People v. Ramos y Natividad

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 240422. June 30, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ROCKY RAMOS y NATIVIDAD, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 30, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 240422 (People of the Philippines v. Rocky Ramos y Natividad). — Before this Court is an appeal 1 filed by accused-appellant Rocky Ramos y Natividad (Ramos), assailing the Decision 2 dated February 26, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 02390, which affirmed his conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165. 3

The Facts

Ramos was charged for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 in an Information, 4 the accusatory portions of which state:

That on or about the 27th day of March 2013, in the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and without justifiable motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and distribute to poseur-buyer [IO1] Marlone Binwag one (1) transparent plastic sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride(shabu), a dangerous drug, weighing 0.02010 gram, without being authorized by law or permit from competent authority to sell or distribute the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

During his arraignment, Ramos, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 5 Following the termination of the pre-trial, trial on the merits then ensued. 6

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented Investigation Officer (IO) 1 Marlone Binwag (IO1 Binwag), IO1 Bobby Marcelino (IO1 Marcelino), IO2 Maria Melinda Panaguiton (IO2 Panaguiton), IO1 Rodito Lobaton, Jr. (IO1 Lobaton, Jr.), who are all agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Region VI, Forensic Chemist Adonis T. Abueva (FC Abueva), and barangay kagawad Regino Pasaje (Brgy. kagawad Pasaje), whose combined testimonies can be summarized in this wise:

On March 20, 2013, Atty. Ronnie U. Delicana (Atty. Delicana), Acting Regional Director of the PDEA Regional Office VI (RO VI), received a report from a confidential agent that a certain Rocky Ramos alias "RR" is engaged in selling illegal drugs at Kalye Broca, Barangay Sto. Rosario, Buenavista, Guimaras. 7 Acting on this information, Atty. Delicana organized a team headed by IO1 Binwag to conduct a casing and surveillance against the subject at the target area. 8 IO1 Binwag confirmed the location of the subject and the report relayed by their confidential agent. 9

On March 27, 2013, PDEA Deputy Regional Director Intelligence Agent 5 Joseph Theodore Atila (IA5 Atila), directed the team to conduct a buy-bust operation, where he designated IO1 Binwag as the poseur-buyer, and IO1 Marcelino as his back-up. 10 IA5 Atila handed to IO1 Binwag a P500.00 marked money with serial number QH109987, to purchase the dangerous drugs. 11

After the briefing, the team proceeded to the target area. 12 Thereat, IO1 Binwag and the confidential agent saw alias "RR" about to enter his house and they approached him. 13 The confidential agent introduced IO1 Binwag as a buyer to alias "RR," who then asked the buyer how much he will buy, to which he responded that he will buy P500.00 worth of shabu. 14 IO1 Binwag gave alias "RR" the marked money who, in return, handed him a small heat-sealed transparent sachet containing suspected shabu. 15 IO1 Binwag examined the contents of the plastic sachet and after confirming his suspicion, executed the pre-arranged signal to his back-up, IO1 Marcelino, who was situated 100 meters away, more or less, from where the sale took place. 16

When the transaction was consummated, the confidential agent slowly moved away, from which conduct, alias "RR" sensed that PDEA operatives were approaching, and thus he fled. 17 The PDEA operatives scoured the vicinity, but failed to catch him despite diligent efforts. 18 The chase caused a commotion which prompted the team to return to their office where IO1 Binwag marked the seized plastic sachet with "RR-BB," in reference to the subject "Rocky Ramos" and the operation undertaken, "buy-bust." 19

Moments later, the PDEA operatives went to the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor's Office for the inventory and photograph of the seized item, which they made in the presence of Brgy. Kagawad Pasaje, media representative Isidro Mondejar II (Mondejar II) and Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ronel Sustituya (Pros. Sustituya), 20 who all signed the Certificate of Inventory, 21 to attest to the same.

