People v. Villete y Cuadro

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 229051. March 21, 2022]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. JOJO VILLETE y CUADRO, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated March 21, 2022, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 229051 (People of the Philippines v. Jojo Villete y Cuadro). — Before this Court is an appeal filed by Jojo Villete y Cuadro (accused-appellant) assailing the Decision 1 dated May 24, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07118, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated August 14, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 82 of Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-10-167881. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Antecedents

In an Information dated November 30, 2010, Villete was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 26th day of November 2010 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her/their possession and control dangerous drugs, to wit: five (5) plastic sachets of dried Marijuana fruiting tops with a total gram of fourteen point nine nine thirty eight (14.9938) and 2 plastic sachets of Cannabis resin with a total gram of twenty seven point five four seventy one (27.5471), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

During arraignment, Villete, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. 4

The prosecution alleged that on November 25, 2010, Search Warrant No. 10-16708 was issued by Executive Judge Amor A. Reyes (Judge Reyes) of the RTC of Manila, authorizing the search of the property owned by one alias "Bok-bok." The property was located at No. 41 Lanao Street, Barangay Sto. Cristo, Quezon City. The warrant also authorized the seizure of an undetermined quantity of dangerous drugs, particularly methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu and drug paraphernalia, concealed in the premises and in the possession of alias Bok-bok and several John Does. 5

On November 26, 2010, Intelligence Officer 1 Joanna Marie Betorin (IO1 Betorin) was at the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Metro Manila Regional Office in Barangay Piñahan, Quezon City. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was called by Agent 1 Bonifacio Craig Lomas-e, Jr. (Agent Lomas-e), the chief of their office, for the implementation of Search Warrant No. 10-16708. After the briefing, IO1 Betorin and the members of her team, composed of thirty (30) PDEA personnel went to the Quezon City Police District (QCPD) for police coordination, as evidenced by a Certification of Coordination that was issued on the same day. The team included, among others, IO1 Cesar Dealagdon (IO1 Dealagdon), one IO1 Dela Rosa and one IO1 Abinido. Thereafter, they proceeded to No. 41 Lanao Street, Brgy. Santo Cristo, Quezon City. 6

When the team arrived at the target area, they saw an unidentified male come out of the house. Upon seeing the police officers, the unidentified male ran away. They then chased the man and saw him enter a nearby house located at No. 57 Pampanga Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon City. The team cornered him inside the house and IO1 Dealagdon proceeded to arrest the unidentified male. The PDEA agents then saw on top of a table, in plain view, transparent plastic sachets containing dried leaves and fruiting tops, as well as sachets containing a greenish soil-like substance. Thereafter, IO1 Betorin arrested Villete, the occupant of the house, seized the sachets and subsequently marked them as follows: 7

 

SPECIMEN	GROSS WEIGHT	MARKED AS
a) one (1) self-sealing transparent plastic sachet containing dried leaves and fruiting tops	4.7262 grams	A-1-JMB 11-26-10
b) one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing dried leaves and fruiting tops	2.9242 grams	A-2-JMB 11-26-10
c) one (1) opened transparent plastic sachet containing dried leaves and fruiting tops	0.72 grams	A-3-JMB 11-26-10
d) one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing greenish soil-like substance	13.71 grams	A-4-JMB 11-26-10
e) one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing greenish soil-like substance	13.84 grams	A-5-JMB 11-26-10
f) one (1) glass vial containing dried leaves and fruiting tops	2.89 grams	A-6-JMB 11-26-10
g) one (1) glass vial containing dried leaves and fruiting tops	3.7315 grams	A-7-JMB 11-26-10 8

 

After IO1 Betorin arrested Villete, she prepared an inventory of the seized items which was duly signed by media representative Kit Gallardo and Barangay Kagawad Bienvenido V. Valerio as witnesses. She then prepared a request for laboratory examination of the seized items and brought Villete to the crime laboratory for medical examination. 9

Jappeth Santiago (Santiago), a forensic chemist of the PDEA, examined the samples taken from the pieces of evidence marked as "A-1 to A-7." Based on the Chemistry Report No. PDEA-DD010-460 he prepared, these specimens tested positive for the presence of marijuana and cannabis resin, viz.: CAIHTE

"Specimens A-1 to A-3 and A-6 to A-7 gave POSITIVE results for the presence of Marijuana.

