People v. Sandiganbayan (1st Division)

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 229656. November 24, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN [FIRST DIVISION], MANUEL M. LAPID, MA. VICTORIA M. AQUINO-ABUBAKAR, LEOLITA M. AQUINO, AND DEXTER ALEXANDER S.D. VASQUEZ, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 24 November 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 229656 — (People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan [First Division], Manuel M. Lapid, Ma. Victoria M. Aquino-Abubakar, Leolita M. Aquino, and Dexter Alexander S.D. Vasquez)

The Case

In their separate motions for reconsideration, Senator Manuel M. Lapid, 1 Ma. Victoria M. Aquino-Abubakar, Leolita M. Aquino, and Dexter Alexander S.D. Vasquez 2 (Lapid, et al.) implore the Court to revisit the following dispositions:

1) Decision3 dated August 19, 2019, reversing the quashal or dismissal of the Information in Criminal Case No. SB-15-CRM-0286 entitled People of the Philippines v. Manuel Mercado Lapid, et al., for violation of Section 3(e) 4 in relation to Section 3(g) 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 6 on the ground that the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) did not incur an inordinate delay in conducting the preliminary investigation of the case against Lapid, et al., and

2) Resolution7 dated February 19, 2020, denying Lapid, et al.'s respective motions for reconsideration.

Antecedents

On May 21, 2004, the Provincial Government of Pampanga through Senator Manuel M. Lapid (Lapid) directly purchased 8 3,880 liters of Macro-Micro Foliar Fertilizer (MMFF) from its exclusive distributor Malayan Pacific Trading Corporation (MPTC) for P4,850,000.00. Lapid certified that no suitable fertilizer substitute with the same quality as MMFF was available in the market. 9 MMFF was formulated by Dexter Alexander S.D. Vasquez (Vasquez) doing business under the name D.A. Vasquez.

This spurred an investigation led by the Field Investigation Office (FIO)-Task Force Abono (TF-Abono). 10 As a result, charges 11 for violations of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) of RA 3019; Section 65.2 (d) 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) in relation to Sections 10 13 and 18 14 of Republic Act No. 9184 (RA 9184), otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act; 15 and violation of Article 217 16 in relation to Article 171 17 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) 18 were filed before the OMB against Lapid, Provincial Accountant Benjamin G. Yuzon (Yuzon), Provincial Treasurer Vergel B. Yabut (Yabut), Provincial Administrator Benalfre J. Galang (Galang), Provincial General Services Officer Lulu S. Alingcastre (Alingcastre), Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority (TIEZA) Technical Assistant Leonardo M. Mendoza (Mendoza), Administrative Officer I Ramil G. Flores (Flores), John and Jane Does — all employees of the Provincial Capitol of San Fernando, Pampanga, MPTC President Ma. Victoria M. Aquino-Abubakar (Aquino-Abubakar), MPTC's Incorporators Ismael B. Abubakar, Jr. (Abubakar, Jr.), Alberto T. Aquino (Alberto), Leolita M. Aquino (Leolita), Arthur M. Aquino, (Arthur), Paul Albert M. Aquino (Paul), Marites Sto. Domingo (Sto. Domingo), Rolando R. Dorado (Dorado), Ade Nasuiton (Nasuiton), and Vasquez, Proprietor of D.A. Vasquez. 19

The FIO TF-Abono essentially alleged: CAIHTE

The Provincial Government of Pampanga violated a) Section 10 of RA 9184 when it resorted to direct purchase of MMFF, and b) Section 18 of the same law when it specified the brand of fertilizer to be purchased. Contrary to Lapid's certification, other foliar fertilizers were readily available in the market of the same quality as MMFF. 20

Worse, D.A. Vasquez and MPTC had no capacity to enter into a contract of purchase with the Provincial Government of Pampanga. MPTC was a dubious corporation because it failed to file its General Information Sheets for Calendar Year (CY) 2000 and 2004, and Financial Statement for CY 2000, and it had no business permit nor a duly issued license from the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). On the other hand, D.A. Vasquez only applied for product registration with the FPA on August 15, 2005 — only after it had already entered into the aforesaid transaction with the Provincial Government of Pampanga in 2004. 21

In his defense, Lapid countered that he relied in good faith on the recommendations of his subordinates who were presumed to have regularly performed their official duties. Hence, he cannot be deemed to have blindly affixed his signature to the "Certification of No Available Substitute" and the purchase order for MMFF. 22

On the part of Yuzon, 23Yabut, 24Alingcastre, 25Mendoza, 26 and Flores, 27 they denied any participation in the preparation and implementation of the questioned transaction.

