People v. Sales
This is a criminal case, People of the Philippines v. Reynolan T. Sales, decided by the First Division of the Supreme Court in 2019. The case involves the conviction of Sales for the crime of homicide and his subsequent application for bail pending appeal. The Sandiganbayan initially granted bail to Sales, but later cancelled it due to his alleged propensity and capability to escape and evade the processes of the court. The Supreme Court granted Sales' petition, reinstated his bail, and ordered his provisional release. The Court held that conviction of the accused of the crime charged is irrelevant in bail application pending appeal where the penalty imposed is not reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death. The Court clarified that when a person is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, he/she shall not be admitted to bail, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, when evidence of his/her guilt is strong. However, in this case, Sales' conviction by the Sandiganbayan does not per se negate bail. The Court used the "less stringent sound discretion approach" in determining whether the bail previously granted to Sales should be revoked or cancelled. The Court ruled that Sales' conviction of the offense charged, without more, is insufficient basis for the revocation of his bail pending appeal.
ADVERTISEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 243426. August 5, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.REYNOLAN T. SALES, CELSO A. RAGUDO, ALFONSO D. CARIAGA, WILLIAM S. QUIAMAS, AND EDUARDO A. LORENZO, accused,
REYNOLAN T. SALES, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 5, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 243426 (People of the Philippines v. Reynolan T. Sales, Celso A. Ragudo, Alfonso D. Cariaga, William S. Quiamas, and Eduardo A. Lorenzo, accused; Reynolan T. Sales, accused-appellant). — The accused-appellant's third motion for final extension of twenty (20) days from July 29, 2019 within which to file a supplemental brief is GRANTED with WARNING THAT THE SAME SHALL BE THE LAST AND NO FURTHER EXTENSION will be given.
In non-capital offenses where the trial court imposes the penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, the conviction of the accused of the crime charged does not ipso facto negate bail pending appeal.
This is an urgent motion for review 1 filed by the accused Reynolan T. Sales (Sales) assailing the Resolution 2 dated December 14, 2018 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, which revoked, upon motion of the People of the Philippines 3 (prosecution), the bail previously granted to him in Criminal Case No. 26115.
In an amended information dated June 25, 2003, Sales was charged as principal by direct participation in the crime of Homicide, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of August 1999, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Pagudpud, Province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused REYNOLAN T. SALES, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, while in the performance or discharge of his official functions, particularly in the supervision of quarrying operations in the municipality and in maintaining peace and order thereat, and committing the offense in relation to office, with intent to kill, while the victim was allegedly involved in illegal quarrying operations, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot ATTY. RAFAEL R. BENEMERITO with an unlicensed firearm, directing the shots against the vital parts of the body of the latter, thereby inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds, which directly caused the death of said ATTY. RAFAEL R. BENEMERITO, which act was committed while in the presence of other accused, CELSO A. RAGUDO, ALFONSO CARIAGA, WILLIAM S. QUIAMAS and EDUARDO LORENZO who being animated by the same criminal purpose, gave moral support to accused REYNOLAN T. SALES prior to and simultaneous with his commission of the subject crime of homicide. CAIHTE
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4 (Emphasis omitted.)
