SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 252457. December 1, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.DIONICIO*VILLE y SANTOS, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 01 December 2021which reads as follows:
''G.R. No. 252457 (People of the Philippines v. Dionicio Ville y Santos). — Challenged in this appeal 1 is the October 10, 2019 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09300, which affirmed the March 20, 2017 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 69, Taguig City in Criminal Case No. 153212, finding accused-appellant Dionicio Ville y Santos (Ville) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide for the death of his son Danilo Ville y Hona (Danilo).
The accusatory portion of the Information 4 reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of January 2014, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without the justifiable cause, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot with improvised shotgun (sumpak) one DANILLO VILLE y HONA, his son, which directly and instantaneously caused his death, said killing having been attended by the qualifying circumstance of relationship which qualifies the killing to Parricide, accused being the biological father of the victim, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
During the arraignment, Ville pleaded not guilty. 6 He also interposed the justifying circumstance of self-defense during pre-trial conference and moved for the conduct of a reversed trial, which the trial court granted in its Order 7 dated July 28, 2014. CAIHTE
Version of the Prosecution:
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Ville's former live-in partner and the victim's mother, Shirley Hona (Shirley), 8 and Ville's daughter and the victim's younger sister, Nina Rose Ville (Nina). 9
Shirley alleged that at around 1:00 in the morning of January 17, 2014, she was awakened by a heated argument between Ville and his son, Danilo. She heard Ville go downstairs and moments later, she heard a gunshot. Upon hearing this, Shirley rushed out of her room to check what happened. She then saw Danila's body on the floor, covered with blood. Shirley and her other children brought Danilo to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. Shirley further claimed that Danilo was nursing a grudge towards Ville because he abandoned them and even brought home another woman to their house. 10
Meanwhile, Nina testified that she arrived home at around 1:00 in the morning of January 17, 2014. When she was about to enter their house, she heard Danilo talking about his long-time grudge towards Ville to his drinking buddies. Infuriated, Ville told Danilo, "nanghihiram ka lang ng tapang sa alak," 11 to which Danilo retorted, "kung gusto mo tapusin na natin ito tay." 12 At this juncture, Ville took out his sumpak and allegedly told Danilo, "kung gusto mo ilabas mo dito ang tapang mo." 13 Danilo who was then unarmed, suddenly attacked Ville not knowing that the latter was armed. After the incident, Ville hid the sumpak in a canal and ran away. 14
Version of the Defense:
The defense presented Ville and Marilou San Pedro (Marilou).
Ville alleged that he came home from work at around 4:00 p.m. of January 16, 2014 when he saw his son, Danilo, having a drinking spree with their neighbors to celebrate the birthday of his grandson. At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, Ville went out of their house to buy cigarette when he overheard Danilo bad-mouthing him to his drinking-buddies describing him as a useless father. This prompted Ville to respond in this wise "nanghiram ka na naman ng tapang sa alak, tama na yan, magpahinga na kayo at may pasok pa kayo bukas nakakahiya sa mga kapitbahay." 15 Danilo then answered, "bakit ako na lang ang nakikita mo, bakit hindi mo tingnan ang sarili mo?" 16 At that point, Ville told Danilo that he will just talk to him the next day and thereafter went upstairs. 17
Since Danilo continued to curse, Ville went down again and there he saw Danilo holding a pipe which appeared to be a "sumpak" while uttering the words, "tapusin na natin to tay." 18 Danilo allegedly aimed the sumpak at Ville, which compelled the latter to grapple for the possession thereof. During the struggle, however, the sumpak accidentally fired and Danilo's body fell on the ground covered with blood. At this juncture, Ville shouted for help and asked his former wife Shirley to bring Danilo to the hospital. 19
Marilou, who lives in the house of the Ville family, confirmed Ville's version. According to Marilou, Ville seemed irked when he came back upstairs after buying a cigarette. She later found out that Ville and Danilo had an argument. When she heard a commotion downstairs, she went down and there she saw Danilo holding a knife or an object and pointed it at Ville. Marilou tried to pacify Ville and Danilo but she fell from the stairs. Suddenly, she heard a gunshot and thereafter saw Danilo's bloodied body on the ground. 20
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
In a Decision 21 dated March 20, 2017, the RTC found Ville guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Parricide. The RTC held that Ville's claim of self-defense was unavailing due to the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Further, the trial court found that Ville's act of fleeing from the crime scene and hiding the sumpak after the incident negated his claim of self-defense. 22
The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused DIONISIO VILLE y SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Parricide, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Danilo Ville the amount[s] of PhP75,000.00 as civil indemnity; PhP75,000.00 as moral damages; and PhP25,000.00 as temperate damages. He is further ordered to pay 6% interest per annum from the finality of this case until full payment. DETACa
SO ORDERED. 23
Aggrieved by the RTC's Decision, Ville appealed 24 before the CA based on the following sole assignment of error:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR PARRICIDE DESPITE THE EXISTENCE AND PROOF OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE. 25
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
In its assailed Decision, 26 the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment convicting Ville of Parricide. It held that the evidence for the defense did not support the theory of self-defense there being no showing of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The CA explained that aiming a gun at Ville, without more, is not sufficient to prove unlawful aggression. There must be some external acts showing the commencement of actual and material aggression. 27 The CA further ruled that through Nina's testimony, the prosecution successfully established that Ville killed Danilo. Ville's act of bringing out the sumpak, holding on to it and waiting for Danilo to charge upon him negates his claim that Danilo's death was unintentional.
