People v. Valida y Albañez

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 232465. June 28, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CHARLIE VALIDA y ALBAÑEZ, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

"G.R. No. 232465 (People of the Philippines v. Charlie Valida y Albañez). — This is an appeal 1 under Rule 124 2 of the Rules of Court challenging the November 29, 2016 Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07246 which affirmed the January 17, 2014 4 Decision 5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case No. 10744 finding accused-appellant guilty of Murder. HTcADC

The Facts:

Accused-appellant Charlie Valida y Albañez (Charlie) mainly argues that the circumstance of insanity should be appreciated to exempt him from criminal liability.

In an Information 6 dated February 14, 2000, Charlie and Fernando Javier y Macalalad (Fernando), as principals, and Christian Valida y Albañez (Christian; collectively, the accused), as accomplice, were charged with Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The accusatory portions of the Information 7 read:

That on or about February 8, 2000 at around 11:15 o'clock in the evening at the New Public Market, Brgy. Cuta, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, while armed with a fan knife (balisong) and a kitchen knife (kutsilyo), with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with said knives one Nicasio Calingasan y De Torres, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly caused the victim's death.

That accused Christian Valida y Albañez, although not having participated in the act, either as principal by direct participation, by inducement or by indispensable cooperation, nevertheless, cooperated into execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts indicating concurrence with the principal in the latter's criminal design by boxing and kicking Nicasio Calingasan y De Torres while the latter was being stabbed by the two other accused, which acts of the accused, Christian Valida y Albañez, have direct relation to the felonious acts done by the principal accused, Fernando Javier y Macalalad and Charlie Valida y Albañez.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

During their arraignment, all of the accused entered a "not guilty" 9 plea.

At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on: (1) the identities and participation of the accused as indicated in the Information; (2) the residence of the accused (Batangas City); and (3) the fact, but not the cause, of death of the victim, Nicasio Calingasan (Nicasio). 10

Relevantly, due to Charlie's mental condition, the RTC suspended the conduct of trial with respect to him while that of the other accused, specifically Fernando and Christian, continued.

Version of the prosecution:

On February 8, 2000, at around 11:15 p.m., Richard Mandigma (Richard) was at a kapihan in Pastor Memorial Market, Barangay Cuta, Batangas City when he heard a commotion at the back of a building which was around two meters away. When he checked the source of the commotion, Richard witnessed Nicasio being chased by Charlie, Fernando, and Christian. When the trio caught up with Nicasio, Christian kicked and punched him while Charlie and Fernando who were armed with a fan knife and a knife, stabbed Nicasio repeatedly. Nicasio begged for help and mercy. 11

Richard then placed himself between Nicasio and Charlie. However, Charlie asked Richard to leave and boasted that he (Charlie) would rather be incarcerated just so that he could kill someone. Meanwhile, Fernando kept stabbing Nicasio whereas Christian persisted in beating up the victim. 12

As Charlie resumed the stabbing, Nicasio eventually lost his balance, which forced him to lean on the side of an owner-type jeepney. Distressed, the driver of the jeepney drove off, inadvertently dragging Nicasio. After realizing this, the driver alighted from the jeepney, covered the plate number of the vehicle, and went to the guard house. 13

After the jeepney driver left, the accused approached Nicasio. Charlie continued stabbing Nicasio until the blade of his knife got wedged in Nicasio's breast area. Charlie then discarded the handle of the knife while Fernando and Christian continued to kick Nicasio. When they saw that Nicasio was already dead, the perpetrators rushed towards the direction of Calero Journal, Batangas City. Richard requested for aid but nobody assisted him. After the guards of Pastor Memorial Market arrived, Richard left the area. 14

SPO2 Nelio Lopez (SPO2 Lopez) investigated the crime scene and saw a man sprawled in the middle of the road. He noticed that a blade 15 was still lodged in the victim's body and found the handle 16 around two meters away from the body. Subsequently, he called a funeral home to transport the body to a morgue. He returned to the police station and prepared the request 17 for a postmortem examination. 18

Dr. Cecille Sosa (Dr. Sosa) conducted the postmortem examination 19 on Nicasio's body. She noted that the victim suffered contusions and multiple stab wounds on different parts of the body. The cause of death was massive hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds. 20 Dr. Sosa opined that the victim struggled and that there were multiple assailants and weapons used, considering the number and location of the stab wounds. 21

