People v. Pletcha, Jr.

[No. 19029-CR. June 27, 1977.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.TITO PLETCHA, JR., accused and appellant.

Mercedes M. Respicio for accused and appellant.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Nathanael P. de Paño, Jr. and Solicitor Concepcion T. Agapinan for plaintiff and appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. GRAVE COERCION; ELEMENT OF VIOLENCE MISSING IN CASE AT BAR. — Where the accused came back with a bolo, without any chance to actually use it or threaten the complainants, who fled as soon as they saw the accused, there is missing the element of violence which the accused should have used to fall under Art. 286 of the Rev. Penal Code, defining and penalizing the cringe of grave coercion.

2. ID.; RATIONALE. — The rationale of the statute penalizing "grave coercion" is precisely to enforce the rule of law (People vs. Mangosing, CA-G.R. No. 1107-R, April 29, 1948), so that no one may take the law into his hands.

3. ID.; DEFINITION. — Coercion is committed by unauthorized compelling of another, whether just as unjust, its essence being an attack on the individual liberty (6 Viada, 5th Ed., p. 80).

4. OWNERSHIP; DEFENSE OF PROPERTY; RIGHT OF OWNER OR POSSESSOR TO RESIST AN INVASION BY USING REASONABLE FORCE; SELF-DEFENSE. — Article 429 of the New Civil Code confirms the right of the owner or lawful possessor of property, or one who has a color of title thereto by virtue of long possession thereof, to use reasonable force to repel an invasion or usurpation, actual, threatened or physical, of his property. The principle of self-defense and the protective measures related thereto, covers not only his life, but also his liberty and property (Tolentino, A., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, ed. 1972, pp. 58-59; Sec. 1, Art. IV, Phil. Constitution).

5. ID.; ID.; LIMITATIONS. — Subject to the restraint that the defense of property does not deteriorate to abuse and open the door to violence, chaos, and disorder, the person defending is entitled to meet the force with necessary force when the need arises.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ART. 429, CIVIL CODE, ACCORDS THE POSSESSOR THE SELF EXECUTORY MECHANICS OF SELF-DEFENSE AND SELF-RELIANCE. — The act of building a fence on land possessed by another constitutes force in contemplation of law, and the possessor is justified in shooing away the trespasser, even by means of a bolo, when he refuses to listen to his appeal, without need of rushing to the court to seek redress. The situation requires immediate action and Art. 429 of the New Civil Code gives the possessor self-executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance. In such a case, it is not the possessor, who enjoys the legal presumption of just title, who takes the law into his hands, but it is the trespasser for scaring away the former by acts of vandalism and strategy.

DECISION

SISON, P.V., J p:

Tito Pletcha, Jr., a civic-conscious farmer, invoking "self-help" in defense of the land he owns for 19 years, fought off and prevented a corporation's crew of 8 men who without any court order was insisting to fence 4 hectares of his land, as a result of which resistance he was prosecuted and convicted of grave coercion (2 month and 1 day, P100 fine, costs) by the Municipal Court of Murcia, Negros Occidental in its decision dated Sept. 23, 1975.

Epitomizing his appeal on the protective mantle of Art. 429 of the Civil Code, appellant asks Us for a reversal, on the ground that the law gives him as the owner the right to use reasonable force to exclude any person threatening his peaceful ownership. We note this is a new provision of the Civil Code.

The People asks for affirmance on the ground that the appellant should not have done anything by himself to resist but should have gone to court instead to enjoin the group of 8 men from disturbing his ownership.

We are thus called to determine if the facts herein justify the application of Art. 429 (Civil Code) and if so, excluding appellant from conviction and the penalty imposed.

Appellant inherited the land from his father 19 years ago and he maintains that for him to stand his ground and ward off such invasion, even with the use of a bolo, is not at all taking the law into his hands, but on the contrary a legitimate exercise of a private citizen's "self-help" right placed in his hands, by Art. 429, Civil Code.

He brought the case on appeal to the CFI of Negros Occidental, 12th Judicial District, Branch III, but inasmuch as the crime of grave coercion falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the municipal courts and the Courts of First Instance, the case was elevated to this Tribunal.

Appellant is charged of preventing 8 men (Godofredo Cuachon, Manuel Paguntalan, Pedro Fuentes, Alfredo Fuentes, Doroteo Fuentes, Carlos Beligorio, Arsenio Verino and Cresencio Pasco), all workers of the Radeco Corporation from fencing a 4-hectare area of the hacienda owned by the Radeco Corporation and over which portion appellant claims and was in actual possession and ownership.

According to the prosecution, in the morning of June 10, 1973, this group under the supervision of Godofredo Cuachon was constructing a fence made of bamboo poles and wire on a piece of land in Hacienda Gaspit allegedly leased by the Radeco Corporation from a certain Lopinco.

