People v. Sandiganbayan (First Division)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 227450. June 16, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), RAMIE B. ROSIT, AMIE B. MONREDONDO, JUDITH B. CASTRES, LUISA C. ALAC, JUVENIL C. LINAZA, WILFREDO C. JUBAC, LEVIRA B. LINTOGONAN, NORBERTO P. DUMAGUETE, ALLEN S. DE JESUS, NILO B. ROSIT AND SOTELO VINCENT CABRERA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 16, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 227450 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, versus THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), RAMIE B. ROSIT, AMIE B. MONREDONDO, JUDITH B. CASTRES, LUISA C. ALAC, JUVENIL C. LINAZA, WILFREDO C. JUBAC, LEVIRA B. LINTOGONAN, NORBERTO P. DUMAGUETE, ALLEN S. DE JESUS, NILO B. ROSIT AND SOTELO VINCENT CABRERA,respondents.

The instant Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 prays for the nullification and the setting aside of the Resolution 2 dated August 12, 2016 (assailed Resolution) of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dismissing the case, docketed as Case No. SB-15-CRM-0289, for violation of respondents' right to speedy disposition of their case. According to petitioner, the SB acted in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the seven (7)-year period in the resolution of the complaint, taking into account the period of fact-finding and preliminary investigation, constitute a violation of the right of respondents to speedy disposition of their case.

After reviewing the Petition and its annexes, inclusive of the assailed Resolution, the Court resolves to DISMISS the same for lack of merit.

Dismissal of the case for

At the outset, the Court notes that the dismissal of the instant Petition is inevitable in view of the principle of double jeopardy.

In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 3 the Court, in light of the finding that petitioners' right to speedy disposition of their case was violated, ordered the dismissal of the criminal case filed against them. The Court further explained that such pronouncement, as a matter of course, results in the acquittal of petitioners. 4 Hence, the dismissal by the SB of the case against respondents for violation of their right to speedy disposition of their case is tantamount to an acquittal. Such acquittal, in general, may not be reversed and set aside without offending respondents' right against double jeopardy.

In criminal cases, no rule is more settled than that "a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation." 5 This is referred to as the finality-of-acquittal rule. 6 Such rule proceeds from the constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused against double jeopardy, 7 which safeguards the accused from government oppression of being prosecuted twice for the same offense.

The finality-of-acquittal rule, however, is not without exception. The Court has recognized that a judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such a case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the SB, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. 8 Further, the Court, in a catena of cases, has clarified that for certiorari to lie against a verdict of acquittal, it must be established that the prosecution was denied its day in court or denied due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment or resolution void. 9

In People v. Tria-Tirona, 10 the Court held:

x x x In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan. Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process.

From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. 11 (Emphasis supplied)

In another case, People v. Asis, 12 the Court ruled that while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, petitioner seeking reconsideration thereof, in such an extraordinary proceeding, must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. The foremost example of which is the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 13 where the denial of the prosecution's right to due process was so blatant and palpable that the Court found the whole trial a sham. 14

Again, in People v. Court of Appeals, Fourth Division, 15 the Court reiterated that:

x x x [F]or an acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.

"Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice." (Citations omitted) 16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this case, the Petition is bereft of any allegation, much less evidence, that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or that the proceedings before the SB were a mockery. Notably, when respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that their right to speedy disposition of their case was violated, petitioner was given ample opportunity to refute respondents' claims and that the assailed Resolution of the SB was rendered after considering the arguments presented by both parties. Consequently, certiorari will not lie to reverse the dismissal of the case without offending respondents' right against double jeopardy.

In view of the foregoing, the resolution of the issue of whether respondents' right to speedy disposition of their case was violated becomes unnecessary. Nonetheless, a review of the evidence shows that the SB correctly dismissed the case for violation of respondents' right to speedy disposition.

Respondents' right to speedy

The case of People v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 17 summarized the guidelines in resolving questions on the right to speedy disposition of cases laid down by the Court in the case of Cagang v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), 18(Cagang) as follows:

(1) The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial.

The former may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law while the latter may be invoked before any tribunal as long as the respondent may already be prejudiced by the proceeding.

(2) For purposes of determining inordinate delay, a case is deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary investigation.

(3) Courts must determine which party carries the burden of proof.

If it has been alleged that there was delay within the time periods (i.e., according to the time periods that will be issued by the Ombudsman), the burden is on the defense to show that there has been violation of their rights to speedy disposition of case or to speedy trial. The defense must prove: (a) that the case took much longer than was reasonably necessary to resolve; and (b) that efforts were exerted to protect their constitutional rights.

If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay. The prosecution must prove: (a) that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and case prosecution; (b) the delay was inevitable due to the complexity of the issues and volume of evidence; and (c) accused was not prejudiced by the delay.

(4) Determination of the length of delay is never mechanical.

Courts must consider the entire context of the case, the amount of evidence and the complexity of issues involved. An examination of the delay is no longer necessary to justify the dismissal of the case if the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice.

(5) The right to speedy disposition of cases (or the right to speedy trial) must be timely raised.

The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods, otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right. 19 (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Based on the foregoing, petitioner is correct that the period of the fact-finding investigation is not included in determining whether there was inordinate delay. Nevertheless, even excluding the period of the fact-finding investigation, the Court finds that the Ombudsman committed inordinate delay in its preliminary investigation.

