People v. Ponseca y Arada

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 248332. June 16, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MANOLO PONSECA y ARADA @ "TOTI", accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 16, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 248332 (People of the Philippines vs. Manolo Ponseca y Arada @ "Toti"). — On appeal is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 27, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09465, which affirmed the May 22, 2017 2 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69 in Criminal Case Nos. 16-024 and 16-025. The RTC found Manolo Ponseca y Arada @ "Toti," (accused-appellant) guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The facts, as culled from the Decision of the CA and the RTC, are as follows: 3

In the early morning of January 7, 2016, a confidential informant told the police officers of the Binangonan Police Station that accused-appellant was selling shabu on Carnation Street, San Carlos, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. Police Inspector Noel Versoza, chief of police of Binangonan Police Station, instructed his police officers to conduct a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant. Police Officer I Melanie Domingo (PO1 Domingo) was designated as their poseur-buyer. PO1 Domingo was also the one who coordinated their operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and prepared two One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills to be used as marked money.

After the briefing, the police officers, together with their informant, proceeded to the target area. Upon arriving at the house of accused-appellant, their informant knocked on the door and called on him. Accused-appellant came out and asked them how much they would be buying and PO1 Domingo replied "kasang dos." Appellant took from his pocket one plastic sachet containing suspected shabu and handed it to PO1 Domingo. In exchange, PO1 Domingo gave accused-appellant the marked money. Immediately after the exchange, PO1 Domingo executed the pre-arranged signal by untying her hair. Upon seeing the signal, the backup police officers rushed to the scene. Accused-appellant tried to escape but was caught by PO2 Rodel Payas (PO2 Payas). PO2 Payas conducted a body search on accused-appellant and recovered from him the marked money and another two small plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. Seeing that a crowd was starting to form, the police officers decided to bring accused-appellant and the seized items to the barangay hall of San Carlos.

In the barangay hall, PO1 Domingo and PO2 Payas prepared an inventory of and placed markings on the seized items in the presence of accused-appellant and Barangay Captain Filipinas E. Agustin while PO3 Arnel Diocena (PO3 Diocena) took photographs thereof. PO1 Domingo and PO2 Payas turned over the recovered items to their investigator, PO3 Diocena, who delivered the said items to the crime laboratory for forensic examination. DTCSHA

Police Senior Inspector Joanne De Chavez Rosales (PSInsp. Rosales) personally received the subject specimens. PSInsp. Rosales, a forensic chemist, conducted a qualitative examination on the specimens submitted, which tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.

Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with committing illegal sale of dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. He was likewise charged with committing illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The two (2) Informations indicting him read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 16-024

That on or about the 7th day of January 2016, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to sell and dispose of any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Melanie M. Domingo, a poseur-buyer one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.06 gram of white crystalline substance, in consideration of Php200.00, which substance after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted by the PNP Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory Office gave a positive result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Criminal Case No. 16-025

That on or about the 7th day of January 2016, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess/use any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing 0.06 gram and 0.05 gram, or with a total weight of 0.11 gram of white crystalline substance, which after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted by the PNP Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory Office on the white crystalline substance, gave a positive result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant, duly assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged in the above-cited Informations. The case was then set for pre-trial and eventually for trial.

In his defense, accused-appellant denied the charges imputed against him. He claimed that he was cleaning his intestine and replacing his colostomy bag at around three o'clock in the morning when five cops kicked his door open, ransacked his house, and helped themselves to food and coffee before hauling him off to the police station, where he was made to point to drugs that do not belong to him. They asked for P150,000.00 in exchange for his freedom but he could not produce such amount.