"Specimens A-4 to A-5 gave POSITIVE results for the presence of Cannabis resin." 10

Meanwhile, Villete narrated his own version of the incidents and claimed that he is the lessee of the property located at No. 57 Pampanga Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon City and that the property is approximately one (1) block away from Lanao Street, Brgy. Sto. Cristo, Quezon City. He works as a tattoo artist at a place located in Recto Street, Manila and that on November 26, 2010, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was inside his house when he suddenly heard someone banging the door. Thereafter, PDEA operatives entered the house, handcuffed him and ordered him to lie down on the floor. According to him, he was ordered to go with them for verification purposes because the PDEA operatives were looking for a particular person. When he was brought to the police station, he repeatedly asked them what offense he committed but they ignored him. Villete further claimed that he was never brought before the prosecutor for inquest proceedings and that he merely stayed outside the prosecutor's office. He also denied any knowledge regarding the seized items. 11

In a Decision 12 dated August 14, 2014, the RTC found Villete guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of IO1. Betorin and held that the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti and the unbroken chain of custody. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jojo Villete Cuadro 'Guilty' beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165.

Accordingly, this Court sentences accused Jojo Villete y Cuadro to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a Fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without eligibility for parole in accordance with R.A. 9346.

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) the dangerous drugs subject of this case for proper disposition and final disposal.

SO ORDERED. 13

Undeterred, Villete appealed to the CA. According to him, the trial court gravely erred when it found him guilty of the offense charged notwithstanding the police officers' violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure and their failure to comply with the requirements found in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. 14

In a Decision dated May 24, 2016, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and sustained the conviction of Villete. According to the CA, the case at bar squarely falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine. 15 It likewise held that although there were deviations from the required procedure, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs have been properly preserved. In so ruling, the CA gave credence to the testimony of IO1 Betorin stressing that prosecution witnesses who are police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Thus, it disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Decision dated August 14, 2014 of Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-10-167881 is hereby AFFIRMEDin toto.

SO ORDERED. 16

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue

Whether accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 17

Moreover, settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. 18 The rule finds stricter application in drug-related cases for the reason that the possession or sale of even a small quantity of dangerous drugs could result in an unimaginably long prison sentence. Given the increasing number of buy-bust operations being conducted, it has become difficult, albeit more crucial than ever, to identify and weed out wrongdoers responsible for the proliferation of drug-planting and tampering of evidence. Thus, the burden is not on the accused to prove his innocence; rather, it is for the prosecution to establish the corpus delicti of the crime.

The successful prosecution of criminal actions involving dangerous drugs depends largely on the weight-evidentiary merit or probative value — accorded the evidence. This is so because, in drug cases, the prohibited articles confiscated from the accused comprise the very corpus delicti of the charge. Accordingly, it is of paramount importance that the identity of the seized items be established beyond reasonable doubt. In order to do so, the prosecution must prove that the illicit substance or paraphernalia recovered during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same as that offered in evidence before the court. 19

Here, accused-appellant was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Jurisprudence dictates that to secure a conviction, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. 20

The trial court and the CA both concluded that the case squarely falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine. Meanwhile, accused-appellant's plea of innocence is anchored on two circumstances; first, the violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and second, the arresting officers' failure to comply with the requirements provided in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. According to him, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot be used to conclude that the integrity of the seized items was preserved, in view of the unjustified breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21, and the invalidity of the arrest and seizure carried out by the arresting officers. 21 Accused-appellant maintains his denial of the charge against him and claims that his right against unreasonable searches and seizure, as guaranteed under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, was violated by the PDEA operatives when the latter barged into his house and arrested him without any justification.

After a thorough assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellant. DETACa

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that "the people's right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature shall be inviolable." To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. 22 Consequently, all evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

To carry out a valid search and seizure, the general rule is that the arresting officers must be armed with a search warrant or warrant of arrest, premised on a finding of probable cause and determined personally by a judge. Over the years, however, jurisprudence has recognized instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures, which are the following:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 23

In searches with a warrant, it is required that the warrant of arrest must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. As such, the address in the search warrant must match the actual place to be searched. In People v. Court of Appeals, 24 the Court ruled that the place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the arresting officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the arresting officers conducting the search. aDSIHc

In this case, the warrant authorized the search of, and was limited to one specific address: "No. 41 Lanao Street." By no stretch of imagination can it be presumed that the validity of the warrant be extended to neighboring residences. As such, any arrest and corresponding search conducted outside of No. 41 Lanao Street, as in this case, must sufficiently comply with the requirements of a valid warrantless arrest.

