ADVERTISEMENT
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 229735. March 4, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.LUIS RAMON a.k.a. "CHITO" P. LORENZO, JR., JOCELYN a.k.a. "JOC-JOC" I. BOLANTE, IBARRA TRINIDAD C. POLIQUIT, JAIME L. PAULE, MARILYN U. ARAOS, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA, MARITES AYTONA, LEONICIA MARCO-LLARENA, * JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 04 March 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 229735 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, versusLUIS RAMON a.k.a. "CHITO" P. LORENZO, JR., JOCELYN a.k.a. "JOC-JOC" I. BOLANTE, IBARRA TRINIDAD C. POLIQUIT, JAIME L. PAULE, MARILYN U. ARAOS, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA, MARITES AYTONA, LEONICIA MARCO-LLARENA, JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, respondents.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) assailing the following Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan 2 (SB) in Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0260: (1) Resolution 3 dated November 28, 2016 (assailed Issuance), 4 granting the motions filed by the accused and ordering the Information against the accused dismissed for lack of probable cause; and (2) Resolution 5 dated February 6, 2017 (assailed Resolution), 6 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.
The case stemmed from the anomalous implementation of the Farm Input and Farm Implementing Funding (FIFIF) component of the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (GMA) Program of the Department of Agriculture, the supposed flagship program in agriculture under the Arroyo administration. It involved the anomalous disbursement of the colossal amount of P728 million purportedly for the purchase and distribution of liquid fertilizers and other farm inputs and implements. This came to be known as the Fertilizer Fund Scam.
After preliminary investigation of the complaints filed by the Task Force Abono of the Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), including the complaint filed against respondents, the OMB Special Panel of Investigators issued a Joint Resolution dated March 18, 2011, finding probable cause against respondents, as well as against Jose F. Barredo (Barredo), for the crime of plunder in conspiracy with one another. All of them were indicted in an Information for the crime of plunder on April 7, 2011, docketed by the SB as Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0260.
On August 15, 2014, the SB issued a Resolution finding no probable cause against respondents and Barredo. Petitioner was given a period of 60 days to present additional evidence showing that accused/respondent Jocelyn "Joc-Joc" Bolante (Bolante), by himself or with the help of his co-accused, amassed, accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least P50 Million.
On March 12, 2015, petitioner filed a motion with leave of court to admit the Amended Information dated December 22, 2014 and excluding Barredo as one of the accused therefrom, and attached thereto Barredo's Judicial Affidavit dated December 5, 2014. In its Resolution dated July 21, 2016, the SB admitted the Amended Information. aScITE
Subsequently, respondent Luis Ramon P. Lorenzo, Jr. (Lorenzo) assailed the July 21, 2016 Resolution by filing a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash or Dismiss the Case, followed by respondents Bolante and Ibarra Trinidad Poliquit's (Poliquit) Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss and respondent Joselito Flordeliza's (Flordeliza) Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner filed a consolidated Comment or Opposition. Respondent Leonicia Marco-Llarena then filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with a Motion to Quash, and petitioner filed a Comment.
In its first issuance denominated as "Minutes of the proceedings held on November 28, 2016," the SB denied the foregoing motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, insofar as the admission of the Amended Information was concerned. In the second issuance denominated as "Minutes of the proceedings held on November 28, 2016," which is the assailed Issuance herein, the SB dismissed the Amended Information for lack of probable cause.
On December 27, 2016, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 23, 2016, which was denied by the SB in a Resolution dated February 6, 2017, which is the assailed Resolution herein.
Hence this Petition. Respondent Lorenzo filed a Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari7 dated October 17, 2017. Respondents Bolante and Poliquit filed a Comment to the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 dated October 19, 2017. Respondent Flordeliza filed a Comment9 dated November 8, 2017.
Issue
The singular issue, as framed by the Petition itself, is whether the SB gravely erred and decided a question of substance in a manner not in accord with law and jurisprudence by applying a higher quantum of proof — prima facie evidence and/or evidence needed to hold an accused accountable or liable, which is akin to, if not the same as, proof beyond reasonable doubt — during the stage of judicial determination of probable cause for the purpose of the issuance of warrants of arrest against respondents, when the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly require only probable cause, and that based on the records, there is probable cause against respondents; thus, SB gravely erred in dismissing Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0260 instead of issuing warrants of arrest against respondents. 10
The Court's Ruling
Section 5, Rule 112 11 of the Rules, which sets forth the duty of the judge in determining probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant, is circumscribed by Section 2, Article III 12 of the Constitution. The SB did not err in its application and interpretation of these sections of the Rules and the Constitution.
The evidence that "clearly" establishes probable cause to justify the filing of an information against an accused is the same evidence that is sufficient to establish a prima facie case; and a prima facie case necessarily rests on prima facie evidence. The quantum of proof that establishes probable cause and a prima facie case is congruent. Since probable cause is required for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, the judge is bound by the same — not lesser — quantum of proof for the filing of an information.
