People v. XXX

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 237976. June 28, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. XXX, 1accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 28, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 237976 (People of the Philippines v. XXX). — This is an appeal under Rule 124 2 of the Rules of Court challenging the November 20, 2017 Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08803, which affirmed the April 10, 2015 Decision 4 and March 10, 2016 Joint Resolution 5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 36, in Crim. Case No. 2013-9-13-51, finding accused-appellant XXX guilty of rape.

The Facts:

In an Information 6 dated September 13, 2013, XXX was charged with Rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, the accusatory portions of which read:

That sometime in the year 2011, during nighttime at ____________________, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with a minor named [AAA], 7 without her consent and against her will resulting to her damage and prejudice.

That the aggravating circumstances that the said victim is a minor who is thirteen (13) years old and that the accused is the guardian of the said minor-victim, attended the commission of the crime charged.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

During his arraignment, XXX entered a plea of "not guilty." 9

The instant case's pre-trial conference and trial on the merits were jointly conducted with the following cases: Criminal Case Nos. 2013-9-13-49 and 2013-9-13-50 both captioned People of the Philippines v. YYY; Criminal Case No. 2013-9-13-52 entitled People of the Philippines v. ZZZ; and Criminal Case Nos. 2013-9-13-53 and 2013-9-13-54 both captioned People of the Philippines v. EEE. The private complainant in these cases, including the case at bench, is AAA who alleged that all of the accused repeatedly raped her in separate instances. 10

According to the prosecution, AAA, born on October 20, 1998 11 has been residing with her aunt, CCC 12 and XXX since she was two years old. 13 In 2011, when she was around 12 or 13 years old, XXX started to take advantage of her. 14

In her Sworn Statement 15 dated July 3, 2013, AAA stated that sometime in 2011, she suddenly woke up from her sleep when she felt someone pull down her shorts and panty. When she opened her eyes, she saw her "Tatay" XXX doing the deed. Despite her resistance, XXX succeeded in removing her undergarments, and proceeded to insert his penis inside her vagina. XXX threatened to kill AAA if she dared to report the incident to anyone. AAA asserted that XXX raped her several more times inside the house during nighttime without any witnesses. 16 She averred that she did not immediately report the rape incidents because of XXX's threats to her life and that she only told her mother on July 2, 2013 because she could no longer bear the pain. 17

During her testimony, AAA described how XXX raped her, as follows:

Q Kindly tell us what x x x your uncle XXX did to you?

A He also raped me, sir.

Q When did your uncle XXX rape you?

A 2011, sir.

Q Where?

A At their house, sir.

Q Aside from you and uncle XXX, who else [stays] in that house?

A My brother and the grandchild of uncle XXX, sir.

Q Who else?

A His children DDD and EEE, sir.

Q You said that you were [raped] by your uncle XXX inside their house, where [were] your brothers?

A They [were] not around, sir.

Q Where were they, if you know?

A [CCC] went to massage someone else, sir.

Q And again, how many times did uncle XXX rape you?

A So many times, sir. 18

However, AAA could no longer recall the exact dates and specific details of the other rape incidents due to her tender age. 19

As she likewise suffered physical abuse in XXX's hands, AAA finally left to live with her mother, BBB, sometime in June 2013. 20 On July 2, 2013, AAA informed BBB about the rape incidents. At the same time, AAA revealed that she was also sexually abused by three other persons, including XXX's eldest son, EEE, on different occasions in the span of three years. 21

On her cross-examination, AAA explained that despite the darkness of the night, the light of the moon helped her ascertain that it was indeed XXX who had carnal knowledge of her. Additionally, she maintained that there was no witness since CCC left to attend to someone. 22 Relevantly, AAA declared that she felt no love for XXX and CCC, and that she stands by her allegations even if she feared them. 23

AAA's mother, BBB, 24 stated in her Sworn Statement 25 dated July 3, 2013 that on June 12, 2013, AAA looked uneasy and refused to return to the house of XXX and CCC. On June 20, 2013, the principal of AAA's school informed BBB that AAA had been absent-minded in class. 26 Thus, the principal asked BBB to observe and probe if AAA was experiencing any difficulties. On July 2, 2013 at around 8:00 P.M., BBB asked AAA if she had a problem as she has been very quiet. Eventually, AAA confided to BBB that XXX raped her several times. AAA added that YYY, ZZZ, and EEE (the other accused) also repeatedly raped her. 27