As for Abubakar, Jr., Aquino-Abubakar, Alberto, Leolita, Arthur, Paul, and Dorado, they, too, claimed that as members of the Board of Directors of MPTC, they had no personal knowledge, much less, actual participation in the transaction. They manifested though that MPTC was a duly registered corporation with the SEC. 28

Galang died on October 17, 2005, before he could even file his counter-affidavit. 29

By Resolution 30 dated September 18, 2013, the OMB found probable cause to indict Lapid, et al., for violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) of RA 3019. It found that the purchase of fertilizers by the Provincial Government of Pampanga violated RA 9184 and its IRR. The Provincial Government of Pampanga could have purchased a fertilizer of equal or better quality than MMFF at a lesser cost if it resorted to competitive public bidding.

The charges against Alingcastre, Mendoza, Flores, Abubakar, Jr., Alberto, Arthur, Paul, Sto. Domingo, Dorado, and Nasuiton were dismissed for lack of probable cause. Due to his untimely demise, the charges against Galang were also dismissed.

Through Resolution 31 dated June 3, 2014, the OMB approved Resolution dated September 18, 2013.

The separate motions for reconsideration of Lapid and Yuzon were denied per Order dated September 12, 2014. The OMB approved the aforesaid Order on January 30, 2015. 32

By Information dated November 4, 2015, Lapid, et al., were jointly charged with violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, viz.:

In May 2004, or thereabout, in the province of Pampanga, and within this Honorable Court's jurisdiction, above-named accused MANUEL MERCADO LAPID, BENJAMIN DE GUZMAN YUZON and VERGEL BALTAZAR YABUT, all public officers, being then the Provincial Governor, Provincial Accountant, and Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, respectively, while in the performance of their official functions, conspiring with one another and with private individuals MA. VICTORIA M. AQUINO-ABUBAKAR and LEOLITA M. AQUINO, incorporators of Malayan Pacific Trading Corporation (MPTC), and DEXTER ALEXANDER S.D. VASQUEZ, proprietor of D.A. Vasquez Macro-Micro Fertilizer Resources (DAVMMFR), acting with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully[,] and criminally cause undue injury to the government and give unwarranted benefits, preference[,] and advantage to accused MA. VICTORIA M. AQUINO-ABUBAKAR, LEOLITA M. AQUINO, and DEXTER ALEXANDER S.D. VASQUEZ by entering, in behalf of the Provincial Government of Pampanga, into a transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter involving the purchase by the Provincial Government of Pampanga of 3,880 liters of Macro-Micro Foliar Fertilizer formulated by DAVMMFR and distributed in Pampanga by MPTC with irregularities and instances of fraud attending the transaction, as follows —

1. Purchase of the said fertilizer from MPTC without the benefit of public bidding as required by Republic Act No. 9184 (The Government Procurement Reform Act) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations;

2. Accused Lapid's certification that there are no suitable substitute[s] to Macro-Micro Foliar Fertilizer in order to unlawfully resort to direct purchase despite the availability of a suitable substitute offered at a much lower price in the locality;

3. Indicating in the Purchase Request/Order a brand name of fertilizer (Macro-Micro Foliar Fertilizer) in violation of Republic Act No. 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations;

4. The inordinate speed by which the transaction was consummated — from submission of the price quotation by Vasquez's DAVMMFR on May 12, 2004, to the issuance of a Purchase Order by accused Lapid on May 24, 2004[,] and delivery of the fertilizer on [the] same date, and full payment to MPTC on May 26, 2004 — all for a period of [fourteen] 14 days only;

5. Vasquez applied for Product Registration with the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority (FPA) only on August 15, 2005[,] after the transaction in May 2004 while MPTC has no Certificate of License to Operate and Product Registration; and

6. Payment to MPTC of a total of P4,761,818.18 (P4,850,000.00 less tax of P88,181.82) for the said fertilizer at P1,250.00/liter which is overpriced by at least P1,100.00/liter, or a total of P4,268,000.00.

thereby causing undue injury to the government in the aforesaid amount of P4,268,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 33

Before arraignment, Lapid moved 34 to dismiss the case on the following grounds: DETACa

First. His rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case against him were violated due to the inordinate delay in the investigation and filing of the case in court. Beginning from the fact-finding investigation, it took the OMB eight (8) years to actually file the case against him and his co-accused before the Sandiganbayan (SB).