To be sure, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which serves as an exception to the requirement of a search warrant, necessitate a prior lawful arrest. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful, viz.:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5 (a) and (b), the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section 5 (a), the arresting officer must have personally witnessed the crime. Meanwhile, under Section 5 (b), the arresting officer must have had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed an offense. Nonetheless, whether under Section 5 (a) or (b), the lawful arrest generally precedes, or is substantially contemporaneous with the search. 25

Here, no overt act could be properly attributed to the unidentified male as to rouse suspicion in the mind of IO1 Betorin and her companions that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. The man's act of running away when he saw the arresting officers should not be construed against him and does not automatically constitute probable cause for the purpose of effecting a valid warrantless arrest. As repeatedly held by the Court, flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one's consciousness of guilt. 26 It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. 27

Similarly, the manner by which accused-appellant was apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellant committed it. Third, accused-appellant was not a prisoner who had escaped from a penal establishment.

Since the arresting officers' intrusion into No. 57 Pampanga Street was not based on a valid warrantless arrest, the same cannot be justified. Incidentally, the plain view doctrine is inapplicable. The plain view doctrine necessitates the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 28

IO1 Betorin personally testified that upon their arrival at No. 41 Lanao Street, an unidentified man went out of the house and ran away upon seeing them. Without ascertaining the man's identity, they chased him on the sole premise that they found him "suspicious." When they followed him inside No. 57 Pampanga Street, a private and enclosed property, they allegedly saw sachets placed on top of a table, containing what appeared to be dangerous drugs. They then arrested the unidentified man and accused-appellant, the latter being the occupant of the house. To reiterate, the search warrant issued by Judge Reyes specifically authorized the search and seizure of dangerous drugs in the possession of alias Bok-bok and several John Does, as well as the property owned by alias Bok-bok located at No. 41 Lanao Street, Brgy. Santo Cristo, Quezon City. There was no mention of the name of accused-appellant or the place No. 57 Pampanga Street in the warrant.

That accused-appellant was neither the target of the operation nor caught in flagrante delicto, belies the prosecution's claim that there was a valid intrusion. To be valid, the prosecution must prove that he was, at the very least, the target or subject of a valid warrantless arrest. Here, there was no mention of any act or behavior on his part that roused suspicion or linked him to the crime charged other than being the occupant of No. 57 Pampanga Street.

In People v. Racho, 29 this Court ruled that the determination of validity of the warrantless arrest would also determine the validity of the warrantless search that was incident to the arrest. A determination of whether there existed probable cause to effect an arrest should therefore be determined first, viz.:

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 30

An in flagrante delicto arrest that does not comply with the overt act test is constitutionally infirm. To be valid, two elements must concur — the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime and such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 31 In his dissent in Esquillo v. People, 32 (then Associate and now former) Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin cautioned against warrantless searches based on just one suspicious circumstance. According to him, there should have been "more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity" to uphold the validity of a stop and frisk search. In this case, there was no overt act within the arresting officers' plain view, which hinted that the unidentified man had just committed, was committing, or about to commit a crime. Thus, their intrusion could not have been premised on a valid warrantless arrest. Consequently, the subsequent apprehension of accused-appellant and the seizure of the effects found in No. 57 Pampanga Street are invalid and the items inadmissible in evidence as there was a clear violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure. ETHIDa

Further, even if We were to assume, for the sake of discussion, that the intrusion was valid and the seizure was justified, this would not automatically mean that the corpus delicti was established. At best, it only affirmed the legality of the arresting officers' intrusion. As stated earlier, the prohibited articles confiscated from the accused comprise the very corpus delicti of the charge. Thus, in order to prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution must ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value thereof has been preserved. To do so, the prosecution must be able to account for all the links in the chain of custody.

The chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. The prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. 33

Here, the trial court gave full credence to the testimony of IO1. Betorin and opined that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 is not fatal to the case of the prosecution so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item are preserved, viz.:

The Court also finds no circumstance that would hint any doubt as to the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the item subject matter of this case. Besides, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. No such evidence was introduced by the accused.

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While the police officers were not able to strictly comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165, case law has it that such non-compliance is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. But what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the accused. 34

We disagree.

Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 outlines the procedure that must be followed by the arresting officers in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs. Paragraph one (1) not only provides the manner by which the seized drugs must be handled but also enumerates the persons required to be present during the inventory and taking of photographs. In 2014, R.A. No. 10640 35 amended R.A. No. 9165, specifically Section 21 thereof, to further strengthen the anti-drug campaign of the government. Notably, the "three-witness rule" in the original provision was amended. The law now only requires two mandatory witnesses — an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (DOJ) or a representative from the media.

