THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 251923. September 15, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ARIS SELMAR y LETRAN, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 15, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 251923 (People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, v. Aris Selmar y Letran, accused-appellant). — The Court resolves to NOTE:
(1) the Letter dated December 9, 2020 of CTCInsp. Albert C. Manalo, Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Inmate Documents and Processing Division, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, confirming the confinement of accused-appellant at the Leyte Regional Prison, Abuyog, Leyte, since October 30, 2017;
(2) the Office of the Solicitor General's Manifestation (in Lieu of Supplemental Brief) pursuant to the Resolution dated October 12, 2020, stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief and adopts its brief for the plaintiff-appellee filed before the Court of Appeals (CA);
(3) accused-appellant's Manifestation (in Lieu of Supplemental Brief) pursuant to the Resolution dated October 12, 2020, stating that (a) he would no longer file a supplemental brief; (b) he adopts his appellant's brief filed before the CA; and (c) he is willing to submit the case for deliberation and decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed;
(4) the Letter dated January 29, 2021 of Mr. Amado M. Vargas, Senior Jail Officer 4, OIC, Jail Warden, Basey Municipal Jail, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Basey, Samar, in compliance with the Resolution dated October 12, 2020, informing the Court that they neither have at present nor had in the past a detainee in the person of one Aris Selmar y Letran; and HESIcT
(5) the Letter dated February 10, 2021 of Mr. Victor B. Templonuevo, Provincial Warden Office of the Provincial Warden, Catbalogan City, Samar, in compliance with the Resolution dated October 12, 2020, informing the Court that accused-appellant Aris Selmar y Letran was already transferred to Leyte Regional Prison, Abuyog, Leyte, on October 30, 2017.
This appeal 1 assails the Decision 2 dated 14 November 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02589. The CA affirmed the Decision 3 dated 15 June 2017 of Branch 30, Regional Trial Court (RTC), __________, Samar in Criminal Case No. 2012-02-3718 convicting accused-appellant Aris Selmar y Letran (accused-appellant) for the crime of Statutory Rape and thereby sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Antecedents
Accused-appellant Aris Selmar y Letran (accused-appellant) was charged with Statutory Rape pursuant to Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353, 4 in an Information with the following accusation:
That on or about the 21st day of August 2011 at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at ____________________, Municipality of ________________, Province of Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with force, threats and intimidation and with lewd designs, lustful intent, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, a seven (7)-year old minor, without her consent and against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
At his arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." 6 Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, AAA, 7 Dr. Rusela Capacio-Grapa (Dr. Capacio-Grapa), and BBB, 8 AAA's mother. On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant as its sole witness. 9
Version of the Prosecution
On 21 August 2011, AAA was on her way home from school when she saw her uncle, accused-appellant, going towards her house. When he got there, accused-appellant got a chicken and then left. 10
Accused-appellant returned to AAA's house in the early evening of the same day and found AAA alone because her parents went to her grandmother's house. Accused-appellant then undressed AAA and told her to lie down. He took off his clothes and laid on top of AAA. Then, he inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitals and observed that there was a milky-whitish fluid that came out of accused-appellant's penis. Afterwards, accused-appellant gave AAA some coins and left. AAA proceeded to eat her dinner before leaving for her grandmother's house to join her parents. 11
BBB learned of what happened after her uncle, CCC, told her that he saw accused-appellant and AAA leave their house. When BBB asked AAA what happened, the latter narrated what accused-appellant did to her. Upon advice of their barangay captain, BBB reported the incident to the police and had AAA undergo a medical examination. 12
Dr. Capacio-Grapa conducted the medical examination of AAA on 22 August 2011 and made the following findings:
External Genetalia: Grossly normal, without pubic hairs noted at the labia.
Introitus: Nullipaous, hymen not intact with healed lacerations at 3 and 7 o'clock position. Presence of fresh laceration at 11 o'clock position.
Internal Examination:
Vagina: Admits examining finger with ease on initial examination and with slight resistance and pain as the examination gets deeper.
— Abrassion (sic) noted 1.5 cm at the right perineal area.
— Abrassion (sic) 1.3 noted at the left upper side of the perineum with pain, tenderness and slight swelling around the area.