The OMB's fact-finding investigation alone already took five (5) years. On May 20, 2011, the OMB ordered him and his co-accused to file their respective counter-affidavits. On November 5, 2012, he moved for the resolution of the complaint. On June 3, 2014, the OMB approved the filing of the Information against him and his co-accused, albeit the Information itself was only filed much later on November 4, 2015.

Second. He was never provided the complete case records to enable him to adequately prepare for his defense.

Third. The case should be dismissed for lack of probable cause. The purchase of the fertilizers fell within allowable purchases by direct contracting, hence, there was no violation of RA 9184 to speak of, nor can he be prosecuted for violation of RA 3019. Apart from his signatures on the official documents, no other evidence was adduced linking him to the alleged anomalous transaction.

Last. The case was prematurely filed because there was no finding of disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA).

Aquino-Abubakar, Leolita, and Vasquez (Lapid's co-accused) filed their respective manifestations adopting Lapid's Urgent Motion to Dismiss. Thereafter, they filed their Supplemental Arguments to the Motion to Dismiss echoing Lapid's submissions in his own motion. 35

Meantime, Yuzon moved to quash the Information on the ground that the allegations did not constitute the offense charged. 36

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) opposed. It asserted that Lapid, et al.'s rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case against them were not violated. It opined that the period corresponding to the fact-finding investigation should be excluded from the preliminary investigation proper.

In view of the voluminous records and the circumstances attendant to the case requiring a thorough evaluation and review, not to mention the steady stream of cases being processed by the OMB, the disposition of the cases certainly took time. 37

Finally, the prosecution opposed Yuzon's Motion to Quash asserting that the Information sufficiently alleged the facts constituting the offense charged. 38

Dispositions of the Sandiganbayan

By Resolution 39 dated September 30, 2016, Lapid's Urgent Motion to Dismiss which his co-accused had also adopted was granted by the SB, 40 but Yuzon's motion to quash Information was denied for lack of merit. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion dated 08 January 2016, filed by accused Manuel M. Lapid, and adopted by accused Ma. Victoria M. Aquino-Abubakar, Leolita M. Aquino, and Dexter Alexander S.D. Vasquez, is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case against them is hereby ordered DISMISSED, for violation of their rights to the speedy disposition of their cases, without prejudice to any civil liability which the Province of Pampanga may file against them.

On the other hand, accused Benjamin G. Yuzon's Motion to Quash Information dated 10 February 2016, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 41

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The SB found that the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation proper was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive. It noted that from the time the complaint got filed, it took the OMB four (4) years and six (6) months to finally file the Information in 2015. The prosecution did not even explain why it took the OMB nine (9) months to approve Resolution dated September 18, 2013, finding probable cause against Lapid, et al.

Finally, the SB denied Yuzon's Motion to Quash Information as it found that the elements of the crime were sufficiently alleged therein. aDSIHc

The People moved for reconsideration but the same was denied under Resolution dated December 13, 2016. 42

Proceedings before the Court

Through a petition for certiorari, the People, through the OSP sought to nullify and set aside the foregoing dispositions which were allegedly rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. According to the People, the SB resorted to a mere mathematical computation of the years it took the OMB to resolve the preliminary investigation without regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 43

In his Comment, Lapid defended the dismissal of the case in light of the People's alleged failure to justify the excessively long delay it took the OMB to terminate the preliminary investigation. 44

In their separate Comments, Lapid's co-accused also prayed for the affirmance of the assailed dispositions. They reiterated that the inordinate delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation violated their rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case against them. 45

Our Prior Dispositions

By Decision 46 dated August 19, 2019, the Court nullified the assailed dispositions and reinstated Crim. Case No. SB-15-CRM-0286. It ruled out the supposed inordinate delay which attended the proceedings before the OMB. Citing Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, 47 the Court held that although the preliminary investigation lasted for four (4) years and six (6) months, it was justified due to the complexity of the issues involved and considering that Lapid, et al., were themselves deemed to have acquiesced to the so-called delay as they did not immediately invoke their right to a speedy disposition of the case against them but instead waited a considerable time to lapse before doing so. Lapid himself moved to dismiss the case only on January 8, 2016, when he was about to be arraigned. His motion was simply adopted by his co-accused.