After the inventory, IO1 Binwag prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination 22 of the seized item, which he delivered, together with the subject specimen, to the PDEA RO VI laboratory service and received by FC Abueva. 23 FC Abueva subjected the specimen to qualitative examination and reduced his findings in Chemistry Report No. DD-001-13, 24 that produced a positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

On January 20, 2014, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras, Branch 65, issued a Warrant of Arrest 25 against Ramos, which led to his arrest on March 28, 2014. 26

Version of the Defense

The defense presented appellant himself, his brother Alvin Ramos (Alvin), and his uncle Edgar Natividad (Edgar), who narrated a different version of events in this manner:

Ramos denied the charge against him. 27 He claimed that he was living in Brgy. San Nicolas with his common-law spouse and children, situated 10 kilometers away, more or less, from Brgy. Sto. Rosario where the alleged buy-bust transpired. 28 As early as 5 o'clock every morning, he and his elder brother leave their homes to sell fish at the local market. 29 They would usually finish in an hour and go home by 6 o'clock in the morning. 30

On March 27, 2013, at around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, Edgar, who lived near his nephew, saw PDEA agents go to his nephew's house. 31 They kicked the door of the house, but it was locked. 32 They entered other houses in the area and asked for Ramos' whereabouts, but they failed to locate him. 33

On March 27, 2013 at around 6 o'clock in the evening, Ramos went with his brother to buy fish at the Iloilo fish port. 34 They returned to Guimaras at 5 o'clock in the morning of March 28, 2013. 35 Ramos had no knowledge that he was indicted for selling illegal drugs until he was arrested by the PDEA agents. 36

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC gave more credence on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which it found sufficient to establish the elements of the crime and the chain of custody of the seized drug. 37 It observed that IO1 Binwag gave a clear and detailed account of the buy-bust operation which transpired on March 27, 2013, 38 while Ramos merely offered denial and alibi which were, at best, uncorroborated and self-serving. 39 For this reason, the RTC convicted Ramos in its Decision dated July 5, 2016, the dispositive portion of which is quoted hereunder:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the court finds accused Rocky Ramos y Natividad GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165. He is sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a FINE of P500,000.00. The accused who is detained shall be credited in the service of his sentence. The item recovered from the accused is FORFEITED in favor of the government to be DESTROYED in accordance with the provisions of R.A. 9165.

SO ORDERED.40

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid ruling, Ramos appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

As earlier stated, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC which held Ramos guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. 41 The CA held that the prosecution duly established the elements of the crime, as well as the chain of custody of the corpus delicti. 42 Likewise, the CA brushed aside Ramos' alibi because he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis when the buy-bust occurred. 43 Hence, the CA affirmed his conviction in its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeal filed in this case is hereby DENIED. The assailed July 5, 2016 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Jordan, Guimaras is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.44

Unrelenting, Ramos filed a Notice of Appeal, which the CA granted in its Resolution dated June 7, 2018 and, consequently, ordered the elevation of the records of the instant case to this Court. 45

In a Resolution 46 dated September 5, 2018, the Court noted the records of the case forwarded by the CA and ordered the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, should they so desire, within 30 days from notice.

On November 16, 2018, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation 47 on behalf of the People, stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief because all of its contentions have been elaborated in the Appellee's Brief that it submitted to the CA. On December 11, 2018, Ramos, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), filed a similar Manifestation. 48

The Court now resolves the instant case.

In essence, the issue is whether the CA correctly upheld Ramos' conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which begs the question: did the prosecution prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling

Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 49 Considering that what is at stake here is no less than the liberty of the accused, the Court has meticulously and thoroughly reviewed and examined the records of the case, and finds that there is merit in the appeal.

R.A. 9165 was enacted as part of the government's effort to safeguard the integrity of our territory and the well-being of the citizens from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs. In line with this goal, the State actively pursues a campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances. 50 However, the right of the government to curb dangerous drugs should not transgress upon the accused's constitutional right to be presumed innocent until his/her guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. 51

Jurisprudence dictates that to secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the prosecution must establish the following: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment, 52 and (c) the existence of the corpus delicti. 53

In cases for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering two (2) crucial points: first, the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime, 54 which has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime was actually committed; 55 and second, narcotic substances are not readily identifiable, which makes them highly susceptible to alteration, tampering, or contamination. 56

