ADVERTISEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 255031. January 17, 2023.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.RICO VIANZON Y MAYOR and REINA SAN PEDRO y BANZON, accused-appellants.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 17, 2023which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 255031 (People of the Philippines v. Rico Vianzon y Mayor and Reina San Pedro y Banzon). — This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to annul and set aside the November 20, 2019 Decision 2 and the November 26, 2020 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 160654 which set aside the February 12, 2019 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga City, Bataan, Branch 1, in Criminal Case No. 19422 denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration to Allow Accused to Apply for Probation.
The Antecedents
In an Information 5 dated January 28, 2019, Rico Vianzon y Mayor and Reina San Pedro y Banzon were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, 6 the accusatory portion thereof reads:
That on or about January 26, 2019, in Balanga City, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully sell, distribute and give away to another one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, weighing ZERO POINT ZERO ONE EIGHT (0.018) GRAM, and that accused Rico Vianzon [y] Mayor was found positive for the use of Methamphetamine, a dangerous drug, after the screening and confirmatory tests on the urine sample taken from him. CAIHTE
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
During arraignment, respondents entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged. DETACa
On February 8, 2018, respondents, through counsel, manifested in open court their willingness to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense or to Sec. 12, Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165. The prosecution vigorously objected and argued that Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 027 8 provides that for a violation of Sec. 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, the lower offense which accused may enter a plea of guilty is Sec. 11. Since the respondents intended to enter a plea of guilty to Sec. 12, which was not allowed under DOJ Circular No. 027, the prosecution opined that they could not give their consent to the plea bargain and submitted the motion of the respondents to the sound discretion of the trial court. 9 aScITE
On the other hand, respondents invoked A.M. 18-03-16-SC (Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases) 10 which allowed them to enter a plea of guilty from Sec. 5 to Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 9165. Respondents were informed that should they insist to plea bargain under Sec. 12 without the prosecutor's consent, the latter may refile the same case against them without violating the rule on double jeopardy. Nevertheless, respondents continued to pray that they be allowed to enter a plea of guilty to Sec. 12. 11
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In the February 8, 2019 Order 12 of the RTC, respondents were allowed to enter a plea of guilty to Sec. 12, Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165. The dispositive portion thereof reads.
WHEREFORE, finding accused Rico Vianzon and Reina San Pedro guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the lesser offense penalized under Sec. 12, Art. 2 of RA 9165, pursuant to A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. They are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six months and one day, as minimum to THREE (3) YEARS, as maximum and to pay a fine of [P]10,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In this connection, the District Jail Warden of Bataan is hereby directed to bring accused Rico Vianzon and Reina San Pedro to the Bataan Crime Laboratory for drug testing. Should Rico Vianzon and Reina San Pedro yield POSITIVE for drug use, they shall be referred to Liyang Treatment Rehabilitation Center for further drug dependency test and shall undergo six months rehabilitation, in which case, the six-month period they were in rehabilitation shall be computed and deducted from the entirety of the sentence imposed hereof. Should both accused will [sic] yield NEGATIVE for drug use, the District Jail Warden is hereby directed to release accused Rico Vianzon and Reina San Pedro from his hold after they are able to completely serve the entire period of the sentence imposed upon them unless they are being held for some other lawful cause of causes. aScITE
The period within which accused was in preventive imprisonment shall be considered in the computation of his sentence.
Further[,] the District Jail Warden is directed to submit a report relative thereof.
Make it of record that the accused is ineligible to apply for probation in this case.
Pros. Saldana, Atty. Sierra and accused Rico Vianzon and Reina San Pedro are notified of this order in open Court.
SO ORDERED. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
On February 11, 2019, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration to Allow Accused to Apply for Probation, 14 and argued that under Sec. 24 of Republic Act No. 9165, only those convicted, not charged, for drug trafficking or pushing cannot apply for probation. In their Comment, 15 the prosecution opposed the said motion and countered that probation is a mere privilege, not a right.
In the assailed February 12, 2019 Order, 16 the RTC denied respondents' motion for reconsideration. ATICcS
Discontented, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari17 with the CA. They argued that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in disqualifying them from applying for probation contrary to the provisions of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. Moreover, they contended that the RTC erred in considering them guilty of the offense charged despite plea bargaining to a lesser offense. Thus, they claimed that they were entitled to apply for probation. 18
In their Comment, 19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that respondents' Petition for Certiorari should be denied outright for being the wrong remedy, the correct one being a petition for review on certiorari with the Court under Rule 45. In any case, the OSG maintained that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed Orders. 20
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed November 20, 2019 Decision, 21 the CA granted respondents' petition, the fallo thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Order dated 12 February 2019 of the public respondent Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan in Criminal Case No. 19422 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered granting petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration to Allow Accused to Apply for Probation.