Based on Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules, probable cause is established when there is "sufficient [evidence or] ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." On the other hand, prima facie evidence has been defined as that "sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted" 13 and a prima facie case is a "cause of action or defense that is sufficiently established by a party's evidence to justify a verdict in his or her favor, provided such evidence is not rebutted by the other party." 14 Under then Act No. 190, 15prima facie evidence is that which suffices for the proof of a particular fact, until contradicted and overcome by other evidence. 16
The issue posed by petitioner is not novel. A similar issue, whether the existence of "probable cause" requires a lesser quantum of proof than a prima facie case, was raised before the Court of Appeals (CA) in the 1977 case of Crisostomo v. Pamaran17(Crisostomo). The CA clarified therein that there was no difference between the existence of probable cause and a prima facie case in light of the requirement under then Presidential Decree No. (PD) 77 18 and PD 911 19 that if a prima facie case was established by the evidence, the investigating fiscal or state prosecutor should immediately file the corresponding information in court; and if he found that there was no prima facie case, he should dismiss the case unless he believed there were matters to be clarified in which case he was allowed to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses. The CA acknowledged in Crisostomo that the two terms "probable cause" and "prima facie case" may be considered synonymous and have been used interchangeably for purposes of preliminary investigation, viz.: aDSIHc
We are not cited to any authority which distinguishes the existence of probable cause, and that of a prima facie case, for purposes of preliminary investigation. It is a matter of common knowledge that the two terms have been used interchangeably, with no significant distinction. Loosely speaking, as has been the reference to either or both of the terms, they may be considered synonymous. At least, that has been the obvious intention of both rules and statutes prescribing the procedure of preliminary investigation. x x x. 20
Even prior thereto, the Court, in the 1958 case of Zulueta v. Nicolas, 21 in agreeing with the fiscal's dismissal of the libel complaint on the finding that there was no prima facie case, reasoned that:
x x x Refusal of the fiscal to prosecute when after an investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is not a refusal, without just cause, to perform an official duty. The fiscal has for sure the legal duty to prosecute crimes where there is enough evidence to justify such action. But it is equally his duty not to prosecute when after an investigation he has become convinced that the evidence available is not enough to establish a prima facie case. x x x 22
In the 1985 case of Salonga v. Paño, 23 the Court clarified that the term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction; 24 and in a preliminary investigation, it is imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. 25
The Court in Sales v. Sandiganbayan26 used both terms ("probable cause" and "prima facie case") in its explanation of the nature and purpose of preliminary investigation. In Miller v. Perez, 27 the Court reiterated that, to establish probable cause, only prima facie evidence is required or that which is, on its face and unrebutted or contradicted, sufficient to establish a party's claim.
Given the consistency of the jurisprudence cited above, it is axiomatic that the evidence that establishes probable cause can and does, as well, establish a prima facie case. The perceived dichotomy between probable cause and prima facie case is, thus, more imagined than real.
While the above pronouncements have been made in connection with the preliminary investigation of the prosecutor or fiscal for the filing of a criminal information (or executive determination of probable cause), there is no compelling reason to deviate therefrom with respect to the determination of probable cause by the judge for the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or judicial determination of probable cause). The Court has employed the two terms synonymously in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the issuance of an arrest warrant. In the 1956 case of Amarga v. Abbas, 28 the Court acknowledged that the issuance of the warrant of arrest is prima facie evidence that, in the judgment of the judge or magistrate at least, there existed "probable cause" for believing that the person against whom the warrant is issued is guilty of the crime charged.
Based on the foregoing, the quantum of proof to establish probable cause and a prima facie case for purposes of issuance of an arrest warrant and for preliminary investigation are one and the same. The evidence that is sufficient for the latter is not greater than the evidence required for the former. Neither is the evidence required for the former lesser than the evidence required for the latter. Thus, as culled from the above-cited jurisprudence, if the evidence on record does not clearly establish probable cause to form a well-grounded belief that a crime has been committed, the elements thereof being present, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, or, stated otherwise, it is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case against the accused, then the imperative is for the prosecutor or the judge to relieve the accused from the pain of going through trial. Conversely, if the finding by the prosecutor or the judge is that the evidence on record sufficiently establishes a prima facie case or probable cause against the accused, the accused should be indicted and held for trial. However, as emphasized by the Court in the above-cited cases, the required evidence in either (probable cause or prima facie case) is definitely less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. ETHIDa
Manifestly, the usage by the SB of the terms "prima facie" and "prima facie showing" has been within the ambit of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants. Indeed, when, as determined by the SB, the evidence on record clearly or on the face failed to establish probable cause, it was justified in not issuing warrants of arrest against respondents, and in dismissing the Amended Information against them. Thus, the Court totally agrees with the SB's opinion expressed in the assailed Resolution that "the reckoning must be, at the very least, prima facie evidence for, if the test is anything lower than mere prima facie, the court could never arrive at that state of being convinced that the evidence on record does not clearly establish probable cause." 29
Given the foregoing, together with the SB's pronouncement that "[f]or a final resolution on the issue of probable cause, [it] took the liberty of going back to the contentions of the parties as contained in their motions for reconsideration of the [August 15, 2014] 30 Resolution" and its finding that:
However, no material participation, other than the release of the funds, could be shown to be attributable to accused Bolante. What was merely showed was that the ill-gotten wealth went to the local officials of the local government units or to certain persons in the regional offices of the DA. What was further shown were funds going into the implementing NGO (NOAEPI), and ending up in the bank account of the fertilizer supplier (FESHAN), to be later withdrawn by accused Araos. Even bank account documents reveal that the checks signed by Araos drawn against FESHAN account were made payable to a private individual. Not one check was made to the public officials. 31
the affirmation of the SB's dismissal of the case is in order.