According to Cagang, to determine whether there is inordinate delay, the court must examine the periods provided under the rules for the conduct of the preliminary investigation. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right to speedy disposition of cases is invoked, the burden of proof shifts to the State to explain and justify the delay. 20

In the cases of Javier v. Sandiganbayan, 21(Javier) and Catamco v. Sandiganbayan Sixth Division, 22(Catamco) the Court noted that the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman does not provide a period within which the preliminary investigation should be concluded; thus, the ten (10)-day period from the termination of the investigation or submission of the case for resolution under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court was suppletorily applied. Further, the Court ruled that while this period may be short or unreasonable from an administrative standpoint, the Ombudsman's failure to provide for particular time periods in its own Rules of Procedure should not prejudice its citizens. Applying the period provided under the Rules of Court, the Court found, in Javier and Catamco, that there was inordinate delay — of five (5) years 23 and two (2) years, 24 respectively — in the resolution of the preliminary investigation, which the prosecution has the burden to explain and justify.

In this case, the formal complaint was filed on October 12, 2012. The Ombudsman, on March 4, 2013, directed respondents to submit their respective counter-affidavits. Respondents immediately complied and submitted their Joint-Counter Affidavit on April 11, 2013. However, despite the immediate filing of respondents' joint counter-affidavit, it took the Ombudsman almost two (2) years to issue the Joint Resolution dated December 15, 2014 finding probable cause against respondents; and almost a year, or on November 13, 2015, to file the corresponding Information before the SB. 25 In other words, from the filing of respondents' Joint Counter-Affidavit on April 11, 2013, it took the Ombudsman about two (2) years and seven (7) months to resolve the complaint and file the Information before the court. Hence, following the aforementioned cases, the prosecution has the burden to establish that such delay is reasonable and justified under the circumstances. 26

The prosecution must prove, among others, that the issues are so complex and the evidence so voluminous, which render the delay inevitable. 27 In other words, absent any extraordinary complication, which the Ombudsman must adequately prove, "such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the case, or any event external thereto that effectively stymied [the Ombudsman's] normal work activity," any delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation is not justified. 28

Unfortunately, however, the prosecution in this case failed to provide any explanation or justification for such delay. In its comment to the motion to dismiss filed before the SB, petitioner simply claimed that the Ombudsman did not incur vexatious, capricious or oppressive delay. 29 In the present Petition, petitioner admits that the Ombudsman took two (2) years to issue the Joint Resolution finding probable cause against respondents, and yet failed to provide reasons or justifications therefor. 30

The Ombudsman's delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation is further unjustified if the Court were to consider the nature of the transaction involved in the present case. A protracted investigation of more than (2) years from the time respondents' Joint-Counter Affidavit was filed is still quite unreasonable considering that the issues in this case are simple and straightforward as it involved only one transaction — the purchase of two (2) heavy equipment — and that based on the Information filed against respondents, their charges were primarily based on the results of the audit issued by the Commission on Audit in December 2009, finding that respondents violated relevant procurement laws and regulations. In this light, the Ombudsman's delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation against respondents was clearly unjustified. 31

Furthermore, the Court finds that respondents had timely asserted their rights at the earliest possible time — when they filed a motion for the early resolution of their case before the Ombudsman and subsequently, a Motion to Dismiss before the SB.

Accordingly, applying the guidelines in Cagang, Javier and Catamco, the delay in the preliminary investigation from the filing of the formal complaint was beyond reasonable. In the absence of a sufficient justification for such delay and in view of the timely invocation of the right to speedy disposition of a case, the dismissal of the criminal case against respondents must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated August 12, 2016 of the Sandiganbayan in Case No. SB-15-CRM-0289 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-25.

2.Id. at 29-37. Penned by Associate Justice/Chairperson Efren N. Dela Cruz with Associate Justices Reynaldo P. Cruz and Michael Frederick L. Musngi, concurring.

3. G.R. Nos. 191411 & 191871, July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 188.

4.Id.

5.Chiok v. People, G.R. Nos. 179814 & 180021, December 7, 2015, 776 SCRA 120, 137.

6.Id.

7.Mandagan v. Jose M. Valero Corp., G.R. No. 215118, June 19, 2019, p. 5.

8.People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 168188-89, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 185, 211.

9.Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 94, 109, citing People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140633, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 74, 78-79.

10. G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 462.

11.Id. at 469.

12. G.R. No. 173089, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 250, 258.

13. No. L-72670, September 12, 1986, 144 SCRA 43.

14.Id.

15. G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 575.

16.Id. at 579-580.

17. G.R. No. 232737, October 2, 2019, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65698>.

18. G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018, 875 SCRA 374, 449-451.

19.People v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), supra note 17.

20. See supra note, at 442.

21. G.R. No. 237997, June 10, 2020, p. 6.

22. G.R. Nos. 243560-62 & 243261-63, July 28, 2020.

23.Javier v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 21.

24.Catamco v. Sandiganbayan Sixth Division, supra note 22.

25.Rollo, p. 9.

26.Cagang v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), supra note 18, at 442-443.

27.Catamco v. Sandiganbayan Sixth Division, supra note 22, at 9.

28.Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra note 3, at 197-198.

29.Rollo, p. 31.

30.Id. at 17.

31. See id. at 7-10.