FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 237348. September 22, 2020.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. XXX, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 22, 2020which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 237348 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XXX1
RESOLUTION
The Case
This appeal assails the Decision 2 dated October 27, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07634, affirming the trial court's verdict of conviction against appellant XXX for rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610). 3
The Proceedings Before the Trial Court
The Charges
Under twin Informations dated January 18, 2012, appellant was charged as follows:
Criminal Case No. 147120(Rape under Art. 266-A)
That, sometime in the year 2007, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the maternal uncle of [AAA], 4 a minor, 14-year old, by means of violence and intimidation and with lewd designs and intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said victim, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Criminal Case No. 147121(Sexual Abuse under Section 5(B), Article III of RA 7610)
That, sometime in February 2011, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, with intent to gratify his sexual desire, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously seduce and commit lascivious conduct upon the person of one [AAA], a minor, 14-year old, at the time of the commission of the offense, by having sexual intercourse with the minor whose will and consent were vitiated by reason of her minority, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
The cases were raffled to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 69, Taguig City.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. 7 Joint trial ensued.
The Prosecution's Version
The testimonies of complainant AAA, her mother, her neighbor, Dr. Katherine Camus (Dr. Camus), and P/C Insp. Lore Dettabali (P/C Insp. Dettabali) may be summarized, in this wise:
In 2007, then ten (10)-year old complainant and her siblings were left in the care of their grandmother in Taguig City while their mother worked as a domestic helper. Appellant, complainant's uncle, was also staying in her grandmother's house. 8
One day, when complainant and appellant were left alone in the house, the latter pointed a knife on complainant and threatened to kill her if she would not yield to his desires. Complainant undressed herself while appellant stripped his clothes off. Appellant forced her to lie down and inserted his penis into her vagina. He stopped when a white discharge came out of his penis. After the act, appellant once again threatened to kill her if she told anyone what happened. Almost every night thereafter, appellant would have carnal knowledge of complainant. When she refused to give in to his desires, appellant threatened her with a knife. 9
Complainant told her grandmother what appellant had been doing to her but she only told her to keep it to herself because it would cause embarrassment to the family and appellant would eventually stop sexually abusing her anyway. When complainant arrived home late one night, appellant got angry. Her grandmother retorted "Ano mainit nanaman ang ulo mo noh kasi hindi ka naka-iyot kay (complainant) noh!." 10
In 2011, complainant's mother fetched complainant and brought her home to Cavite City. Complainant suddenly undressed herself in front of her mother's live-in partner. The latter pushed complainant away and immediately called complainant's mother. When her mother arrived home and asked what happened, complainant divulged that appellant had been sexually abusing her. Ever since then, she would have the urge to have intercourse all the time. 11
Complainant's mother asked her sisters about the alleged sexual assault. They insisted that it was her live-in partner who had been sexually abusing complainant. 12
Dr. Dettabali examined complainant and found the presence of a shallow healed laceration at the 3 o'clock position and a deep healed laceration at the 8 o'clock position, caused by blunt penetrating trauma. 13
Dr. Camus, a psychiatrist, also examined complainant and found her suffering from post-traumatic stress. Dr. Camus explained that complainant had a sexualized behavior which meant that she (complainant) was having sexual desire. This was not a normal behavior for a fourteen (14)-year old child and was caused by suffering from sexual abuse. Complainant was given medications and was required to undergo further treatment. 14
Complainant's neighbor in Cavite City, observed that the mother's live-in partner was good to complainant and her siblings. Their mother's live-in partner took care of them and had always treated them as his own children.
The Defense's Version
On the other hand, appellant himself, his mother, and siblings testified for the defense, in this wise:
It was impossible for appellant to have sexually abused complainant because she was living with her mother in Cavite City while he was staying in Taguig City. Besides, the room where he was staying in was so crowded with his other relatives and, thus, it was impossible that he could have abused her there. 15
Appellant also claimed that complainant and her mother's live-in partner have an intimate relationship. In fact, complainant's younger sibling saw them having sexual intercourse on August 26, 2011. Complainant's mother was just afraid that her husband would learn of the incident and blame her for it. 16
Appellant's mother and his siblings corroborated his testimony and stated that the mother's live-in partner was the real molester. 17
The Trial Court's Ruling
As borne by Decision dated June 17, 2015, the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction, viz.:
WHEREFORE, finding accused [XXX] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape (under Article 266-A, 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code, as amended) in Criminal Case No. 147120, this court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA without eligibility for parole; and to pay [AAA] the sum of PhP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP75,000.00 as moral damages, and PhP30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, of Sexual Abuse (Under Sec. 5(b), R.A. 7610) in Criminal Case No. 147121, this court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 2 months of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to 20 years of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum, and to pay AAA the sum of PhP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP50,000.00 as moral damages, PhP30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and a fine of PhP50,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 18
