People v. Sajed Fernandez Abuhijleh

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 224342. September 12, 2018.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FERDINAND H. NAVARRO, petitioners,vs. SAJED FERNANDEZ ABUHIJLEH, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 12, 2018,which reads as follows: caITAC

"G.R. No. 224342 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FERDINAND H. NAVARRO, Petitioners, v. SAJED FERNANDEZ ABUHIJLEH, Respondent.) — To be resolved is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) — through the assailed decision promulgated on September 17, 2015 1 — correctly dismissed the criminal case for serious illegal detention as defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code brought against the respondent for failure to establish probable cause against him. The CA thereby annulled and set aside the resolutions issued on April 16, 2014 and May 12, 2014 in Criminal Case No. 153705-TG by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 271, in Taguig City, respectively, finding probable cause against him and denying his motion for reconsideration (against the finding of probable cause). The CA further recalled and set aside the warrant of arrest issued against him as a consequence.

The following background facts are narrated by the CA in the assailed decision, to wit:

By virtue of the Sinumpaang Salaysay and several other sworn statements executed by private respondent Ferdinand Navarro (complainant Navarro), a Subpoena dated February 21, 2014 was issued by the Panel of Investigating Officers of the Department of Justice (Panel), directing petitioner Sajed Fernandez Abuhijleh (petitioner) and several others, to appear and submit their respective counter-affidavits to the Complaint for Serious Illegal Detention, Serious Physical Injuries, Grave Threats, Grave Coercion, Illegal Arrest, and Threatening to Publish and Offer to Prevent such publication for a compensation.

On March 7, 2014, petitioner executed and filed his Counter-Affidavit.

The Panel concluded the preliminary investigation by issuing a Consolidated Resolution dated April 4, 2014, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the undersigned Assistant State Prosecutors respectfully recommend that:

(1) In NPS Docket No. XVI-INV 14A-000-22:

An INFORMATION for violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code otherwise known as Serious Illegal Detention, be filed against respondents Deniece Millinette Cornejo, Cedric Cua Lee, Bernice Cua Lee a.k.a. Marie, Simeon Palma Raz, Jr. a.k.a. Zimmer Raz, Jose Paulo Gregorio A. Calma, Ferdinand Guerrero and Sajed Fernandez Abuhijleh a.k.a. Jed Fernandez; and

An INFORMATION for violation of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code, or Grave Coercion, be filed against respondents Deniece Millinette Cornejo, Cedric Cua Lee, Bernice Cua Lee a.k.a. Marie, Simeon Palma Raz, Jr. a.k.a. Zimmer Raz, Jose Paulo Gregorio A. Calma, Ferdinand Guerrero and Sajed Fernandez Abuhijleh a.k.a. Jed Fernandez, while the charge for serious physical injuries, grave threats, and illegal arrest are already absorbed in the charge for serious illegal detention, and;

The charge for threatening to publish and offer to prevent publication for compensation against respondents Deniece Millinette Cornejo, Cedric Cua Lee, Bernice Cua Lee a.k.a. Marie, Simeon Palma Raz, Jr. a.k.a. Zimmer Raz, Jose Paulo Gregorio A. Calma, Ferdinand Guerrero and Sajed Fernandez Abuhijleh a.k.a. Jed Fernandez, be DISMISSED for lack of probable cause. ICHDca

(2) In NPS Docket No. XV-16-INV-14A-00096:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) In NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-14A-000

