THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232392. January 10, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ANTHONY REPANI y CABERO, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 10, 2018, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 232392 (People of the Philippines vs. Anthony Repani y Cabero). — The Court NOTES:
(1) the letter dated October 19, 2017 of P/Supt. I Roberto R. Rabo, Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, confirming the confinement therein of accused-appellant since June 26, 2016;
(2) the Office of the Solicitor General's Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief dated October 26, 2017 stating that it is adopting the arguments in its brief as supplemental brief considering that it has already discussed all the issues relevant to this case in its Brief of August 23, 2017; and
(3) accused-appellant's Manifestation (in Lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated November 2, 2017 stating that a supplemental brief would no longer be filed since he is adopting the Appellant's Brief of January 29, 2016 as his supplemental brief.
On appeal is the Decision 1 dated September 30, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07752, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated September 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 9590, convicting beyond reasonable doubt the herein appellant Anthony Repani y Cabero for the crime of Qualified Rape under paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of Article 266-A in relation to paragraph 2 of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC).
The Information against the appellant reads as follows:
That, on or about the 20th day of August 2007, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [herein appellant], by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA, who is suffering from mental retardation lapses and therefore deprived of reason, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
The crime is qualified having been committed with the use of a deadly weapon and further aggravated by the circumstances of nighttime. 3
On arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 4 After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. 5
During trial, the following testified for the prosecution: (1) AAA, the victim herself; (2) Police Officer 3 Allan Poe Dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz); (3) PO3 Marlyn Jepa (PO3 Jepa); (4) Senior Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Leonardo T. Gonzales (Gonzales); (5) Dr. John Pio A. Dacudao (Dr. Dacudao); and (6) PCI Maria Anna Lissa Dela Cruz (PCI Dela Cruz). The defense, on the other hand, presented the appellant as its lone witness. 6
The evidence for the prosecution established that sometime in August 2007, at about nighttime, AAA, a 22-year old mental retardate, met the appellant, who then called and pulled her towards a secluded place inside the cemetery. While thereat, the appellant plucked out AAA's left eye, removed the latter's pants, and raped her. After satisfying his bestial desire, the appellant left. 7
The following day, or on August 20, 2007, at around 7:00 a.m., the Philippine National Police-Rodriguez, Rizal (PNP-Rodriguez), received a telephone call that a woman was found dead in the cemetery. As such, PO3 Dela Cruz, together with Senior Police Officer 1 Reynaldo Año (SPO1 Año), PO3 Jepa, and Police Officer 1 Jose Reyes (PO1 Reyes), immediately proceeded to the area. Upon arriving thereat, they saw a woman lying beside a tomb, bloodied and naked from waist down. She also had cigarette burns all over her body and her eyes were protruding. She likewise had cigarette butts and rugby on her vagina. But, contrary to the report, the woman was still breathing. Thus, they rushed her to the [Amang] Rodriguez Memorial [Medical Center] for medical treatment. 8
An investigation was thereafter conducted. In the course thereof, the police officers learned the identity of the victim as AAA, who hailed from Laguna, a former resident of San Mateo, Rizal, and was suffering from mental retardation. At the crime scene, the police officers retrieved bottles of rugby. They then found a man lying inside a nearby mausoleum, whose clothes were covered with blood. They woke him up and invited him to the police station, where he admitted having sexually abused someone in the cemetery. The man, who later identified himself as the appellant, was subsequently brought to the hospital, where AAA was confined. After seeing AAA, the appellant identified her as the same woman whom he raped. 9 aScITE
The next day, the appellant was brought to the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), where he voluntarily executed an extrajudicial confession in the presence of his mother, and his counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Censon (Atty. Censon), who prepared the appellant's extrajudicial confession after interviewing the latter and explaining to him the legal implications of his confession. 10
Later, in a Certificate of Confinement issued by Dr. Alejandro Geronimo (Dr. Geronimo), AAA's attending physician at the [Amang] Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, the extent of the injuries she suffered was revealed. The same contained the following findings: "traumatic brain injury secondary to the alleged mauling, sexual assault, multiple lacerated wounds facial area and paraurethral abrasion." 11