The trial court gave full credence to complainant's positive testimony pointing to appellant as the person who sexually ravished her. It noted that fourteen (14)-year old complainant would not concoct an accusation of rape against appellant, allow her private parts to be examined, and subject herself to ridicule if the same were not true. She was not shown to have been motivated by any consideration other than her genuine desire for justice for what appellant did to her. Her testimony was also corroborated by the medical findings, thus, must prevail over appellant's bare denial. 19
More, appellant's contention that it was impossible for him to have sexually abused complainant allegedly because the house where they stayed was full of occupants and made of thin walls was rejected by the trial court. For lust is not a respecter of time and place, thus, rape could be committed anywhere and anytime. 20
The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court when it gave credence to complainant's purportedly inconsistent and improbable testimony, viz.: 1) complainant's narration of the incident lacked details, 2) she did not scream for help or resisted during the alleged sexual assault, and 3) she did not immediately report the incidents of sexual assault. Appellant also argued that complainant had ill-motive in filing the case against him because she was covering up for her mother's live-in partner, the actual abuser of complainant. 21
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Assistant Solicitor General Magtanggol M. Castro and State Solicitor Dino Robert L. De Leon countered in the main: complainant's positive testimony that appellant had carnal knowledge of her was worthy of belief specially since it was corroborated by medical findings. Complainant's failure to shout for help despite the supposed presence of other occupants in the house did not negate the occurrence of such sexual assault because there was no standard response when one is confronted by a startling incident like sexual abuse. 22 Too, the OSG maintained that a legal interest of 6% per annum should also be imposed on the total amount of damages awarded. 23
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction but modified the monetary awards, granting an additional six (6%) legal interest per annum on the total amounts awarded from finality of judgment until fully paid. 24
The Present Petition
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and pleads anew for his acquittal. In compliance with Resolution 25 dated June 6, 2018, both appellant and the OSG manifested that in lieu of supplemental briefs, they were adopting their respective briefs before the Court of Appeals. 26
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming appellant's conviction for rape in Criminal Case No. 147120 and sexual abuse in Criminal Case No. 147121?
Ruling
We modify.
Rape through force or intimidation
Rape under Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code requires the following elements: 1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and 2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. 27
These elements are all present in this case. Complainant herself narrated how appellant raped her, thus:
Q What did [he] do to you if you can still remember?
A He undressed me, Ma'am.
Q What else?
A Pinasok niya po iyong ari niya sa pekpek ko.
Q What did you feel when he inserted his penis into your private part?
A It was painful and afterwards something came out like colored red, Ma'am.
Q And did you inform your mother about [the] incident?
A At first[,] no Ma'am.
Q Why?
A Because I was afraid of him, Ma'am.
Q Why are you afraid [of] him?
A Because he told me not to tell anyone because if I tell anyone he would kill me, Ma'am. 28
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant's testimony is clear, positive, and unwavering despite her young age. People v. Ramos29 ordains that when the victim's testimony is straightforward, consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.
More, complainant's testimony was corroborated by medico legal Dr. Dettabali's finding showing that complainant sustained blunt penetrating trauma 30 and psychiatrist Dr. Camus' assessment that complainant was suffering from post-traumatic stress causing her to have sexual urges, an abnormal behavior for her age. She also concluded that this sexualized behavior was caused by complainant's exposure to sexual abuse. 31
In People v. Ronquillo, the Court held that when the consistent and straightforward testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge had been established. 32
On appellant's allegation that complainant did not even resist or shout for help, suffice it to state that a victim's failure to shout or resist the accused would not ipso facto negate rape, let alone, indicate consent. People v. Palanay is in point:
It bears to stress that in rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance because it is not an element of rape. Thus, the failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim's submission to the criminal act of the offender. 33
As for complainant's alleged delay in reporting the rape incidents, People v. Bejim ordains:
[L]ong silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape have not always been construed as indications of a false accusation. A rape charge becomes doubtful only when the delay in revealing its commission is unreasonable and unexplained. In the present case, appellant threatened the victims that he would kill them and their families if they would tell anyone of what he did to them. To our mind, this is a reasonable explanation for the delay. 34
As a young girl, complainant could not be expected to have known what to do under such difficult circumstances and to have mustered the courage to lodge a complaint immediately. For a rape victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. This would not, however, undermine her credibility as a witness. 35
Appellant further claims he was charged with the rape of complainant because the latter's mother was covering up for her live-in partner who was the actual abuser.
The argument does not persuade. Motive such as resentment, hatred, or revenge becomes inconsequential when the rape victim gave an affirmative and credible declaration, which clearly established the liability of the accused. 36 The same dictum applies here.
Besides, no decent parent would use his or her daughter as an instrument of revenge, especially if it will subject the child to embarrassment and lifelong stigma that a public trial brings. Complainant's mother who was not shown to be an indecent person, would not drag complainant's honor to public scrutiny if she was not motivated solely by the desire to exact justice for the wrong committed on her daughter. 37
Finally, appellant's bare denial and alibi, aside from being inherently weak, cannot prevail over complainant's positive and credible testimony on appellant's identity as the man who sexually ravished her. 38
Sexual Abuse Was Not Duly Proven
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 are:
1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 39
On the alleged sexual abuse, complainant testified:
Court to the Witness
Q Kailan iyong huli na naalala mo na may ginawa sa iyo ang Tito mo?
