People v. Suerte y Edubos

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 242015. June 21, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.DANNY SUERTE y EDUBOS and TOTONG LUMISTA [AL],accused,

DANNY SUERTE y EDUBOS,accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 21, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 242015 (People of the Philippines [plaintiff-appellee] vs. Danny Suerte y Edubos and Totong Lumista [Al][accused]; Danny Suerte y Edubos [accused-appellant]). — This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated May 15, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01438-MIN, finding Danny Suerte y Edubos (accused-appellant), guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal transportation of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Facts

In an Information 2 dated June 26, 2008, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 8, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 18643-08, accused-appellant and Totong Lumista (accused Lumista) were jointly charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of June 2008, in the afternoon, at Barangay Iba, Municipality of Cabanglasan, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, hold and possess and transport marijuana leaves and fruiting tops with an aggregate weight of 1,816.57 grams, without authority [or] permit from the government to possess the same.

The commission of the crime is aggravated by the qualifying circumstance of use since the accused DANNY SUERTE y EDUBOS was found positive for the use of THC-metabolites (marijuana), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY to and in violation of Article II, Section 5, R.A. 9165.

When arraigned on September 1, 2008, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged.

After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued against accused-appellant while his co-accused Lumista remained at-large.

Evidence for the Prosecution

Τo prove the guilt of accused-appellant, the following witnesses were presented by the prosecution:

1) Police Senior Inspector Erma C. Salvacion (PS/Insp. Salvacion), (Forensic Chemist);

2) Police Senior Inspector Dante B. Incason (PS/Insp. Incason); and

3) Senior Police Officer 1 Hermon Pandong (SPO1 Pandong).

Their salient testimonies, intertwined together established the following:

At around 12:00 noon of June 11, 2008, PS/Insp. Incason, Officer-in-Charge of the Cabanglasan Municipal Police Station received a report from an informant about two suspicious persons sighted at Barangay Cananga-an, Cabanglasan, Bukidnon, on board a motorcycle without a plate number and side cover. The report described the driver to be wearing a black helmet with black jacket while the back rider was wearing a black jacket carrying an orange, gray and black colored backpack believed to be containing bundles of marijuana.3

Acting on the information, a team was formed to set up a mobile checkpoint at Sitio Taulan, Iba, Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The team was composed of PS/Insp. Incason, SPO1 Rolando L. Codilla (SPO1 Codilla), SPO1 Pandong, PO3 Josefino O. Bongat, PO2 Eutropio M. Ocier, and PO1 Henry R. Marte, Jr. (PO1 Marte). 4

At around 1:30 p.m., the team proceeded to the target area and put up a signage with the wording "STOP CHECKPOINT." Not long after, they noticed an incoming motorcycle with two persons on board who matched the description of the informant. At a distance of about 50 meters more or less, PO1 Marte flagged down the driver of the motorcycle to stop. However, instead of stopping, the driver accelerated his speed, prompting PS/Insp. Incason to order SPO1 Codilla to block the road with their patrol car. Upon seeing the patrol car, the driver of the motorcycle was forced to slow down. Meanwhile, the back rider carrying a backpack jumped off and attempted to run. PO1 Marte ran after the back rider and managed to grab him. On the other hand, as soon as the back rider jumped off, the driver of the motorcycle accelerated his speed and drove off. Consequently, the rest of team pursued the driver, but the latter managed to speed away and evade arrest. 5

Thereafter, PS/Insp. Incason and the rest of the team went back to the checkpoint. They requested accused-appellant who was later identified as Danny Suerte to open the backpack he was carrying. When it was opened, they discovered that it contained two (2) bundles of dried marijuana leaves and a Nokia cellphone. The apprehending team then apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional rights. 6