"The existence of the corpus delicti heavily relies on whether the identity and integrity of the confiscated drug itself was shown to have been preserved." 57 Thus, "the only way by which the State could lay the foundation of the corpus delicti is to establish beyond reasonable doubt the illegal sale or illegal possession of the dangerous drug by preserving the identity of the drug offered as evidence against the accused." 58 This requirement is complied with by ensuring that the custody of the seized drug from the time of confiscation until presentation in court is safeguarded under what is referred to as the chain of custody by R.A. 9165, whose objective is to remove unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence. 59

As a means to establish the chain of custody, the Court, in People v. Hementiza, 60 summarized the links in the chain of custody that must be established by the prosecution: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.

It is worth noting that in cases involving sale of dangerous drugs, life imprisonment to death await violators. Thus, to eradicate wrongful arrests and, worse, convictions, safeguards against abuses of power in the conduct of drug-related arrests must be strictly implemented. 61

In this accord, the Court held in People v. Holgado62 that the miniscule amount of narcotics underscores the need for more exacting compliance with the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of R.A. 9165 since "the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives." 63 In Filipinas Pimentel v. People, 64 the Court cautioned the "[c]ourts [to] meticulously consider the factual intricacies of each buy-bust case covered by the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act."

Here, the quantity of shabu involved in this case amounted to only 0.02010 gram, a quantity which is so miniscule that it can be compared to one (1) long grain of rice packed in a small plastic sachet. 65 Hence, the Court has every reason to carefully scrutinize whether the law enforcers complied with the procedures outlined by the law.

After a judicious scrutiny of the records of the case, the Court is constrained to grant the appeal because the prosecution failed to establish the existence of the corpus delicti owing to the unexplained gaps in the first and fourth links in the chain of custody.

I. None of the witnesses required by

Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items after they have been seized. 66 It is the starting point in the custodial link. 67 The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they were seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, obviating, switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. 68

On this note, law enforcement agencies should continually be reminded of the chain of custody rule embodied in Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165, which states:

Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia Laboratory Equipment. —

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. 69

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165 provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

Stated simply, the foregoing provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of: (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel; (b) an elected public official; (c) a representative from the media; and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination. 70

Notably, Section 21 of R.A. 9165 was amended by R.A. 10640 71 on July 15, 2014, which prescribes that the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items shall be made in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, plus two (2) other witnesses, particularly, (1) an elected public official, and (2) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media. 72 Proponents of the amendment recognized that the strict implementation of the original Section 21 of R.A. 9165 could be impracticable for the law enforcers' compliance, and that the stringent requirements could unduly hamper their activities towards drug eradication. 73

In the case at bench, the Information charges Ramos of allegedly committing the crime on March 27, 2013, or prior to the effectivity of the amendatory R.A. 10640. Consequently, the Court is bound to evaluate the apprehending officers' compliance with the chain of custody requirement in accordance with Section 21 of R.A. 9165. Hence, the suspected drug should be physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused or person/s from whom the items were seized and confiscated, or his representative or counsel, and in the presence of the following witnesses: (a) a representative from the media; (b) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (c) any elected public official.

Jurisprudence 74 has recognized that while a buy-bust operation can indeed enable authorities to uncover illicit transactions otherwise kept under wraps, such an operation poses a significant drawback — that is, it is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. As a matter of fact, the Court, in the recent case of People v. Serabo, 75 even declared that "it is a matter of judicial notice that entrapment operations, which are the usual means of apprehending violators of the dangerous drugs law, are susceptible to police abuse."

Considering the notoriety of buy-bust operations as possible tools for extortion, and the seeming habit of "calling in" witnesses, the Court has already taken steps to untangle confusions on this point. 76 In Ma. Carmen Rosario Abilla v. People, 77 the Court categorically clarified that the requirement under Section 21 (1) of R.A. 9165 for the apprehending team to conduct an inventory and photograph of the item immediately after seizure and confiscation in the presence of certain witnesses, should be interpreted to mean that [the] witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension. They may also be near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation. 78 The reason is simple: it is at the time of arrest — or at the time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" — that the presence of the [witnesses] is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would insulate against the police practice of planting evidence. 79 In the recent case of People v. Ely Policarpio, 80 the Court stressed that the presence of these persons will guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame up." They are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."