In his subsequent motion for reconsideration, Lapid 48 pointed out that Cagang49 should have been applied prospectively. Even then, he asserted that even if Cagang50 is applied to the present case, the same should still be dismissed. He outlined the alleged inordinate delay in the following matrix, viz.: 51

 

	Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 112)	Ombudsman's Time Periods in this Case against Senator Lapid
Preliminary Investigation	60 days	1,110 days (37 months)
Investigating officer's determination of probable cause to file a Complaint	10 days	840 days (28 months)
Senior prosecutor's approval of the finding of probable cause	10 days	270 days (9 months)

 

Additionally, he claimed to have promptly invoked his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him initially before the OMB and later on before the SB itself. He emphasized that the delay here has already caused him prejudice as it would be utterly difficult for him to gather material evidence and witnesses over a transaction which happened fifteen (15) years ago.

In their separate motion for reconsideration, Lapid's co-accused insisted that applying Cagang52 to the case is akin to applying an ex post facto law. 53

By Resolution 54 dated February 19, 2020, the Court denied the motions for reconsideration.

Acting thereon, the Court resolved to require the People and the OMB to file their Comment. Unfortunately, however, the subsequent Resolution dated February 19, 2020, inadvertently did not accurately hear this action. As it was, instead of requiring a comment from the People and the OMB, the Resolution outrightly denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, by Resolution 55 dated July 7, 2020, the Court recalled the aforesaid resolution and required the People and the OMB to file their respective Comments on Lapid, et al.'s separate motions for reconsideration.

In its Comment 56 dated October 5, 2020, the OSP asserts that the Decision dated August 19, 2019, had already lapsed into finality, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect. It further reiterates the arguments in its petition for certiorari.

Our Ruling

We reverse.

The Decision dated August 19, 2019,

Indeed, a judgment which has lapsed into finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Once a judgment becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. 57

Contrary to the claim of the OSP, the Decision dated August 19, 2019, has not lapsed into finality. As borne by the records, Lapid, et al., had filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Court, thereafter, required the OSP to comment thereon, and the Court has yet to resolve these motions for reconsideration here and now. As for the Resolution dated February 19, 2020, bearing an outright denial of the motions for reconsideration, sans any comment from the OSP and OMB, the Court, as stated, had already recalled it to set the record straight and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. ETHIDa

So must it be.

We now resolve the motions for reconsideration.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution assures all persons of their right to a speedy disposition of their cases, viz.:

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial[,] or administrative bodies.

The guarantee of the right to a speedy disposition of cases applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. 58 The judicial bodies mentioned in Section 16 include the OMB and the OSP. 59

The right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases was designed to prevent the oppression of citizens by holding criminal prosecution suspended over them for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of cases. 60 It recognizes the truism that justice delayed can mean justice denied. 61

Similar to the right to a speedy trial, the right to a speedy disposition of cases is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; and even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his or her case tried. 62 It is a flexible concept consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of the case. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. 63

The right to a speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations and preliminary investigations by the OMB since neither of these proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution. 64

The Court is not unmindful of the duty of the OMB under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770) 65 to promptly act on complaints brought before it. Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

SECTION 12.  The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof. 66 (Emphasis supplied)

This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 13 of RA 6770, viz.:

SECTION 13.  Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people. (Emphasis supplied)

That the OMB was given the constitutional prerogative to promulgate its own rules and procedure does not necessarily give it a license nor premium to disregard, let alone, violate an accused's right to a speedy disposition of the case against him or her. While the OMB has yet to set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case as mandated in Cagang, 67 the Court is not precluded from determining whether the delay in a particular case amounts to prejudice on the part of the accused.

In situations where the right to a speedy disposition of cases is invoked, the Court is guided by the rules laid down in Cagang, 68viz.:

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without [the] need of further analysis of the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases. 69

We revisit the application of Cagang70 here.

The OMB took four (4) years and six (6) months

The defense bears the burden of proof to show that there had been a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his or her case. 71 Lapid, et al., must therefore prove:

First, that the case took much longer than was reasonably necessary to resolve; and

Second, that (sic) efforts were exerted to protect their constitutional rights. 72

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To repeat, the OMB has yet to set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case as instructed in Cagang.

Meantime, we ought to be guided by the Rules of Court and the Rules of Procedure of the OMB in the disposition of this case. cSEDTC

Section 3, in relation to Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court mandates that within ten (10) days after investigation, the investigating officer should determine whether there is sufficient ground to hold respondent for trial:

SECTION 3.  Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him or her to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10)-day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. 73 (3a)

SECTION 4.  Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him [or her]; and that he [or she] was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.