AAA also underwent a medico-legal examination at the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory that issued the Final Medico-Legal Report RSA-001-07 duly signed by one Dr. Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez). The said report consists of two parts: one for examination of physical injuries, and the other one for examination of AAA's vagina. On the basis of the said report, PCI Dela Cruz stated that AAA sustained approximately 20 injuries on different parts of her body but the most serious of which were the lacerated wounds in the "left infra-orbital region" or left eye and in the "left maxillary region," left cheek that required an operation. PCI Dela Cruz also testified that a bladed weapon likely caused some of AAA's injuries, such as the multiple incised wounds with superimposed abrasions on her neck. On her genitalia, AAA also sustained injuries, particularly a trauma in the labia minora. The same caused congestion (redness and swelling) on the upper right portion thereof and was accompanied by an abraded posterior forchette (healing laceration), which could have been caused by the penetration of a blunt object, like an erect penis. 12
The appellant, in his defense, denied the accusation and testified that on August 20, 2007, he was sleeping at the plaza from 10:00 p.m. until past 12:00 midnight when he was suddenly arrested by the barangay officials and was later brought to the precinct for allegedly raping a woman. He was investigated even without the assistance of counsel. He vehemently denied the accusation but he was mauled and was forced to admit the commission of the crime. Thereafter, he was brought to the PAO, where he was interviewed and asked about the incident involving a woman, which he denied. He was, however, afraid to tell the PAO that he was being forced to admit the commission of the crime. He executed an affidavit before the PAO and was assisted by PO3 Jepa. He then identified the said document during trial. He claimed that PO3 Jepa forced him to sign that document but the lawyer and the prosecutor with whom he subscribed the extrajudicial confession did not force him to sign it. 13
After giving credence to the prosecution's evidence and upholding the admissibility and voluntariness of the appellant's extrajudicial confession, the trial court rendered a Decision dated September 2, 2014 convicting him of Qualified Rape and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The appellant was likewise ordered to pay the victim the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. 14
On appeal, the CA, in its now assailed Decision dated September 30, 2016, affirmed the appellant's conviction.
Unsatisfied, the appellant appealed his conviction before this Court.
On review, this Court upholds the appellant's conviction.
The gravamen of the crime of rape under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. 15 It specifically states that:
ART. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied.)
Prescinding therefrom, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman through any of the four enumerated circumstances. And, without doubt, carnal knowledge of a woman who is suffering from mental retardation is rape under subparagraph (b) of the aforesaid provisions of law. With that, proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What must be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the latter's mental retardation, 16 which the prosecution successfully did in this case.
Here, the sexual congress between the appellant and AAA was duly established by the very own testimony of the latter, who categorically stated in open court that while she and the appellant were inside the cemetery, the latter hurt her and then removed her long pants and proceeded in raping her. As to the fact of her mental retardation, the same is not disputed even by the defense.
AAA's mental retardation did not in any way impair the credibility of her testimony. Mental retardation per se does not affect one's credibility. Someone mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court. 17 In this case, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that AAA was able to communicate well her ordeal and the credibility of her testimony was upheld by both lower courts. Worth stressing also is the fact that during AAA's testimony, she even positively identified the appellant as her defiler. 18 Hence, AAA's candid narration of what transpired, coupled by her categorical identification of the appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case for the prosecution. Moreover, as this Court has oft pronounced, when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. 19 HEITAD
Aside from the fact that the prosecution has successfully proven the elements of rape, the appellant himself admitted the commission thereof in an extrajudicial confession he voluntarily executed in the presence of his mother and counsel. Both lower courts upheld its admissibility and this Court finds no cogent reason to rule otherwise. Here we quote with conformity the CA's disquisition on the matter:
The Court is, thus, confronted with the question of admissibility of the extra-judicial confession made by the [herein appellant]. In resolving the issue, it is well to lay down the requirements set out by the Constitution to render a confession admissible, to wit: 1) it must be voluntary; 2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) it must be express; and 4) it must be in writing.
That the rights of the [appellant] were respected during the confession is evident from the examination of the questioned document itself where the [appellant] admitted that he was making the confession voluntarily in the presence of a competent and independent counsel, Atty. Censon, who himself represented the [appellant] during trial.
The said confession in part reads:
"xxx xxx xxx
9. Tanong:
Ikaw ba kusang loob na nagbibigay ng iyong salaysay?
Sagot:
Opo
10. Tanong:
Alam mo ba ang maaari mong sapitin o kahinatnan ng pag amin mo na ito, alam mo ba na maaari kang makulong sa mahabang panahon o di kaya ay makulong ng habambuhay?
Sagot:
Opo, dahil sinabi at ipinaliwanag po sa akin ng abogadong umasiste sa akin? (sic)
11. Tanong:
Ikaw ba ay pinilit, tinakot o sinaktan ng kung sino man upang gawin ang pag-amin na ito?