While the Court acknowledges that the Filipino people have suffered the huge amount of P728 million, which could have been used to build schools, hospitals, roads, bridges and other infrastructures and would have directly impacted on their day-to-day plight, it is apparent that there was a failure on the part of the OMB to gather and present the required evidence to convince the SB of the presence of probable cause to indict the respondents for the crime of plunder, despite the OMB having been given a second chance to fortify its evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated November 28, 2016 and February 6, 2017 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-11-CRM-0260 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (PERLAS-BERNABE, J., on wellness leave)"
Very truly yours,
MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of CourtBy:(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Also referred to as "Leoncia Marco-Llanera" in some parts of the rollo.
1.Rollo, pp. 70-105, excluding Annexes.
2. Special Second Division.
3.Id. at 23-45. Approved by Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires (former Member of this Court), Chairperson, Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg.
4. Per petitioner's definition. See Petition, rollo, p. 78.
5.Rollo, pp. 61-68. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires (former Member of this Court) with Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg concurring.
6. Per petitioner's definition. See Petition, rollo, p. 80.
7.Rollo, pp. 355-391, excluding Annexes.
8.Id. at 770-797.
9.Id. at 802-813.
10. Petition, id. at 82.
11. This section applies to the SB by virtue of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which provides: "The Rules of Court, resolutions, circulars, and other issuances promulgated by the Supreme Court relating to or affecting the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, insofar as applicable, shall govern all actions and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan." Section 5, Rule 112 provides:
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint o[r] information. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
12. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may procure, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
13. <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prima_facie> (last accessed on March 1, 2019).
14.Id.
15. THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
16. Manuel V. Moran, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES (1939 Revised & Enlarged Ed.), p. xxvi, citing Sec. 280, Act No. 190, which provides:
Sec. 280. Where Dispute Relates to Obligation or Duty of Third Person, Prima Facie Evidence. — Where the question in dispute between the parties is the obligation or duty of a third person, whatever would be the evidence for or against such person is prima facie evidence between the parties; prima facie evidence being that which suffices for the proof of a particular fact, until contradicted and overcome by other evidence. (See Moran, id. at 576-577)
17. Nos. SP-06028-32-R, February 22, 1977, 74 OG 6658 (No. 34, August 1978).
18. AMENDING SECTION 1 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5180 PRESCRIBING A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BY PROVINCIAL AND CITY FISCALS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, AND BY STATE ATTORNEYS OR THEIR ASSISTANTS. Done on December 6, 1972.
19. FURTHER AMENDING SECTION 1 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5180 AS AMENDED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 77. Done on March 23, 1976. It provides:
"b. If on the basis of the complainant's sworn statements and documents submitted, the investigating fiscal or state prosecutor finds no probable cause to conduct a preliminary investigation, he shall dismiss the case. If probable cause is established by complainant's evidence, he shall notify the respondent by issuing a subpoena requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, if any, and other supporting documents, within ten (10) days from receipt of such subpoena. x x x
c. If a prima facie case is established by the evidence, the investigating fiscal or state prosecutor shall immediately file the corresponding information in court. If he finds that there is no prima facie case, he shall dismiss the case unless he believes there are matters to be clarified in which case he may propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses affording both parties opportunity to be present but without right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties or their counsel so desire, they may submit questions to the fiscal which the latter may in his discretion propound to the parties concerned."
20. Supra note 17, at 6663.
21. 102 Phil. 944 (1958).
22. Id. at 946.
23. 219 Phil. 402 (1985).
24. Id. at 416.
25. Id. at 428.
26. 421 Phil. 176, 188 (2001).
27. 664 Phil. 405, 427-428 (2011).
28. 98 Phil. 739, 742 (1956).
29. SB Resolution dated February 6, 2017, rollo, p. 67; additional emphasis supplied.
30. SB Resolution dated November 28, 2016, id. at 37.
31. Id. at 41.