Subsequently, accused-appellant and the backpack were brought to the Cabanglasan Municipal Police Station for booking, investigation, and interrogation. 7 At the police station, the seized evidence was marked, photographed and inventoried in the presence of accused-appellant and Municipal Kagawad Ondoy Salahag (Kagawad Salahag). 8 Thereafter, PS/Insp. Incason prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination 9 dated June 11, 2008 and personally delivered the same together with the seized bundles of suspected marijuana and urine sample of accused-appellant to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Bukidnon Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. 10 The same were received by Police Chief Inspector April Carbajal Madroño (PC/Insp. Madroño) under Control Number 99-08 on 1625H, June 11, 2008. 11 After conducting a screening and confirmatory tests on the 60 ml urine sample of accused-appellant, PC/Insp. Madroño issued Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-59-2008B 12 stating that the specimen gave positive result for the presence of TCH-metabolites or marijuana.

Meanwhile, PS/Insp. Salvacion, the Forensic Chemist conducted a quantitative and qualitative examination on the two bundles of marijuana. 13 She reduced her findings in Chemistry Report No. D-68-2008B, 14 stating that the subject specimen yielded positive for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug.

Evidence for the Defense

For the defense, accused-appellant was presented as the lone witness, who proffered a different version of the incident. He claimed that on June 10, 2008, or a day before the arrest, he was in Cananga-an, Cabanglasan, Bukidnon to visit his child and common-law spouse. 15

The following day, on June 11, 2008, he waited for a motorcycle for hire on his way back home to Malaybalay City. When he flagged down a motorcycle, he was surprised that the driver was accused Lumista, a neighbor at Purok 5, Barangay 9, Malaybalay, City, Bukidnon. When he rode on the motorcycle, he observed that there was a backpack placed on top of the motorcycle's tank. 16

Upon reaching Iba, Cabanglasan, Bukidnon, he saw a commando jeep and two persons in civilian clothes walking along the road, who flagged them down. He claimed that one of persons grabbed and arrested him, while accused Lumista sped off, leaving him behind. The commando jeep then chased accused Lumista. Thereafter, another motorcycle which happened to pass by was flagged down. Afterwards, he was brought to the police station and after 20 minutes, the commando jeep arrived. He then saw one of the policemen on board the commando jeep, carrying a black and orange backpack. 17

At the police station, he was detained in a cell and was made to sign a piece of paper, without knowledge of its contents. His photographs were also taken along with the backpack. He claimed that there was no checkpoint where he and accused Lumista were flagged down. He also denied that he jumped off from the motorcycle and attempted to run. 18

RTC Ruling

In a Decision 19 dated July 7, 2014, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [accused-appellant] Danny Suerte y Edubos is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 and is hereby sentenced as mandated under the said provision, to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and for him to PAY A FINE of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos.

The case as against accused Toto[ng] Lumista who remains at-large is ARCHIVED. Let an alias Warrant of Arrest issue against the said accused.

SO ORDERED. 20

In convicting accused-appellant, the RTC held that all the elements of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs have been established through the testimonies of PS/Insp. Incason and SPO1 Pandong that accused-appellant was carrying a backpack containing marijuana while on board the motorcycle driven by accused Lumista. The RTC debunked accused-appellant's denial and allegation that the backpack belonged to accused Lumista. According to the RTC, accused-appellant's denial is weak and self-serving and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers and whose testimonies are accorded credence.

Furthermore, the RTC opined that there was a valid warrantless search and seizure of the backpack from accused-appellant under the recognized exceptions of search of a moving vehicle and search incidental to lawful arrest. Elucidating further, the RTC held that the police authorities had probable cause to flag down the motorcycle carrying accused-appellant and accused Lumista following the tip received by PS/Insp. Incason from the informant, as well as, the fact that accused-appellant jumped off and attempted to run while accused Lumista sped away when their motorcycle was flagged down. Given these circumstances, the police officers acted well within their authority to ask accused-appellant to open the backpack, which resulted to the discovery of the illegal drugs.