SO ORDERED. 22 (Emphasis in the original)
On the propriety of respondents' resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the CA ruled that the RTC's Order dated February 12, 2019 is interlocutory in nature and not a final order. There being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to respondents, the CA held that the resort to a Rule 65 petition was proper. 23
On the substantive aspect, the CA held that respondents were allowed to apply for probation since they were convicted of Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 9165. As such, they did not possess any of the disqualifications under Sec. 9 24 of the Probation Law. It agreed with the respondents that the trial court's denial of their application for probation was arbitrary. It opined that while probation is a mere privilege conferred by the State and discretionary upon the court, the grant or denial thereof should still be guided by the criteria under Sec. 8 25 of the Probation Law. Moreover, the CA noted that no prior investigation was conducted to determine if the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as that of respondents will be served if the latter would be placed on probation contrary to Secs. 5, 26 6, 27 and 7 28 of the Probation Law. Thus, the CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondents' motion to apply for probation. 29
The People, through the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 30 which was later denied in the CA's November 26, 2020 Resolution. 31
Issue aScITE
In the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, 32 the OSG raises the sole issue of whether the CA committed reversible error when it failed to declare the trial court's Orders dated February 8, 2019 and February 12, 2019 null and void.
The OSG contends that respondents' oral motion to plea to a lesser offense is contrary to DOJ Circular No. 027 which requires a written offer for plea bargaining. Moreover, the prosecution's consent is required before an accused may be allowed to plea to a lesser offense. They argue that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in allowing respondents to plea bargain despite the objection of the prosecution. Since the Orders dated February 8, 2019 and February 12, 2019 were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the OSG claims that the said orders are void and without legal effect.
At the crux of the controversy is the validity of respondents' plea bargaining to a lesser offense and their corresponding right to apply for probation.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Plea bargaining is a "process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge." 33 Plea bargaining to a lesser offense is governed by Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
Section 2. Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. 34 (Emphasis supplied) TIADCc
With the promulgation of Estipona v. Lobrigo, 35 the Court has expressly allowed plea bargaining in illegal drugs cases and declared Sec. 23, Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165 which expressly disallowed plea bargaining in drugs cases as unconstitutional for contravening the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. 36 Thereafter, the Court issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and laid down a plea bargaining framework in drugs cases to be adopted by all trial courts. Following this, the Secretary of Justice issued DOJ Circular No. 27 as a guide for prosecutors to observe when entertaining plea bargaining offers in drugs cases.
Notably, A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and DOJ Circular No. 27 differ in the acceptable plea bargain or the lesser offense which the accused may plead guilty to for violation of Sec. 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. Under DOJ Circular No. 27, an accused charged with violation of Sec. 5 involving less than five grams of shabu or less than 300 grams of marijuana may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Sec. 11, par. 3 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). On the other hand, under A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, an accused charged with violation of Sec. 5 involving 0.01 gram to 0.99 gram of shabu or 0.01 gram to 9.99 grams of marijuana may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Sec. 12 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs). This inconsistency has been squarely addressed in DOJ Circular No. 18 37 which now provides Sec. 12 as the lesser offense which an accused may plead guilty to in accordance with the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.
In the consolidated cases of People v. Montierro, 38Baldadera v. People39 and Re: Letter of the Philippine Judges Association Expressing its Concern over the Ramifications of the Decisions in G.R. No. 247575 and G.R. No. 250295, 40 (Consolidated Cases of Montierro, et al.) the Court En Banc clarified the Court-issued Clarificatory Guidelines on Plea-Bargaining in drugs cases as follows:
1. Offers for plea bargaining must be initiated in writing by way of a formal written motion filed by the accused in court.
2. The lesser offense which the accused proposes to plead guilty to must necessarily be included in the offense charged.
3. Upon receipt of the proposal for plea bargaining that is compliant with the provisions of the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, the judge shall order that a drug dependency assessment be administered. If the accused admits drug use, or denies it but is found positive after a drug dependency test, then he/she shall undergo treatment and rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months. Said period shall be credited to his/her penalty and the period of his/her after-care and follow-up program if the penalty is still unserved. If the accused is found negative for drug use/dependency, then he/she will be released on time served, otherwise, he/she will serve his/her sentence in jail minus the counselling period at the rehabilitation center.
4. As a rule, plea bargaining requires the mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval of the court. Regardless of the mutual agreement of the parties, the acceptance of the offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the court.
a. Though the prosecution and the defense may agree to enter into a plea bargain, it does not follow that the courts will automatically approve the proposal. Judges must still exercise sound discretion in granting or denying plea bargaining, taking into account the relevant circumstances, including the character of the accused.