Scouring over the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish that any witness was at or near the area, to confirm whether the sale between Ramos and IO1 Binwag transpired. The records bear that only Brgy. kagawad Pasaje testified where he revealed that he did not witness the actual arrest and seizure of the contraband. He was only called to come to the place of inventory after the purported buy-bust operation was over, as can be gleaned from his testimony:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, do you recall having been requested to be a witness in the conduct of the inventory by the PDEA relative to the case against a certain Rocky Ramos?

A: Yes, sir. 81

Q: Who approached you to act as a witness?

A: The PDEA officer who called me in our barangay because they need a barangay official. 82

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Where did you go?

A: At the PDEA office. 83

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, what did you notice during the conduct of the inventory. Please tell us what did you notice or observe?

A: In the inventory, sir, I only saw one sachet of shabu. 84

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you reached the PDEA office at Regional Office VI and you said you saw the item, one (1) sachet. Was it already marked?

A: Yes, sir. 85

The testimony of IO1 Lobaton, Jr., even highlights the lapse on the part of the arresting officers for they secured the witnesses only at the Prosecutor's Office before filing the charge, and when the evidence against appellant was already marked, thus:

Q: At that time before it was brought to the Prosecutor's Office in Iloilo City, you did not document that by taking picture?

A: No, sir. 86

Q: So, only at the PDEA Region VI?

A: Yes, sir during the marking. 87

Q: At the PDEA?

A: Yes, sir. 88

xxx xxx xxx

Q: No more inventory done at the Prosecutor's Office?

A: The inventory was done at the Prosecutor's Office, sir. 89

Q: x x x So there was no inventory done at the Region VI of PDEA?

A: No, sir. 90

Q: Why [did] the inventory and the marking [take] place at two (2) different places and not at the PDEA office?

A: Because during that time we cannot gather three (3) witnesses so we decided to go to the Prosecutor's office.91

Q: Is it not that the witnesses will witness also the marking. Is it not?

A: Yes, sir.92

Q: And the marking and the inventory will be done at the same time?

A: During the inventory[,] the witnesses were completed at the Prosecutor's office. 93

Q: While in the PDEA Region VI when you photographed the marking, there were no other witnesses, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.94

IO1 Lobaton Jr.'s testimony evidently shows that the witnesses required by law were merely called-in at the Prosecutor's Office to witness the inventory. The PDEA agents may have given a justification as to the necessity of immediately leaving the place of arrest and conducting the inventory at their office, i.e., for security purposes. However, no explanation was given why they called up the required witnesses only at the Prosecutor's Office, after the alleged buy-bust operation.

In People v. Marlon Bob Caraniagan Sanico, 95 the Court emphasized that the practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the representative of the DOJ, the media representative, and the elected public official, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the police station to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs. In this regard, the Court in People v. Jomar Castillo, 96 held that "far from a passive gesture, the attendance of third-party witnesses ensures the identity, origin and integrity of the items seized." 97

Lamentably, IO1 Lobaton Jr.'s testimony also revealed that the item allegedly seized from appellant was already marked when the said witnesses arrived at the Prosecutor's Office. In People v. Baura98(Baura), the Court was confronted with a similar situation where the PDEA intelligence officer who acted as the poseur-buyer admitted that the marking of the alleged seized specimen was done at the PDEA Office and the three (3) witnesses were summoned only after the marking of the alleged seized specimen was completed. In Baura, the Court acquitted the appellant since "the non-presence of the witnesses during the marking of the subject evidence puts into doubt the identity of the allegedly retrieved drug specimen."