As to the chain of custody, the RTC ratiocinated that there was substantial compliance with the mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165. Immediately after confiscation, the seized evidence was marked, inventoried and photographed at the police station and witnessed by Kagawad Salahag. Thereafter, PS/Insp. Incason brought the Letter Request for Examination and the seized evidence to the PNP Bukidnon Crime Laboratory Office. Within 24 hours after the receipt of specimen, PS/Insp. Salvacion issued Chemistry Report No. D-68-2008B, stating that seized evidence gave positive result for the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug. During trial, the parties stipulated that PS/Insp. Salvacion was the one who conducted the quantitative and qualitative examination of the specimen and that her findings were reduced into writing as Chemistry Report No. D-68-2008B. PS/Insp. Salvacion brought the specimen to the court and duly identified the same.

At odds with the ruling, accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in its Order dated September 8, 2014.

Adamant, accused-appellant elevated the matter to the CA raising the lone issue of whether he was correctly convicted for the crime as charged despite his unlawful arrest.

The CA's Ruling

On May 15, 2018, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, affirming the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal transportation of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 7, 2014 and the Order dated September 8, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 8, Malaybalay City in Criminal Case No. 18643-08, finding accused-appellant Danny Suerte y Edubos guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 21

In arriving at such disposition, the CA held that the warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant was valid. Similar to the RTC, the CA opined that there existed a probable cause for the police officers to believe that accused-appellant and accused Lumista were offenders of the law, or the contents of the backpack were instrument of some offense considering their failure to slow down at the checkpoint and after having been flagged down by the police officers, coupled by accused-appellant's act of jumping from the motorcycle and accused Lumista's act of speeding away.

In the same vein, the CA sustained the validity of accused-appellant's warrantless arrest as he was caught inflagrante delicto transporting marijuana at the time of his arrest after a valid search was conducted against him.

Lastly, the CA ruled that accused-appellant was correctly adjudged guilty for illegal transportation of dangerous drugs based on the narration of PS/Insp. Incason that accused-appellant was caught carrying a backpack containing marijuana leaves when he was flagged down on board a motorcycle at the checkpoint. The CA likewise upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties of the police officers and debunked accused-appellant's unsubstantiated denial.

Unperturbed by the setback, accused-appellant lodged this present appeal.

In a Resolution 22 dated November 7, 2018, the Court directed the parties to file their respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation 23 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental brief and instead adopt the arguments raised in its Appellee's Brief filed before the CA.

On the other hand, accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Brief, 24 claiming that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated when he was apprehended based solely on a tip of an informant, which consisted merely of a general statement that there were persons riding a motorcycle. He postulates that the tip was sorely lacking in details, such that it could have not aroused a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, or about to be committed. He also laments that his alleged act of jumping from the motorcycle is not a sufficient basis for his warrantless arrest citing the case of People v. Andapat. 25

Accused-appellant further bewails that the apprehending team failed to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, thereby casting serious doubt on the corpus delicti. More specifically, he harps on the following: (1) the failure to mark the seized dangerous drugs at the place of arrest; (2) the absence of representatives from the media and National Prosecution Service (NPS) to witness the inventory; (3) absence of an investigating officer; and (4) absence of testimonial, or documentary evidence on how the drugs were kept while in custody of the forensic chemist until the same were transferred to the court. For accused-appellant, these procedural lapses, unexplained and unjustified by the prosecution, are fatal to its case. These irregularities also negate the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the apprehending team.

Finally, accused-appellant propounds that the prosecution failed to prove actual transportation of the dangerous drugs. He maintains that he was not the owner or in possession of the backpack containing the marijuana at the time of his arrest. He insists that he only saw the same after one of the police officers ran after his co-accused Lumista, leading him to believe that the backpack must have come from the hot-pursuit operation.

Issue

The core issue to be resolved is whether the guilt of accused-appellant for Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is impressed with merit.

Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 penalizes, among others, the act of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs. It provides:

Sec. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any such transactions. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, to successfully prosecute a case for illegal transportation of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the transportation of illegal drugs was committed; and (2) the prohibited drug exists. 26 It is therefore imperative that the prosecution prove not only the movement of dangerous drugs from one place to another, but also to establish with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited drugs.