The fallo of the appellate court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed 20 March 2017 Decision of the Taguig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 69 in Crim. Case No. 153212 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 28
Undaunted, Ville filed a Notice of Appeal 29 before this Court.
Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding Ville guilty of Parricide and in not considering his plea of self-defense.
Our Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Ville failed to prove that he acted
An accused is presumed innocent; thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the crime charged rather than for the accused to prove his innocence. However, a person invoking self-defense in effect admits to having performed the criminal act but claims no liability therefor, because the actual and imminent danger to his or her life justified his/her infliction of harm against an aggressor. 30 This dispenses with the prosecution's burden to prove that the accused performed the criminal act; what remains to be established is whether the accused was justified in inflicting the harm. 31 This the accused must prove with clear and convincing evidence. 32
To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must prove the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. 33
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing as there is nothing to repel. The unlawful aggression of the victim must put the life and personal safety of the person defending himself in actual peril. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression. 34
In the instant case, Ville's defense centers on his claim that it was Danilo who initiated the attack by aiming a sumpak at him. In essence, Ville asserts that the unlawful aggression originated from Danilo. aDSIHc
Contrary to Ville's story, however, both the RTC and the CA found that Ville was not exposed to any real or imminent danger when Danilo allegedly attacked him. It is worthy to point out that Ville's version of the incident is completely contradicted by the testimony of Nina, who happened to be his own daughter. Nina testified that Ville and Danilo were engaged in a fight when Ville suddenly fired at Danilo, causing the latter to fall on the ground. Nina maintained that Danilo was not armed when he attacked Ville and that it was the latter who brought the sumpak into the scene as what he is accustomed to do whenever he is engaged in a fight. 35 The testimony of Nina is entitled to full faith and credit because she was not shown to have been impelled by any ill motive to testify falsely against her own father.
The question of whether Ville acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. It is well-established that the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to respect because it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand and, therefore, is in the best position to weigh conflicting testimonies and to discern whether the witnesses are telling the truth. 36 This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA and the RTC failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and substance that would have merited Ville's acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the CA that Ville did not act in self-defense.
Moreover, this Court has observed Ville's tendency to invoke mixed defenses. While he admitted the commission of the crime in order to preserve his own life, he maintained that Danilo's death was an accident and that he had no intention to kill his son. 37 This renders his testimony dubious.
Accident presupposes lack of intention to kill the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness, induced only by necessity. 38 Indeed, if there is truth to either of his claim, his natural course of action was to assist the victim, or at the very least, report the incident to the authorities. On the contrary, Nina testified that after the incident, Ville hid the sumpak in a canal and fled. This was strengthened by the testimony of Shirley that she shouted for help and was the one who brought Danilo to the hospital, together with the latter's siblings and cousins, contrary to Ville's claim that he called Shirley and asked her to bring the victim to the hospital. 39 Certainly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated considering Ville's flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident. 40 Furthermore, Ville's failure to surrender the weapon used to kill Danilo to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead, indicates his culpability of the crime charged. 41
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. 42 Undoubtedly, all elements are present in this case.