BBB confirmed that when AAA was around two years old, XXX and CCC adopted her so she lived with them until June 11, 2013. Even so, BBB asserted that she occasionally visited AAA at XXX and CCC's house during that time. 28 AAA then transferred to BBB's place from June 12, 2013 onwards. 29

BBB and AAA reported the rape incidents to the police a day after AAA confessed. 30 The police referred them to a social worker, who in turn submitted a Social Case Study Report 31 dated July 4, 2013. The social worker also recommended that AAA be referred to a medico-legal officer for examination. 32

AAA submitted to a medical examination which was conducted by Dr. Claudine Dirige (Dr. Dirige). Dr. Dirige stated in the Medico-Legal Certificate 33 dated July 9, 2013 that AAA might have suffered abuse or had sexual contact. During Dr. Dirige's testimony, she specified that there were hymenal attenuation and lacerations at the 3, 7 and 9 o'clock positions on AAA's private part which could have been due to any matter which can cause trauma to the genital area such as the insertion of an object or an erect penis; running; jumping; intercourse; and masturbation. Dr. Dirige opined that the lacerations could have been inflicted more than a month before the conduct of the medical examination. 34

Conversely, the defense confirmed that AAA is the daughter of CCC's brother. Because her parents separated, AAA lived with XXX's family since she was just two years old. Since XXX treated AAA like his own daughter, he could not understand why AAA would accuse him of rape. In his Judicial Affidavit, 35 XXX asserted that every night, he slept in the kitchen with CCC while AAA stayed in the other part of the house with XXX's oldest son, EEE, and his grandson, YYY. 36 Likewise, he argued that it is impossible to see anyone at night because it is very dark especially when the gas lamp is off and the window is closed. 37 XXX insisted that AAA lied about the rape charges, including the ones she imputed against the other accused. 38

On cross-examination, XXX averred that on June 11, 2013, he sent AAA on an errand to verify the price of charcoal but she did not return. 39 He reiterated that he sleeps in the kitchen with CCC and that he considered AAA as his own child, which made him wonder why she filed a case against him. 40

In the Judicial Affidavit 41 of CCC, she claimed that it was impossible for XXX to have raped AAA. CCC averred that she always slept with XXX in the kitchen which is separate from the place where AAA slept. 42 She added that it was improbable to see anyone at night in their house because it would be very dark without the gas lamp on and with the only window shut closed. 43 In her cross-examination, CCC reiterated that the allegations were not true as AAA slept in a different area from XXX. Also, she affirmed that she treated AAA like her own and that AAA started living with them when she was just two years old until June 11, 2013. 44

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In a Decision 45 dated April 10, 2015, the RTC ruled that the victim's statements and testimony established the existence of the elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC. 46 Dr. Dirige, who found that AAA's private part had old, healed hymenal lacerations at the 3, 7 and 9 o'clock positions which could have been caused by an erect penis, corroborated AAA's testimony. 47 The trial court rejected XXX's denial of the charge because it was insufficient to discredit AAA's claim. She was aware that XXX raped her in spite of the darkness of the night, as the light of the moon shone brightly at the time. 48

Significantly, the trial court held that while the Information alleged that AAA was thirteen years old and that XXX was her guardian, the prosecution did not show convincing proof that he was her legal or judicial guardian which would warrant the imposition of a higher penalty. 49 Hence, the dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding XXX GUILTY for Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Accused is furthermore ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.

Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the District Jail Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Mountain Province District Jail, Bontoc, Mountain Province, is directed to immediately transfer the said accused, XXX, to the custody of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the expiration of fifteen (15) days from the date of promulgation unless otherwise ordered by this Court.

SO ORDERED. 50

Aggrieved, all of the accused, including XXX, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 51 pointing out that they could not have raped the victim in 2010 or 2011 because the healed hymenal lacerations suggested that the supposed assault only happened a little over a month before the conduct of the medical examination.