5. The court shall not allow plea bargaining if the objection to the plea bargaining is valid and supported by evidence to the effect that:
a. the offender is a recidivist, habitual offender, known in the community as a drug addict and a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, or has been charged many times; or
b. when the evidence of guilt is strong.
6. Plea bargaining in drugs cases shall not be allowed when the proposed plea bargain does not conform to the Court-issued Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases. AIDSTE
7. Judges may overrule the objection of the prosecution if it is based solely on the ground that the accused's plea bargaining proposal is inconsistent with the acceptable plea bargain under any internal rules or guidelines of the DOJ, though in accordance with the plea bargaining framework issued by the Court, if any.
8. If the prosecution objects to the accused's plea bargaining proposal due to the circumstances enumerated in item no. 5, the trial court is mandated to hear the prosecution's objection and rule on the merits thereof. If the trial court finds the objection meritorious, it shall order the continuation of the criminal proceedings. aScITE
9. If an accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under RA No. 9165, other than for illegal drug trafficking or pushing under Section 5 in relation to Section 24 thereof, then the law on probation shall apply. 41
Moreover, the Court En Banc held that in view of the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 18, the prosecution's objection to plea bargaining proposals based solely on DOJ Circular No. 27 is considered as effectively withdrawn. Consequently, issues on whether the trial court erred in overruling the prosecution's continuing objection to plea bargaining proposals based solely on DOJ Circular No. 27 is rendered moot and academic.
Applying the foregoing guidelines to the case at bar, the trial court correctly overruled the objection of the prosecution since it was based solely on the ground that the respondents' plea bargaining proposal was inconsistent with the acceptable plea bargain under DOJ Circular No. 27 though in accordance with the plea bargaining framework issued by the Court. In any case, the prosecution's objection is already deemed withdrawn by virtue of DOJ Circular No. 18 42 as it now clearly provides for Sec. 12 as the lesser offense which an accused may plead guilty to.
As to the OSG's argument that respondents made an oral offer to plea bargain in open court instead of formally submitting a written motion, this Court notes that this argument was only proffered for the first time in the petition before this Court. This Court emphasizes that in order to uphold the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process, arguments not ventilated before the lower courts do not merit the attention of the Court. 43 Accordingly, such alleged defect in respondents' offer to plea is already deemed waived. As further held in S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation v. Parada: 44 SDAaTC
It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel. 45 (Emphasis in the original)
On the issue of respondents' eligibility to apply for probation, the guidelines provide that if an accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under Republic Act No. 9165, other than for illegal drug trafficking or pushing under Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. 24 thereof, then the law on probation shall apply. Notably, Sec. 24, Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under Sec. 5 of the law cannot avail of the benefits of the Probation Law, viz.:
Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. — Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
Sec. 9 of the Probation Law also enumerates the disqualified offenders or those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
(b) convicted of any crime against the national security;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of not more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00);
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
In the present case, respondents are not disqualified to apply for probation. As reiterated in Pascua v. People, 46 Sec. 24, Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165 and the provisions of the Probation Law provide that in applying for probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the offense to which the accused is ultimately found guilty of. The Court explained it in this wise:
In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that upon acceptance of a plea bargain, the accused is actually found guilty of the lesser offense subject of the plea. According to jurisprudence, "[p]lea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge."
Thus, regardless of what the original charge was in the Information, the judgment would be for the lesser offense to which the accused pled guilty. This means that the penalty to be meted out, as well as all the attendant accessory penalties, and other consequences under the law, including eligibility for probation and parole, would be based on such lesser offense. Necessarily, even if Pascua was originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 18805, he was ultimately convicted of the lower offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law. Since the foregoing effectively removed Pascua's case from the coverage of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165, he should, at the very least, be allowed to apply for probation. 47 (Emphasis supplied)
Using the said parameters in the case at hand, even if respondents were originally charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Sec. 5, Art. II of Republic Act No. 9165, they were convicted under Sec. 12 thereof and should also, at the very least, be eligible to apply for probation. In determining if respondents are entitled to apply for probation, We echo the CA's pronouncement as follows:
While it is true that probation is not a right but a mere privilege conferred by the State, and the grant thereof rests solely upon the discretion of the court, the grant or denial should be guided by the provisions of the Probation Law, specifically Section 8 thereof, which sets the criteria for placing an offender on probation. to wit: EcTCAD
Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. — In determining whether an offender may be placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and available institutional and community resources. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that:
(a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(b) there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or
(c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
It has been held that in exercising the discretion given to the court in granting probation, it must consider the potentiality of the offender to reform, together with the demands of justice and public interest, along with other relevant circumstances.
