SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 248848. September 19, 2022.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.VVV, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 19, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 248848 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VVV, accused-appellant). — After a careful review of the records of the case and the issues submitted by the parties, this Court affirms accused-appellant VVV's conviction, with modification based on recent jurisprudence. The issues and matters raised before this Court are the same as those raised in the Court of Appeals, which have been sufficiently addressed and correctly ruled upon.
On February 3, 2017 four separate Informations were filed against accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. Their accusatory portions read:
Criminal Case No. 312-V-17:
The undersigned Associate Prosecution Attorney II accuses [VVV] of the crime of "RAPE under Paragraph 2 of Article 266-A in Relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code," committed as follows:
That sometime in 2007 in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the accused, being the step father of herein minor complainant, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, inserted [sic] his penis inside the mouth of AAA (DOB: x x x), who was then 8 years old, against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 313-V-17:
The undersigned Associate Prosecution Attorney II accuses [VVV] of the crime of "RAPE under Paragraph 2 of Article 266-A in Relation to Article 266-[B] of the Revised Penal Code," committed as follows:
That sometime in 2010 in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the accused, being the step father of herein minor complainant, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, inserted [sic] his penis inside the mouth of AAA (DOB: x x x), who was then (11) years old, against her will and without her consent. AScHCD
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 314-V-17:
The undersigned Associate Prosecution Attorney II accuses [VVV] of the offense of "Violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610," committed as follows:
That on or about April 21, 2016 in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the accused, being the step father of herein minor complainant, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, inserted [sic] his finger inside the vagina of AAA (DOB: x x x), a minor seventeen (17) years old, while the said complainant is [sic] sleeping and hence deprived of reason or [was] unconscious, against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 315-V-17:
The undersigned Associate Prosecution Attorney II accuses [VVV] of the offense of "Violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610," committed as follows:
That on or about 2nd week of April 2016 in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the accused, being the step father of herein minor complainant, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, inserted [sic] his finger inside the vagina of AAA (DOB: x x x), a minor seventeen (17) years old, while the said complainant is [sic] sleeping and hence deprived of reason or [was] unconscious, against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Accused-appellant now appeals before this Court after both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals convicted him of the crimes charged. 2 Accused-appellant asserts that the dates indicated in the four Informations were so indefinite and uncertain as to deprive him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3
Contrary to accused-appellant's assertion, the absence in the Information of the exact dates when the incidents occurred does not violate his rights. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the exact date of the commission of the crime is not an essential element as what is material is its occurrence. 4 This was explained in People v. Nuyok: 5
The failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes were committed did not ipso facto render the informations defective. Neither the date nor the time of the commission of rape is a material ingredient of the crime, for the essence of the crime is carnal knowledge of a female against her will through force or intimidation. Precision as to the time when the rape is committed has no bearing on its commission. Consequently, the date or the time of the commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. 6 (Citations omitted)
Accused-appellant disagrees that private complainant AAA's testimony is credible. He points out the substantial inconsistency and contradiction between her sworn statement and her testimony in open court on whether accused-appellant sexually abused her until 2013 or 2014. 7 AcICHD
Again, accused-appellant is mistaken. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, "since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed." 8 Further, variance in minor details, instead of diminishing credibility, bolsters it as they discount the possibility that the testimony was rehearsed. What is important is the "witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same." 9
In this case, as observed by the Regional Trial Court and upheld by the Court of Appeals, AAA sufficiently testified on the material points of her allegations against accused-appellant in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and consistent manner. It is likewise observed that the alleged inconsistency or contradiction does not involve the incidents subject of this case, thereby rendering the matter immaterial.