A Kasi po umalis kami doon February na.
Q Noong buwan ng February may nangyari sa iyo?
A Kalahati yata meron na po.
Q Ibig mong sabihin kalahatian ng buwan ng Pebrero may nangyari pa?
A Opo.
Counsel
Q What year was that?
A 2011, Ma'am. 40
Complainant's testimony on the sexual abuse was too general and lacked specific details on how it was committed. Her bare statement that appellant did something to her in 2011 is inadequate to establish beyond reasonable doubt the alleged sexual abuse. The Court is left to guess and theorize on what really happened. Unlike the detailed testimony on the rape committed in 2007, the narration of the alleged sexual abuse was bereft of the essentials that comprise the elements of the crime.
To be sure, each and every charge of rape or sexual abuse is a separate and distinct crime so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. A victim's general statement that she was raped repeatedly after the first incident is clearly inadequate and insufficient to establish the guilt of the accused as far as the other rape charges are concerned. Such statement was a mere conclusion, not a narration of constitutive facts. 41
In People v. Tabio, the Court declared that the prosecution must demonstrate in sufficient detail the manner by which the crime was perpetrated. Certainly, the testimony of complainant to the effect that the appellant repeated what he did in the first rape would not be enough to warrant the conclusion that the second and third rape had indeed been committed. 42
In light of the prosecution's failure here to prove appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) or RA 7610, he ought to be acquitted therefrom. Indeed, the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. 43
Penalty and Damages
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 266-B. Penalty. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxx xxx xxx.
Both minority of the victim and the relationship of the offender to the victim must both be alleged in the Information and duly proved clearly and indubitably as the crime itself. They must be lumped together and their concurrence constitutes only one special qualifying circumstance. 44
Here, the twin circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged in the Information. Too, during trial, the prosecution presented complainant's birth certificate indicating that she was born on August 4, 1997, 45 complainant's sinumpaang salaysay describing appellant as her uncle, being the sibling of her mother, 46 and appellant's own sinumpaang salaysay admitting his relationship to complainant. 47 Verily, the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship were sufficiently proven qualifying the offense of simple rape to qualified rape.
Qualified rape under Paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC is imposable by death penalty. With the enactment of RA 9346, 48 however, the imposition of death penalty is prohibited and the proper penalty would be reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole.
Finally, following People v. Jugueta, 49 the awards of damages is increased to P100,000.00, as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated October 27, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07634 is MODIFIED, thus:
1) In Criminal Case No. 147120, appellant XXX is GUILTY of QUALIFIED RAPE under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole; and to pay complainant the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The total amount of damages awarded shall earn a legal interest six (6%) per annum from finality of the decision until fully paid.
2) In Criminal Case No. 147121, appellant XXX is ACQUITTED of the charge of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act 7610 on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED." PERALTA, C.J., took no part; ZALAMEDA, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated September 16, 2020.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family, or household members, shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy, and fictitious initial shall, instead, be used in accordance with People v. Cabalquinto [533 Phil. 703 (2006)] and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and concurred in by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, and Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan Manahan, rollo, pp. 2-22.
3. Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
4.Supra note 1.
5. Records, p. 1.
6.Id. at 3.
7.Id. at 52-53.
8.Rollo, p. 4.
9.Id. at 4-5
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13. Record, pp. 15 and 18.
14.Id. at 19 and 67.
15.Rollo, p. 6.
16.Id. at 6-7.
17.Id. at 7.
18. CA rollo, p. 34.
19.Id. at 32-34.
20.Id. at 33.
21.Id. at 75-79.
22.Id. at 116-124.
23.Id. at 125.
24.Rollo, pp. 21-22.
25.Rollo, pp. 29-30.
26. The People's Manifestation, id. at 33-35; Appellant's Manifestation, id. at 40-42.
27.People v. Tubillo, G.R. No. 220718, June 21, 2017.
28. TSN dated July 3, 2012, pp. 13-15.
29. G.R. No. 210435, August 15, 2018.
30. Record, pp. 15 and 18.
31.Id. at 19 and 67.
32. 818 Phil. 641, 651 (2017).
33. 805 Phil. 116, 124 (2017)
34. 824 Phil. 10, 22 (2018)
35.People v. Traya, 388 Phil. 293, 300 (2000).
36.People v. Opong, 577 Phil. 571, 590 (2008).
37.People v. Bagsic, 822 Phil. 784, 797 (2017).
38.People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 527 (2013).
39.People v. Dagsa, 824 Phil. 704, 721 (2018).
40. TSN dated July 3, 2012, p. 34.
41.People v. Manalo, 444 Phil. 654, 673 (2003).
42.People v. Tabio, 568 Phil. 144, 155 (2008).
43.Daayata v. People, 807 Phil. 102, 118 (2017).
44.People v. Bolo, 792 Phil. 905, 921-922 (2016).
45. Record, p. 16.
46.Id. at 11-13
47.Id. at 20-22.
48. An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
49. 783 Phil. 806, 848 (2016).