In its Decision 6 dated May 22, 2017, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing illegal sale of dangerous drugs as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. As such, accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Accused-appellant was also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally possessing 0.11 gram of shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

The RTC held that the prosecution was able to establish that accused-appellant illegally sold 0.06 gram and possessed 0.11 gram of shabu. The RTC likewise ruled that the apprehending team substantially complied with the requirements provided in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC found accused-appellant's claims to be uncorroborated and preposterous and as such were not given credence. Thus, the RTC disposed as follows:

In light of the above, we find accused Manolo Ponseca GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentence him to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. We also find accused Manolo Ponseca GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and illegally possessing 0.11 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or [shabu], respectively and accordingly sentence him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and l day as minimum to 13 years as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

Let the drug samples in these cases be forwarded to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. Furnish PDEA with a copy of this Decision per OCA Circular No. 70-2007.

SO ORDERED. 7 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring in the original)

Disagreeing with the ruling of the RTC, accused-appellant filed an appeal with the CA. Accused-appellant maintained that he is innocent of the charges imputed against him. He faulted the RTC for holding him guilty of selling and possessing illegal drugs when the integrity of the corpus delicti was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant asseverated that there was a broken chain of custody and the prosecution failed to provide an explanation for such non-compliance. Specifically, the marking, inventory, and taking of photographs were done in the barangay hall and not at the place of arrest.

In a Decision 8 dated February 27, 2019, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. The CA held that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under Section 11 of the same statute. The CA also ruled that the prosecution was able to account for all the links in the chain of custody of evidence. Thus, the CA disposed as follows: CScTED

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED.

Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated 22 May 2017 of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 69, Binangonan, Rizal in Criminal Case Nos. 16-024 and 16-025 finding appellant Manolo Ponseca y Arada @ Toti guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 9 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Undeterred, accused-appellant filed the instant appeal before the Court.

Upon a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds the appeal to be meritorious.

First and foremost, it has been the rule that the entire records of a criminal case are opened for review whenever an appeal is filed therein. This confers to the appellate courts the full jurisdiction to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment, regardless of whether they are assigned or not. 10

Here, accused-appellant was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. To properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must: (1) prove that the transaction or sale took place; (2) present in evidence the corpus delicti or the illicit drug; and (3) identify the buyer and seller. 11 In instances wherein an accused is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the following elements to warrant their conviction: "(a) the accused is in possession of an item or object identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug." 12

Furthermore, it has been consistently held that in both cases of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug confiscated from the accused-appellant comprises the corpus delicti of the said charges. 13 Thus, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish in court that the dangerous drugs presented in court are the same as the ones seized from the accused-appellant. 14

It is a given fact that the dangerous drugs prohibited under R.A. No. 9165 are not readily identifiable by sight or touch. These can also be easily tampered with or substituted. Thus, to obviate any unnecessary doubts as regards the identity of the seized drugs, Section 21, 15 Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by RA 10640, prescribes the procedure that must be observed by the police officers to ensure that the integrity and identity of these pieces of evidence were duly preserved. 16 Jurisprudence succinctly summarized the procedure that must be observed in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs, to wit:

[F]irst, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 17

Aside from these four links, the prosecution also bears the burden of proving that the inventory and taking of photograph of the seized items were both done in the presence of the accused-appellant or the person from whom the items were seized, or their representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) a representative from the media, a representative from the Department of Justice, and any elected public official; 18 if the criminal case was instituted prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640 19 in 2014 or (b) an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS)OR the media if the criminal case was instituted after R.A. No. 9165 was amended by R.A. No. 10640 in 2014. The presence of the said witnesses was intended as a guarantee against the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence, which tainted the buy-bust operations then conducted under R.A. No. 6425. 20

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers failed to comply with the witness requirement under R.A. No. 10640. This puts into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs that were purportedly seized from the accused-appellant.