Jurisprudence is well-settled that in cases involving dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. 27 Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant. 28 The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 29

In People v. Bangcola, 30 the Court reiterated its previous pronouncement in Mallillin v. People31 as to how the chain of custody over the seized evidence should be maintained, and the testimony needed to establish the chain of custody, thus:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 32 (Emphasis supplied)

Pertinently, jurisprudence has identified four critical links in the chain of custody of the confiscated items: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 33

Moreover, as part of chain of custody, Section 21 (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides the exacting requirement to be observed by the arresting officers in relation to the seizure and custody of illegal drugs. It states:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; (Emphasis supplied)

Supplementing this provision is Article II, Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 which spells out the procedures to be observed by the apprehending officers to ensure the chain of custody, viz.:

"xxx xxx xxx.

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing, it is unmistakably clear that the law requires that: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The law further provides a saving mechanism to ensure that not every case of non-compliance irreversibly prejudices the State's evidence. It explicitly states that non-compliance with the requirements shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over the confiscated items provided that such non-compliance were under justifiable grounds and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.

The Court notes, however, that Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was amended by R.A. No. 10640, 34 and it essentially added the provisions contained in the IRR with a few modifications on the witness requirement. In particular, the apprehending team is now required to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in (1) the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (2) with an elected public official; and (3) a representative of the NPS or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Evidently, before the amendment of R.A. No. 9165, three insulating witnesses are required to be present during the inventory and photography of the seized items, namely: a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. After such amendment, only two witnesses are required to be present, it could either be an elected public official and representative of the NPS or a representative from the media. 35

In this case, since the alleged offense was committed on June 11, 2008, or prior to the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 10640, the old provisions of Section 21 (1) and its IRR shall apply.

After a circumspect scrutiny of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to show compliance with the safeguards laid down under the aforementioned rule, more particularly on the witness requirement.

Manifest on record that there were no media and DOJ representatives to witness the marking, physical inventory and photography of the seized evidence. This can easily be gleaned from the Inventory Receipt 36 and the testimony of PS/Insp. Incason, who admitted that only a Barangay Kagawad was present, to wit:

Q: Okay. Now, when the motorcycle was flagged down was there a public official present who was in company of your team?

A: None.

Q: Was there any media man who was invited by you to be at the checkpoint at the time of arrest?

A: At that time there was no media representative in Cabanglasan because it was [an] interior place.

Q: So interior. You have no friends in the media, you did not text?

A: We have friends in Malaybalay but Cabanglasan is far away from Malaybalay, Sir.

Q: Okay. So after the seizure your brought the accused to the police station?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Conducted an inventory, right?

A: And proper documentation, sir.

Q: Now, what is the proper documentation that you were referring to?

A: Photographs of the presence of the public official.

Q: In short upon arrival at the Police Station you invited a kagawad. Is that a kagawad that you attended?

A: When we arrived at the Police Station the kagawad was already at the Police Station, Sir. 37

In People v. Mendoza, 38 the Court stressed that the presence of the three witnesses: (1) elected public official; (2) media representative; and (3) DOJ representative is intended as a guarantee against planting of evidence and frame up, as they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity." In their absence, it has been held in People v. Año39 that the prosecution must provide a credible explanation justifying the non-compliance with the rule; otherwise, the saving clause under the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 (and now, the amended Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165) would not apply.

Here, PS/Insp. Incason made no attempt to justify why they failed to secure the presence of a DOJ representative. As to the absence of media representative, he claimed that they have friends from the media in Malaybalay but the same is far from Cabanglasan where the seized illegal drugs were confiscated and it was an interior place. The explanation offered, however, will not suffice to excuse the procedural lapse. Other than the bare allegation of PS/Insp. Incason that Malaybalay is far from Cabanglasan and an interior place, the prosecution failed to adduce any factual or documentary evidence to substantiate the same. Besides, even if the claim were true, there is dearth of evidence to prove that the police officers exerted genuine effort to obtain the presence of the required witnesses and such effort failed. Certainly, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. 40

