People v. Quijano y Dizon

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 251016. November 18, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. JOSEFINO QUIJANO y DIZON a.k.a. "BOBOT,"accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 18, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 251016 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, versus JOSEFINO QUIJANO y DIZON a.k.a. "BOBOT,"accused-appellant.

After a careful review of the records of the case and the issues submitted by the parties, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision 1 dated July 25, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10993, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated April 13, 2018 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 282, in Criminal Case Nos. 2068-V-16 and 2069-V-16 convicting accused-appellant Josefino Quijano y Dizon a.k.a. "Bobot" (Quijano) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as amended.

In the prosecution of crimes involving illegal drugs, aside from proof beyond reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed, there must be proof of the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti — the dangerous drug itself. 3 There must be an accounting of the following links in the chain of its custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. 4

In this regard, Section 21, 5 Article II of RA No. 9165, as amended by RA No. 10640, 6 the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes, outlines the procedure which the police officers must strictly follow to preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, and (c) a representative from the media or a representative from the National Prosecution Service (NPS), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and, thereafter, the seized drugs must be turned over to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 7 Strict compliance with Section 21 is mandatory, and any deviation therefrom must be acknowledged and explained or justified by the prosecution. 8 This is especially true where the quantity of illegal drugs is miniscule, such as in the present case, since the same is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration. 9

Furthermore, in a long line of cases, 10 the Court has held that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the apprehension and inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose. The presence of the said witnesses is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drugs, 11 and it is their insulating presence that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drugs. 12

In the present case, the police officers failed to comply with the foregoing requirements.

First, the police officers failed to comply with the mandatory two-witness rule. As the prosecution witnesses testified, the marking, inventory and photographing of the seized drugs were witnessed only by Kagawad Danilo Canda. 13 Meanwhile, no representative from either the media or the NPS was present. 14

To reiterate, the law requires that the following witnesses should be present during the physical inventory and photography of the seized drugs: (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel; (b) an elected public official; and (c) a representative from the media or a representative from the NPS. However, only the elected barangay official was present. Thus, it is clear that they failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of the law.

While this is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that a justifiable ground exists to explain the police officers' failure to comply with the requirements of the law. The records, however, do not show that the prosecution was able to establish a justifiable ground as to why the police officers were not able to secure the presence of the NPS or media representative. In People v. Gamboa, 15 the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the witnesses required under the law. Mere statements that the witnesses are unavailable, without any showing of genuine and serious attempts to contact them, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. Considering that a buy-bust is a planned operation, "police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time x x x to prepare x x x and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of [RA No.] 9165." 16 They are therefore compelled "not only to state reasons for their non[-]compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstance, their actions were reasonable." 17

The CA excuses the police officers' non-compliance with the witness requirement as it was alleged that Police Chief Inspector Jowilouie Bilaro (PCI Bilaro) tried calling said witnesses after the completion of the buy-bust operation, but only the barangay official arrived after "more or less one (1) hour" of waiting. 18 However, merely alleging that they tried to contact a media representative and an NPS representative is not sufficient. As held in People v. Retada, 19 a mere allegation that the police tried to contact said witnesses, without more, "is not the earnest effort that is contemplated by the law." 20

Furthermore, it bears noting that PCI Bilaro conducted a briefing before the intended buy-bust operation. 21 Hence, the police officers had ample time to secure the presence of the required third-party representatives. 22 Had they really wanted to ensure that their operation was free from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity, 23 they could have easily already contacted said witnesses at such time, and not only after the consummation of the buy-bust operation. Hence, the mere fact that they waited for more or less one (1) hour, assuming this to be true, is not sufficient justification, considering that it was actually PCI Bilaro's belated attempt to comply with this requirement which led to the alleged unavailability of the required witnesses.

To stress, the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving the police officers' compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-compliance. As the Court En Banc unanimously held in the case of People v. Lim: 24

It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:

(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. 25 (Emphasis in the original; citation omitted)

Undeniably, none of the abovementioned circumstances was attendant in the case. Their excuse for non-compliance is unconvincing. The police officers' mere allegation that they called for the said representatives but only the barangay official arrived after "more or less one (1) hour" of waiting is a frail justification, especially considering that they had ample time to arrange for the presence of the required witnesses even before the conduct of the buy-bust operation.

Second, the Court finds as reckless and irregular the handling of the seized illegal drugs by Police Officer 2 Christian Rey F. Corpuz (PO2 Corpuz), the designated poseur-buyer, 26 upon the consummation of the entrapment operation. As testified by PO2 Corpuz, after completing the buy-bust operation, he did not immediately mark the seized items in front of Quijano and, instead, simply "walked away" with the seized shabu on hand and thereafter went inside his vehicle together with the confidential informant. 27 His testimony is quoted as follows:

"ATTY. AQUILER, JR:

Then, after giving you the shabu, during your direct, you mentioned that you simply walked away from him?

WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

ATTY. AQUILER, JR:

You simply walked away from him and you went inside your vehicle?

WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

ATTY. AQUILER, JR:

And after the lapse of few minutes, you went back.

WITNESS:

Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. AQUILER, JR:

What did you do with the shabu that you were able to buy from the accused?