Uterus: Not palpable, no masses, no tenderness
Discharge: With minimal light yellowish vaginal discharge noted with slight foul smelling odor. 13
The doctor explained that the fresh laceration could have been caused by a recent event and could have been caused by an erect penis forcefully inserted into AAA's vagina. She opined that it was not normal for her to be able to insert the tip of her examining finger with ease inside AAA's vagina, who was only seven (7) years old. 14 ICHDca
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant denied the charges. He testified that on 21 August 2011, at around 8 p.m., he was at Nanay Estring's billiard hall with his friends, Bimbim, Tata Peding, Jekjek, and Toto. Afterwards, he went home at around 10:00 p.m. Accused-appellant admitted that AAA's father was his elder brother and that his house was only eight (8) meters away from AAA's house. 15
Ruling of the RTC
In the Decision dated 15 June 2017, the RTC convicted accused-appellant for Statutory Rape, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused Aris Selmar y Letran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape through sexual intercourse and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with full credit of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code; and ordering him to pay AAA as follows: [Php]75,000.00 as civil indemnity; [Php]75,000.00 as moral damages; [Php]75,000.00 as exemplary damages with interests at six (6) percent per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid.
Costs of suit to be paid by the accused. 16
Accused-appellant appealed the ruling to the CA. 17 cDHAES
Ruling of the CA
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the findings of the RTC in its Decision dated 14 November 2019, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 15 June 2017 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of ______, Samar, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. 2012-02-3718, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 18
Like the RTC, the CA afforded full faith and value to AAA's testimony. It explained that there was no reason to doubt AAA's narration. It cited the Supreme Court's previous rulings giving credit to a child-victim's testimony owing to her "relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter about which they testified was not true." 19 Further, the CA noted that accused-appellant's defenses of denial and alibi could not be sustained as against AAA's direct, positive, and categorical testimony. 20
Thus, the present appeal. 21
Issue
The issue for resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's Decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is dismissed.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court has always been guided by three well-entrenched principles: (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually involves two persons, the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of the complainant's testimony. 22
Accused-appellant challenged his conviction and claimed that the trial court erred in affording full faith and credence to AAA's testimony because her testimony was "lacking in material and vital points sufficient to detail the recital of elemental facts in the information." 23 To support his argument, he raises two (2) main points: first, that AAA's testimony was wanting in the particular acts that would constitute the crime charged, and second, that AAA's testimony was inconsistent.
The Court is not convinced.
First, on the alleged lack of particularity in AAA's testimony, accused-appellant alleged:
The prosecution therefore left to guesswork a number of vital details, such as where in particular AAA was made to lie down, how the accused undressed himself and AAA, whether AAA put up any resistance, whether accused threatened AAA with her life or any member of her family, whether AAA's mouth was covered that prevented her from shouting, whether she was crying, whether accused at any point slapped or hurt her physically, whether accused inserted his penis to her vagina, whether accused made thrusting motion during the insertion and how long, whether accused caressed or kissed her prior to the actual coitus — and the list could go on. 24
The Court, however, finds that the particulars accused-appellant is looking for are immaterial to the present case. Accused-appellant is charged with Statutory Rape defined in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, which provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is Committed:
xxx xxx xxx
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. In statutory rape, force, intimidation or physical evidence of injury is immaterial. Where the girl is below twelve (12) years of age, violence or intimidation is not required, and the only subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge took place. 25 As such, the only elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such woman is under twelve (12) years of age, which are both present in this case. 26
As the CA pronounced:
As to the first element AAA's age at the time of the commission of the offense is uncontroverted. Her birth certificate, which was duly presented and offered in evidence, showed that she was born on 29 April 2004. She was, thus, only seven (7) years old at the time she was raped. ASEcHI
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the second and third elements, AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the person who molested her. She consistently and without hesitation, pointed to the accused-appellant as the one who ravaged her on 21 August 2011. AAA clearly narrated her harrowing experience in the hands of the accused-appellant. Despite the gruelling cross-examination by the accused-appellant's counsel, AAA remained steadfast, never faltered and gave a very candid and straightforward account of the traumatic events, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Then, what transpired?
xxx xxx xxx
A: And at night, he came back during night time.
Q: What did he do when he came back during night time?
A: He undressed me.
Q: Then what else?
A: He told me to lie down.
Q: Then?
A: Then he raped me.
COURT:
SHE SAID RAPE. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT? WHAT DID HE DO TO YOU?
A: 'Ginkinuan niya ako.' 'Ginkuan ako.'
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
DO YOU KNOW WHAT IS MEANT BY VAGINA?
A: Yes.
COURT:
DO YOU KNOW WHAT IS PENIS?
A: Yes.
COURT:
NOW, YOU TELL THE COURT. WHEN YOUR UNCLE WENT TO YOUR HOUSE, DID HE PUT HIS PENIS INTO YOUR VAGINA?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And what did you feel?