In People v. Reyes, 41 the Court enumerated certain instances when absence of the required witnesses may be justified, viz.:

It must be emphasized that the prosecution must be able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain requirements provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following: (1) media representatives are not available at that time or that the police operatives had no time to alert the media due to the immediacy of the operation they were about to undertake, especially if it is done in more remote areas; (2) the police operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available representative of the National Prosecution Service; (3) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of the operation to be undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with all the requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165. 42

The above ruling was further reiterated in People v. Sipin,43 where the Court provided additional grounds where the presence of the required witnesses may be dispensed with, viz.:

The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of the required witnesses was not obtained for any of the following reasons, such as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. 44

In justifying any departure from the requirement of the insulating witnesses, the police officers are compelled not only to state the reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 45

In People v. Crispo, 46 the Court emphasized that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."

Similarly, in People v. Perez, 47 the Court underscored that non-compliance with the witness requirement may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. While the earnestness of these efforts must be examined on a case-to-case basis, the overarching objective is for the Court to be convinced that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given circumstances.

In this case, not only did the prosecution failed to proffer a justified reason for the absence of media and DOJ representatives, they likewise failed to prove that earnest efforts were exerted to procure the presence of these witnesses. It must be stressed that the police officers had considerable time to gather the required witnesses or at least to invite them prior to their operation. As testified by PS/Insp. Incason, he received the tip from the confidential informant at around 12:00 noon. Thereafter, they made preparations and set-up the checkpoint at around 1:30 p.m. Verily, they had sufficient time to at least call the required witnesses had they exerted the slightest efforts, especially since they claim to have friends from the media. However, not even an attempt to do so was made as they simply and blatantly ignored the witness requirement.

In a plethora of cases, 48 it has been repeatedly held that the presence of the required insulating witnesses at the time of the inventory is mandatory, and that their presence thereat serves both a crucial and a critical purpose. Indeed, under the law, the presence of the so-called insulating witnesses is a high prerogative requirement, the non-fulfillment of which casts serious doubts upon the integrity of the corpus delicti itself — the very prohibited substance itself — and for that reason imperils and jeopardizes the prosecution's case.

Aside from the witness requirement, the prosecution miserably failed to establish the second, third and fourth links in the chain of custody.

The second link refers to the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Here, there is no showing that the seized illegal drug was turned over to the investigating officer. Neither is there evidence that an investigating officer was assigned to the case. PS/Insp. Incason simply claimed that from the place of seizure, he took custody of the backpack containing the two bundles of marijuana to the police station until he turned over the same to the PNP Bukidnon Crime Laboratory Office. Pertinent portion of his testimony is quoted as follows:

Q: Now, from the time of seizure you were always in custody of that bag?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Until you reached the PNP Station?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Until it was submitted to the crime lab?

A: Yes, Sir. 49

However, his testimony is contradicted by another prosecution witness, SPO1 Pandong who claimed that the backpack containing the two bundles of marijuana leaves was in the possession of PO1 Marte from the place of seizure until it was brought to the crime laboratory. Unfortunately, PO1 Marte already passed away before he could testify in court. The testimony of SPO1 Pandong on these relevant matters is as follows:

Q: By the way, who in particular took the bag from the possession of the accused?

A: PO1 Marte, Ma'am.

xxx xxx xxx. 50

Q: Now, where is this PO1 Marte now?

A: He is already dead.

xxx xxx xxx. 51

Q: So the fact, it is already clear that PO1 Marte was in the custody of that bag?

A: Yes.

Q: From whom did he turn over that?

A: Actually that bag was at the custody of Marte from that (sic) bag recovered until (it) was turned over to the laboratory for examination?

Q: To whom [did] he [turn] over the bag?

A: He turned over the bag at the crime laboratory, Sir.

Q: Okay. So that is now the actual situation from Marte he turned over to the crime laboratory?

A: We brought the suspect to the Police Station and after that we made the request for the crime laboratory to examine the two bundles of marijuana.

Q: You did not understand the question. My question to whom did he turn over the bag after the seizure?