xxx xxx xxx

On April 10, 2014, two (2) Informations were filed against petitioner and six (6) others, one of which was this case, Criminal Case No. 153705-TG for Violation of Article 267 of the RPC. The said Information states:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Asst. State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice hereby accuse DENIECE MILLINETTE CORNEJO, CEDRIC CUA LEE, BERNICE CUA LEE a.k.a. Marie, SIMON PALMA RAZ, JR., JOSE PAOLO GREGORIO A. CALMA, SAJED FERNANDEZ ABUHIJLEH a.k.a. JED FERNANDEZ and FERDINAND GUERRERO of the crime of serious illegal detention for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about January 22, 2014, in Bonifacio Global City, Taguig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, detain and deprive FERDINAND "VHONG" NAVARRO y HIPOLITO of his liberty and against his will, by means of threat and intimidation with the use of firearm and hold him captive, and on the occasion and during the detention, the accused inflicted serious physical injuries and threatened to kill the victim and demand for money was made as a condition for his release, which was initially in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php200,000.00), which was later increased to TWO MILLION PESOS (Php2,000,000.00) and which the victim agreed to pay the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (Php1,000,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of the victim in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the New Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On April 15, 2014, petitioner filed an urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Suspension of Proceedings, assailing the Consolidated Resolution of the Panel on the following grounds: (1) grave abuse of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and (2) manifest errors and grave abuse of discretion on the findings of fact.

In the said Motion, he assailed the findings of the Panel that conspiracy exists among the accused to perform the crime of serious illegal detention for purposes of extorting ransom. He also questioned the conclusion reached by the Panel that the alleged demand of money made against Mr. Navarro was in the form of ransom. Thereafter, the prosecution filed their Opposition thereto.

On April 16, 2014, the public respondent issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner and four (4) others. The relevant portion of which reads:

xxx xxx xxx

The participation of Sajed Fernandez Abuhijleh a.k.a. Jed Fernandez was not specifically clear in the 23 January 2014 Affidavit of the private complainant. He was not identified therein. In the 30 January 2014 Affidavit of the private complainant, a certain Mike was identified. He was finally identified by the private complainant in the 4 February 2014 Affidavit as said Mike. The specific acts attributed to him were his having talked about the ransom. The counter-affidavit of the accused and the affidavits of the rest of accused would deny that there was such a ransom made. However, Mr. Sajed Fernandez admitted that he had talked with the private complainant and that there was talk of money, although as form of damages. His participation can therefore be seen.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, probable cause is hereby found for the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest on the following accused SIMEON PALMA RAZ, JR., SAJED FERNANDEZ ABUHIJLEH a.k.a. JED FERNANDEZ, FERDINAND GUERRERO, CEDRIC CUA LEE and DENIECE MILLINETTE CORNEJO in Criminal Case No. 153705-TG for the crime of Serious Illegal detention on 22 January 2014. TCAScE

Let the case be DISMISSED as against JOSE PAOLO GREGORIO A. CALMA and BERNICE CUA LEE a.k.a. Marie for lack of probable cause.

SO ORDERED.

On April 24, 2014, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Resolution on the ground that the evidence on record is insufficient to justify the finding of probable cause against him. In the said Motion, petitioner questioned the erroneous finding of the public respondent that there was "talk of money" which the latter concluded as a form of "demand for ransom." Petitioner strongly asserted that he never admitted having discussed monetary issues with complainant Navarro and that there was never any demand for ransom to secure the release of the latter. Finally, petitioner pointed out that there was no evidence showing that he conspired with the rest of the accused to commit the alleged crime of Serious Illegal Detention against complainant Navarro.

On May 12, 2014, the public respondent issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The public respondent maintained her position that there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against petitioner, ratiocinating in part that:

The evidence so far of the prosecution as against the accused movant herein had passed the stage of probable cause. The denial of the movant of said evidence of the prosecution is a matter that must be threshed out at the trial proper. That is when the Court will determine which theory of the incident bears the hallmark of truth. Again, in the determination of the probable cause, the Court need not determine the evidence of the prosecution with the quantum weight of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The allegations of the movant in the counter-affidavit are merely in the nature of denial which is negative in nature while the allegations of the private complainant are affirmative being positive evidence, the evidence of the prosecution so far, must be given its weight of probable cause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration of the accused Sajed Fernandez Abuhijleh a.k.a. Fernandez is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari ascribing to public respondent grave abuse of discretion (1) in concluding that the alleged demand of money was in the form of demand for ransom; (2) in finding that there was conspiracy to commit the crime of serious illegal detention for purposes of extorting ransom between petitioner and the other accused; and (3) in finding probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner.

