FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 248923. July 14, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs. RAMIL RAPOG y CASTILLO,accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 14, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 248923 (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Ramil Rapog y Castillo, Accused-appellant). — This is an appeal 1 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated 25 June 2019 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro Station (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01994-MIN. The CA affirmed the Judgment 3 dated 28 March 2018 of Branch 27, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, in Crim. Case No. 2017-6907.
Antecedents
Ramil Rapog (appellant) was indicted for Rape in an Information, the accusatory portion of which states:
That on May 30, 2017, at more or less 4:00 o'clock in the morning, in ____________________________________________, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously force and intimidate [AAA], 4 18 years old, single, and then forcibly committed sexual intercourse by forcibly inserting his penis to the vagina of [AAA] against her will.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 266-A, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 5
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. 6
Version of the Prosecution
On 30 May 2017, at around 4:00 a.m., while the victim, AAA, was sleeping beside her two (2) minor children, she was suddenly awakened when a then unknown person who was wearing only his underpants, held her feet and straddled her. AAA pushed her assailant away and shouted twice, "In Jesus' name, who are you?" At this point, her assailant covered AAA's mouth with his left hand, and with his right hand pressed a knife to the right side of her body, and uttered, "Don't move because if you move I will stab you." AAA then took hold of her mobile phone and managed to illuminate the face of the man straddling her for five (5) seconds. AAA recognized her assailant as the appellant, who then grabbed her mobile phone and threw it away. 7
Appellant commanded AAA to undress. When she did not, he removed her leggings and underwear with his left hand. With his right hand, appellant continued to press the knife to AAA's side. When AAA kicked the appellant, he pinned down her feet with his body. She did not shout because he threatened to stab her if she did. After removing his underpants, appellant inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina, the knife still pressed against her right side. When he has been done, appellant left. 8
At around 10:00 a.m. of the same day, AAA went to ________, ___________ to tell her live-in partner what appellant had done to her. The two then proceeded to the police station and lodged a complaint against the appellant. Consequently, appellant was arrested. AAA was likewise brought to the hospital to be examined. 9
During trial, AAA testified that she knew the appellant, as the latter worked at a quarry near their house. While she was in the porch of their house on 29 May 2017, the day before the incident, she noticed that appellant was staring at her, as he was engaged in a drinking spree in a nearby house. 10
Version of the Defense
Appellant admitted that on 29 May 2017, he was drinking with his friends from 4:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. As he was intoxicated, his brother brought him to the house of his friends where he slept and woke up at about 5:00 a.m. the following day. Later that day he was arrested because a relative filed a complaint against him for the theft of the latter's mobile phone. It was only when he was at the Prosecutor's Office that he learned that he was being charged for Rape. 11
Ruling of the RTC
On 28 March 2018, the RTC rendered its Judgment, 12 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, Ramil Rapog y Castillo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of [reclusion perpetua] and to pay [AAA] P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 [moral damages], 13 plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Judgment.
In the service of his sentence, the accused is hereby credited with the full time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment provided that he agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED. 14
The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of Rape. AAA's testimony was given full faith and credit, as it was straightforward, candid, and unflawed by inconsistencies in its material points. 15
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA. 16
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision 17 dated 25 June 2019, the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction pronounced by the RTC. The CA ruled that the prosecution succeeded in establishing all the elements of Rape. Appellant's defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail over AAA's positive and categorical testimony identifying him as her rapist. 18
Hence, this appeal.
For purposes of this appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General 19 and the Public Attorney's Office 20 manifested that they were no longer filing their respective supplemental briefs.
Issue
The issue is whether the CA correctly affirmed appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
To sustain a conviction of Rape, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the girl; and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation. 21
We find that the prosecution indubitably established the elements of Rape. AAA was awakened when appellant held her feet and straddled her. He covered AAA's mouth, pressed a knife against her side, and threatened to stab her if she shouted. Appellant, after removing AAA's leggings and underwear, inserted his penis inside her vagina, all the while pressing the knife against her side.
The defense of denial cannot be
This Court has, time and again, held that the assessment of a trial court in matters pertaining to the credibility of witnesses, especially when already affirmed by an appellate court on appeal, are accorded great respect — if not binding significance — on further appeal to this Court. 22 Such assessment is treated with respect, as the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor during trial. 23 Absent any substantial reason, the Court will not reverse the factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts. 24
Here, AAA positively identified appellant as the perpetrator of the Rape since she was able to shine her mobile phone light to his face. She recognized him because he worked at a quarry near their house. In addition, appellant's father is a friend of AAA's common-law husband. So there were times when AAA and her partner invited appellant to share a meal with them. 25
Appellant denied AAA's accusations and claimed that he was still asleep when the Rape occurred. Denial is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over private complainant's positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. It is viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of the accused. When unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, denial is negative self-serving evidence that cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on affirmative matters. 26
As pointed out by the RTC, appellant slept off his liquor in the house of his friends, which was only about 120 meters away from AAA's house. Hence, it was not physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of the incident. 27
The testimony of the victim is
Appellant contends that there were no marked changes in AAA's behavior since she acted as if nothing had happened when she saw him later that day. To him it was incredible that she did not accuse or denounce him or showed rage, revulsion, or disgust. He likewise considers AAA's failure to shout for help unnatural for a Rape victim. Finally, he claims that it was stated in the medico-legal certificate issued to AAA that there was no presence of spermatozoa in her vagina. This contradicts her testimony that there was semen from appellant's penis; 28 thus, negating the charge of Rape. 29
AAA's explanation as to why she acted as if nothing was amiss when she saw appellant was believable. She had to pretend in order that he would not get the idea of escaping before she was able to seek police assistance. 30 We agree with the CA's observation that her seemingly normal actions after the atrocious act done to her was brought about by her desire to bring appellant to justice. 31 If appellant was to have an inkling that she intended to go to the police, he could very well have escaped.