Claiming actual possession and ownership, the appellant asked the group to desist from fencing pending a resurvey he proposed, but he was totally ignored. The appellant came back with a bolo, without any chance, however, to actually use it or threaten them, because as soon as the group saw him they ran away (p. 3, Tsn, June 3, 1975). The 8 men fled, leaving behind their "poles, wires and bolos to dig holes in the ground" (pp. 4-13, Tsn, Dec. 17, 1974) and instead filed the complaint for grave coercion under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. Missing, therefore, is the element of "violence" which the appellant should have used to fall under this Article.

The accused categorically denied having intimidated complainants. He testified that, having noticed that the fence, if constructed, would encroach on his land, he told Godofredo Cuachon, the overseer, to have the titled land re-surveyed to determine the exact boundary of each other's property.

He further testified that he was positive the land sought to be fenced was an integral part of the land he inherited from his father in 1954 and which he has been for 19 years possessing, occupying and cultivating the same without any interruption or obstruction. Incidentally, there is a pending case for damages regarding same land between the appellant and Peter Lopinco, the predecessor-in-interest of the Radeco Corporation (pp. 4-13, Tsn, Dec. 17, 1974).

Appellant made this lone assignment of error:

"THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACTS OF THE ACCUSED IN DEFENSE OF HIS PROPERTY CONSTITUTED GRAVE COERCION."

We agree with His Honor, the trial judge with his statement that ours is a government of laws and not of men and that no person may take the law into his hands. There is no dispute about this principle. But neither is this the issue before Us. His Honor may have overlooked that the rationale of the statute penalizing "grave coercion" is precisely to enforce the rule of law (People vs. Mangosing, CA-G.R. No. 1107-R, April 29, 1948), so that no one may take the law into his hands. Coercion is committed by unauthorized compelling of another, whether just or unjust, its essence being an attack on the individual liberty (6 Viada, 5th Ed., p. 80).

His Honor must have known that the above principle is by no means absolute. And had the trial court taken note of this, appeal would have been unnecessary, because under Art. 429 of the New Civil Code:

"The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property."

The above-quoted law confirms the right of the appellant, an owner and lawful possessor, to use reasonable force to repel an invasion or usurpation, actual, threatened or physical, of his property. The principle of self-defense and the protective measures related thereto, covers not only his life, but also his liberty and property.

"The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force, not only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is a sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession does not possess by force. The use of such necessary force to protect propriety or possessory rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under our Penal Code." (Tolentino, A., Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, Ed. 1972, pp. 58-59).

Corollary to this is what the Constitution provides in Sec. 1, Art. IV:

"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

Did the accused have real and actual interest in the parcel of land sought to be fenced? In its attempt to deny applicability of Art. 429 of the Civil Code to the accused, the People contends that there is no categorical statement of appellant asserting claim to the land being fenced by the Radeco Corporation (p. 3, Appellee's Brief).

We disagree. The appellant has real interest on that parcel of land sought to be fenced by virtue of his 19-year uninterrupted and open occupation. The court a quo itself sustain the appellant in its decision when it said:

"Indeed it is deplorable that one is to be dispossessed of a thing which he had come to sentimentally consider as his own after a long occupation." (p. 2, Decision).

His Honor should have taken into account the situation of appellant, a poor farmer, pitted against the giant of a corporation, the former just fighting for his small piece of land passed on from his father. There was no necessity for him to file first a case in court to protect his property, in the light of the strong testimonial evidence coming from the prosecution as follows:

On cross-examination, Godofredo Cuachon, a witness for the prosecution, declared:

"COURT:

Q. Yes, but my question is, did the accused tell the reason why he stopped you?

A. Because he does not want us to fence.

Q. Why?

A. Because he said it is his land."

On cross-examination, Manuel Paguntalan, also a witness for the prosecution, testified:

"COURT:

Q. Now, you said that the accused Tito Pletcha, Jr. shouted to you to stop fencing. Did he tell you why you should stop fencing there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the reason given by the accused?

A. Because he claims the land to be his own." (p. 11, Tsn, Nov. 19, 1974, Italics ours).

So, from the admission of Cuachon and Paguntalan, there is not a scintilla of doubt that the appellant made a valid claim on the land being invaded. He could not have been as pugnacious as the way he did if he did not believe that he had genuine interest in the land being fenced, and only inheritance from his father.

On direct examination, appellant testified:

"COURT:

Q. Godofredo Cuachon testified before the court that you shouted to them to stop fencing because if they will not stop fencing, something will happen to them. What can you say to that?

A. I did not shout to them as alleged by them but I told that if possible to go to Peter Lopinco and Mr. Manaloto to have the adjacent land surveyed before fencing so that my plants will not be destroyed including that of my father's because they were planting sugar cane." (p. 8, Tsn, Dec. 17, 1974).