In fine, We hold that the prosecution has sufficiently established that Ville killed his son, Danilo. That Danilo is the son of Ville was sufficiently proven by the prosecution through the victim's Certificate of Live Birth. 43
Penalty:
All told, We affirm Ville's conviction for Parricide. The penalty for Parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. 44 There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance proven, both the trial court and the CA correctly sentenced Ville to reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, 45 the phrase "without eligibility for parole" shall be used to qualify the penalty of reclusion perpetua only if the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for Republic Act No. (RA) 9346. 46 In this case, Ville was sentenced to reclusion perpetua there being no aggravating circumstance that would have otherwise warranted the imposition of the death penalty were it not for RA 9346. Hence, the phrase "without eligibility for parole" need not be borne in the decision to qualify Ville's sentence. 47
The monetary awards of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages are correct and in accord with recent jurisprudence. 48 Temperate damages of P50,000.00, in lieu of actual damages, is also granted as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. 49 Finally, these amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid. ETHIDa
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DISMISSED. The October 10, 2019 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09300 finding accused-appellant Dionicio Ville y Santos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant is further required to pay temperate damages of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Danilo Ville y Hona. These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the:
a) MANIFESTATION (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated March 8, 2021 by the Public Attorney's Office adopting the brief filed before the Court of Appeals as accused-appellant's supplemental brief, as the same had sufficiently refuted all arguments raised by the plaintiff-appellee and no new issues material to the case were discovered;
b) MANIFESTATION AND MOTION dated May 5, 2021 by the Office of the Solicitor General, stating that it shall no longer file a supplemental brief as its brief filed before the Court of Appeals had adequately discussed accused-appellant's guilt of the crimes charged; and
c) LETTER dated May 28, 2021 of CInsp. Edgar N. Morillo, Acting Superintendent, NBP-South, Muntinlupa City confirming the confinement of accused-appellant Dionisio Ville y Santos on May 25, 2017 in their institution.
SO ORDERED." (Inting and Gaerlan, JJ., no part due to prior action in the Court of Appeals; Zalameda and Lopez, M.V., JJ., designated additional Members respectively per November 15, 2021 Raffle; Dimaampao, J., on official leave.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Also spelled as "Dionisio" in some parts of the records.
1.Rollo, pp. 11-13. Captioned as Notice of Appeal.
2.Id. at 3-10. Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of the Court).
3. CA rollo, pp. 40-44. Penned by Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna.
4. Records, pp. 1-2.
5.Id. at 1.
6.Id. at 36.
7.Id. at 64.
8.Id. at 8-9. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Shirley Hona y De Guzman.
9.Id. at 10-12. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Nina Rose Ville y Hona.
10.Id. at 9; TSN, May 19, 2015, June 16, 2015 and August 25, 2015.
11.Id. at 11.
12.Id.
13.Id.
14.Id.
15.Id. at 67.
16.Id.
17.Id.
18.Id.
19. TSN, August 19, 2014, pp. 8-9. See also records, p. 68.
20. TSN, September 29, 2014, pp. 7-16.
21. CA rollo, pp. 40-44.
22.Id. at 43-44.
23.Id. at 44.
24. Records, p. 211.
25. CA rollo, p. 28.
26.Rollo, pp. 3-10.
27.Id. at 7.
28.Id. at 9.
29.Id. at 11-13.
30.People v. Caliao, 836 Phil. 966, 974 (2018), citing People v. Macaraig, 810 Phil. 931 (2017).
31.Id., citing Velasquez v. People, 807 Phil. 438 (2017).
32.Id., citing People v. Mediado, 656 Phil. 377, 382 (2011).
33.Velasquez v. People, supra at 450.
34.People v. Ramos, 715 Phil. 193, 204-205 (2013).
35. TSN, March 8, 2016, pp. 11-13.
36.People v. Caliao, supra note 30 at 975.
37. Records, p. 68.
38.People v. Carlos, 115 Phil. 704, 706 (1962).
39. Records, p. 9.
40. See People v. Abrazaldo, 445 Phil. 109, 122 (2003).
41.Id.
42.People v. Dacanay, 798 Phil. 132, 146 (2016).
43. Records, p. 177.
44. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 246, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (1993).
45. Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase "Without Eligibility for Parole" in Indivisible Penalties.
46. AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE IN THE PHILIPPINES.
47.People v. Saltarin, G.R. No. 223715, June 3, 2019.
48.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 848 (2016).
49.People v. Saltarin, supra.