On July 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Hold Departure Order and an Order of Arrest against Sales and his cohorts. Thereafter, Sales posted bail in the amount of P40,000.00. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 5
In its Decision 6 dated July 6, 2018, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sales of Homicide. It rejected Sales' invocation of self-defense in the killing of Atty. Rafael R. Benemerito (Atty. Benemerito) because of his failure to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. It sentenced Sales to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. 7 As principal by direct participation, Sales was also ordered by the court to pay 1/2 of the following amounts: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P49,099.05 as actual damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of the decision until fully paid. 8
To secure his provisional liberty post-conviction, Sales applied for bail on the same day of the promulgation of judgment against him, which the court granted. The Sandiganbayan doubled the amount of bail to P80,000.00. Thus, Sales posted an additional cash bond of P40,000.00. 9 On July 20 and 24, 2018, he filed an urgent motion for reconsideration 10 and a supplemental motion for reconsideration of his conviction. 11
On July 26, 2018, the prosecution filed an omnibus motion to cancel bail bond and passport 12 (omnibus motion), alleging that Sales is a flight risk based on the following circumstances: (1) he lives in Ilocos Norte where he can be sneaked out through the Bangui Bay; (2) the local policemen are his allies considering that he sat as a Mayor of Pagudpud from 1992 to 2001 and his live-in partner is currently the town's Vice-Mayor, while his brother is the mayor; (3) he was given a clear police clearance one day prior to his conviction despite the fact that his shooting of Atty. Benemerito is well-known; and (4) he hurried the court staff for the issuance of an order of payment and approval of his bail bond on the same day of his conviction. 13 The prosecution also averred that Sales is a danger to the society because he abused his authority while sitting as Mayor and even after his term, he used his own goons to do his bidding. 14 In support of its prayer for cancellation of Sales' passport, the prosecution cited Republic Act No. (RA) 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 which authorizes the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his duly authorized representative to cancel a passport on the ground that its continued use would be detrimental to the national security, public safety, and public health. The prosecution also stated that the law's implementing rules and regulations provide that a passport may be cancelled upon conviction by the holder of a criminal offense. 15
Sales opposed the omnibus motion, primarily on the ground that it is a lapsed motion. He claimed that the Order granting bail attained finality after 15 days or on July 21, 2018, while the omnibus motion was filed only on July 26, 2018. Even if the omnibus motion was seasonably filed, Sales alleged that there is no basis for the cancellation of his bail. 16 He averred that none of the bail-negating circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) is present in the case. Thus, his right to bail pending appeal remains unabridged. 17 Moreover, Sales asserted that the prosecution did not present any evidence supporting its claim that he is a flight risk and a danger to the society. He recalled that he always sought the permission of the court before he travels and when his motion to travel is denied, he does not go anywhere. He also belied the prosecution's assertion that he is allied with his brother, who is the incumbent Mayor of Pagudpud because the latter is in fact his political opponent. With respect to the police clearance which he obtained a day before his conviction, he explained that what was stated therein is "no derogatory record on file" and not that there is "no pending case" against him. He secured the clearance for the purpose of renewing his passport. Finally, he maintained that what RA 8239 contemplates as a ground for cancellation of a passport is the final conviction of an accused of a criminal offense. 18
In its Resolution 19 dated October 9, 2018, the Sandiganbayan denied the omnibus motion for lack of merit. It held that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of any of the bail-negating circumstances listed in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules. It agreed with Sales that RA 8239 refers to a final conviction in a criminal case. This is implied from the law because it allows the restoration of a cancelled passport after the holder finished serving his/her sentence. Sales' conviction has not yet reached finality, thus the prosecution's prayer for cancellation of his passport is premature. DETACa
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, 20 alleging that Sales has the "propensity and capability to escape and abuse his authority to evade the processes of [the court]." 21 It hastened to add that Sales may commit further crimes while on bail as may be inferred from the malevolent manner by which he killed Atty. Benemerito. It emphasized that Sales has unduly dragged the case for many years, thereby showing his evident lack of remorse despite his admission that he shot the victim. 22
Meanwhile, on November 5, 2018, the Sandiganbayan denied reconsideration of Sales' conviction. On November 26, 2018, Sales filed a notice of appeal to the Sandiganbayan. 23
In its now assailed Resolution 24 dated December 14, 2018, the Sandiganbayan partly granted the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated October 9, 2018. It cancelled Sales' cash bond and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him. The Sandiganbayan remained steadfast that "the prosecution failed to support its allegations that the circumstances enumerated under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the [Revised Rules] are present," 25 but it noted that in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, it can consider all other relevant circumstances other than those stated in the Revised Rules. It declared that it made a thorough review of the records of the case and found that the evidence establishing the guilt of Sales is more convincing than the evidence offered to refute it. Therefore, it cannot be lenient in allowing Sales to continue being on bail after his conviction. The Sandiganbayan highlighted that after a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications for bail is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. 26
The Sandiganbayan furthermore stressed that in adopting a stringent approach to bail post-conviction, it aims to: (1) discourage the filing of frivolous appeals; (2) prevent the deterioration of the deterrent effect of our criminal laws; and (3) safeguard the accused's compliance with his/her punishment in case his/her conviction is affirmed on appeal by diminishing his/her chances to escape. 27
Sales moved for partial reconsideration. 28 He argued that the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated October 9, 2018 of the Sandiganbayan merely parroted what was stated in its omnibus motion which was earlier denied by the Court. 29 The motion also violated the three-day rule because it was received by Sales through his counsel on the same day that it was set for hearing and after its appointed time. 30 More importantly, on December 14, 2018 or the same date that the challenged Sandiganbayan Resolution was issued, the prosecution filed a motion to withdraw (the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated October 9, 2018). 31
In its Resolution 32 dated March 21, 2019, the Sandiganbayan denied Sales' partial motion for reconsideration. It stated that it no longer has residual jurisdiction because the original records of the case were already transmitted to the Supreme Court on December 27, 2018.