Since the offense subject of this appeal was committed before the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 10640, the old provisions of Section 21 and its IRR (three-witness rule) shall apply, viz.:

"(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items." 36

From the foregoing provision, it is clear that strict compliance is required. Contrary to the stance taken by the trial court, an unjustified breach or deviation from the required procedure is fatal to the case of the prosecution unless the same has been satisfactorily justified by the apprehending officer or team. In fact, in a series of cases, the Court has repeatedly held that failure of the arresting officers to justify their deviation from the outlined procedure, i.e., delayed marking, delayed inventory or absence of a mandatory witness, constitutes a substantial gap or break in the chain of custody.

In People v. Tomawis, 37 the Court simplified the procedure outlined in Section 21 by enumerating the requirements which govern the manner of handling and inventory, time, witnesses, and of place after the arrest of the accused and seizure of the dangerous drugs, viz.: cSEDTC

1. The initial custody requirements must be done immediately after seizure or confiscation;

2. The physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of:

a. the accused or his representative or counsel;

b. a representative from the media;

c. a representative from the DOJ; and

d. any elected public official.

3. The conduct of the physical inventory and photograph shall be done at the:

a. place where the search warrant is served; or

b. at the nearest police station; or

c. nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure.

All the above requirements must be complied with for a successful prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165. Any deviation in the mandatory procedure must be satisfactorily justified by the buy-bust team. Under Section 21 of the IRR, the Court may allow deviation from the procedure only where the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. If these two elements are present, the seizures and custody over the confiscated items shall not be rendered void and invalid.

The prosecution's contention that the arrest and seizure were valid as the case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine, is not only misplaced, but an entirely separate matter from the procedural compliance required by Section 21. Given the conflicting testimonies and circumstances under which accused-appellant was arrested, there is all the more reason to determine whether or not Section 21 was complied with.

Section 21 of RA No. 9165 mandates that physical inventory and photographing be done in the presence of three witnesses — a barangay official, a representative from the media, and a representative from the DOJ. Here, not only was the representative from the DOJ absent when the inventory was conducted, but the arresting team also failed to take photographs of the seized items. As to the absence of a DOJ representative, IO1 Betorin testified that they tried to secure the attendance of one, but later on admitted that she could not recall whether or not her team tried to contact the DOJ. She also testified that she did not know for certain whether the seized items belonged to accused-appellant, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Very nice of you officer. I noticed in your inventory that there is no representative from the Department of Justice, why was that so, officer?

A: We tried to secure the attendance of the DOJ representative, but no one is available, sir.

Q: Before you implemented the search warrant, did you try to contact the Department of Justice for them to give you an available representative?

A: I cannot recall, sir.

Q: You cannot recall again. Now, the items which according to you, you recovered on top of the table of house no. 57, of course, you do not know who owns those paraphernalia?

A: No, sir.

Q: You also do not know. You also do not know whether that house belongs to Jojo Villete, it so happened that he was there only, right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So at this point in time, you cannot with certainty tell the Court who owns those paraphernalia because you recovered them on top of the table, right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You did not bother to ask the Kagawad who owns that house?

A: I cannot recall, sir. 38

xxx xxx xxx

IO1 Betorin's mere assertion that there was no DOJ representative available will not suffice as it lacked the requirement of allegation and proof that earnest efforts were made to secure the attendance of this mandatory witness. To reiterate, the prosecution witnesses testified that the search warrant was issued on November 25, 2010 and the operation was carried out sometime in the afternoon of November 26, 2010. During cross-examination, IO1 Betorin even testified that the team tasked to implement the search warrant was composed of almost 30 personnel from the PDEA. 39 Clearly, it was a pre-planned and big-scale operation that not only necessitated thorough planning, but likewise required a certain level of preparedness from their end. That they had sufficient workforce and ample time to secure the attendance of all the mandatory witnesses had they really wanted to, or could have at least bothered to provide a more detailed explanation of the measures taken to secure the attendance of a representative from the DOJ, bolsters the conclusion that they were remiss in their duty. In People v. Mendoza, 40 the Court highlighted the importance of the three-witness rule, explaining that the mandatory presence of these witnesses would preserve an unbroken chain of custody and prevent the possibility of tampering with or 'planting' of evidence, viz.: SDAaTC

[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. 41

In People v. Lim, 42 the Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, reiterated that testimonies of the prosecution witnesses must establish in detail that earnest effort to coordinate with and secure the presence of the required witnesses were made. The Court also pointed out that given the increasing number of poorly built up drug-related cases in the courts' docket, Section 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations should be enforced as a mandatory policy, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification or record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86(a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall be presented.

xxx xxx xxx

(1) In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended and its IRR.