If upon petition by a proper party under such Rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. 74 (4a)

These provisions are reiterated in Section 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the OMB, viz.:

SECTION 4.  Procedure. — The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:

a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.

b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.

c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may consider the comment filed by him [or her], if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence on record.

d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the complainant's affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.

e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.

f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, (sic) there are facts material to the case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.

g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall forward the records of the case together with his resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action thereon.

No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases. 75

The Court, however, recognizes that the prescribed ten-day (10-day) period may just be too short when it comes to processing cases for preliminary investigation. 76 But processing cases for over four (4) years, sans any acceptable justification as in this case, is definitely unreasonable, however, and wherever we look at it. SDAaTC

We take a look at the material dates here. The case against Lapid, et al., was initiated upon the filing of the complaint against them before the OMB on May 2, 2011. Two (2) years and four (4) months later, by Resolution dated September 18, 2013, the OMB found probable cause to indict Lapid, et al., for violation of Section 3 (c) in relation to Section 3 (g) of RA 3019.

Consistent with Cagang, 77 we exclude the fact-finding investigation in determining whether the right of Lapid, et al., to a speedy disposition of the case against them was indeed violated.

 

Material Dates	Proceedings
May 20, 2011	The OMB issued several ordered respondent[s] to file their Counter-Affidavits. 78
xxx xxx xxx	xxx xxx xxx
September 18, 2013	The OMB found probable cause to indict Senator Lapid, Benjamin G. Yuzon, Vergel B. Yabut, Ma. Victoria M. Aquino-Abubakar, Leolita M. Aquino, and Dexter Alexander S.D. Vasquez for violation of Section 39 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) of RA 3019. 79
June 3, 2014	The OMB approved the Resolution dated 18 September 2013.
September 12, 2014	Per Order dated September 12, 2014, the Panel denied Lapid's and Yuzon's separate motions for reconsideration. 80
January 30, 2015	Ombudsman Carpio-Morales approved the Order dated September 12, 2014. 81
November 4, 2015	Senator Lapid, Benjamin G. Yuzon, Vergel B. Yabut, Ma. Victoria M. Aquino-Abubakar, Leolita M. Aquino, and Dexter Alexander S.D. Vasquez were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section (g) of RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. 82

 

In his Comment and motion for reconsideration, Lapid himself has shown another matrix bearing the prescribed timelines under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the timelines actually used up by the OMB: 83

 

	Rules of Criminal Procedure	Ombudsman's Time Periods in this case against Senator Lapid
Preliminary Investigation	60 days	1,110 days (37 months)
Investigating officer's determination of probable cause to file a Complaint	10 days	840 days (28 months)
Senior prosecutor's approval of the finding of probable cause	10 days	270 days (9 months)

 

As shown, it took the OMB nine (9) months or until June 3, 2014, to approve the Resolution dated September 18, 2013; and another nine (9) months to finally file the Information with the SB.

To reiterate, there was a lapse of four (4) years and six (6) months from the time the complaint was filed up to the time the Information itself was filed in court. The purpose of a preliminary investigation, however, is only to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused should be held for trial. 84 The OMB's finding of probable cause does not resolve the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused. 85

Here, the only issue the OMB ought to resolve in the preliminary investigation was whether probable cause existed to support the indictment of Lapid, et al., for violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, specifically whether they entered, on behalf of the government, into any grossly or disadvantageous contract or transaction, which thereby gave any party unwarranted benefit. acEHCD

The elements of the offense punished under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are:

(1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial[,] or official functions;

(2) he or she must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith[,] or inexcusable negligence; and

(3) his or her action caused injury to any party, including the government, or giving any party unwarranted benefits, advantage[,] or preference in the discharge of his or her official functions. 86

Meanwhile, the elements of the crime punished in Section 3 (g) are:

(a) the accused is a public officer;

(b) he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(c) such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 87

Here, the Information alleged that Lapid, on behalf of the Provincial Government of Pampanga, entered into a grossly disadvantageous contract of purchase with MPTC for 3,880 liters of MMFF without the benefit of public bidding, thus, giving unwarranted benefits to MPTC, Aquino-Abubakar, Leolita, and Vasquez, to the prejudice of the government.

First off, the People keeps saying that the issue is complex but does not say why it is so, thus:

41. x x x The intricacy of the case can be gleaned from the fact that there was already a disbursement of public fund[s] arising from a syndicated scheme of fraud against the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Program x x x 88

xxx xxx xxx

It appears that the only act complained of was Lapid, et al.'s act of direct contracting itself. A perusal of the contract of purchase itself vis-a-vis the absence of bidding would have sufficed in determining whether probable cause existed to warrant the indictment of Lapid, et al., for violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) of RA 3019.