While not raised as an error on appeal, a review of the records and pleadings made available before the Court shows the failure of the police officers to comply with the witness requirement under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640 on July 15, 2014. It should be pointed out that accused-appellant was arrested on January 7, 2016. Hence, the provisions of R.A. No. 10640 should be observed in the instant case. Pursuant to Section 1 of the said law, the taking of photographs and inventory of the dangerous drugs seized from an accused must be done in the presence of an elected public official and a representative of the NPS or the media. It appears, however, from the records of this case that the marking, inventory, and taking of photographs of the seized items were only witnessed by Barangay Captain Filipinas E. Agustin. cDCEIA

It has been acknowledged that strict observance of the procedure under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is nearly impossible. Nevertheless, the prosecution bears the burden of proving its justifiable ground for non-compliance and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence have nonetheless been preserved. 21

In this case, the witnesses for the prosecution failed to provide a justifiable reason for their failure to comply with the said witness requirement under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640. Likewise, there was no showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the attendance of the said witnesses. 22 In the case of People v. Sipin, 23 the Supreme Court enumerated the instances when the absence of the required witnesses may be justified, to wit:

(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. 24

None of the aforementioned instances apply to the case at bar. The police officers failed to provide a justifiable reason for their failure to comply with the said witness requirement under the law. It bears noting that while the police officers received the tip from their confidential informant in the early hours of January 7, 2016, they conducted the inventory of the seized items during day time. At that time, government officials and employees are supposed to be at their place of work and readily available to perform their duty. As such, they should be able to receive timely communications, especially when police officers conduct a buy-bust operation. At this time of the day, it is seldom, if not highly unlikely, for police officers to encounter any difficulty in seeking communication with a government office mandated by law to act as an important partner in ensuring the integrity of a seized dangerous drug, as required by R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640. The police officers plainly failed to observe the mandated procedure and chose to forego the attendance of a representative from the NPS or media. There was even no showing of an urgency or any circumstance that would show the need to immediately proceed to the area of operation to prevent any lapse of time as testified by the prosecution witness. This failure to provide a justifiable reason for non-compliance with the witness requirement militates against the cause of the prosecution. Worth reiterating is the Court's pronouncement in People v. Macud, 25 as follows:

The presence of the persons who should witness the post-operation procedures is necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity. The insulating presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody. We have noted in several cases that a buy-bust operation is susceptible to abuse, and the only way to prevent this is to ensure that the procedural safeguards provided by the law are strictly observed. In the present case, not only have the prescribed procedures not been followed, but also (and more importantly) the lapses not justifiably explained. In People v. Dela Cruz where there was a similar failure to comply with Section 21 of RA No. 9165, the Court declared:

x x x This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates their seizure of and custody over the seized drugs, thus, comprising the identity and integrity of the same. We resolve the doubt in the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti in favor of appellant as every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Considering that the prosecution failed to present the required quantum of evidence, appellant's acquittal is in order. 26

It has been the rule that "the procedure under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects." 27 A stricter adherence to the rule on chain of custody is required in cases where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is minuscule. While a minuscule amount of dangerous drug is not per se a badge of innocence or would not automatically entitle the accused-appellant to an acquittal, it has been recognized that such amount is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration. 28 Taken together with the absence of the required number of witnesses, the failure of the police officers to adopt appropriate safeguards to preserve the integrity of the corpus delicti places the credibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution in serious doubt.

Considering the doubts engendered by the paucity of the prosecution's evidence, this Court has no recourse but to give accused-appellant the benefit of doubt under the law and acquit him of the charges imputed against him.

As a final note, this Court reiterates that law enforcers should not only be mindful of the procedures required in the seizure, handling, and safekeeping of confiscated drugs, but also prove every material detail in court. Observance of these is necessary to avoid wasting the efforts and the resources in the apprehension and prosecution of violators of our drug laws. 29 As earlier held, "the procedure under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects." 30 It would then be apt to quote the recurring pronouncements of this Court on the subject matter:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x.

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with the procedure is determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction. 31 (Citation omitted)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court resolves to GRANT the appeal. The Decision dated February 27, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09465 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Manolo Ponseca y Arada @ "Toti" is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. DHESca

The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to immediately release accused-appellant Manolo Ponseca y Arada @ "Toti" from custody, unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause. Copies of this Resolution shall also be furnished to the Police General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for their information. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED." (HERNANDO, J., on official leave; LOPEZ, M., J., vice INTING, J., per Raffle dated July 29, 2020)

By the authority of the Court:

MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) RUMAR D. PASIONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob, with Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a member of this court) and Danton Q. Bueser, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-13.

