THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232616. January 21, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ELMER SALLY y RAMOS AND ARLAN SALLY y RAMOS, accused; ELMER SALLY y RAMOS, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated January 21, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232616 (People of the Philippines v. Elmer Sally y Ramos and Arlan Sally y Ramos, accused; Elmer Sally y Ramos, accused-appellant). — Before this Court is an appeal of accused-appellant Elmer Sally y Ramos (accused-appellant) via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision 1 dated January 25, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07636, affirming the Decision dated June 19, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City, Branch 74 in Criminal Case No. 37501-MN, convicting accused-appellant and his co-accused Arlan Sally y Ramos (Arlan) of murder.
An Information dated July 18, 2008 was filed, accusing accused-appellant and Arlan of the crime of murder. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 13th day of February, 2008, in the City of Navotas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, while armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, treachery, premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab JOLITO VERZOSA y DOSAL, whereby the victim sustained fatal injury which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
On September 8, 2008, accused-appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty 3 to the charges. Trial ensued.
During the pre-trial conference on November 5, 2008, both parties stipulated that: (1) the RTC has jurisdiction over the case; (2) the identity of accused Arlan as the person charged in the Information; and (3) the fact of limited police investigation. Notably, accused Arlan remains at-large. 4
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the testimonies of two witnesses, namely: (1) Juliet Verzosa (Juliet), 5 daughter of victim Jolito Versoza (Jolito); and (2) Dr. Bonnie Chua (Dr. Chua). 6 CAIHTE
The evidence of the prosecution, based on the records, is summarized as follows: On February 13, 2008, Juliet was with her father, victim Jolito, at their home in Tanza Pulo, Navotas City. Jolito, who was inebriated and was looking for water to quench his thirst, got agitated when he could not find the plastic water container. In his anger, Jolito threw a different plastic container, which hit the house of Arlan, their neighbor. Suddenly, Arlan came out of his house with a knife and shouting at Jolito, "Dinuduro-duro mo ba ako?" In response, Jolito punched Arlan. Arlan, wielding the knife, stabbed Jolito several times. Accused-appellant came out of the house and proceeded to grab Jolito's hands behind his back as Arlan continued to stab Jolito. Arlan and accused-appellant ran away immediately after. Jolito was brought to the hospital in Tondo, Manila, where he was declared dead. 7
Dr. Chua, who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim, found that he sustained three (3) stab and incise wounds in the head and neck. In addition, Dr. Chua found six (6) additional stab wounds and abrasions on the victim's thorax and abdomen. It was reported that Jolito's cause of death were the stab wounds on his thorax and abdomen. 8
Meanwhile, the evidence of the defense, as culled from the records, provides that: On February 13, 2008, accused-appellant alleged that he was constructing the wall on his own house. His brother, accused Arlan's wife, a certain May, called and informed him that Arlan was quarreling with someone. Accused-appellant proceeded to Arlan's house which was around 20 to 30 meters away. As soon as he arrived, he saw Arlan fighting with Bontoy, Jolito's nickname. Accused-appellant pacified and separated them, and afterwards both Jolito and Arlan ran in separate directions. Accused-appellant tried to look for his brother, but to no avail. Thereafter, he met with his wife and May, who told him that Jolito was dead. Accused-appellant, upon learning that Juliet implicated her in the alleged murder of Jolito, went to stay at his sister's house in Tanza, Navotas for a few days. The police arrived looking for Arlan, and when they saw accused-appellant, he was arrested and he left with them voluntarily. 9
On June 19, 2015, the RTC rendered the Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, accused Elmer Sally y Ramos is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder qualified by treachery and abuse of superior strength under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines). He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jolito Versoza y Dosal in the amount of P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity for the death of the victim and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The bail bond posted by the accused is hereby cancelled. The Warden of the Malabon City Jail is hereby ordered to take immediate custody of the accused and hereafter transferred [sic] his custody and committed to the National Bilibid Prison. Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 10
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, accused-appellant appealed the same before the Court of Appeals.