In any event, bare allegations, without more, have no probative value. 89

More, since the delay here occurred way beyond the prescribed ten-day (10-day) period under the Rules of Court and the Rules of Procedure of the OMB and in view of Lapid, et al.'s vigorous invocation of their right to a speedy disposition of the case against them, the burden now shifts to the prosecution to justify the delay. 90

Has the prosecution discharged this burden?

The prosecution failed to justify

The prosecution asserts that for the entire four (4) years and six (6) months the case pended for preliminary investigation, the OMB had to deal with the voluminous case records, the so-called surrounding circumstances of the case, and the steady stream of cases it regularly receives. The OSP explained:

7) x x x The complaint and the respective counter-affidavits of the respondents consist of annexes. Definitely, these documents and the circumstances of the case considering that the complaint involves fertilizer scam, need a thorough evaluation and review before coming up with a fair resolution.

xxx xxx xxx

12) x x x Incidentally, the Supreme Court had taken judicial notice of the fact that the nature of the Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient government service to lodge freely their complaints against alleged wrongdoing of government personnel. A steady stream of cases reaching the Ombudsman inevitably results. Naturally, disposition of those cases would take some time. 91

xxx xxx xxx

Again, bare allegations, without more, are unworthy of credence. The OMB failed to justify the unreasonable delay. Plain and simple. Apart from claiming that the case here involved voluminous records; sufficient time was needed to thoroughly review the surrounding circumstances of the case; and there was a steady stream of cases reaching the OMB, not a single substantiating evidence was adduced to support these claims. As to how voluminous the records of the case were, what exactly were the so-called surrounding circumstances that needed thorough review, and what specific steady stream of cases supposedly reached the OMB, the OSP was conspicuously silent. Uttering this statement is one thing, substantiating it is another.

In any case, the so-called voluminous case records and the steady stream of cases at the OMB are not magical incantations that would sufficiently justify the delay in the proceedings before it. It is high time that the government agencies stop hiding behind the curtain of heavy caseload as the invocation of this defense puts a premium and even justifies delay, sans any corroborating evidence, to the prejudice of both the litigants and the government. Inordinate delays should never be rewarded. Heavy caseload can neither justify the delayed dispensation of justice.

Javier v. Sandiganbayan92 is apropos:

At this juncture, it is well to point out that the Ombudsman cannot repeatedly hide behind the "steady stream of cases that reach their office" despite the Court's recognition of such reality. The Court understands the reality of clogged dockets — from which it suffers as well — and recognizes the current inevitability of institutional delays. However, "steady stream of cases" and "clogged dockets" are not talismanic phrases that may be invoked at whim to magically justify each and every case of long delays in the disposition of cases. Like all other facts that courts take into consideration in each case, the "steady stream of cases" should still be subject to proof as to its effects on a particular case, bearing in mind the importance of the right to speedy disposition of cases as a fundamental right. 93 (Emphases Supplied)

Lapid, et al., timely asserted their right to a

Indeed, to successfully invoke a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of cases, the defense must prove that efforts were exerted to protect their constitutional right. 94 Inaction or failure to timely invoke said right, would mean acquiescence to the delay. 95 SDHTEC

In Tello v. People, 96 the Court rejected Tello's claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him for failure to timely assert the same. For Tello did not take any step to accelerate the disposition of his case as he only invoked his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him after the SB had promulgated its verdict of conviction against him for malversation of public funds. According to the Court, Tello's silence may be considered as a waiver of such right.

Here, the exact opposite happened. Lapid, et al., timely asserted their right to a speedy disposition of the case against them.

As early as November 5, 2012, Lapid already moved to resolve the case against him before the OMB. Understandably, he did not move to dismiss the case before the OMB because he was prohibited under the OMB Rules of Procedure from doing so. The only ground he was allowed to invoke before the OMB was lack of jurisdiction. 97 Section 4 (d), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the OMB reads:

d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the complainant's affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section. 98

For all intents and purposes, therefore, Lapid's motion to resolve before the OMB was akin to an invocation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. For what else could have prompted him to move for early resolution if not the invocation of said right?