The prosecution contends that the appellant repeatedly made mention only of his plants and not of his ownership (pp. 2-5, Appellee's Brief). But that is not so. Here, the accused does not only refer to his plants being destroyed. Having noticed that the complainants were including inside their fence part of the land containing his plants, he requested them to have a resurvey made because he believed that they had gone beyond their boundary limits and had encroached upon considerable portion of his land.

On direct examination, Pletcha testified:

"COURT:

Q. With respect to this land which was fenced by Godofredo Cuachon on June 10, 1973, was this particular land found inside your land?

A. Yes, sir. Because some of my plants which they destroyed were planted with sugar cane." (p. 10, Tsn, Dec. 17, 1974).

Again, on cross-examination, Pletcha testified:

"COURT:

Q. Mr. Pletcha, is it not a fact that Godofredo Cuachon and his men were inclosing their sugar cane fields because you were planting your bananas inside the sugar cane field?

A. Their sugar cane plants are far from my house.

ATTY. BITANGA, JR.:

That does not answer the question I request that the witness be directed to answer the question, Your Honor.

COURT:

Alright, answer the question.

WITNESS:

A. It was because they destroyed my banana plants. That is why I replanted them and also my coconuts.

Q. And you planted your banana plants inside the sugar cane field even though the sugar cane are already growing?

A. I replanted bananas to those they have destroyed. In fact there were still bananas standing.

Q. Aside from the banana inside the sugar cane field, can you also sow mongo, soybeans and other plants inside the sugar cane field?

A. There was no mongo, soybeans. What I sow were agoho trees which they cut and plow with their tractors.

Q. And you sowed those agoho inside the sugar cane field?

A. Just inside my plants.

Q. Even though there were sugar cane growing?

A. Yes, sir. Because they have taken possession of about 4 hectares of my land which is quite far from my house." (pp. 14-15, Tsn, Dec. 17, 1974).

On the whole, we are of the considered opinion that there is basis for appellant to consider and believe in good faith that a portion of the land being fenced by the Radeco Corporation is part and parcel of the 24 hectares which was bequeathed to him by his father. And this land has been in his possession en concepto dueño since 1954 and had been planted by him with bananas and agoho trees. By virtue of this long possession, the appellant has pro tanto acquired at least in his favor the color of title thereto.

"Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property.

"Art. 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it."

In view of this presumption, his right should be respected by all, including the group of 8 intruding laborers. Inasmuch as this right was disregarded or violated, the appellant was justified to retaliate in self-defense invoking the principle of self-help as embodied in Art. 429 of the New Civil Code, especially in the absence of evidence he used force in so doing.

Subject to the restraint that it does not deteriorate to abuse and open the door to violence, chaos, and disorder, a person in the defense of his property is entitled under the law to meet force with necessary force when the need arises. We liken appellant's land as part of his home where tradition says, "even the king and his constables cannot trespass" without his consent. Appellant cannot just be expected to close his eyes and fold his hands while other persons trespass his land. In the instant case, the complainants had already begun seriously segregating a four-hectare portion of his land by fencing it.

The trial court a quo opined that the appellant Pletcha, Jr. should have ventilated his case in the proper agencies (p. 2, Decision). We disagree on this point. It is the corporation which has all the time, legal facilities and money to question appellant's possession or ownership. Appellant has only his courage and the traditional manliness of the Filipino to rely upon for the moment.

Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, Civil Law Commentator, classifies actual invasion of property:

"It may consist of a mere disturbance of possession or of a real dispossession. In case of mere disturbance of possession, force may be used against it at anytime as long as it continues. If the invasion consists of real dispossession, force to regain possession can be used only immediately after the dispossession. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1972 Ed., p. 59). But once possession has been lost, even if wrongfully or illegally, and the usurper's possession has become firm by the lapse of time, the lawful possessor must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property (Art. 433, New Civil Code) for he must invoke the order of the competent court." (Art. 536).

In the instant case, the usurper's possession has not yet become complete and the complainants were in the act of building a fence. Such an act constitutes force in contemplation of law. This act of trespass justified the appellant to shoo them away, even by means of a bolo, because they refused to listen to his appeal which is reasonable, they refused to be generous, patient, nay compassionate.

We, therefore conclude that appellant need not rush to the court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of his property. The situation required immediate action and Art. 429 gave him the self-executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance. We find that it was not the appellant, who enjoys the legal presumption of just title, who took the law into his hands, but it was the complainants for trying to scare away the appellant by acts of vandalism and strategy.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed in toto and the appellant, Tito Pletcha, Jr. is hereby acquitted and set at immediate liberty, with the cancellation of his bail bond. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gaviola, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.