SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 224206. October 10, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. CEZAR TUMBAGAHAN y DEL PUERTO, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated10 October 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 224206 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, versus CEZAR TUMBAGAHAN y DEL PUERTO,accused-appellant.
After a careful review of the records of the case and the issues submitted by the parties, the Court finds no error committed in the Decision 1 dated April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals, Seventeenth Division (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05177. The facts, as borne out by the records, sufficiently support the conclusion that accused-appellant Cezar Tumbagahan y Del Puerto (Cezar) is indeed guilty of the crime of Rape. The issues and matters raised before the Court, the same ones as those raised in the CA, there being no supplemental briefs filed, were sufficiently addressed and correctly ruled upon by the CA.
It is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court. 2 Thus, when the case pivots on the issue of the credibility of the victim, the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great weight and respect as they are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the demeanor and sincerity of witnesses during trial. 3 Here, after examining the records of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to vacate the RTC's 4 appreciation of the evidence, which was affirmed in toto by the CA.
The Court finds no merit in the allegations of Cezar (1) that the prosecution failed to prove the force and intimidation inflicted upon AAA 5 by the accused and (2) that the absence of injuries or physical indications negate struggle or resistance on the part of AAA. As correctly ruled by the CA, for the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force employed be so great or be of such character that it could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force employed by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. In other words, force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; as long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point. 6 Further, proof of physical injury is not an essential element of the crime of rape. 7 The absence of abrasion or contusion on the victim does not signify that there was no force or intimidation. The law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. 8 Moreover, in this case, it has been established that AAA is a 13-year-old deaf-mute. Obviously, she could not have shouted for help or defended herself from Cezar who is more than twice her built and weight.
The Court likewise cannot subscribe to the contention of Cezar that AAA had all the opportunity to escape from him since she could have at least held on tightly to the bottle of kerosene she was holding then and threw the contents thereof on the face of Cezar, or at the very most, hit him with the bottle. In AAA's testimony, it was established that she was very afraid and trembling at the time the incident happened, hence she could not have fought back. 9 It is settled in jurisprudence that the failure of a rape victim to shout, fight back, or escape from the accused is not tantamount to consent or approval because the law imposes no obligation to exhibit defiance or to present proof of struggle. 10
Lastly, well-settled is the rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and are practically worthless against the positive identification made by the prosecution witness, especially the rape victim. 11 In this case, Cezar did not present any other evidence or witness to prove that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time the rape took place. Also, considering the proximity between his house and the place where the incident happened, it was not impossible for Cezar to be at the scene of the crime.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution had completely proved the guilt of Cezar beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals, Seventeenth Division, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05177 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." (REYES, J., JR., J., designated additional Member per S.O. No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018; on wellness leave)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of CourtBy:TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-12. Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy concurring.
2.People v. Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, 831 SCRA 469, 478.
3.People v. Aguilar, 565 Phil. 233, 247 (2007).
4. Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Crim. Case No. RTC 2008-0107.
5. The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information which tend to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family, or household members, shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy, and fictitious initial shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 [2006]) and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017.
6.People v. Grefiel, 290 Phil. 77, 90 (1992), citing US v. Villarosa, 4 Phil. 434, 437 (1905); People v. Plaga, 279 Phil. 56, 62 (1991); People v. Saldivia, 280 Phil. 501, 513 (1991) and People v. Momo, 56 Phil. 86, 87 (1931).
7. See People v. Abella, 373 Phil. 650, 657-658 (1999).
8.People v. Alquizalas, 364 Phil. 858, 872 (1999); People v. Cantos, Sr., 365 Phil. 340, 352 (1999).
9.Rollo, pp. 8-9.
10.People v. De Guzman, 644 Phil. 229, 247 (2010).
11. See People v. Cabuntog, 420 Phil. 137, 151 (2001), citing People v. Henson, 337 Phil. 318, 324 (1997).