On February 9, 2000, at around 11:30 a.m., the accused were arrested. 22 They were hiding at a small nipa hut in the middle of the rice field in Barangay Bolbok, Batangas City. 23

Version of the defense:

According to the defense, Charlie is a good person who never quarreled with anybody. However, a month before the incident, a dog bit Charlie. Thereafter, he started showing abnormal behavior such as talking to himself and laughing for no apparent reason. He became agitated whenever his mother, Soledad Valida (Soledad), would ask him about his behavior. Due to lack of funds, Soledad could not seek medical help for Charlie. 24

On February 8, 2000, at around 11 p.m., Fernando bought ice at a store behind his house in Barangay Mypa Journal, Batangas City. Along the way, Charlie suddenly blocked his path, poked a knife at him and forced him to go to the electric post in front of a junkshop. Fernando refused but Charlie dragged him to the public market where they bought a bottle of gin. Charlie forced Fernando to have a drinking spree in Charlie's house. Afterwards, Charlie again brought Fernando to the public market to buy another bottle of gin. On their way back to Charlie's house, they chanced upon Nicasio whom Charlie challenged to a fight. 25

Fernando watched while Charlie and Nicasio fight. When Nicasio overpowered Charlie, the latter pulled out a knife and stabbed the former on the chest. Nicasio ran away but Charlie chased him down, pulling Fernando along. When they reached Nicasio, Charlie pointed an arrow against Fernando and threatened him to stab Nicasio with the knife or else be killed. Fernando attempted to stab Nicasio but missed. Charlie retrieved the knife from Fernando and repeatedly stabbed Nicasio. The relatives of Charlie then arrived at the scene. Christian, along with Soledad and Zosimo Valida, the parents of Charlie and Christian, tried to pacify Charlie. 26

The next day, Christian was arrested at home. Subsequently, the authorities brought him to Barangay Bolbok where Charlie and Fernando were found and arrested. 27

Other Incidents:

Notably, Branch 4 of the RTC of Batangas City promulgated a Decision 28 dated May 7, 2002 finding Fernando and Christian guilty of homicide as principal and accomplice, respectively, and accordingly sentenced them pursuant to the law. 29

In an Order 30 dated May 10, 2002, the Presiding Judge of Branch 4 of the RTC of Batangas City voluntarily inhibited himself from further proceeding with the case. Thereafter, the said case, with respect to Charlie, was re-raffled to Branch 7 of the RTC of Batangas City.

Meanwhile, Christian filed a Motion for Reconsideration 31 to request for a reduction of his sentence. In an Order 32 dated May 23, 2002, the Presiding Judge of Branch 4 of the RTC recalled his inhibition in order to resolve the pending motion. Hence, in an Order 33 dated June 5, 2002, the Presiding Judge of Branch 4 of the RTC reduced Christian's penalty in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Afterwards, in an Order 34 dated July 1, 2002, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 4 again inhibited himself from the case.

Nonetheless, even after the re-raffle of Charlie's case, the trial has been suspended and resumed 35 several times because Charlie has been in and out of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) due to his mental illness (schizophrenia) which recurs when he fails to take his medication while in jail. Charlie's condition was supported by the numerous Medical Reports 36 issued by the NCMH. Eventually, however, he was found competent enough to stand the rigors of trial.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In a Decision 37 dated January 17, 2014, the RTC ruled that anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence, as it is in the nature of both a confession and avoidance. The proof of insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or contemporaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged as it presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason at that time. 38 The trial court arrived at the following findings:

The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that at the time that accused Charlie Valida stabbed Nicasio Calingasan with a kitchen knife, he was fully aware of what he is doing and the possible dire consequences of the act. Eyewitness Richard Mandigma testified that when he tried to pacify Charlie who was then stabbing Nicasio Calingasan, Charlie told him to leave, saying that he would rather go to jail just to kill somebody. This statement shows that at that precise moment, the accused was capable of intelligent discernment. He was able to distinguish between Nicasio, whom he suspected of being a chicken thief, from his long-time acquaintance, Richard. Thus, he refrained from harming the latter. Second, Charlie Valida fled the scene after committing the crime. This shows his understanding that the act he committed is illegal and that he must depart from the scene to avoid the police authorities. Thus, the requisite for insanity to be appreciated as an exempting circumstance, that is, that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime is lacking. If there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts. 39