WITNESS:

I just held it, sir.

ATTY. AQUILER, JR:

Did you not leave it inside the private vehicle?

WITNESS:

No, sir.

ATTY. AQUILER, JR:

You were just holding it?

WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

ATTY. AQUILER, JR:

And you did not place any markings?

WITNESS:

No, sir." 28

The foregoing certainly puts in doubt the integrity, identity and evidentiary value of the seized items. To be sure, it puts in doubt the entire version of the prosecution as to what truthfully happened. As well, it lends credence to the version of the defense as testified to by Quijano and his daughter.

Based on the foregoing testimony, the seized items were brought inside PO2 Corpuz's vehicle, away from the view of Quijano, the other police officers, or any other witness, and for a substantial period of time thereafter, 29 remained unmarked — in clear violation of the initial custodial requirements mandated under the law. The Court is thus left to speculate the identity and integrity of the seized illegal drugs.

To emphasize, marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link. 30 In this regard, the guidelines of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency 31 define marking as the arresting officers' act of placing their initials and signature on the seized illegal drugs, in the presence of the accused, immediately after confiscation. 32 It is vital, that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. 33 Thus, as held by the Court, marking should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon confiscation to truly ensure that they are the same items which enter the chain of custody. 34

Finally, in light of the foregoing unexplained and unjustified deviations by the police officers, the prosecution may not rely on the presumption that official functions have regularly been performed. 35 Neither is PO2 Corpuz's self-serving claim that the seized items were held only by him and Police Officer 2 Rodrigo B. Pagarigan, Jr., 36 and no one else, all throughout until the marking and inventory, sufficient to establish with moral certainty the identity of the corpus delicti. 37 Indeed, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official  duty arises only when the records do not indicate any irregularity or flaw in the performance of official duty. Applied to dangerous drugs cases, the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption when there is a clear showing that the apprehending officers unjustifiably failed to comply with the requirements laid down in Section 21 of RA No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations. In any case, the presumption of regularity cannot be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. 38

In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs remained uncompromised. Quijano must perforce be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 25, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10993 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant JOSEFINO QUIJANO y DIZON a.k.a. "BOBOT" is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The said Director General is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution the action taken.

SO ORDERED." Lopez, M., J., on official leave.

By authority of the Court:

LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-17. Penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Rafael Antonio M. Santos, concurring.

2. CA rollo, pp. 56-69. Penned by Presiding Judge Elena A. Amigo-Amano.

3.People v. Barte, G.R. No. 179749, March 1, 2017, 819 SCRA 10, 20.

4.People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 199644, June 19, 2019, 904 SCRA 537, 548.

5. The said Section provides:

Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That non-compliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

6. AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002," July 15, 2014.

7.See RA No. 9165, Art. II, Secs. 21 (1) and (2), as amended by RA No. 10640, Sec. 1.

8.Limbo v. People, G.R. No. 238299, July 1, 2019, 907 SCRA 129, 138.

9.People v. Señeres, Jr., G.R. No. 231008, November 5, 2018, 884 SCRA 172, 192.

10.People v. Espejo, G.R. No. 240914, March 13, 2019, 897 SCRA 205; People v. Caranto, G.R. No. 217668, February 20, 2019, 894 SCRA 18; People v. Cabezudo, G.R. No. 232357, November 28, 2018, 887 SCRA 448; People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 225786, November 14, 2018, 885 SCRA 526; People v. Musor, G.R. No. 231843, November 7, 2018, 885 SCRA 154; People v. Bricero; G.R. No. 218428, November 7, 2018, 885 SCRA 1; People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 225736, October 15, 2018, 883 SCRA 218; and People v. Tomawis, G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018, 862 SCRA 131.

11.People v. Tomawis, id. at 149.

12.Id. at 150.

13.Rollo, p. 7.

14.Id.

15. G.R. No. 233702, June 20, 2018, 867 SCRA 548.

16.Id. at 569-570.

17.Id. at 570; citation omitted.

18.Rollo, pp. 6-7; CA rollo, p. 39.

19. G.R. No. 239331, July 10, 2019, 909 SCRA 1.

20.Id. at 13; emphasis supplied.

21.Rollo, p. 4; CA rollo, p. 57.

22.See People v. Sagana, G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017, 834 SCRA 225, 247.

23.See People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 236455, February 19, 2020.

24. G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, 879 SCRA 31.

25.Id. at 61-62.

26. CA rollo, p. 38.

27.Id. at 38-39.

28.Id. at 48; citation omitted.

29. As stated by the prosecution, the marking was done only after "more or less one (1) hour" upon the police officers' arrival at the police station; id. at 48, 59.

30.People v. Ismael, G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017, 818 SCRA 122, 134.

31. GUIDELINES ON THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10640, May 28, 2015.

32.Id.

33.People v. Ismael, supra note 30.

34.People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 225690, January 17, 2018, 852 SCRA 85, 97, citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194.

35. CA rollo, p. 108.

36.Id. at 57.

37.Id. at 66.

38.People v. Omamos, G.R. No. 223036, July 10, 2019, 908 SCRA 367, 384; citation omitted.