On April 12, 2019, Sales filed this urgent motion for review, questioning the legality of the cancellation of his bail on three grounds: first, he was denied due process because he was deprived of his right to seek reconsideration of the Resolution dated December 14, 2018 as the Sandiganbayan hurriedly transmitted the records of the case to this Court; second, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to act on the omnibus motion since it was filed out of time; and third, there is no basis for the cancellation of his bail considering that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of any of the bail-negating circumstances stated in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules. 33 aDSIHc
In Our Resolution 34 dated July 3, 2019, We directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), and the counsel 35 for the private-complainant to comment on the urgent motion for review within a non-extendible period of 10 days from receipt of notice. The Resolution was personally served to the OSG, OSP, and the counsel for the private-complainant on July 16, 2019. 36
The OSG filed a manifestation and motion (in lieu of comment) 37 on July 22, 2019, claiming that the OSP has the duty and responsibility to prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the OSG prays that it be excused from further participating in the case. The OSP 38 filed its ad cautelam comment/opposition 39 on July 30, 2019. 40 On the procedural aspect, the OSP argues that this urgent motion for review is not one of the several modes of review recognized under the law, specifically under the Rules of Court. 41 For the substantive part, the OSP contends that the Sandiganbayan properly recalled Sales' bail. 42 The OSP therefore prays for the denial of this urgent motion for review for disregard of procedural rules and for lack of merit. 43 Meanwhile, private complainant did not file a comment on the urgent motion for review.
The issue is whether the Sandiganbayan erred in revoking the bail of Sales.
The petition is meritorious.
I.
At the outset, We rule that Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules 44 allows this Court, motu proprio or upon motion of any party, to review the resolution of the trial court (on the grant or denial of bail), provided notice to the adverse party was given in either case. Here, Sales, through his urgent motion for review, has properly invoked the Court's authority to review the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which cancelled his bail post-conviction.
We now address the claim of Sales that he was denied due process of law.
Case law teaches that due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 45
Here, it is undisputed that Sales filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated December 14, 2018 of the Sandiganbayan. He was able to argue why his bail should be reinstated. Whether the Sandiganbayan granted or denied his motion is a different matter. Thus, contrary to his claim, he was not deprived of due process.
Meanwhile, upon transmittal of the records, the Sandiganbayan lost jurisdiction over the case. Thus, it correctly refrained from acting on Sales' motion, which was filed on January 23, 2019. Under Section 9, 46 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the Sandiganbayan's residual jurisdiction ceased to exist upon its transmittal of the original records to the Supreme Court.
II.
Sales next contends that the Order granting him bail attained finality on July 21, 2018 or 15 days after it was issued on July 6, 2018. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to act on the omnibus motion filed by the prosecution only on July 26, 2018. We disagree.
In People v. Escobar (Escobar), 47 We declared that "an order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory. This order does not attain finality when a new matter warrants a second look on the application for bail."