The trial court found Soledad's bare allegation that Charlie's behavior changed after a dog bite not sufficient to support the claim that he was legally insane when he stabbed Nicasio. It also noted that Charlie's condition was not incurable as the doctors who examined him pronounced that with consistent medication his schizophrenia could be managed. 40

The RTC held that all the elements of murder are present in the case considering the testimony of Richard who is familiar with the accused and actually saw what transpired. 41 Likewise, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength by stating that: "Nicasio was alone and unarmed whereas Charlie and Fernando were each armed with a knife and fan knife, respectively, and abetted by Christian who punched and kicked the victim even as the two were stabbing him. The disparity of the forces between the victim and the three accused was such that, in stark contrast to the three who remained unscathed, Nicasio Calingasan sustained such grievous injuries, leading to a massive hemorrhage which caused his death." 42 Hence, the trial court declared that the totality of evidence established that Charlie is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. 43

As for the penalty, the RTC stated that murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. However, absent either a mitigating or aggravating circumstance, reclusion perpetua should be imposed. Also, it awarded civil indemnity and damages with the corresponding legal interest for the said monetary awards. 44 The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused CHARLIE VALIDA y ALBAÑEZ GUILTY as principal beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER, defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Nicasio Calingasan the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P29,075.00 as actual damages, all to earn an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum until fully paid, and costs of suit.

In view of the conviction of, and the penalty imposed on, the accused, let a mittimus be issued to the Jail Warden of the Batangas City Jail directing him to immediately transfer the accused to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, for the service of his sentence.

SO ORDERED.45

Even after the promulgation of the RTC's Decision, the NCMH still issued Medical Reports 46 to determine if Charlie is capable of serving his sentence.

Notwithstanding this, Charlie appealed 47 to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA, in its assailed November 29, 2016 Decision, 48 dismissed the appeal. 49 It held that for insanity to be considered as an exempting circumstance, there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence when the crime was committed. Insanity is a question of fact and the said condition should relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the felony. 50 The appellate court found that the observations of the NCMH regarding Charlie's mental condition are inconclusive in relation to whether or not he was insane at the time preceding the act or the very moment of the consummation of the crime. It found Charlie's proof insufficient to establish his claim of insanity, regardless of Soledad's claim that he (Charlie) started acting unnaturally after a dog bite. 51 Moreover, it ruled that the killing was attended by abuse of superior strength given that three assailants ganged up on the unarmed victim by using excessive force. 52

The CA affirmed the RTC's imposition of reclusion perpetua since there was no other aggravating circumstance present aside from abuse of superior strength. It added that Charlie is not eligible for parole and that the awards of damages and interest were proper. 53

Dissatisfied, Charlie appealed 54 before the Court.

Issue

The main issue is whether or not Charlie's claim of insanity should be considered in assessing his liability.

Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Jurisprudence dictates that "[t]he determination of witnesses' credibility is left to the trial courts, which have the unique opportunity to observe their conduct in court. The trial courts' findings are generally binding on this Court and will not be overturned absent a showing of any fact or circumstance that was overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, which may change the results of a case. If these findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, then all the more will this Court be stringent in applying the rule." 55 Based on the Court's assessment, the RTC and the CA ruled in accordance with the relevant laws and jurisprudence in upholding Charlie's conviction notwithstanding his claim of insanity to evade or lessen his liability. Absent convincing proof that the lower courts were remiss in their duties to ferret out the truth, the Court sees no reason to disturb or modify their findings.

Article 248 of the RPC defines and penalizes the felony of murder as follows:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means of persons to insure or afford impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

For the killing to be qualified to murder, the following elements must be proven: "(1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide." 56

In the case at bench, the first and fourth requisites are not disputed, given that Nicasio already met his demise and he was not related to Charlie. To comply with the third requisite, there is no doubt that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, as the perpetrators used knives and they outnumbered and overpowered Nicasio. Case law provides that "[a]buse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime." 57 The perpetrators were clearly emboldened by their number and the victim's weakened state when they took turns in stabbing, punching, and kicking Nicasio.