Accused-appellant insists that AAA's demeanor during and after the alleged incidents should place doubt on the truthfulness of her claims. He asserts that AAA's testimony that he inserted his finger into her vagina in 2016 is incredulous as she could have shouted for help or asked for her mother's assistance since they were all sleeping in the same bedroom. He claims her failure to do so is contrary to human experience and should render her claim difficult to believe. Additionally, he argues that if he truly sexually abused AAA, then she should have felt awkward when he assisted her in filing a criminal complaint against her former boyfriend. Instead, her testimony revealed that she did not find his assistance awkward, thereby putting in question her reliability as a witness. 10
These arguments are without merit. In a number of cases, this Court has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or who has been raped. It is a settled rule that the failure of the victim to shout or seek help does not negate rape. 11 This is because "[n]o standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement, particularly a child who could not be expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult. People react differently to emotional stress, and rape victims are no different from them." 12 AAA should not be faulted for not shouting for help when accused-appellant was sexually assaulting her. Similarly, her feelings toward accused-appellant's assistance in the filing of a case against her former boyfriend is immaterial to the incidents at hand.
Considering the foregoing, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court correctly rejected accused-appellant's defense of denial and ruled for his conviction. Nonetheless, in line with recent jurisprudence, there is a need to modify the nomenclature of the crimes charged, as well as the resultant penalties and damages to be paid. caITAC
The Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 312-V-17 and 313-V-17 charged accused-appellant with "Rape under Paragraph 2 of Article 266-A in Relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code." 13 Based on the facts as found by the Regional Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant inserted his penis into AAA's mouth when she was eight (8) and eleven (11) years old. 14 Pursuant to People v. Tulagan, 15 the proper nomenclature of the crime is "Sexual Assault under Article 266-A (2) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610":
Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a mere "crime against chastity" in the form of acts of lasciviousness to a "crime against persons" akin to rape, as well as the rulings in Dimakuta and Caoili, We hold that if the acts constituting sexual assault are committed against a victim under 12 years of age or is demented, the nomenclature of the offense should now be "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610" and no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610," because sexual assault as a form of acts of lasciviousness is no longer covered by Article 336 but by Article 266-A (2) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. Nevertheless, the imposable penalty is still reclusion temporal in its medium period, and not prision mayor. 16
Since accused-appellant is AAA's stepfather and such relationship was alleged in the Informations and remains undisputed, 17 an aggravating circumstance exists for the purpose of increasing the imposable penalty to the maximum period. Accordingly, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is instead sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count. In accordance with People v. Tulagan, 18 this Court also modifies the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 each, for each count.
As regards Criminal Case Nos. 314-V-17 and 315-V-17, this Court affirms accused-appellant's conviction, subject to the modification of its nomenclature from "Violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610" to "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act. No. 7610," 19 and the deletion of the phrase "without eligibility for parole" in the penally to be imposed on accused-appellant. 20
FOR THESE REASONS, the conviction of accused-appellant VVV for Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault under Article 226-A (2) in relation to Article 226-B of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. He is hereby sentenced as follows:
a. In Criminal Case Nos. 312-V-17 and 313-V-17, accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Sexual Assault under Article 266-A (2) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay private complainant AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count; cDHAES
b. In Criminal Case Nos. 314-V-17 and 315-V-17, accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay private complainant AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and a fine in the amount of P15,000.00 for each count; and
c. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay private complainant AAA interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid. 21
SO ORDERED." (Lopez, M., J., on official business)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 5-6.
2. Id. at 8-9 and 20-21.
3. CA rollo, p. 77.
4. Rollo, p. 11. See People v. Bunagan y Sonio, 579 Phil. 271 (2008) [Per J. Velasco, Second Division].
5. 759 Phil. 437 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
6. Id. at 448-449.
7. Id. at 79.
8. People v. Masubay y Pasagi, G.R. No. 248875, September 3, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66811> [Per J. Reyes, Jr., First Division].
9. People v. Gerola y Amar, 813 Phil. 1055, 1066 (2017) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].
10. CA rollo, pp. 80-81.
11. People v. Masubay y Pasagi, G.R. No. 248875, September 3, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66811> [Per J. Reyes, Jr., First Division].
12. People v. XXX, G.R. No. 246499, November 4, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67145> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
13. Rollo, p. 4; and CA rollo, p. 88.
14. Rollo, p. 7.
15. G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65020> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
16. Id.
17. Rollo, p. 18.
18. G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65020> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
19. Id.
20. A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC (2015), Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase "Without Eligibility for Parole" in Indivisible Penalties.
21. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc.]