A: After the seizure[,] he did not turn over the bag to anybody that bag was in his possession. 52

The glaring discrepancies between the testimonies of PS/Insp. Incason and SPO1 Pandong cast serious doubt as to who exactly had custody of the seized illegal drugs from the place of seizure until it was turned over to the crime laboratory. The contradicting evidence of the prosecution on this matter constitutes a serious gap in the chain of custody.

Furthermore, contrary to the findings of the RTC, there is absolutely no evidence showing that PO1 Marte turned over the seized illegal drugs to PS/Insp. Incason after seizure. In fact, SPO1 Pandong was categorical when he stated that PO1 Marte did not turn over the seized illegal drugs to anyone from the moment of seizure until he brought the same to the crime laboratory.

Notably, the prosecution also failed to accomplish a Chain of Custody Form from which we can verify the persons who touched or handled the confiscated evidence, when and from whom they were received, the condition in which they were received and delivered to the next link in the chain. While the absence of a Chain of Custody Form is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case, the same could have provided the missing details on the handling of seized evidence. Regrettably, none was presented in this case.

On the other hand, the third link pertains to the delivery by the investigating officer of the illegal drugs to the forensic chemist. Here, the Request for Laboratory Examination 53 shows that the two bundles of marijuana were received by PC/Insp. Madroño from PS/Insp. Incason. However, the prosecution failed to explain how the seized items were transferred to PS/Insp. Salvacion, the forensic chemist who conducted the quantitative and qualitative examination on the seized illegal drugs. Neither did PS/Insp. Salvacion identify the person from whom she received the seized evidence or how she came into its possession. While the parties have stipulated on her testimony, such stipulations were limited to the following: (1) that she conducted the quantitative and qualitative examination on the specimen; and (2) that her findings were reduced into writing as Chemistry Report No. D-68-2008B. 54 Clearly, the stipulations were inadequate as it failed to shed light on how the confiscated evidence was turned over to the forensic chemist. The Court is thus forced to resort to guesswork as to the third link.

Lastly, the fourth link involves the submission of the seized illegal drugs by the forensic chemist to the court. Here, PS/Insp. Salvacion did not testify on how the seized illegal drugs were safeguarded, if at all, after she received the same and following her qualitative examination thereof, and prior to her appearance in court. To reiterate, the parties simply entered into a general stipulation of her testimony, which failed to provide information regarding the condition, proper handling and storage of the seized items while in her custody or that there was no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession thereof.

In People v. Gutierrez, 55 there were also inadequate stipulations as to the testimony of the forensic chemist. No explanation was given as to how the seized items were handled after conducting a qualitative examination and before its presentation in court. The Court ruled that this necessary detail imputes uncertainty on the integrity of the seized items presented, warranting the acquittal of the accused.

Indubitably, given the plurality of procedural lapses and apparent evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody, the Court can only conclude that the prosecution failed to establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. When there is uncertainty as to the corpus delicti, it cannot be said that all the elements of the crime charged was proven to sustain the conviction of accused-appellant.

To stress, the flagrant deviations of the apprehending team, unexplained and unjustified by the prosecution cannot be remedied by the simple allegation of substantial compliance or invocation of presumption of regularity. Here, both the RTC and the CA merely glossed over these procedural lapses by relying on the presumption of regularity.

The Court reminds that judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law is fundamentally flawed because the lapses themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity. 56 It bears repeating that in drugs cases, this presumption arises only when there is a showing that the apprehending officer/team followed the requirements of Section 21, or when the saving clause is successfully triggered. 57 The invocation of the presumption of regularity was not designed to cure unjustified lapses in the apprehension and seizure pursuant to drug operations. Instead, this presumption holds only until proof to the contrary is shown, and may not overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. 58

All told, the blatant transgressions committed by the apprehending team are sufficient to cast serious doubt on the guilt of accused-appellant. Absent faithful compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 which is primarily intended to, first, preserve the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items in drugs cases, and second, to safeguard accused persons from unfounded and unjust convictions, an acquittal becomes the proper recourse. 59

In view of these disquisitions, We need not delve on the other matters raised by accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 15, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01438-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Accused-appellant Danny Suerte y Edubos is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate implementation. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to the Court the action he has taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED." (Leonen,J., on leave; Hernando,J., Acting Chairperson, per S.O. No. 2828, dated June 21, 2021)

By authority of the Court:

MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) RUMAR D. PASIONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Perpetua T. Atal-Paño with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Walter S. Ong, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-20.