Clearly, the fact that only the arresting officers were present during the apprehension of accused-appellant is enough to raise concerns. 99 In such an environment, police impunity becomes inherent. To state the obvious, assuming arguendo that there was indeed evidence planted, it would be virtually impossible for accused-appellant — or any accused placed in a similar plight — to overcome the oft-favored testimony of police officers through mere denial. The Court considers the virtual impossibility for any accused to prove his claim that the evidence against him was planted in such apprehension where only he and the police officers were present. 100 This is further aggravated by the known fact that entrapment procedures are inevitably shrouded with secrecy and cunningness to ensure the success of the operation. 101

To recapitulate, the presence of the three (3) insulating witnesses must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest, such that they are required to be at, or at least, near the intended place of the arrest, and accordingly be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized items "immediately after seizure and confiscation." 102 In other words, in case of warrantless seizures, while the physical inventory and photographing is allowed to be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable," this does not dispense with the requirement of having these witnesses to be physically present at the time of apprehension. 103 They are necessary in order to fortify the links in the chain of custody as it prevents any lingering doubt that the evidence gathered from the buy-bust operation was merely planted. 104 This is the necessary interpretation of Section 21 if the purpose of the law, which is to insulate the accused from abuse, is to be achieved. 105

As a rule, strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is mandatory. 106 The reason for this was explained in People v. Gabunada, 107 where the Court held that these considerations anent the witness requirement "arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and, consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand, knowing fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule."

This Court sees no difficulty in, at least, trying to secure the presence of the witnesses during the buy-bust operation, considering that they had one (1) week from March 20, 2013, when they conducted their casing and surveillance, until the day of the alleged buy-bust on March 27, 2013. Compliance should not be an afterthought, but made part of the planning stage as far as it is practicable. To do otherwise is to leave more questions than answers, as in this case. 108

Meanwhile, apart from the three (3) insulating witnesses, Section 21 requires that the physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs by the apprehending team immediately after confiscation and seizure be likewise made in the presence of "the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel." 109 Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items — to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain, and are eventually the ones offered in evidence — should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation. 110

Here, the marking and inventory of the alleged seized item were not made in the presence of Ramos due to the fact that he allegedly escaped after the buy-bust. From the prosecution's narration, he successfully evaded arrest despite the efforts of the buy-bust team to apprehend him. He remained at-large until his subsequent apprehension on March 28, 2014, by virtue of a warrant of arrest.

In People v. Adobar, 111 the Court construed the flight of an accused during the buy-bust as a waiver of his right to be present during the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs allegedly seized from him. The prosecution cannot be burdened by the accused's escape provided that reasonable efforts were made to apprehend him, as what appears in the present case. The buy-bust team cannot be reasonably expected to secure the presence of the accused's representative or counsel at the time of confiscation and during the buy-bust operation, considering the clandestine nature of such operations. In the same vein, after such escape, it should be difficult, if not impossible, for the buy-bust team to find a counsel or representative for the accused before the initial custody requirements which Section 21 mandates to be performed "immediately after" the confiscation.

As such, the prosecution is excused from complying with the requirement of Section 21 as to the presence of the accused during the initial custody requirements, i.e., physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs. However, it is not excused as to the presence of the three (3) insulating witnesses, i.e., the DOJ and media representative and elected public official. The buy-bust team must still secure the presence of these insulating witnesses, and the prosecution must still prove such presence, not only during the inventory and photographing, but likewise at the time of, and at, or near the intended place of confiscation and seizure of the subject drugs. 112

For failing to observe the witness requirement, the identity and integrity of the drug allegedly recovered from Ramos had been compromised at the initial stage of the operations. Establishing the very first link of the chain is crucial, because "subsequent precaution and safeguards observed would be rendered inutile if in the first place there is doubt as to whether the drugs presented in court were in fact recovered from the accused." 113 The inevitable consequence of this failure is that — "there was already a significant break such that there can be no assurance against switching, planting, or contamination." 114 Because of this glaring omission, the Court cannot conclude with moral certainty that the transaction actually happened, as the source of the dangerous drugs had become highly uncertain. 115 A reasonable hypothesis that the source of the dangerous drugs was from someone else other than the appellant is not far-fetched and cannot be ignored. 116

In Filipinas Pimentel v. People, 117 the Court declared that "[t]he absence of the required third-party witnesses during the actual arrest and seizure creates a gap in the chain of custody, producing doubt on the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation and the identity of the seized illicit drug."