Petitioner argues in the main that there is no evidence on record that would support the finding that he extorted ransom from complainant Navarro. He further argues that he never admitted talking to complainant Navarro regarding money and demanding the same from him. Finally, he argues that there is no evidence on record that would support that he participated in a conspiracy to commit the alleged crime because for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be conscious design to commit an offense and that there must be an indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect deprivation of the victim's liberty.

On the other hand, complainant Navarro posits that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent when she issued the assailed Resolutions finding probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against petitioner. 2

After due proceedings, the CA granted the respondent's petition for certiorari upon finding that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that probable cause existed to charge the respondent with serious illegal detention and in issuing the warrant for his arrest. 3

Hence, this appeal by the State and the complainant.

Ruling of the Court

We deny the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioners to persuasively show that the CA erred in promulgating its assailed decision. cTDaEH

In granting the petition for certiorari of the respondent, the CA explained its reasons, as follows:

We grant the Petition. There is a paucity of evidence upon which a finding of probable cause could firmly rest.

In the assailed Resolutions, the public respondent was unequivocal in justifying her finding of probable cause against petitioner by ruling that the latter talked with complainant Navarro about money during the latter's alleged detention. The public respondent pointed out that this is specifically anchored on petitioner's Affidavit itself. The public respondent declared that:

x x x. The specific acts attributed to him (petitioner Fernandez) were his having talked about the ransom. The counter-affidavit of the accused and the affidavits of the rest of accused would deny that there was such a ransom made. However, Mr. Sajed Fernandez admitted that he had talked with the private complainant and that there was talk of money, although as form of damages. His participation can therefore be seen.

In light of petitioner's vehemence over the public respondent's attribution to him of statements that are unquestionably prejudicial to him, it is imperative that We reproduce in full his March 7, 2014 Counter-Affidavit upon which the public respondent anchored in part her finding of probable cause:

[Omitted]

A punctilious but objective reading of the contents of this Counter-Affidavit shows that the same is barren of any inculpatory admission supposedly made by petitioner contrary to the findings of the public respondent. Try as We might, We find no statement, express or implied, showing or even insinuating that petitioner admitted that he "talked about money" with complainant Navarro. As to where and why the public respondent made an attribution to petitioner of a supposed declaration against the interest of the latter that is not found in the records is baffling to say the least. We cannot but conclude that there was a misapprehension in the reading of the said Counter-Affidavit. This lapse to Our mind unfortunately betrays lack of fidelity to the facts of the controversy and haphazard appraisal of the defences of an accused who pins his hope for deliverance from his plight before an assiduous court.

But even if We brush aside this lengthy Affidavit of the petitioner, complainant Navarro's Affidavit dated January 23, 2014 likewise does not point to petitioner as one of those who demanded money from him or restrained him. x x x

If there was anyone who was pinpointed in the said Affidavit as the person who talked about or demanded money from complainant Navarro, it was accused Cedric Lee and not petitioner herein. We note that no less than three (3) Affidavits were executed by complainant Navarro. None in these Affidavits was the petitioner accused of having extorted money in exchange for complainant Navarro's freedom.

Another consideration that does not escape Our attention is the public respondent's Resolution dated September 12, 2014 which is attached to this Petition. In this Resolution, the public respondent found, after the bail hearings for the petitioner's co-accused that, based on complainant Navarro's testimony, the ransom, if ever one was demanded, was not for complainant Navarro's release. The public respondent stated:

It can be deduced from said allegations of the private complainant that, based on the circumstances of the demand for money, that the ransom was actually demanded by reason of the video and the blotter report. This is because the amount of money, demanded upon the private complainant was not for his release. He was already released and still, money was demanded upon him. He had so acknowledged this when he stated that he was determined to pay even after being released because of the video and the police blotter report.