(2) In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.

xxx xxx xxx

In addition to the unjustified absence of a mandatory witness, the prosecution also failed to justify the police officers' failure to photograph the seized items. A perusal of the records of this case would show no photographs presented as evidence by the prosecution.

The prosecution cannot merely invoke the saving clause found in Section 21 — that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved — without justifying the police officers' failure to comply with the requirements stated therein. Even the presumption as to regularity in the performance by police officers of their official duties cannot prevail when there has been a clear and deliberate disregard of procedural safeguards by the police officers themselves. The Court's ruling in People of the Philippines v. Umipang 43 is instructive on the matter:

Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted. This is especially true when the lapses in procedure were recognized and explained in terms of justifiable grounds. There must also be a showing that the police officers intended to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason. However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence. This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official duties. As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.

For the arresting officers' failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude from the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting officers deliberately disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, as every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities to exert greater efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our society. The need to employ a more stringent approach to scrutinizing the evidence of the prosecution especially when the pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-bust operation redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice system by protecting civil liberties and at the same time instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors. 44 (Citations omitted)

Although the Court has, in several cases, repeatedly applied the saving clause, it remains to be the exception rather than the rule. The requirements found in Section 21 cannot easily be dispensed with absent a reasonable justification or some unforeseen circumstance that absolutely prevented the arresting officers from carrying out their duties in the manner required by law. To prove this, the arresting officer or team must account for all the links in the chain of custody and specifically allege, and be able to justify any form of deviation, lest they leave room for doubt. Any form of deviation from the standard procedure, when left unjustified, constitutes a substantial gap in the chain of custody. As such, it cannot be cured by the simple expedient of invoking the saving clause. A substantial gap or break in the chain casts serious doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. If the corpus delicti is not established, an accused must be acquitted.

The presumption of innocence of an accused is a fundamental constitutional right that should be upheld at all times. In consonance with this constitutional provision, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and the accused must then be acquitted and set free should the prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his/her favor. 45

In all, the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of innocence of accused-appellant. He should thus be acquitted of the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 24, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07118 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant JOJO VILLETE y CUADRO is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. acEHCD

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate implementation. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution, the action he has taken. A copy shall also be furnished to the Police General of Philippine National Police for his information.

The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the dangerous drugs to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando P. Villon with Associate Justices Rodil V. Zalameda (now a member of this Court) and Pedro B. Corales, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 87-97.

2. Penned by Acting Judge Lily Ann M. Padaen; id. at 49-55.

3. Rollo, pp. 2-3.

4. Id. at 3.

5. Rollo, p. 3.

6. Id. at 3-4. *No record of full names of IO1 Dela Rosa and IO1 Abinido.

7. Records, p. 25.

8. Rollo, pp. 4-5.

9. Id. at 5.

10. Id.

11. Id. at 5-6.

12. CA rollo, pp. 49-55.

13. Id. at 54-55.

14. Id. at 36.

15. Rollo, p. 8.

16. Id. at 97.

17. See Sindac v. People, 794 Phil. 421, 427 (2016), People v. Comboy, 782 Phil. 187, 196 (2016).

18. Macayan, Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202, 214 (2015).

19. People v. Honoras, G.R. No. 242878, March 15, 2021.

20. People v. Minanga, 751 Phil. 240, 248 (2015).

21. CA rollo, p. 45.

22. Sindac v. People, 794 Phil. 421, 427 (2016).

23. Larry Sabuco Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019.

24. 353 Phil. 604, 618 (1998).

25. Id.

26. People v. Villareal, 706 Phil. 511, 521 (2013); Valdez v. People, supra note 19, citing People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 862 (1999).

27. People v. Villareal, supra.

28. Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214 (2019).

29. 640 Phil. 669 (2010).

30. Id. at 676-677.

31. Pascasio Duropan and Raymond Nixer Coloma v. People, G.R. No. 230825, June 10, 2020.

32. 643 Phil. 577 (2010).

33. People v. Rosialda, 643 Phil. 712, 714-715 (2010).

34. CA rollo, p. 54.

35. AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002." Approved on June 9, 2014.

36. Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly provides: n

37. 830 Phil. 385 (2018).

38. Records, pp. 33-34.

39. Id. at 24.

40. 736 Phil. 749 (2014).

41. Id. at 764.

42. G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018.

43. 686 Phil. 1024 (2012).

44. Id. at 1053-1054.

45. People v. Arposeple, 821 Phil. 340, 357 (2017).

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.