Besides, it is not Lapid, et al.'s duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. It was the OMB's constitutional duty to expedite the same within a reasonable time. After all, no less than the Constitution commands it to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. 99

At any rate, Lapid, et al., were deemed to have, for the second time around, invoked their right to speedy disposition of the case against them when they filed before the SB an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of inordinate delay.

In Javier, 100 the Court held that Javier and Tumamao timely asserted their right to speedy disposition of the case against them because they filed the Motion to Quash at the earliest opportunity. As in here, before arraignment, they already sought permission from the SB to file the Motion to Quash to assert their right to a speedy disposition of the case against them. This, according to the Court, showed that Javier and Tumamao did not sleep on their right. Certainly, this could not be construed as acquiescence to the delay incurred by the OMB during the preliminary investigation.

As in Javier, we find that Lapid, et al., timely asserted their right to a speedy disposition of the case against them.

Lapid, et al., were unduly prejudiced by the

A claim of prejudice must have a conclusive and factual basis. Pure speculation and mere generalization will not work in favor of the accused and there must be an actual, specific, and real injury to his or her rights. Prejudice cannot be established by conjectural supplications of prejudice or by dubious vocations of constitutional rights. 101

Here, from the time the complaint was filed against Lapid, et al., the OMB took four (4) years and six (6) months before it finally indicted them before the SB.

As of this writing, seventeen (17) years and five (5) months had already passed from the date the impugned transaction took place on May 12, 2004. Meanwhile, ten (10) years and five (5) months had already passed since May 2, 2011, when the complaint was filed against Lapid, et al., before the OMB.

We readily acknowledge that in view of the many years that had passed since the assailed transaction took place in 2004, Lapid, et al., would be hard-pressed to secure, let alone, preserve material evidence and even witnesses for the purpose of properly and adequately preparing for their defense.

We also take judicial notice of the fact that litigants have to shell out a fortune to defend themselves in court. Compared to the vast resources available to the government, the resources of litigants easily diminish, especially when the case has dragged on for almost two (2) decades as in this case.

To be sure, the looming unrest, as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should now be weighed against the State and in favor of Lapid, et al.102

In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 103 the Court found the delay of two (2) years and nine (9) months in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan to be violative of petitioner's constitutional rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case against him. As early as October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were submitted and the case was ready for disposition by the Tanodbayan. But it was only on July 5, 1985, that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal Informations against petitioner. AScHCD

In the same vein, in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 104 the Court considered unreasonable the delay of four (4) years in the termination of the irregularly conducted preliminary investigation. Petitioners' manifestation adopting the comments of their co-respondents was filed on February 18, 1992. But it was only on February 22, 1996, or four (4) years later, that petitioners received a Memorandum dated February 8, 1996, recommending the filing of Information against them for violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA No. 3019.

Worse, in this case, the OMB took four (4) years and six (6) months before it finally indicted Lapid, et al., before the SB.

There is no denying, therefore, that the constitutional right of Lapid, et al., was violated. 105 As a necessary consequence, the dismissal of the case against them should follow as a matter of right.

Clearly, the dismissal of the case against Lapid, et al., does not carry a definitive pronouncement on their civil liability, if any. This means that in accordance with Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, 106 the Provincial Government of Pampanga may still file a civil action against Lapid, et al., based on delict for the purpose of recovering the amount of P4,850,000.00 in public funds representing the alleged illegal purchase. 107

The same recourse was given the Province of Negros Occidental in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan. 108

ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for Reconsideration dated December 3, 2019, and November 26, 2019 of Manuel M. Lapid and Ma. Victoria M. Aquino-Abubakar, Leolita M. Aquino, and Dexter Alexander S.D. Vasquez, are GRANTED. The Decision dated August 19, 2019, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Resolutions dated September 30, 2016, and December 13, 2016, dismissing Criminal Case No. SB-15-CRM-0286 against Manuel M. Lapid, Ma. Victoria M. Aquino-Abubakar, Leolita M. Aquino, and Dexter Alexander S.D. Vasquez, are REINSTATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to any civil action which the Provincial Government of Pampanga may file against them.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 478-501.

2. Id. at 410-426.

3. Id. at 393-404.

4. Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. —

In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage[,] or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith[,] or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 3019, August 17, 1960).

5. Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. —

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 3019, August 17, 1960).

6. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 3019, August 17, 1960.