II. The forensic chemist failed to

The fourth link refers to the turnover and submission of the dangerous drug from the forensic chemist to the court. 118 To establish the fourth link of the chain, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show compliance with the following requisites:

First, how the forensic chemist handled and analyzed the dangerous drug submitted for examination; 119 and

Second, how the dangerous drugs were handled, stored, and safeguarded pending its presentation in Court. 120

To satisfy this requirement, FC Abueva should have testified or stipulated precisely the manner how he preserved the specimen intact. To be exact, the prosecution failed to provide the following important details in order to establish the links to preserve the identity and integrity of the seized illegal drug: (a) the place where the specimen was kept after the qualitative examination; (b) the possibility of other people having access to the specimen; and (c) the complete details on the handling of the specimen at the Prosecutor's Office when it was presented by FC Abueva, such as the name of the person who received the specimen, the status of the specimen upon receipt at the Prosecutor's Office, and the duration the specimen was left at the Prosecutor's Office. 121

Regrettably, FC Abueva's testimony was simply confined to the results of his qualitative examination on the subject specimen. Moreover, he also failed to identify the person to whom he gave the specimens after examination, and what precautions were taken by such person to ensure that there was no change in the condition of the seized evidence and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession thereof. Simply put, the prosecution failed to present any testimonial or documentary evidence on how the evidence was stored and preserved after its examination and pending its presentation in court.

In the recent case of People v. Sorrera, 122 this Court held that absent any testimony on the management, storage, and preservation of the illegal drugs allegedly seized after their qualitative examination, the fourth link in the chain of custody could not be reasonably established. Similarly, the Court in People v. Durado, 123 held that the prosecution failed to establish the fourth link in the chain of custody, when it failed to provide details as to who the evidence custodian was and how the items were handled by the said custodian. Without any proof of how the items were handled from the forensic chemist to the trial court, the prosecution failed to prove the fourth link in the chain of custody. 124

As it stands, there was incomplete and unjustified non-compliance with the chain of custody rule. Lamentably, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify or explain, the arresting officers' deviation from the procedure mandated by law. The prosecution's failure to offer any justifiable reason for its non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. 9165 resulted in a substantial gap in the chain of custody which placed the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item[s] in question. 125

In People v. Que, 126 the Court emphasized that "failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implie[s] a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti." Consequently, the Court, in People v. Luna, 127 held that "considering that the State left the lapses of the [arresting] officers unacknowledged and unexplained, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised, thereby creating reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant for the crimes charged. Hence, his acquittal must follow without delay."

The Court is well aware that a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve and so it has previously ruled that minor procedural lapses or deviations from the prescribed chain of custody may be condoned provided that the arresting or apprehending officers are able to justify their failure to comply with the same. 128 It must be alleged that they put in their best effort to ensure compliance but were prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond their control. The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact. 129 The prosecution cannot simply invoke the saving clause found in Section 21 — that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved — without justifying its failure to comply with the requirements stated therein. 130 Even the presumption as to regularity in the performance by the police officers of their official duties cannot prevail when there has been a clear and deliberate disregard of procedural safeguards by the police officers themselves. 131

Judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law is fundamentally flawed because the lapses themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity. 132 The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally-enshrined right to be presumed innocent. 133

In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In order to convict an accused, the circumstances of the case must exclude all and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused. What is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime. It is only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has indeed been committed by the person on trial that the judgment will be for conviction. 134

If doubt surfaces on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, regardless that it does only at the stage of an appeal, our courts of justice should nonetheless rule in favor of the accused, lest it betray its duty to protect individual liberties within the bounds of law.135 The Court, on various occasions, has reversed judgments rendered by lower courts and set an accused free on the basis of unexplained gaps and lapses in the chain of custody, primarily those pertaining or related to the handling of the seized drugs. 136 Any indicium of doubt in the evidence of the prosecution that puts into question the fundamental principle of credibility and integrity of the corpus delicti makes an acquittal a matter of course. 137