The RTC denied the motion in a Joint Resolution 52 dated March 10, 2016, ruling that the attempt of the accused to capitalize on the supposed freshness of the victim's injuries had no merit. It explained that the doctor's declaration did not preclude the possibility that AAA was raped in 2010 or 2011. It held that "the rape incidents could have happened from 17 June 2013 or several days, weeks, months or even years before the said date ergo, it corroborates AAA's testimony that she had been sexually abused from 2010 to 11 June 2013." 53 The trial court pointed out that in the evaluation of the felony of rape, the absence of hymenal lacerations does not negate the crime and that a medical evaluation is not necessary in order to determine the culpability of the accused. 54

Discontented, XXX appealed 55 before the CA and assigned the following errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND INSTEAD RELYING ON THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF AAA. 56

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA, in its assailed November 20, 2017 Decision, 57 held that the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses deserve weight on appeal. Significantly, it ruled that the elements of simple rape are present in the case, as the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and committed the crime through force, threat or intimidation. 58 The appellate court found that AAA, despite her age and immaturity, clearly narrated in her sworn statement and her testimony that XXX raped her through force, threat or intimidation when she was only 13 years old, and significantly, by using his moral ascendancy over her as she treated him like her father (even if he is her uncle) and called him "tatay." Moreover, it found that the medical findings of Dr. Dirige supported AAA's allegations. It did not find merit in XXX's denial as it was not substantiated by convincing evidence. 59

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC but modified the award for damages in line with recent jurisprudence. 60 The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal filed by accused-appellant is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION with respect to the award of damages in that appellant is ordered to pay AAA the following, [viz.]: (a) civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, (b) moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00, and (c) exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00.

The interest of six percent (6%) per [annum] on all the aforesaid civil liabilities shall be reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment imposed by the trial court is sustained.

SO ORDERED. 61

Dissatisfied, accused-appellant appealed 62 his case before the Court.

Issue:

Whether or not XXX is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of rape.

Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

"'Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on the credibility of witnesses should be best addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts.'" 63 In view of this, We sustain the RTC's ruling, which the CA previously affirmed, that XXX had carnal knowledge of AAA through force, threat or intimidation. Based on Our assessment, the accused-appellant did not present evidence showing that the trial court erred when it gave more credence to the prosecution's version of the incidents.

XXX argues that the Information which stated that the felony happened "sometime in 2011" failed to specify the date and time of the commission of the crime and deprived him the opportunity to properly defend himself. We are not convinced. In cases of rape, "the date of commission is not an essential element of rape but what is material is its occurrence, 64 which in his case, was sufficiently established by AAA. The failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face." 65

The felony of rape is penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC as follows:

Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. 66 (Emphasis supplied)

The penalty for rape committed under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 266-B of the RPC. However, the rape shall be qualified and the death penalty shall be imposed under paragraph 1 of Article 266-B of the RPC if the offender is the guardian of the victim who is below 18 years old, viz.:

ART. 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx xxx xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim[.] 67 (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bench, the totality of evidence points to XXX's guilt in the commission of rape. Notwithstanding this, both the trial court and the appellate court held that XXX could not be held liable for qualified rape even if the Information alleged that he was AAA's guardian when he raped her. According to jurisprudence, "the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with his ward," 68 which means that XXX should be the legal or judicial guardian of AAA. The prosecution did not adduce evidence to prove this legal relationship. People v. Flores69 instructs, to wit:

Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of when the accused will be considered a 'guardian' as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. In said case, appellant therein raped a 12-year-old girl. The victim was left to the care of appellant, who is the live-in partner of the victim's aunt. The issue of whether appellant is considered a guardian in the contemplation of the amendment to the law on rape such that, the victim being a minor, he should be punished with the higher penalty of death for the nine (9) crimes of rape was answered in the negative by the Court. The underlying reason behind its ruling was explained in this discourse:

In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, specifically as one who, aside from the offended party, her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file the sworn written complaint to commence the prosecution for that crime. In People vs. De la Cruz, it was held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on civil procedure.

xxx xxx xxx

It would not be logical to say that the word 'guardian' in the third paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from the 'guardian' in the recent amendments of Article 335 where he is also mentioned in the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion of the guardian is only to invest him with the power to sign a sworn written complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the imposition of the death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should the restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or judicial guardian, he required in the latter article.