Sagot:
Hindi po ako pinilit o sinaktan ninuman at kusang loob ko po ang pag-amin na ito.
xxx xxx xxx"
Atty. Censon also made sure that such right of the [appellant] was protected when he testified that the confession was made after he personally interviewed the [appellant] and explained to the latter the consequences of his confession. This was made in the presence of the [appellant's] mother.
Prosecutor Gonzales testified that the requirements of the constitution and statutory law were complied with in the execution and signing of the extra-judicial confession of the [appellant], to wit: the document is express in its statement that the [appellant] had committed the crime for which he is charged, executed voluntarily and in the presence of counsel and with counsel advising the [appellant] of the consequences of the extra-judicial confession.
Further negating the claim of irregularity in the execution of the extra-judicial confession was the fact that the [appellant] did not make known such allegation of force or duress to the persons administering the oath, nor he initiated complaints against the police officers allegedly involved in forcing him to admit the commission of the crime in this case. In a decided case, the Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession when, "(1) there is no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on the person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the officers administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did not file any criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for maltreatment; (4) no marks of violence were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himself examined by a physician to support his claim. x x x" 20 (Emphases supplied; italics in the original.)
Now, as regards the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon, Article 266-B of the RPC, which provides for the qualification of the crime, 21 explicitly provides:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphases and italics supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that for one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of the RPC must be alleged in the Information and duly proved during the trial. 22 In this case, this Court affirms both lower courts' finding that a bladed weapon, indeed, qualified the crime. Such qualifying circumstance was properly alleged in the Information and duly proven during the trial. The use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime was very evident in the result of the medico-legal report of the victim showing that the latter suffered multiple incised wounds caused by a bladed weapon. The appellant himself also admitted having used a knife in causing the said injuries to his victim. 23 Being in the nature of a qualifying circumstance, "use of a deadly weapon" increases the penalties by degrees, and cannot be treated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance which affects only the period of the penalty. This so-called qualified form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Thus, the presence of generic aggravating and mitigating circumstances will determine whether the lesser or higher penalty shall be imposed. 24 Here, the prosecution alleged in the Information the aggravating circumstance of nighttime but, as properly observed by both lower courts, it was unable to prove that the appellant purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the crime. As such, since neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the minimum penalty, that is, reclusion perpetua, should be the penalty imposable pursuant to Article 63 of the RPC. 25 Therefore, both lower courts properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant. ATICcS
As to the award of damages, this Court sustains both lower courts in awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P75,000.00 as moral damages to the victim. But, as regards the award of exemplary damages, this Court deems it proper to increase the same from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00 in line with the recent pronouncement in People v. Jugueta. 26 An interest at the rate of 6% per annum is also imposed on all the damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated September 30, 2016 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07752 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS increasing the award of exemplary damages to P75,000.00 and imposing an interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza with Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now member of this Court) and Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, concurring, Rollo, pp. 2-13.
2. Penned by Presiding Judge Josephine Zarate-Fernandez, CA rollo, pp. 40-46.
3. CA Decision dated September 30, 2016, Rollo, p. 3.
4.Id.
5. RTC Decision dated September 2, 2014, CA rollo, p. 40.
6.Id. at 40-44.
7. CA Decision dated September 30, 2016, Rollo, p. 3; RTC Decision dated September 2, 2014, id. at 40-41; Appellee's Brief dated April 7, 2016, CA rollo, p. 59.
8.Id. at 3-4; Id. at 41; Id. at 59-60.
9.Id. at 4; Id. at 41; Id. at 60.
10.Id. at 4; Id. at 41-43; Id. at 60.
11. CA Decision dated September 30, 2016, Rollo, p. 4; RTC Decision dated September 2, 2014, CA rollo, p. 43.
12. CA Decision dated September 30, 2016, id. at 4-5; RTC Decision dated September 2, 2014, id. at 43-44; Appellee's Brief dated April 7, 2016, CA rollo, pp. 60-61.
13. CA Decision dated September 30, 2016, id. at 5-6; RTC Decision dated September 2, 2014, id. at 44-45; Appellant's Brief dated January 29, 2016, id. at 23.
14. RTC Decision dated September 2, 2014, id. at 46.
15.People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.
16.Id.
17.People v. Rosales, G.R. No. 197537, July 24, 2013.
18.People v. Moticalvo, supra note 15.
19.People v. Gahi, G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014.
20. CA Decision dated September 30, 2016, Rollo, pp. 9-11.
21.People v. Jumawid, G.R. No. 184756, June 5 2009.
22.People v. Galagar, Jr., G.R. No. 202842, October 9, 2013.
23. CA Decision dated September 30, 2016, Rollo, p. 12.
24.Supra note 21.
25.Supra.
26. G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.