SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232335. March 27, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.XXX, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 27 March 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232335 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, versusXXX, 1accused-appellant.
After a careful review of the records of the case and the issues submitted by the parties, the Court finds no error committed in the Decision 2 dated December 6, 2016 of the Court of Appeals, Seventeenth (17th) Division (CA), in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 07823. The facts, as borne out by the records, sufficiently support the conclusion that accused-appellant XXX (XXX) is indeed guilty of the crime of Rape. The issues and matters raised before the Court, the same ones as those raised in the CA, there being no supplemental briefs filed, were sufficiently addressed and correctly ruled upon by the CA.
It is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court. 3 Thus, when the case pivots on the issue of the credibility of the victim, the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great weight and respect as they are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the demeanor and sincerity of witnesses during trial. 4 Here, after examining the records of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to vacate the RTC's 5 appreciation of the evidence, which was affirmed in toto by the CA.
The Court finds no merit in the allegations of XXX that: (1) he should not have been convicted of the crime of Rape because of the incredibility and unreliability of private complainant AAA's 6 (AAA) testimony; (2) the prosecution failed to establish that AAA resisted the sexual acts as she did not incur any physical injuries; and (3) the trial court erred in not considering his defenses of denial and alibi.
Anent the first contention of XXX, the CA is correct in convicting XXX based on the testimony of AAA. The Court has consistently held that it will not disturb findings of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses. 7 The evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. 8 In this case, AAA categorically testified to the act of sexual intercourse, identifying the perpetrator in the process. 9 The RTC did not overlook or misconstrue any substantial fact which could have affected the outcome of the case. 10 A thorough examination of AAA's testimony reveals that such testimony is spontaneous, clear, candid, and free from any material inconsistencies. 11 Thus, the Court finds no reason to disturb the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the testimony of AAA. CAIHTE
He likewise attempts to undermine the credibility of AAA's testimony by alleging that AAA's actuations during the rape incident is not in accord with the normal course of things or consistent with human nature. He alleges that AAA had the chance to escape when XXX left her on the floor when he went to her son, yet she did not do so. The Court, however, is not swayed by the contentions of XXX. Rape is not commonly experienced by a woman. Thus, there is no common reaction to it. 12 As correctly ruled by the CA, the failure of AAA to escape while XXX was transferring her child to the ground was in accord with common human experience. No mother will leave her child in the hands of a man who is about to commit a bestial act against her. Thus, the CA was correct in saying that AAA took a prudent course of action when she stayed put, which was impelled by the maternal instinct in giving utmost importance to the welfare of her child. 13
As to his second contention that there was no force or intimidation because she did not sustain any injuries, the Court has consistently held that for the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force employed be so great or be of such character that it could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force employed by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. In other words, force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; as long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point. 14 Further, proof of physical injury is not an essential element of the crime of rape. 15 The absence of abrasion or contusion on the victim does not signify that there was no force or intimidation. The law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. 16 In this case, it has been established that XXX poked a balisong at her and her child in order for her to submit to his sexual desires. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that there was force and intimidation in the case at bar.
In addition, XXX contends that it cannot be ascertained who caused the hymenal remnants and abrasion bearing in mind that AAA has a common-law husband who could have caused such prior to the alleged incident. However, jurisprudence provides that the absence of fresh lacerations in the victim's hymen does not negate sexual intercourse, nor does it prove that she was not raped; 17 a hymenal laceration or its absence is merely corroborative evidence that is not indispensable to a finding of rape. The CA thus correctly ruled that even if the medical findings of the physician who examined AAA is disregarded, rape may still be established because what is essential is proof of carnal knowledge between XXX and AAA, i.e., that there be at least penile contact with the latter's labia even without the laceration of her hymen. 18
Lastly, his defenses of denial and alibi must fail. Well-settled is the rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and are practically worthless against the positive identification made by the prosecution witness, especially the rape victim. 19 Although Bonifacio "Dodong" Casas testified that he rode at the back of XXX's motorcycle to the cockpit at around 10:30 a.m., he also testified that he was not always with XXX in the cockpit and he did not know if XXX was with AAA between 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.20 Moreover, he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to have been in the crime scene at the time AAA was raped. The cockpit was only around one kilometer or 30 minutes away from the house of AAA. 21 To overcome the evidence of the prosecution, an alibi, must satisfy the test of full, clear, and satisfactory evidence. This test requires not only proof that the accused was somewhere else other than the scene of the crime, but clear and convincing proof of physical impossibility for him to have been at the place of the commission of the crime. 22
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution had completely proved the guilt of XXX beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape.
However, the Court modifies the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, 23 in cases of rape, the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages should be in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Decision dated December 6, 2016 of the Court of Appeals, Seventeenth (17th) Division, in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 07823. The Decision finding accused-appellant XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. He is ordered to pay the private complainant ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as civil indemnity, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. DETACa
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of CourtBy:TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. The identity of the victims or any information which could establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992; RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children" (November 15, 2004). (See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 [2014], citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 [2013]. See also Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN THE PROMULGATION, PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF DECISIONS, FINAL RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USING FICTITIOUS NAMES/PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017; and People v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018.)
2.Rollo, pp. 2-17. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz, with Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting concurring.
3.People v. Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, 831 SCRA 469, 478.
4.People v. Aguilar, 565 Phil. 233, 247 (2007).
5. See Decision dated June 26, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55, in Crim. Case No. 2011-296, penned by Presiding Judge Agripino R. Bravo; CA rollo, pp. 28-40.
6. See note 1.
7.People v. Beduya, 641 Phil. 399, 412 (2010).
8.People v. Banzuela, 723 Phil. 797, 815 (2013), citing People v. Sapigao, Jr., 614 Phil. 589, 599 (2009).
9.Rollo, p. 10.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.People v. Delos Reyes, 697 Phil. 531, 550 (2012).
13.Rollo, p. 13.
14.People v. Grefiel, 290 Phil. 77, 90 (1992), citing US v. Villarosa, 4 Phil. 434, 437 (1905); People v. Plaga, 279 Phil. 56, 62 (1991); People v. Saldivia, 280 Phil. 501, 513 (1991) and People v. Momo, 56 Phil. 86, 87 (1931).
15.People v. Abella, 373 Phil. 650, 657-658 (1999).
16.People v. Alquizalas, 364 Phil. 858, 872 (1999); People v. Cantos, Sr., 365 Phil. 340, 352 (1999).
17.People v. Aguiluz, 406 Phil. 936, 943-944 (2001).
18. See id. at 944.
19.People v. Cabuntog, 420 Phil. 137, 151 (2001), citing People v. Henson, 337 Phil. 318, 324 (1997).
20.Rollo, p. 6.
21.Id.; CA rollo, p. 38.
22.People v. Villanueva, 284-A Phil. 316, 320-321 (1992).
23.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 906 (2016).