In this case, no hearing was conducted to "consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and available institutional and community resources." The court a quo merely stated that "the Court may not allow an accused to avail the benefits of probation even if the penalty imposed upon him does not exceed six (6) years like in the instant case." aScITE
Moreover, no prior investigation was conducted to determine whether or not the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as that of petitioners will be served if the latter would be placed on probation. This violates the provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Probation Law x x x 48 (Citations omitted)
Considering the foregoing, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding respondents eligible to apply for probation. However, given that respondents have been detained 49 longer than their maximum sentence, they are now considered to have fully served their respective sentences and must be immediately released.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The November 20, 2019 Decision and the November 26, 2020 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 160654 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondents Rico Vianzon y Mayor and Reina San Pedro y Banzon are now ordered to be IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless they are being held for some other valid or lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the District Jail Warden of the Bataan District Jail for immediate implementation. The District Jail Warden of the Bataan District Jail is DIRECTED to REPORT to this Court the action taken hereon within five days from receipt of this Resolution.
The respondents' filing of comment on the petition for review on certiorari as required in the Resolution dated November 15, 2021 is DISPENSED WITH.
Let entry of judgment be issued immediately. HSAcaE
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 15-42.
2. Id. at 44-57. Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi.
3. Id. at 59-64. Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi.
4. Id. at 116-118. Penned by Judge Angelito I. Balderama.
5. Id. at 103-104.
6. Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved: June 7, 2002.
7. Rollo, p. 103.
8. AMENDED GUIDELINES ON PLEA BARGAINING FOR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002." Dated: June 26, 2018.
9. Rollo, p. 105.
10. "ADOPTION OF THE PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK IN DRUGS CASES." Dated: April 10, 2018.
11. Rollo, p. 106.
12. Id. at 105-107.
13. Id. at 106-107.
14. Id. at 108-112.
15. Id. at 113-115.
16. Id. at 116-118.
17. Id. at 77-100.
18. Id. at 83-95.
19. Id. at 120-139.
20. Id. at 125-137.
21. Id. at 44-56.
22. Id. at 56.
23. Id. at 48-49.
24. Section 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those: (a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years; (b) convicted of any crime against national security; (c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00); (d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and (e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
25. Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. — In determining whether an offender may be placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and available institutional and community resources. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that: (a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or (b) there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or (c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
26. Section 5. Post-sentence Investigation. — No person shall be placed on probation except upon prior investigation by the probation officer and a determination by the court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as that of the defendant will be served thereby.
27. Section 6. Form of Investigation Report. — The investigation report to be submitted by the probation officer under Section 5 hereof shall be in the form prescribed by the Probation Administrator and approved by the Secretary of Justice.
28. Section 7. Period for Submission of Investigation Report. — The probation officer shall submit to the court the investigation report on a defendant not later than sixty days from receipt of the order of said court to conduct the investigation. The court shall resolve the petition for probation not later than five days after receipt of said report. Pending submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, the defendant may be allowed on temporary liberty under his bail filed in the criminal case; Provided, That, in case where no bail was filed or that the defendant is incapable of filing one, the court may allow the release of the defendant on recognizance the custody of a responsible member of the community who shall guarantee his appearance whenever required by the court.
29. Rollo, 49-56.
30. Id. at 65-76.
31. Id. at 59-64.
32. Id. at 15-42.
33. Pascua v. People, G.R. No. 250578, September 7, 2020, citing Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 375 (2008).
34. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 116, Sec. 2.
35. 816 Phil. 789 (2017).
36. Id. at 817.
37. Revised Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." Dated: May 10, 2022.
38. G.R. No. 254564, /[Supreme Court] Provides Clarificatory Guidelines on Plea-Bargaining in Drugs Cases/, July 28, 2022 ,https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28879/. (last visited November 14, 2022).
39. G.R. No. 254974, /[Supreme Court]Provides Clarificatory Guidelines on Plea-Bargaining in Drugs Cases/, July 28, 2022, https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28879/. (last visited November 14, 2022).
40. A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC, /[Supreme Court] Provides Clarificatory Guidelines on Plea-Bargaining in Drugs Cases/, July 28, 2022, https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28879/. (last visited November 14, 2022).
41. /[Supreme Court] Provides Clarificatory Guidelines on Plea-Bargaining in Drugs Cases/, July 28, 2022 <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28879/> (last visited November 14, 2022).
42. Revised Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
43. Office of the President v. Cataquiz, 673 Phil. 318, 343-344 (2011).
44. 717 Phil. 752 (2013).
45. Id. at 760.
46. Pascua v. People, supra note 33.
47. Id.
48. Rollo, pp. 52-53.
49. Id. at 102.