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals denied accused-appellant's appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision with modification in line with the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta, 11 awarding the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and increasing the exemplary damages awarded to Jolito's heirs from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00. In addition, the Court of Appeals held that all damages awarded to said heirs shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 12 DETACa
Accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal 13 dated February 10, 2017. Both the plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and accused-appellant manifested that they will no longer file their respective supplemental briefs for this case, and resolved to adopt their briefs filed before the Court of Appeals.
In his Supplemental Brief, accused-appellant asserts the following issues:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JULIET DESPITE ITS INCONSISTENCIES, CASTING DOUBT UNTO HER CREDIBILITY AND THE VERACITY OF HER ALLEGATIONS.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND CO-ACCUSED ARLAN CONSPIRED TO COMMIT MURDER.
IV
ASSUMING THAT ARLAN ATTACKED JOLITO WITH A KNIFE, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED STABBING WAS DONE WITH TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH. 14
Accused-appellant interposes the defense of denial, stating that the inconsistencies and lapses in Juliet's testimony do not prove that there was conspiracy to commit murder nor they prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court is not convinced.
It bears emphasis that accused-appellant's bare denials cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of Juliet. 15 Further, accused-appellant failed to show, much less allege, that Juliet harbored any ill-motive towards him that would impel Juliet to withhold the truth in her testimony. In her direct examination, Juliet positively identified accused-appellant and Arlan as her father's attackers, to wit:
PROS. BATARA: (to witness)
Q: Do you know why [Jolito] is dead?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?
A: He was stabbed by Arlan Sally, sir.
Q: This Arlan Sally that stabbed to death your father, is he inside the courtroom?
A: He is not here, sir.
Q: Was Arlan Sally alone in attaching [sic] your father?
A: He was with somebody, sir.
Q: And who is that somebody?
A: Elmer Sally, sir.
Q: This Elmer Sally, is he inside the courtroom?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is he?
A: Him, sir. He is wearing yellow t-shirt, sir. (witness is pointing to a person and when asked he gave his name as Elmer Sally)
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Who actually stabbed your father? aDSIHc
A: Arlan, sir.
Q: You said that your father was seated at that time, where did Arlan and Elmer came (sic) from?
A: The (sic) came from the front of the store while Arlan was sharpening the knife, sir.
Q: And what was the participation of Elmer if Arlan was the one who stabbed your father?
A: Elmer held both hands of my father at the back "patalikod," sir.
Q: So Elmer was then behind your father holding your father's hand?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Two (2) hands?
A: Yes, sir. 16
On the issue of the alleged inconsistencies in Juliet's testimony, the Court has repeatedly held that "such inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, its veracity, or the weight of their testimonies." 17 Likewise, the Court's ruling in Medina, Jr. v. People, 18 highlighting the value of a witness's positive and categorical testimony, finds application in this case, to wit:
x x x Appellant's insistence, therefore, that the presentation of the two (2) knives would prove his innocence is futile, irrelevant and immaterial, in the face of positive identification by two unbiased and credible eyewitnesses. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter prevails over a denial. Denial being negative evidence which is self-serving in nature, cannot prevail over the positive identification of prosecution witnesses. More so in this case where the defense of denial is not corroborated by disinterested and credible witnesses: the mother of the accused whose presence in the crime scene was not sufficiently established and Edgar Erro whose testimony is found to be doubtful and not without bias.
xxx xxx xxx
In addition, the witnesses incriminating Ricardo were not only credible but were not shown to have harbored any ill-motive towards him. They were surely entitled to full faith and credit for those reasons, and both the RTC and the CA did well in according such credence to them. Their positive identification of him as the assailant prevailed over his mere denial, because such denial, being negative and self-serving evidence, was undeserving of weight by virtue of its lack of substantiation by clear and convincing proof. Hence, his denial had no greater evidentiary value than the affirmative testimonies of the credible witnesses presented against him. 19
Relevantly, in People v. Viñalon, 20 the Court also held that: ETHIDa
Appellants' defense of denial of any wrongdoing, by claiming that they were just among the passengers of the bus, is far from convincing. The defense of denial, like alibi, is considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be fabricated easily. Their bare-faced denial cannot prevail over their positive identification as the malefactors by eyewitnesses who had no motive to falsely testify against them.