The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept of 'guardian' as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state 'guardian' without the qualification that he should be a legal or judicial guardian. It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward.

They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty of death.

xxx xxx xxx

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.

In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the 'common-law spouse of the parent of the victim' in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.

People v. De la Cuesta adhered to Garcia when it ruled that the mere fact that the mother asked the accused to look after her child while she was away did not constitute the relationship of guardian-ward as contemplated by law.

Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar where it was held that the 'guardian' envisioned in Section 31 (c) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. In said case, accused was charged for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an 11-year-old child to at least two clients. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish filiation albeit it considered accused as a de facto guardian. However, this was not sufficient to justify the imposition of the higher penalty pursuant to the ruling in Garcia. In addition, the Court construed the term 'guardian' in this manner:

Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Section 31 (c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an 'ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity.' It should be noted that the words with which 'guardian' is associated in the provision denote a legal relationship. From the description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the ward's biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAA's biological parent nor is AAA's adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the 'guardian' contemplated by law. 70 (Citations omitted)

Thus, despite the reprehensible acts XXX committed against AAA who considered him like a father, and even if he physically abused the victim as well, XXX could not be held liable for qualified rape based on the foregoing discussion.

Nonetheless, AAA's birth certificate verified that she was only around 13 years old when XXX raped her in 2011. Accused-appellant admitted that he took care of AAA since she was two years old and treated her like his own daughter. Notwithstanding this, XXX sexually ravaged her without her consent, using his moral ascendancy over her as he acted as a father figure to her. 71 These findings would still render him liable for the commission of rape for which he should ultimately be punished for.

In another attempt to absolve himself from liability, XXX argues that he could not have raped AAA since there were other occupants in the house who slept in the same area as her. We are unconvinced. To this, "[j]urisprudence instructs us that lust is no respecter of time or place; rape defies constraint of time and space. Rapists are not deterred from committing the odious act of sexual abuse by mere inconvenience or awkwardness of the situation or even by the presence of people or family members nearby. Rape is committed not exclusively in seclusion." 72 Besides, XXX did not present the testimony of those individuals who purportedly slept in the same space with AAA.

Accused-appellant likewise contends that AAA's belated reporting of the rape incidents is questionable. We disagree. People v. Gratela73 teaches that:

Neither the delay in reporting the incidents to the proper authorities tainted the victims' credibility. For sure, there was no prompt revelation of what befell the victims. But 'long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape have not always been construed as indications of a false accusation.' 'A rape charge becomes doubtful only when the delay in revealing its commission is unreasonable and unexplained.' x x x 74

In the case at bench, XXX threatened AAA that he would kill her if she reports what he had been doing to her. Undoubtedly, threat to her life is an acceptable and reasonable explanation for her delayed revelation to her mother and the authorities. Also, XXX was a father figure to her and lived in the same household. Surely, his proximity and constant presence forced AAA to keep her silence about accused-appellant's abhorrent acts.

Moreover, it should be noted that the "testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, because when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity." 75 When evaluated alongside the medical findings of Dr. Dirige who stated that there were healed hymenal lacerations on AAA's private part, the only conclusion is that AAA was certainly raped. Indeed, "[i]t is settled that when a rape victim's account is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, the testimony is sufficient to support a conviction." 76 To stress, these circumstances affirm XXX's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We emphasize that AAA positively identified XXX in open court as among those who raped her; thus, XXX's denial without corroborative proof cannot convince Us otherwise. 77 XXX did not dispute AAA's explanation that the moonlight helped her confirm the identity of her rapist. Additionally, We should factor in her familiarity with XXX since she has been living with him for around ten years when the felony was committed. Moreover, XXX himself admitted that he did not have any idea why AAA filed the case. Hence, he failed to establish ill motive on the part of AAA. Withal, We believe that "'a young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction."' 78 To repeat, absent any convincing proof to negate his culpability, XXX should be adjudged guilty of one count of rape as the elements of the felony are present in this case.

With regard to the penalties, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC's imposition of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC. Likewise, the CA's awards for civil indemnity and damages are in accord with recent jurisprudence, 79 including the imposition of legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until its full satisfaction. 80

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed November 20, 2017 Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08803, is hereby AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant XXX is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the victim, AAA, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Initials were used to identify the accused-appellant pursuant to Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-15 dated September 5, 2017 Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Order using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances issued on September 5, 2017.

