unmeritorious. The Court has invariably ruled that rape victims react differently. 8 There is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested. Some may shout, some may faint, some choose to keep their ordeal, and some may be shocked into insensibility. None of these, however, impair the credibility of a rape victim. Let alone, negate the commission of rape. 9
Lastly, AAA's delay in reporting the rape incident does not weaken the case against accused-appellant. Nor can it be construed as an implied consent, let alone, condonation of what accused-appellant did to her. 10 She had been held back in terror not just because of her possible exposure to public disgrace but foremost, for fear of reprisal from accused-appellant. This fear crippled her and forced her into silence. 11 It must be emphasized that AAA was held in fear by accused-appellant's threat to harm her and her family if she would tell anyone of the rape incident. AAA had no choice as she continued to live with her father for several years even after the incident. Moreover, there can be no greater source of fear or intimidation than your own father — one who, generally, has exercised authority over your person since birth. Delay brought by fear for one's life cannot be deemed unreasonable. 12
Both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the CA found that AAA's testimony was straightforward and candid. Thus, the Court sees no cogent reason to depart from the foregoing rule, since accused-appellant failed to demonstrate that the RTC and the CA overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts of weight and substance that would alter the assailed decision.
For a charge of rape by sexual intercourse under Art. 266-A (1), as amended by R.A. No. 8353, to prosper, the prosecution must prove that:
(a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act under the circumstances mentioned in the provision, e.g., through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will. 13
In the instant case, this Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of rape by sexual intercourse. First, accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA was unwavering in her assertion that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina and made the so-called "push and pull motions." Second, accused-appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. In this case, AAA testified that accused-appellant pointed his gun at her and commanded her to undress and do everything he wants or else he will kill her and her family.
At gunpoint, AAA was forced to remove her clothes and thereafter was pushed onto the bed by accused-appellant where he raped her.
Accordingly, the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
However, this Court does not agree with the RTC in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon, which was not sufficiently alleged in the information although established during trial. An information "should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the proper penalty it should impose." 14
In any case, the RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, the Court deems it proper to modify the award of damages pursuant to People v. Jugueta, 15 which provides that in case of simple rape and the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the award for civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is P75,000.00 each, all subject to the interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. 16
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the April 27, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09321. Accused-appellant XXX is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape punishable under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is likewise ORDERED to PAY private complainant AAA civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until full payment.
SO ORDERED." Lazaro-Javier, J., no part; Carandang, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated November 9, 2020; Lopez, M., J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 [2006]), the real name of the private offended party and her immediate family members, including any other personal circumstance or information tending to establish or compromise the identity of said party, shall be withheld.
2.Rollo, pp. 2-20; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon with Associate Justices Rodil V. Zalameda (now a Member of this Court) and Renato C. Francisco, concurring.
3. The city where the crime was committed is withheld to protect the identity of the rape victim pursuant to Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 issued on September 5, 2017.
4. The true name of the victim has been replaced with fictitious initials in conformity with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017 (Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances). The confidentiality of the identity of the victim is mandated by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act); R.A. No. 8505 (Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998); R.A. No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003); R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004); and R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006).
5. CA rollo, pp. 44-45.
6.Pendoy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 228223, June 10, 2019.
7.People v. ________, G.R. No. 229836, July 17, 2019.
8.People v. XXX, G.R. No. 230904, January 8, 2020.
9.People v. Pareja, 724 Phil. 759, 778 (2014).
10.People v. Salazar, 327 Phil. 663, 670 (1996).
11.People v. Abarientos, G.R. No. 243580, November 13, 2019.
12.People v. Pacayra, 810 Phil. 275, 293-294 (2017).
13.People v. Ejercito, 834 Phil. 837, 844 (2018).
14.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 838-839 (2016).
15.Id.
16.People v. Masubay, G.R. No. 248875, September 3, 2020.