With these findings of the public respondent indicating that the alleged demand for money was not made to ensure complainant Navarro's liberty, a crucial element of the alleged offense, which is extortion of ransom, vanishes. In order to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense. cSaATC

Neither can We subscribe to the finding of the public respondent that petitioner appears to have conspired with his co-accused. The public respondents ruled that petitioner's allegation are in direct contrast with the allegations of complainant Navarro. The public respondent further stated in the assailed Resolution dated May 12, 2014 that:

x x x, the Court is only required to personally go over the evidence of the prosecution in the finding of the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest on the crime charged. That means that the Court considers only the evidence presented by the prosecution. As between the theory of the accused movant herein and that of the prosecution at this stage of the proceeding on what actually happened and on the participation of the accused movant, the Court need only rely on the evidence of the prosecution. The evidence of the defense would only gain weight if the evidence of the prosecution is such that it could not be believed even when it stands on its own.

This is neither here nor there. In evaluating the weight of the evidence for purposes of determining probable cause, the Court, expectedly, and contrary to the position of the public respondent, must consider everything that is appended to the records.

In Our evaluation of the entire records, We find the angle of conspiracy against the petitioner wanting. It is merely based on suspicion perilously perched on the weak anchors of speculation and innuendo brought about by the photographs or reproduction of CCTV footages which seem to portray the petitioner as having been within the periphery of the alleged scene of the crime.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators directly participated in every act constituting the offense. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. What is important is that they all performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the commission of the said crime. While conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and the manner in which the offense was perpetrated, it must, like the crime itself, be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate is not enough to establish conspiracy.

The mere fact that petitioner arrived at the crime scene does not necessarily establish conspiracy. Mere presence during and after the incident at the scene of the crime by themselves cannot be taken as evidence of conspiracy absent any concrete evidence that the accused was intentionally present to insure the success of a common criminal design. As noted at the outset, there is inadequate proof of petitioner's participation in the actual deprivation of complainant Navarro's liberty. Complainant Navarro's Affidavits likewise do not clearly show the participation of petitioner in the said acts. The pictures presented by the prosecution wherein petitioner was seen leaving the scene of the crime together with the other accused are not, by themselves, evidence of conspiracy nor do they supply the requisite link of actual participation in furtherance of a common criminal design. For to repeat, to establish conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another by performing an act leading to the crime which is not present in this case. Conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.

Judges and prosecutors are not off on a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a delicate legal duty defined by law and jurisprudence. And, whether it is a preliminary investigation by the prosecutor, which ascertains if the respondent should be held for trial, or a preliminary inquiry by the trial judge which determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the bottomline is that there is a standard in the determination of the existence of probable cause, i.e., there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged.

On a final note, We are aware that even an unfounded criminal charge may expose the clearly innocent to severe distress and tarnished reputation, that even a subsequent acquittal may not fully alleviate or cleanse. It is in this light that We remind the public respondent that in penal litigations, more importantly in the determination of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the courts are mandated by the Constitution not only to acquit the innocent after trial, but to insulate them from the very start, from tenuous charges and ensuing proceedings — for innocence, itself, ought to be enough. cHDAIS

In light of the foregoing, We hereby find public respondent to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned Resolutions dated April 16, 2014 and May 12, 2014, respectively. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the public respondent dated April 16, 2014 and May 12, 2014 finding probable cause for the arrest of petitioner Sajed Fernandez Abuhijleh for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is hereby DISMISSED with respect to the said petitioner for failure to establish probable cause consistent with Section 6 (a), Rule 112, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the Warrant of Arrest issued against the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 153705-TG, if any, is RECALLED and SET ASIDE effective immediately. [citations omitted]

SO ORDERED. 4

The foregoing explanations are in full accord with the records and the pertinent law and jurisprudence. Indeed, there was a paucity of evidence showing that the respondent was probably guilty of serious illegal detention.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 17, 2015, without pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED." Tijam, J., on official leave.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENAActing Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 49-67; penned by Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles with the concurrence of Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino.

2.Id. at 50-55.

3.Id. at 66.

4.Id. at 55-67.