The law, being a creature of justice, is blind towards both the guilty and the innocent. The Court, as justice incarnate, must then be relentless in exacting the standards laid down by our laws — in fact, the Court can do no less. For when the fundamental rights of life and liberty are already hanging in the balance, it is the Court that must, at the risk of letting the guilty go unpunished, remain unforgiving in its calling. And if the guilty does go unpunished, then that is on the police and the prosecution — that is for them to explain to the People. 138

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 02390, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Rocky Ramos y Natividad is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to cause his IMMEDIATE RELEASE, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to INFORM this Court of the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Copies shall also be furnished to the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for his information.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED." (Rosario, J, designated additional member per Special Order No. 2833).

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, p. 17.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos (retired member of this Court), with Associate Justices Edward B. Contreras and Louis P. Acosta, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 4-16.

3. The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

4. Records, p. 1.

5.Id. at 36.

6. CA rollo, p. 5.

7.Id.

8.Id.

9.Id.

10.Id. at 6.

11.Id.

12.Id.

13.Id.

14.Id.

15.Id.

16.Id.

17.Id.

18.Id.

19.Id. at 7.

20.Id.

21. Records, p. 13.

22.Id. at 14.

23. CA rollo, p. 7.

24. Records, p. 15.

25.Id. at 20.

26. CA rollo, p. 8.

27.Id.

28.Id.

29.Id.

30.Id.

31.Id. at 11.

32.Id. at 10.

33.Id.

34.Id.

35. Records, p. 217.

36.Id.

37.See Decision dated July 5, 2016, penned by Honorable Presiding Judge Rosario Abigail M. Dris-Villanueva; id. at 217-220.

38.Id. at 217.

39.Id. at 218.

40.Id. at 220. (Emphasis in the original).

41.Rollo, pp. 4-16.

42.Id. at 13.

43.Id. at 14.

44.Id. at 16. (Emphasis in the original).

45.Id. at 23.

46.Id.

47.Id. at 25-26.

48.Id. at 28-29.

49.People v. Gatlabayan, 669 Phil. 240, 251 (2011).

50.People v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 223718, (Minute Resolution), June 17, 2020.

51.Id.

52.People v. Abbas, G.R. No. 248333, September 8, 2020.

53.People v. Narca, G.R. No. 196533 (Minute Resolution), October 5, 2015.

54.People v. Laroga, G.R. No. 238999, January 29, 2020, citing Fuentes v. People, G.R. No. 228718, January 7, 2019.

55.Id., citing People v. Peromingan, G.R. No. 218401, September 24, 2018.

56.People v. Palao, G.R. No. 219890, January 12, 2021, citing People v. Jaafar, 803 Phil. 582 (2017).

57.People v. Narca, supra note 53.

58.People v. Nepomuceno, G.R. No. 216062, September 19, 2018.

59.People v. Angngao, 755 Phil. 597, 604-605 (2015), citing Mallillin v. People, 576 Phil. 576, 587 (2008).

60. 807 Phil. 1017 (2017).

61.People v. Borromeo, G.R. No. 245251 (Minute Resolution), December 5, 2019.

62. 741 Phil. 78, 81 (2014).

63.Id. at 92, citing Mallillin v. People, 576 Phil. 576 (2008).

64. G.R. No. 239772, January 29, 2020. (Emphasis ours).

65. See People v. Soria, G.R. No. 246462 (Minute Resolution), June 29, 2020. A single grain of rice weighs an average of 0.029 gram. [Lifted from https://shigen.nig.ac.jp/rice/oryzabase/asset/rgn/vol5/v5VI33.html.] In People v. Soria, the quantity of the drug involved amounts to 0.052 gram.

66.People v. Abella, 834 Phil. 511, 534 (2018).

67.Id.

68.Id.

69. Emphases ours.

70.People v. Bryan Deliña, G.R. No. 243578, June 30, 2020.

71.An Act to Further Strengthen the Anti-Drug Campaign of the Government, Amending for the Purpose Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, Otherwise Known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

72.Jose Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 227217, February 12, 2020.

73.Id.