In Escobar, the accused was charged with kidnapping for ransom. His first bail application was denied by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) in 2008 and 2011, respectively. However, by January 2012, only the accused was left in detention pending the final judgment on the merits of the case as all the other accused who had actively participated in the crime had been granted bail. The accused saw this as a new development, prompting him to file a second bail application. The RTC denied the second bail petition on the ground of res judicata because the Order of the CA on the first bail application already attained finality. The CA overturned the RTC on appeal. We sustained the CA. We held that res judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed. The kidnapping case itself has not yet attained finality. Thus, the RTC should have taken cognizance of the second bail petition. ETHIDa
In this case, the omnibus motion alleged that the prosecution was recently informed that Sales was able to secure a police clearance one day before the promulgation of the judgment against him, which stated that there is no pending case against him. This circumstance, taken together with the fact that Sales hastily paid for his bail post-conviction and his strategic location in Ilocos Norte where he could sneak out at any time through the Bangui bay, makes him a flight risk. This is a new matter which, if proven, warrants a revocation of Sales' bail. Applying Escobar, We rule that the order granting Sales' bail did not attain finality; thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to act on the omnibus motion.
III.
Sales argues that there is absolutely no basis for the cancellation of his bail because the prosecution failed to prove the presence of any of the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Article 114 of the Revised Rules, which reads:
Sec. 5. Bail, When Discretionary. — x x x
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Leviste v. Court of Appeals (Leviste), We explained that the foregoing provisions contemplate two scenarios. First, where none of the listed bail-negating circumstances is present, the Court may grant or deny bail based on its sound judicial discretion. Second, if a bail-negating circumstance exists, the Court has no other option but to deny or cancel the bail. We, however, emphasized that the enumeration in Section 5 is not exclusive. The appellate court is not a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited in determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. 48 Hence, the Court may consider "other similar circumstances" in its allowance, denial, or revocation of bail. This is the rationale used by the Sandiganbayan in cancelling Sales' bail. While the Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of the enumerated bail-negating circumstances, it considered other "relevant circumstances" — specifically, the conviction of Sales of the crime charged 49 — as basis for the cancellation of bail. The Sandiganbayan adopted a "stringent approach" to bail post-conviction because to its mind the case of Sales falls in the second scenario.
We are not persuaded. The Sandiganbayan misapplied Leviste. When the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Revised Rules speaks of "other similar circumstances" which would result in the denial or cancellation of bail, it refers to matters extraneous or separate from the fact of conviction. It cannot include the conviction of the accused because the provision first and foremost presupposes that the accused was already found guilty by the court and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years. If the fact of conviction would be treated as a bail-negating circumstance, the rules on bail pending appeal would be rendered nugatory. All accused sentenced to suffer imprisonment exceeding six years would be automatically denied bail. Thus, the Court's discretion to allow bail pending appeal would be curtailed — the very thing that the Court, in Leviste, seeks to prevent. cSEDTC
Nevertheless, We clarify that conviction of the accused of the crime charged is irrelevant only in bail application pending appeal where the penalty imposed is not reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death. The Revised Rules is clear that when a person is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, he/she shall not be admitted to bail, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, when evidence of his/her guilt is strong. 50 Conviction of a capital offense imports that evidence against the accused is strong so bail pending appeal is foreclosed.
Since Sales' conviction by the Sandiganbayan does not per se negate bail, the case before Us would fall in the first scenario discussed in Leviste. Consequently, We may use the "less stringent sound discretion approach" in determining whether the bail previously granted to Sales should be revoked or cancelled. 51
We rule that Sandiganbayan erred in cancelling Sales' bail. In cases of bail pending appeal, the purpose of bail is for the accused to avoid the potential hardships of prison, while at the same time prevent his flight from custody and to ensure the protection of the community from potential danger. 52 Aside from its bare allegations, the prosecution failed to prove that Sales is a flight risk or a danger to the society. In People v. Canillo-Prospero, We held that conviction by the Sandiganbayan does not ipso facto make one a flight risk. 53 Further, the record shows that during the trial of the case, Sales had applied for, and was granted permission to travel abroad numerous times. 54 Each time, he had abided by the terms and conditions of his travel. Had he wanted to escape from trial, he could have easily done so in any of the occasions that he was outside of the country; but he did not do so. Thus, We see no propensity to flee on his part. Furthermore, the claim of the prosecution that Sales is a danger to the society is unsubstantiated. Allegation is not proof.