2. Penned by Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez; CA rollo, pp. 36-38.

3.Rollo, pp. 5-6; CA rollo, pp. 36-38.

4.Rollo, p. 4.

5.Id. at 4-5.

6. CA rollo, pp. 36-38.

7.Id. at 38.

8.Rollo, pp. 3-13.

9.Id. at 12-13.

10.People v. Miranda, 824 Phil. 1042, 1050 (2008).

11.People v. Dadang, G.R. No. 242880, January 22, 2020.

12.Id.

13.People v. Oliva, G.R. No. 234156, January 7, 2019.

14.Id., citing People v. Gatlabayan, 699 Phil. 240, 252 (2011).

15.Section 21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;

(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media, and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent the former;

(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and

(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH. (emphasis supplied)

16.People v. Silayan, G.R. No. 229362, June 19, 2019, citing People v. Ismael, 806 Phil. 21, 30 (2017); People v. Oliva, supra note 13; People v. Cadungog, G.R. No. 229926, April 3, 2019, citing People v. Almodiel, 694 Phil. 449, 459-460 (2012).

17.People v. Gayoso, 808 Phil. 19, 31 (2017), citing People v. Nandi, 639 Phil. 134, 144-145 (2010); People v. Dahil, et al., 750 Phil. 212, 231 (2015), citing People v. Kamad, 624 Phil. 289, 304 (2010).

18.Limbo v. People, G.R. No. 238299, July 1, 2019, citing People v. Tumulak, 791 Phil. 148, 160-161 (2016); People v. Rollo, 757 Phil. 346, 357 (2015).

19. An Act to Further Strengthen the Anti-Drug Campaign of the Government, Amending for the Purpose of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, Otherwise Known as the 'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,' Republic Act No. 10640 (2014).

20.Limbo v. People, supra note 18, citing People v. Miranda, supra note 10, at 1050; People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749, 764 (2014); People v. Año, 828 Phil. 439, 448-449 (2018).

21.People v. Año, supra note 20, at 450, citing People v. Almorfe, et al., 631 Phil. 51, 59 (2010); People v. De Guzman y Danzil, 630 Phil. 637, 647-648 (2010); People v. Goco, 797 Phil. 433 (2016).

22. See Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 238349, August 14, 2019; Gamboa v. People, 799 Phil. 584, 595 (2016), citing People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1052-1053 (2012).

23. 833 Phil. 67 (2018), as cited in People v. Oliva, supra note 13.

24.Id. at 93.

25. 822 Phil. 1016 (2017).

26.Id. at 1041.

27.People v. Año, supra note 20 at 452, citing People v. Macapundag, 807 Phil. 234, 244 (2017).

28.People v. Oliva, supra note 13, citing People v. Abelarde, 824 Phil. 122, 133-134 (2018); People v. Macud, supra note 25, at 1042; People v. Arposeple, etal., 821 Phil. 340, 370 (2017); Aparente v. People, 818 Phil. 935, 946-947 (2017); People v. Cabellon, 818 Phil. 561, 571 (2017); People v. Saragena, 817 Phil. 117, 142-143 (2017); People v. Saunar, 816 Phil. 482, 495 (2017); People v.Sagana, 815 Phil. 356, 377-378 (2017); People v. Segundo, 814 Phil. 697, 728 (2017); People v. Jaafar, 803 Phil. 582, 591 (2017).

29. See People v. Hementiza, 807 Phil. 1017 (2017).

30.People v. Año, supra note 20, at 452, citing People v. Macapundag, supra note 27, at 244.

31.People v. Patacsil, G.R. No. 234052, August 6, 2018, citing People v. Mamangon, 824 Phil. 728, 741-742 (2018); People v. Go. 457 Phil. 885, 925 (2003); People v. Miranda, supra note 10, at 1059-1060.