74.People v. Saragena, 817 Phil. 117, 138 (2017), citing People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 226 (2015).

75. G.R. No. 244171 (Minute Resolution), January 6, 2020. (Emphasis supplied).

76.Michael Tañamor v. People, G.R. No. 228132, March 11, 2020.

77. G.R. No. 227676, April 3, 2019. (Emphasis supplied).

78.People v. Tomawis, 830 Phil. 385, 409 (2018).

79. G.R. No. 227676, April 3, 2019. (Emphasis supplied).

80. G.R. No. 227868, January 20, 2021, citing People v. Federico Seneres, Jr., G.R. No. 231008, November 5, 2018.

81. TSN, July 13, 2015, p. 4.

82.Id.

83.Id. at 5.

84.Id.

85.Id. at 10.

86. TSN, June 22, 2015, p. 11.

87.Id.

88.Id.

89.Id.

90.Id. at 12.

91.Id. (Emphasis supplied).

92.Id. (Emphasis supplied).

93.Id.

94.Id. (Emphasis supplied).

95. G.R. No. 240431, July 7, 2020.

96. G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019.

97.Michael Tañamor v. People, supra note 76, citing People v. Castillo, supra.

98. G.R. No. 237689 (Minute Resolution), January 8, 2020.

99.People v. Luna, 828 Phil. 671, 692 (2018), citing People v. Tan, 401 Phil. 259, 273 (2000).

100.People v. Serabo, supra note 75.

101.People v. Luna, supra note 99.

102.People v. Khaled Firdaus Abbas, G.R. No. 248333, September 8, 2020, citing People v. Luna, supra note 98.

103.People v. Luna, supra note 99.

104.Luzviminda Llamado v. People, G.R. No. 243375, June 30, 2020, citing People v. Jagdon, G.R. No. 234648, March 27, 2019.

105.People v. Khaled Firdaus Abbas, supra note 102.

106.People v. Luna, supra note 99, at 686, citing People v. Cayas, 789 Phil. 70, 79 (2016); see also People v. Havana, 776 Phil. 462, 475 (2016).

107. G.R. No. 242827, September 9, 2019, as cited in Sayson v. People, G.R. No. 249289, September 28, 2020.

108.People v. Khaled Firdaus Abbas, supra note 102.

109.People v. Adobar, 832 Phil. 731, 759 (2018).

110.People v. Obrero, G.R. No. 236835 (Minute Resolution), September 14, 2020.

111.Supra note 109.

112.Id.

113.Luzviminda Llamado v. People, G.R. No. 243375, June 30, 2020, citing People v. Jagdon, G.R. No. 234648, March 27, 2019.

114.People v. Villarta, 828 Phil. 259, 283 (2018) citing People v. Ismael, 806 Phil. 21, 34 (2017). (Emphasis supplied).

115.People v. Metakur Abdula, G.R. No. 212192, November 21, 2018.

116.Id.

117. G.R. No. 239772, January 29, 2020. (Emphasis supplied).

118.People v. Mike Omamos, G.R. No. 223036, July 10, 2019.

119.Id.

120.People v. Plaza, G.R. No. 235467, August 20, 2018.

121.People v. Soria, G.R. No. 246462, (Resolution), June 29, 2020.

122. G.R. No. 251110 (Minute Resolution), February 3, 2021.

123. G.R. No. 244258 (Minute Resolution), February 19, 2020.

124.Id.

125.Edangelino v. People, G.R. No. 235110, January 8, 2020.

126. 824 Phil. 882, 895 (2018), citing People v. Morales, 630 Phil. 215, 236 (2010). (Emphasis supplied).

127.Supra note 99, at 699-700. (Emphasis supplied).

128.People v. Peña, G.R. No. 233750, June 10, 2019.

129.Id. (Emphasis in the original).

130.Id.

131.Id.

132.Edangelino v. People, supra note 125.

133.Id.

134.People v. Gatlabayan, supra note 49, at 260.

135.People v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 230721, October 15, 2018. (Emphasis supplied).

136.People v. Peña, supra note 128.

137.Id.

138.People v. Luna, supra note 99, at 700.