A: I felt pain.
Q: What else?
A: I just felt that it was painful.
Q: Did you see something coming out from his penis?
A: Yes.
Q: What was it?
A: It looked like a milk-whitish fluid.
Q: And after he placed his penis into your vagina that you were able to see a whitish substance, what did he do next? ITAaHc
A: Nothing.
Q: Did he say anything to you?
A: None.
COURT:
DID HE GIVE MONEY AFTER THAT?
A: Yes.
COURT:
DO YOU REMEMBER HOW MUCH?
A: No.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
FROM THE COURT. WHEN YOUR UNCLE ARIS, WHEN YOU SAID EARLIER THAT YOUR UNCLE ARIS PLACED HIS PENIS INTO YOUR VAGINA, WAS HE NAKED?
A: Yes.
COURT:
WHAT ABOUT YOU, WERE YOU ALSO NAKED?
A: Yes.
COURT:
WHO TOOK OFF YOUR ATTIRE AT THAT TIME?
A: He was the one who took off my clothes.
COURT:
YOU MEAN UNCLE ARIS?
A: Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said awhile ago that you saw your Uncle Aris here and he is now outside the court room. Can you look over outside point to where is your Uncle Aris?
A: That person sitting on a chair. (Who when asked, answered that he is Aris Selmar).
xxx xxx xxx. 27
Clearly, the two (2) elements of Statutory Rape — age and carnal knowledge — have been duly proved in this case.
Second, on the alleged inconsistency in AAA's testimony, accused-appellant stated:
More damningly, reasonable doubt has been injected on the prosecution evidence when AAA herself categorically testified in court that on the date alleged in the information, August 21, 2011, appellant Aris Selmar did not go to her house on that day and even in the evening of that same day. Her revelation reads:
Q: Do you remember on August 21, 2011, if somebody went to your house to see the chicken?
A: Yes.
Q: Who?
A: Sometimes, Kuya Entoy will go there.
COURT:
Q: WHAT ABOUT ARIS SELMAR, DID HE GO TO YOUR HOUSE ON THAT DAY OF AUGUST 21, 2011? CHTAIc
A: NO.
COURT:
Q: Also in the evening he did not also go to your house.
A: No, he did not. 28
He claims that AAA did not provide the specifics of her ordeal because accused-appellant did not really go to her house, and thus, could not have committed the crime. 29
The Court disagrees.
It is settled that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, that is sufficient to convict the accused. 30 Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where, as in this case, there is no inconsistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailant. 31
A witness' testimony that may have purported inaccuracies, on its own, will not diminish the credibility of such testimony. In the case of People v. Geroal, 32 one of the alleged inconsistencies was the statement on the date of the commission of the crime, similar to this case. The Court, in Geroal, brushed aside said inconsistency and held that the date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the crime and need not be started with absolute accuracy; where the time of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time alleged. It is well to stress that variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same.
A person does not usually remember what particular incident/s associate with a specific date under normal circumstances. This hasty recollection is more true if the person is under a stressful scenario as when that person is testifying in open court that she had been raped, similar to AAA's situation in this case. The Court cannot fault AAA for not remembering that accused-appellant went to their house on 21 August 2011. What is important is that AAA clearly and categorically identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Further, AAA had no reason to conjure a storyline implicating accused-appellant in the most vicious and reprehensible accusation and presenting herself as a rape victim. It is established that the credibility of a rape victim is augmented when she has no malevolent motive to testify against the accused-appellant or where there is absolutely no evidence which even remotely suggests that she could have been actuated by such motive. 33 Thus, AAA's credibility remained intact.
Accused-appellant likewise invokes the ruling in People vs. Jampas, 34 claiming that it is on all fours with the present case, thus strengthening his argument against AAA's credibility. Accused-appellant is mistaken.
In Jampas, the Court did not discredit the complainant's testimony solely because she did not attest to the specifics on how the accused raped her. The Court held that she failed to attest to the specifics on how the accused raped her as alleged in the Information. The specific allegation in the Information read: "accused removed [AAA]'s short pants and panty and afterwhich, accused removed his long maong pants and brief, placed on top of her and kissed her, pointed a knife to her and warned her not to tell anyone for he would kill her should she do[.]" However, during her testimony, complainant merely gave a general testimony that the accused raped her, put himself on top of her, and that she felt pain after the act, with no narration on the specifics as alleged in the Information. Thus, the Court found complainant's testimony "simplistic that it leaves much to be desired and leaves unmentioned those expectedly required." EATCcI
Further, in Jampas, the Court considered other factors, such as the unexplained delay in reporting the incident to the police, going to school right after the incident and the apparent inexistent lawting where the incident allegedly occurred, in concluding that complainant's narrative lacked credibility.