Furthermore, given the positive and unequivocal identification of both accused-appellant and Arlan, the Court has held that accused-appellant's defense of alibi cannot prevail. 21 To reiterate, positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying one the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. 22
Likewise, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly held that the prosecution sufficiently proved accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The following elements must be proven to sustain a conviction of murder: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed said person; (3) that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstances in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Cole (RPC), such as treachery and/or taking advantage of superior strength; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 23
The killing of Jolito in this case is neither parricide nor infanticide, and the same was attended with treachery and abuse of superior strength. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 24 On the other hand, abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. 25
In this case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was correctly appreciated by the courts a quo given the manner by which Arlan and accused-appellant held and stabbed Jolito. As properly held by the Court of Appeals:
x x x Here, treachery is evident from the fact that the victim could not have been aware of the imminent peril to his life. He was unprepared for the sudden, unexpected and unprovoked attack on his person when accused Arlan suddenly stabbed him with a knife. Clearly, Arlan's execution of the killing left the victim with no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. The presence of treachery is also evident in the fact that [accused-appellant] held the victim's hands behind his back, rendering the latter immobile, as Arlan continued to stab him. As regards the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the same was absorbed in [the] qualifying circumstance of treachery. 26 cSEDTC
As regards the issue of conspiracy between Arlan and accused-appellant, the same was, likewise, sufficiently presented by the courts a quo. Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 27 The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. 28
In the present case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals appropriately ruled that conspiracy was duly established. In particular, the Court of Appeals, citing People v. Tan, 29 concluded, " [I]t has been held that there is conspiracy where two of the accused held the victim's hands and the third stabbed the victim from behind, 30 such as in this case where [accused-appellant] held Jolito's hands behind his back as Arlan stabbed the latter. 31
When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. 32 As such, accused-appellant as a conspirator shall be held equally responsible for the acts of his brother and co-conspirator, Arlan.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Arlan and accused-appellant are guilty of murder. The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of the RPC, as amended, is reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence of any aggravating circumstance, the penalty imposed should be reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties. Pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346, accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole. 33 The courts a quo imposed the proper penalty in this case.
As regards the damages imposed upon accused-appellant, the Court of Appeals correctly increased the amounts due and the interest of 6% per annum in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. 34 Additionally, temperate damages must be awarded to the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 in lieu of actual damages. 35
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals' Decision dated January 25, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07636 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the heirs of Jolito Verzosa y Dosal shall be awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. Accused-appellant Elmer Sally y Ramos is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, and to pay the heirs of Jolito Verzosa y Dosal the following: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages. All damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. SDAaTC
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Elihu A. Ybañez concurring; rollo, pp. 2-10.
2. CA rollo, p. 76.
3.Id.
4.Id.
5.Rollo, p. 4.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 4-5.
9.Id. at 5.
10. CA rollo, p. 51.
11. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
12.Rollo, p. 9.
13.Id. at 11-12.
14. CA rollo, pp. 39, 42, 43, 45.
15.People v. Gani, 710 Phil. 466, 474 (2013); Crisostomo v. People, 644 Phil. 53, 65 (2010); People v. Corpuz, 714 Phil. 337, 345-346 (2013).
16. CA rollo, pp. 63-64. (Emphasis Supplied)
17.People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 198109 (Notice), [June 11, 2014], citing People v. Blanco, 716 Phil. 408, 415 (2013).
18. 724 Phil. 226 (2014).
19.Id. at 236-237. (Emphasis supplied).
20. 434 Phil. 72, 84 (2002).
21.People v. Villablanca, 374 Phil. 355, 364 (1999).
22.Id.
23.People v. Mahusay, G.R. No. 229085, November 29, 2017.
24.Id.
25.People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 226475, March 13, 2017.
26.Rollo, p. 8. (Citations omitted)
27.People v. Jesalva, G.R. No. 227306, June 19, 2017.
28. Id.
29. 556 Phil. 389 (2007).
30. Id. at 402.
31. Rollo, p. 8.
32. People v. Gerero, et al., 791 Phil. 618, 623 (2016).
33. SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
34. People v. Jugueta, supra note 11.
35. Id.