It should be remembered that appellant pressed a knife against AAA's side, threatening to stab her if she shouted. Thus, AAA's alleged failure to shout for help during the commission of the crime does not negate its commission. It is worth emphasizing that Rape victims react differently. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. There is no standard form of reaction for a woman when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. People react differently — some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may openly welcome the intrusion. But none of these reactions impair the credibility of a Rape victim. Lastly, failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victim's submission to the criminal acts of the accused. 32
Further, the fact that there was no spermatozoa in AAA's vaginal area does not rule out a finding of Rape. The presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial because the presence of spermatozoa is not an element of Rape, since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which constitutes the crime of Rape. Besides, the absence of the seminal fluid from the vagina could be due to a number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of the semen from the vagina, the acidity of the vagina, or simply the washing of the vagina after the sexual intercourse, 33 which AAA had done. 34
Worth noting is that both the RTC and the CA found AAA's testimony credible. Consequently, it became incumbent upon the appellant to present clear and persuasive reasons to persuade the Court to reverse their unanimous determination of her credibility as a witness in order to resolve the appeal his way. However, he did not discharge this burden. 35
Appellant employed force and
Appellant tries to discredit AAA's testimony by pointing out that if it he had indeed pressed a knife to her side, she should have sustained some form of injury from the knife. Yet, she did not even have a scratch.
The Court has ruled that the absence of physical injuries does not negate the Rape, and although medical results may not indicate physical abuse, Rape can still be established since medical findings or proof of injuries are not among the essential elements in the prosecution for Rape. 36
It is worth reiterating that appellant threatened to stab her if she shouted and used force by pinning her feet down with his body so that he could remove her leggings and underwear. Clearly, appellant employed force and intimidation upon AAA.
In Rape committed through force or intimidation, the force employed by the guilty party need not be irresistible. It is only necessary that such force is sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted. Similarly, intimidation should be evaluated in light of the victim's perception at the time of the commission of the crime. It is enough that it produced the fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher, some evil would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. Hence, what is important is that because of force and intimidation, the victim was made to submit to the will of the appellant, 37 as what happened in the instant case.
There is a need to modify the
The RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a), in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 38
However, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence, there is a need to modify the damages awarded since only civil indemnity and moral damages were awarded by the RTC. Thus, the Court further awards AAA with exemplary damages in the amount of Php75,000.00, in accordance with People v. Jugueta. 39 All damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of judgment until fully paid. 40
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.The Decision dated 25 June 2019 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro Station in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01994-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant RAMIL RAPOG y CASTILLO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ORDERED to pay AAA the following amounts: Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages, and Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until such amounts are fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 22-23; see Notice of Appeal dated 10 July 2019.
2.Id. at 5-21; penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Florencio M. Mamauag, Jr. of the Twenty-First (21st) Division, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro.
3. CA Rollo, pp. 32-40; penned by Presiding Judge Giovanni Alfred H. Navarro.
4. The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, including the names of her immediate family or household members, and the barangay and town of the incident, are withheld pursuant to SC Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015.
5.Rollo, p. 6.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 6, 12-14, 16.
8.Id. at 14-17.
9.Id. at 8.
10.Id. at 7.
11.Id. at 9.
12. CA rollo, pp. 32-40.
13.Id. at 39; The words "moral damages" were supplied because in the body of its Judgment, the RTC intended to award the same, thus — "In the present [case], the accused must pay [AAA] civil indemnity and moral damages."
14.Id.
15.Id. at 34, 38.
16.Id. at 5.
17.Rollo, pp. 5-21.
18.Id. at 11, 19-20.
19.Id. at 31-33.
20.Id. at 34-36.
21.See People v. Nievera, G.R. No. 242830, 28 August 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].
22.See People v. Bay-Od, G.R. No. 238176, 14 January 2019 [Per J. Peralta], citing People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 526 (2013), G.R. No. 200329, 05 June 2013 [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro].
23.See People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 229209, 12 February 2020 [Per J. Leonen].
24.See People v.XXX, G.R. No. 246194, 04 November 2020 [Per J. Hernando].
25.Rollo, p. 7.
26.Supra at note 24.
27. CA rollo, p. 38.
28.Id.
29.Rollo, pp. 26-27.
30.Id. at 19.
31.Id.
32.People v. XXX, G.R. No. 235662, 24 July 2019 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier], citing People v. Palanay, 805 Phil. 116, 124 (2017), G.R. No. 224583, 01 February 2017 [Per J. Velasco, Jr.].
33.People v. Manlolo, G.R. No. 227841, 19 August 2020 [Per J. J.C. Reyes, Jr.].
34. CA rollo, p. 33.
35.See People v. Domingo, 810 Phil. 1040 (2017), G.R. No. 225743, 07 June 2017 [Per J. Bersamin].
36.People v. Batalla, G.R. No. 234323, 07 January 2019 [Per J. Peralta], citing People v. Lagbo, 780 Phil. 834, 846 (2016), G.R. No. 207535, 10 February 2016 [Per J. Peralta].
37.People v. Galagati, 788 Phil. 670 (2016), G.R. No. 207231, 29 June 2016 [Per J. Peralta], citing People v. Flores, 423 Phil. 687, 698-699 (2001), G.R. No. 141782, 14 December 2001 [Per J. Panganiban].
38.People v. Talmesa, G.R. No. 240421, 16 November 2020 [Per J. Inting].
39.783 Phil. 806 (2016), G.R. No. 202124, 05 April 2016 [Per J. Peralta].
40.See People v. Agoncillo, 820 Phil. 1194 (2017), G.R. No. 229100, 20 November 2017 [Per J. Gesmundo].