In this case, the trial court found AAA's testimony to be firm, categorical, and straightforward despite her young age. It is, moreover, corroborated by Dr. Rusela Capacio-Grapa's medico-legal findings. When the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. 35
It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, it was in a better position to decide the question of credibility. 36
At this juncture, the Court finds nothing on record that would warrant a deviation from the findings of the trial court.
As regards accused-appellant's defenses of denial and alibi, both must fail. It is well settled that denial is an intrinsically weak defense, which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Alibi, on the other hand, is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove and for which reason it is generally rejected. For the alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establish two elements: "(1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission," which elements were not established in this case. 37 We note that accused-appellant failed to present a witness to corroborate his whereabouts at the time of the incident. Likewise, he himself admitted that his house was only a few meters away from AAA's house.
Given that accused-appellant's guilt for the crime of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is established, the Court affirms the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B of the same Code, as well as the award of civil indemnity, and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Php75,000.00 each to be in accord with law and jurisprudence. 38 The Court likewise finds the imposition of legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards reckoned from the date of finality of this Resolution until full payment as proper. 39
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 14 November 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 02589, which affirmed the Decision dated 15 June 2017 of Branch 30, Regional Trial Court (RTC), ________, Samar in Criminal Case No. 2012-02-3718, finding accused-appellant Aris Selmar y Letran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with full credit of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED. The awards of civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Php75,000.00 each to the victim, AAA, are likewise AFFIRMED. All monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully satisfied. DHITCc
SO ORDERED." (Lopez, J., additional Member per S.O. No. 2834.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 18-19; See Notice of Appeal dated 02 January 2020.
2. Id. at 5-17; Penned by Associate Justice Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga and concurred in by Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap of the Special Twentieth (20th) Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
3. CA rollo, pp. 31-42.
4. Entitled "AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on 30 September 1997.
5. Rollo, p. 6.
6. Id. at 43.
7. The identity of the private complainant/victim withheld and other material information are kept confidential pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 9262 and Republic Act No. 7610, as applied in the case of People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006), G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006 [Per J. Tinga].
8. The real name of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act" and A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC entitled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names."
9. CA rollo, pp. 31-32.
10. Rollo, p. 6.
11. Id. at 6-7.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id.
16. CA rollo, p. 42.
17. Rollo, p. 9.
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 13.
20. Id. at 15-16.
21. Id. at 18-19.
22. People v. Tormis, 595 Phil. 589, 601 (2008), G.R. No. 183456, 18 December 2008 [Per J. Chico-Nazario], citing People v. Dizon, 453 Phil. 858, 867 (2003), G.R. No. 133237, 11 July 2003 [Per J. Callejo, Sr.].
23. CA rollo, p. 18.
24. Id. at 20.
25. People v. Pancho, 462 Phil. 193, 201 (2003), G.R. Nos. 136592-93, 27 November 2003 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez].
26. People v. Lopez, 617 Phil. 733, 744-745 (2009), G.R. No. 179714, 02 October 2009 [Per J. Peralta], citing People v. Alegado, G.R. Nos. 93030-31, 21 August 1991, 201 SCRA 37, 48 [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr.].
27. Rollo, pp. 10-13.
28. CA rollo, p. 24.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 17.
31. People v. Bato, 382 Phil. 558, 565-566 (2000), G.R. No. 134939, 16 February 2000 [Per J. Pardo].
32. 813 Phil. 1055 (2017), G.R. No. 217973, 19 July 2017 [Per J. Caguioa].
33. Id.
34. 610 Phil. 652 (2009), G.R. No. 177766, 17 July 2009 [Per J. Carpio-Morales].
35. People v. Manaligod, G.R. No. 218584, 25 April 2018, 862 SCRA 751, 758 [Per J. Martires].
36. People v. Edem, 428 Phil. 43, 57-58 (2002), G.R. No. 130970, 27 February 2002 [Per J. Panganiban].
37. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 242276, 18 February 2020 [Per J. J.C. Reyes, Jr.].
38. People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, G.R. No. 202124, 05 April 2016 [Per J. Peralta].
39. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013), G.R. No. 189871, 13 August 2013 [Per J. Peralta].