2. Records, p. 2.

3. TSN, August 27, 2013, p. 4; TSN, November 28, 2013, p. 4; Records, pp. 6-7.

4. TSN, August 27, 2013, p. 5.

5. TSN, August 27, 2013, pp. 5-8; TSN, November 28, 2013, pp. 5-7; Records, pp. 6-7.

6. TSN, August 27, 2013, pp. 8-11.

7.Id. at 11.

8.Id. at 11-14.

9. Records, p. 100.

10. TSN, August 27, 2013, pp. 36-37.

11. Records, p. 100.

12.Id. at 102.

13. TSN, November 28, 2013, pp. 3-5.

14. Records, p. 101.

15. TSN, November 11, 2013, pp. 4-5.

16.Id. at 5.

17.Id. at 5-7.

18.Id. at 8-11.

19. Rendered by Presiding Judge Isobel G. Barroso; CA rollo,pp. 40-64.

20.Id. at 64.

21.Rollo, p. 19.

22.Id. at 26.

23.Id. at 29-30.

24.Id. at 41-54.

25. CA-G.R. HC No. 01602-MIN, October 12, 2018.

26.People v. Baterina, G.R. No. 236259, September 16, 2020.

27.People v. Hilario, 823 Phil. 580,590 (2018).

28.People v. Badilla, 794 Phil. 263, 277 (2016).

29.People v. Ismael, 806 Phil. 21, 29 (2017).

30. G.R. No. 237802, March 18, 2019.

31. 576 Phil. 576 (2008).

32.Id. at 587.

33.People v. Macud, 822 Phil. 1016, 1029 (2017).

34. "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002.'" As the Court noted in People v. Gutierrez (see G.R. No. 236304, November 5, 2018), R.A. 10640 was approved on July 15, 2014. Under Section 5 thereof, it shall "take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation, " R.A. 10640 was published on July 23, 2014 in the Philippine Star (Vol. XXVIII, No. 359, Philippine Star Metro section, p. 21) and Manila Bulletin (Vol. 499, No. 23; World News section, p. 6). Thus R.A. 10640 appears to have become effective on August 7, 2014.

35.People v. Angeles, G.R. No. 224223, November 20, 2019.

36. Records, p. 103.

37. TSN, August 27, 2013, pp. 33-34.

38. 736 Phil. 749, 761-762 (2014).

39. 828 Phil. 439, 451 (2018).

40.People v. Santos, G.R. No. 243627, November 27, 2019.

41. 830 Phil. 619 (2018).

42.Id. at 633.

43. 833 Phil. 67 (2018).

44.Id. at 93.

45.Grefaldo v. People, G.R. No. 246362, November 11, 2019.

46. 828 Phil. 416, 435-436 (2018).

47. G.R. No. 241261, July 29, 2019.

48.People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 229509, July 3, 2019; People v. Yusop, G.R. No. 224587, July 28, 2020.

49. TSN, August 27, 2013, p. 36.

50. TSN, November 28, 2013, p. 7.

51.Id. at 9.

52.Id. at 16-17.

53. Records, p. 100.

54. TSN, November 28, 2013, p. 3; rollo, p. 41.

55. 614 Phil. 285 (2009).

56.Edangalino v. People, G.R. No. 235110, January 8, 2020.

57.People v. Mola, G.R. No. 226481, 830 Phil. 364, 383 (2018).

58.People v. Milana, G.R. No. 233747, December 5, 2018.

59.Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 227217, February 12, 2020.