2. As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.

3.Rollo, pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices Socorro B. Inting and Rafael Antonio M. Santos.

4. CA rollo, pp. 49-60; penned by Presiding Judge Sergio T. Angnganay, Jr.

5. Records, pp. 226-228; penned by Presiding Judge Sergio T. Angnganay, Jr.

6.Id. at 1-2.

7. "The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children, effective November 15, 2004." (People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 [2011]).

8. Records, p. 1.

9.Id. at 61-62.

10.Rollo, pp. 3-4.

11. Records, p. 17; Birth Certificate of AAA.

12.Supra note 7.

13. TSN, March 11, 2014, p. 38.

14. CA rollo, p. 72.

15. Records, pp. 8-10.

16.Id. at 9.

17.Id. at 10; TSN, March 11, 2014, p. 45.

18. TSN, March 11, 2014, p. 43.

19. CA rollo, p. 73.

20. TSN, March 11, 2014, p. 55.

21. CA rollo, p. 73; TSN, March 11, 2014, p. 46.

22. TSN, March 11, 2014, pp. 51-52.

23.Id. at 56.

24. Records, p. 1.

25.Id. at 11-12.

26. TSN, February 20, 2014, pp. 27-28.

27.Id.

28. Records, p. 11; TSN, February 19, 2014, pp. 18-19.

29. TSN, February 19, 2014, pp. 16-18.

30. Records, p. 13; TSN, February 19, 2014, p. 4.

31.Id. at 18-19.

32. TSN, February 20, 2014, p. 31.

33. CA rollo, p. 25.

34. TSN, March 19, 2014, p. 59.

35. Records, pp. 154-160.

36.Id. at 156.

37.Id. at 158-159.

38. CA rollo, pp. 38-39.

39. TSN, September 19, 2014, pp. 2-3.

40.Id. at 5.

41. Records, pp. 112-118.

42.Id. at 115.

43.Id. at 116.

44. TSN, May 21, 2014, pp. 74-76.

45. CA rollo, pp. 49-60.

46.Id. at 54-57.

47.Id. at 57.

48.Id. at 58-59.

49.Id. at 59-60.

50.Id. at 60.

51. Records, pp. 210-215.

52.Id. at 226-228.

53.Id. at 227.

54.Id. at 227-228.

55. CA rollo, pp. 13-14.

56.Id. at 33.

57.Rollo, pp. 2-18.

58.Id. at 11-12.

59.Id. at 12-16.

60.Id. at 16-17.

61.Id. at 17.

62.Id. at 19-20.

63.People v. Roy, 836 Phil. 920, 929 (2018), citing People v. Barcela, 734 Phil. 332 (2014).

64.People v. Biala, 773 Phil. 464, 484 (2015) citing People v. Prodenciado, 749 Phil. 746-772 (2014).

65.Id., citing People v. Espejon, 427 Phil. 672 (2002).

66. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 266-A, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (1997).

67. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 266-B, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (1997).

68.People v. Flores, 643 Phil. 683, 699 (2010).

69.Id. at 700-702.

70.Id. at 702-707.

71. See People v. Bentayo, 810 Phil. 263, 269 (2017) citing People v. Fragante, 657 Phil. 577, 592 (2011).

72.People v. XXX, G.R. No. 225793, August 14, 2019 citing People v. Agudo, 810 Phil. 918, 928 (2017).

73.People v. Gratela, G.R. No. 225961, January 6, 2020 citing People v. Bejim, 824 Phil. 10, 35 (2018).

74.Id.; id. at 22.

75.People v. Salaver, 878 Phil. 104, 118 (2018), citing People v. Vergara, 724 Phil. 702 (2014).

76.People v. Traigo, 734 Phil. 726, 730 (2014).

77.People v. Alberca, 810 Phil. 896, 909 (2017). Citation omitted.

78.People v. Salaver, supra note 74 citing People v. Dalipe, 633 Phil. 428 (2010).

79.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 849 (2016).

80.Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Felipe, 720 Phil. 828, 840 (2013), citing Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 281-283 (2013) citing BSP-MB Circular No. 799 dated May 16, 2013.