The second requisite, aside from being proven by evidence that Charlie killed Nicasio, was not actually questioned by accused-appellant anymore. Instead, he invoked the defense of insanity 58 in order to exempt him or mitigate his liability. People v. Bacolot59 is instructive, viz.:

In the case of People v. Isla, the Court stated that:

Article 12 of the [RPC] provides for one of the circumstances which exempt one from criminal liability which is when the perpetrator of the act was an imbecile or insane, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. This circumstance, however, is not easily available to an accused as a successful defense. Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity, must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense which he is charged.

For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense. 60

Having invoked the defense of insanity, accused-appellant is deemed to have admitted the commission of the crime. Accordingly, he has the onus to establish with certainty that he was completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness. 61

The recent case of People v. Dela Cruz62 also teaches, as follows:

In People v. Madarang, the Court explained how insanity is successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal liability, to wit:

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. 63

After a perusal of the records, the Court finds that the defense failed to prove its claim that Charlie was insane immediately before or simultaneous with the commission of the felony. To repeat, "[t]he evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of execution." 64

As found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, Richard's description of Charlie during the stabbing incident shows that he (Charlie) had the capacity to distinguish between his victim, Nicasio, and Richard, an acquaintance. Charlie even told Richard that he (Charlie) would rather be jailed just so he could kill someone. Additionally, Charlie fled the scene as soon as he realized that Nicasio was already dead. This shows that he is capable of discerning that he committed an illegal act for which he would be held accountable.

Relevantly, the Court notes that prior to the stabbing incident, Charlie was not properly diagnosed or declared to be suffering from schizophrenia. As admitted by Charlie's mother, their family did not have the means to send Charlie to a medical specialist after he was bitten by a dog. Interestingly, though, the defense did not present proof that Charlie was indeed bitten by a dog and that there is a direct causal connection between a dog bite and one's mental faculties. In other words, it was not sufficiently proven that immediately before and during the slabbing incident Charlie was insane as to exempt him from criminal liability.

During trial, the defense did not present the testimony of any doctor or expert from the NCMH or any other mental institution to demonstrate that Charlie was insane prior to or coetaneous to the commission of the felony. Without a definite declaration regarding Charlie's behavior or mental capacity when the crime was committed, the Court can only presume that he was sane.

"Time and again, this Court has stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate to the period before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability." 65 To stress, the Medical Reports from the NCMH were issued after Charlie's arrest and during trial, as he exhibited disruptive and abnormal behavior while in prison. Simply put, he was seen by specialists because the trial court needed to determine Charlie's competence to stand trial and not to exempt him from liability.

Notably, Charlie did not deny the charge against him but only hinged his exoneration on his mental state. It can thus be inferred that he admitted to committing the murder but sought to exempt himself from liability by submitting that he was insane at the time. Unfortunately for the defense, Charlie was not able to satisfactorily establish his insanity. Hence, the Court has no reason to reverse or modify the ruling of the CA. The accused-appellant's conviction as a principal for murder must be sustained.

With regard to the penalties, there being no other aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information and proven during trial and in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua is proper. 66 Furthermore, the term "without eligibility for parole" need not be specified in the dispositive portion of the decision pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 15-08-02-SC. 67

Moreover, according to People v. Jugueta, 68 when the penalty consists of indivisible penalties (i.e., for murder) and the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages should be fixed at P75,000.00 each. However, we delete the award of P29,075.00 as actual damages and in lieu thereof, we award temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 69 In addition, the said awards for damages shall bear legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the judgment until full payment. 70

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated November 29, 2016 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07246 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Charlie Valida y Albañez is hereby found GUILTY of Murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, accused-appellant is ordered to PAY the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of P29,075.00 as actual damages is DELETED and in lieu thereof temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is AWARDED. All monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. CA rollo, pp. 115-116.

2. As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.

3.Rollo, pp. 2-15; penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes.

4. Promulgated on January 10, 2014.

5. CA rollo, pp. 38-59; penned by Presiding Judge Aida C. Santos.

6. Records, pp. 1-2.

7.Id.

8.Id.

9. CA rollo, p. 39.

10. Records, p. 24.

11.Rollo, p. 4; Exhibit "C-C2"; TSN, July 25, 2000, pp. 6-7, 13-14.

12.Id.; id.; id. at 7-8, 16.