7. Id. at 460.

8. Purchase Request (PR) No. GO-109.

9. Rollo. p. 97.

10. Id. at 95-96.

11. Complaint dated May 2, 2011, id. at 394.

12. 65.2. Private individuals who commit any of the following acts, and any public officer who conspires with them, shall upon conviction, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than fifteen (15) years:

xxx xxx xxx

d) When a bidder, by himself or in connivance with others, employs schemes which tend to restrain the natural rivalry of the parties or operates to stifle or suppress competition and thus produce a result disadvantageous to the public. (2016 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184, IRR of RA 9184, 2016).

13. Section 10. Competitive Bidding. —

All Procurement shall be done through Competitive Bidding, except as provided for in Article XVI of this Act. (Government Procurement Reform Act, Republic Act No. 9184, January 10, 2003).

14. Section 18. Reference to Brand Names. —

Specifications for the Procurement of Goods shall be based on relevant characteristics and/or performance requirements. Reference to brand names shall not be allowed. (Government Procurement Reform Act, Republic Act No. 9184, January 10, 2003).

15.Government Procurement Reform Act, Republic Act No. 9184, January 10, 2003.

16.Article 217. Malversation of Public Funds or Property. —

Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property shall suffer:

xxx xxx xxx

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by Republic Act No. 1060).

17.Article 171. Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary or Ecclesiastic Minister. —

The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.

18. Rollo, pp. 95-96.

19. Id. at 94-95.

20. Id. at 98.

21. Id. at 98-99.

22. Id.

23. Id. at 100.

24. Id.

25. Id. at 101.

26. Id.

27. Id. at 101-102.

28. Id. at 102.

29. Id.

30. Id. at 94-113.

31. Id. at 13.

32. Id. at 10.

33. Id. at 10-11.

34. Id. at 176-200.

35. Id. at 42.

36. Id. at 41-42.

37. Id. at 40-41.

38. Id. at 42.

39. Id. at 39-52.

40. Penned by Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Efren N. Dela Cruz and Michael Frederick L. Musngi.

41. Rollo, p. 51.

42. Id. at 54-57.

43. Id. at 3-36.

44. Id. at 146-175.

45. Rollo, pp. 281-300.

46. See People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 229656, August 19, 2019.

47. G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018, 374 SCRA 487.

48. Rollo, pp. 478-497.

49. Supra note 47.

50. Id.

51. Id. at 444.

52. Supra note 47.

53. Id. at 410-427.

54. Id. at 460.

55. Id. at 471.

56. Id. at 511-529.

57. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 700, 705 (1995).

58. See People v. Sandiganbayan, 723 Phil. 444, 447 (2013).

59. See Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 899, 915 (2004).

60. Id. at 917.

61. See Magante v. Sandiganbayan, 836 Phil. 1108, 1118 (2018).

62. See Escobar v. People, G.R. Nos. 228349, 228353 & 229895-96, September 19, 2018.

63. See Ombudsman v. Jurado, 583 Phil. 132, 145 (2008).

64. Supra note 47.

65. The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Republic Act No. 6770, November 17, 1989.

66. The 1987 Constitution, February 2, 1987.

67. Supra note 47.

68. Id.

69. Id. at 448-451.

70. Supra note 47.

71. Supra note 47 at 436.

72. Id.

73. Rules of Court, July 1, 1997.

74. Id.

75. Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 07, April 10, 1990.

76. See Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 237997, June 10, 2020.

77. Supra note 47.

78. Rollo, p. 11.

79. Id. at 112.

80. Id. at 10.

81. Id.

82. Id.

83. Id. at 444.

84. See Tumbocon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 235412-15, November 5, 2018.

85. See Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 210488, January 27, 2020.

86. See Leonardo v. People, G.R. No. 246451, February 3, 2021.

87. See Froilan v. Sandiganbayan, 385 Phil. 32, 44 (2000).

88. Rollo, p. 20.

89. See LNS International Manpower Services v. Padua, Jr., 628 Phil. 223, 224 (2010).

90. Supra note 47 at 445.

91. Id. at 118-119.

92. G.R. No. 237997, June 10, 2020.

93. Id.

94. Supra note 47 at 436.

95. Supra note 92.

96. 606 Phil. 514, 524 (2009).

97. Supra note 92.

98. Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 07, April 10, 1990.

99. See Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, 714 Phil. 55, 64 (2013).

100. Supra note 92.

101. See Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 231144, February 19, 2020.

102. Supra note 99 at 65.

103. 242 Phil. 563, 565 (1988).

104. 352 Phil. 557, 579 (1998).

105. Supra note 99 at 59.

106. Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules onCriminal Procedure.

When separate civil action is suspended —

xxx xxx xxx

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (2a)

107. Supra note 99.

108. Id.