In fine, Sales' conviction of the offense charged, without more, is insufficient basis for the revocation of his bail pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the urgent motion for review is hereby GRANTED. Accused Reynolan T. Sales is hereby ordered PROVISIONALLY RELEASED, unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor's ad cautelam comment/opposition (re: accused-appellant Reynolan T. Sales' urgent motion for review [re: resolution of the Sandiganbayan recalling its previously granted bail on appeal dated April 11, 2019], in compliance with the Resolution dated July 3, 2019, praying that the said urgent motion of accused-appellant be denied for its blatant disregard of procedural rules and for utter lack of merit is NOTED. The accused-appellant is hereby required to SUBMIT within five (5) days from notice hereof, a verified declaration of the signed third motion for final extension of time pursuant to A.M. Nos. 10-3-7-SC and 11-9-4-SC. SDAaTC
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 69-83.
2.Id. at 189-193; as penned by Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz with the concurrence of Associate Justices Alex L. Quiroz and Bayani H. Jacinto.
3. Represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman.
4.Rollo, p. 5.
5.Id. at 85-86.
6.Id. at 4-48.
7.Id. at 46.
8.Id. at 47. One-half of the amount of damages shall be paid by the other accused (who were convicted as accomplices) in the case.
9. Sandiganbayan records, Vol. 6, p. 160.
10.Id. at 180-207.
11.Id. at 208-233.
12.Id. at 129-142.
13.Id. at 131.
14.Id. at 134.
15.Id. at 135.
16.Id. at 149.
17.Id. at 150-151.
18.Id. at 152-154.
19.Id. at 162-168.
20.Id. at 169-175.
21.Id. at 169.
22.Id. at 171.
23.Id. at 49-52.
24.Id. at 189-193.
25.Id. at 190.
26.Id. at 190-191.
27.Id. at 192.
28.Id. at 195-204.
29.Id. at 196-197.
30.Id. at 199-200.
31.Id. at 200. See also Sandiganbayan records, Vol. 6, pp. 554-556. Acting on the motion to withdraw, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on December 18, 2018 declaring the motion moot and academic. It noted that the motion was filed on the same day that the court promulgated its December 14, 2018 Resolution. (Id. at 568.)
32.Rollo, pp. 207-210.
33.Id. at 72-77.
34.Id. at 232-233.
35. Kapunan and Castillo Law Offices.
36.Rollo, p. 233.
37.Id. at 246-249.
38. Before it filed its ad cautelam comment/opposition, the OSP filed a manifestation with motion stating that the filing of its final motion for extension to file appellee's brief on July 8, 2019 was done in good faith for reasons stated therein and praying that it be allowed to file its appellee's brief within a fresh period of 30 days from receipt of accused-appellant's brief. (Rollo, p. 254.) The OSP's manifestation with motion was filed in relation to the pending appeal of Sales from his conviction before the Supreme Court, and not in connection with the urgent motion for review.
39.Id. at 254-257.
40. Beyond the non-extendible period of 10 days given by the Court to file comment, or until July 26, 2019.
41. Rollo, p. 267.
42. Id. at 272.
43. Id. at 275.
44. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"x x x The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case."
45. Aguinaldo v. Ventus, G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA 461, 478, citing Catacutan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175991, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 524, 632.
46. Sec. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. x x x
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. x x x
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
47. G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017, 833 SCRA 180, 184.
48. G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619, 637-639.
49. Rollo, p. 191. The Sandiganbayan stated: "In this case, the Court made a thorough review of the records, taking into consideration all the evidence adduced therein, and found that the evidence establishing the guilt of accused Sales, as the principal accused in this homicide case, more convincing than the evidence to refute the same."
50. REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 114, Sec. 7.
51. Supra note 48 at 638. See also People v. Canillo-Prospero, G.R. Nos. 212399 & 212874 (Resolution), November 26, 2018.
52. People v. Canillo-Prospero, G.R. Nos. 212399 & 212874 (Resolution), November 26, 2018.
53. Id.
54. Rollo, pp. 144-145.
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