13.Rollo, p. 5; TSN, July 25, 2000, pp. 8-9.

14.Id.; id. at 9-12.

15. Exhibit "H-H1."

16. Exhibit "I-I1."

17. Exhibit "D-D2."

18.Rollo, p. 5; Exhibit "M"; TSN, January 23, 2001, pp. 4-6; March 1, 2006, pp. 5-8.

19. Exhibits "E" and "G-G1."

20.Rollo, p. 6; Exhibit "F-F1;" TSN, November 28, 2000, pp. 9-12.

21.See records, p. 154; TSN, November 28, 2000, pp. 12-14.

22. Exhibits "J-J2," "K-K2," and "L-L2"; TSN, January 23, 2001, pp. 17-18.

23.Rollo, p. 6.

24.Id.; TSN, April 27, 2011, pp. 4-6.

25.Id. at 7; TSN, March 6, 2001, pp. 2-5.

26.Id.; TSN, March 6, 2001, pp. 6-9; June 15, 2001, pp. 4-6; September 11, 2001, p. 4.

27.Id.; TSN, June 15, 2001, pp. 6-7.

28. Records, pp. 152-159; by Branch 4 of the RTC of Batangas City, penned by Presiding Judge Conrado R. Antona.

29. The dispositive portion of the May 7, 2002 Decision of Branch 4 of the RTC reads:

WHEREFORE, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law accused Fernando Javier y Macalalad is sentenced to imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of PRISION MAYOR as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL together with its inherent accessory penalties while accused Christian Valida y Albañez is sentenced to imprisonment from SIX (6) YEARS of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of PRISION MAYOR together with its inherent accessory penalties. Both accused shall pay the cost of this proceedings, pay jointly and severally the heirs of the late Nicasio Calingasan with the sum of P50,000 as moral damages plus the sum of P64,955.00 as indemnification for actual damages incurred with the killing of the victim. Both accused however, are credited with their preventive imprisonment if they are entitled to any.

SO ORDERED.

30. Records, p. 160.

31.Id. at 163-165.

32.Id. at 166.

33.Id. at 170.

34.Id. at 178.

35.Id. at 247, 252-253, 363-364, 369, 442-443, 455, 472, 485, 499-500, 522, 559-560; TSN, November 28, 2000, p. 2.

36.Id. at 148-150, 243-245, 248-250, 365-367, 447-449, 495-497, 557-559.

37. Promulgated on January 20, 2014.

38. CA rollo, pp. 50-51.

39.Id. at 51-52.

40.Id. at 52-53.

41.Id. at 53-55.

42.Id. at 55-56.

43.Id. at 56.

44.Id. at 56-58.

45.Id. at 58-59.

46. Records, pp. 639-640, 641-643.

47. CA rollo, pp. 12-13.

48.Rollo, pp. 2-15.

49.Id. at 11, 15.

50.Id. at 11-12.

51.Id. at 12-13.

52.Id. at 13-14.

53.Id. at 14.

54.Id. at 16-17.

55.People v. Pitulan, G.R. No. 226486, January 22, 2020 citing People v. Gerola, 813 Phil. 1055, 1064 (2017) which cited People v. Gahi, 727 Phil. 642 (2014).

56.People v. Pigar, G.R. No. 247658, February 17, 2020 citing People v. Flores, G.R. No. 228886, August 8, 2018.

57.Id. citing People v. Cortez, G.R. No. 239137, December 5, 2018.

58. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 12, § 1.

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

xxx xxx xxx

59. G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018.

60.Id. Emphasis in the original; citations omitted.

61.Id.

62. G.R. No. 227997, October 16, 2019.

63.Id. Emphasis in the original; citations omitted.

64.People v. Bacolot, supra note 59.

65.Id. citing People v. Villa, Jr., 387 Phil. 155, 156 (2000).

66.People v. Pigar, supra note 56 citing REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 63.

67.Id. citing Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase "without eligibility for parole" in Indivisible Penalties, August 4, 2015; See also People v. Ursua, 819 Phil. 467, 476 (2017).

68.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 847-848 (2016).

69.Id.

70.Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Felipe, 720 Phil. 828, 840 (2013) citing Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 281-283 (2013) which cited BSP-MB Circular No. 799 dated May 16, 2013.