FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 196007. April 23, 2014.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEÑAFRANCIA PERAL y CERENADO, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 23, 2014which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 196007 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEÑAFRANCIA PERAL y CERENADO, Accused-Appellant.
Accused-appellant seeks the Court's review of the Decision dated May 31, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 03761 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Peñafrancia Peral y Cerenado, which affirmed the Decision dated January 4, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Case No. 8103.
In an Information dated May 18, 2005, appellant was charged with the sale of dangerous drugs which is proscribed by Section 5, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Appellant was arraigned on July 21, 2005. She pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the charge leveled against her.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals presented the evidence for the prosecution in the following manner:
PSI Stella Ebuen's testimony was the subject of stipulation between the prosecution and defense to the effect that upon a written request made by the San Mateo Police Station, witness conducted an examination over one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.29 gram of white crystalline substance. After the examination, the specimen gave positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. All stipulation of facts entered into were subject to the condition that witness does not know the source and origin of the specimen examined. aSTAcH
According to PO3 Juanito Tougan, on May 17, 2005, at around 6:20 in the evening, he was with SPO1 Arellano and a civilian informant (agent) to conduct a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant Peñafrancia Peral alias "Fanny" at Sitio Ibayo, Barangay Maly, San Mateo, Rizal. Upon their arrival at the house of accused-appellant Peral, their agent knocked at the door while witness Tougan hid at a place about three (3) to five (5) meters away. When the door opened, witness Tougan watched the accused-appellant and their agent converse and not long after, their agent handed to the accused-appellant the buy-bust money. The latter for her part delivered to their agent a plastic sachet containing suspected prohibited drug. At this juncture, witness Tougan made an approach and arrested the accused-appellant. He also recovered the prohibited drug from the agent. Witness told the accused-appellant "Wala kang kadala-dala" and the latter replied "Pag-usapan na lang natin ito at isang buwan pa lang ako nakakapanganak." Witness Tougan ignored what the accused-appellant said and instructed her to empty the contents of her pockets to enable him to recover the buy-bust money. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was informed of her constitutional rights and then brought to the police station. The incident was entered in the police blotter and the specimen forwarded to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Witness was the one who marked the specimen with his initials "JLT" at the San Mateo Police Station. Witness further testified that they coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency prior to the buy bust operation by preparing a Pre-Operational Report. They were issued a Certificate of Coordination.
When crossed-examined, witness Tougan testified that he could not determine the quantity of shabu that the amount of seven hundred (P700.00) pesos can buy. Witness heard their agent told the accused-appellant "Iiskor ako" but did not hear the accused-appellant's reply. The latter lives in a squatters area where houses were adjacent to one another. Although witness was hiding, he was able to watch what was going on during the entrapment operation. Witness confiscated the buy-bust money as well as the suspected shabu. Witness further testified that accused-appellant is known to be a drug dealer and is among the top ten drug watch list. Witness agrees that the usual amount used in buy-bust operations is only one hundred pesos.
During re-direct examination, witness Tougan testified that they offered seven hundred pesos for a plastic of shabu. The subject plastic sachet was greater in weight and is more expensive during Ramadan time. Witness claims that they have monitored shabu as ordinarily coming from Muslims. Witness was given the amount of seven hundred pesos as budget although the amount of two hundred pesos would have been enough in this kind of operation. Witness reiterated that he had met the accused-appellant even prior to the operation because they had previously arrested her.
Finally, on recross-examination, witness testified that a pusher could apportion shabu to conform to the amount of money, which the buyer intends to buy and in this case, 0.29 would amount to more or less seven hundred pesos.
According to SPO1 Herminio Arellano, they prepared a pre-operational Report and coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency as a result of which they received a Certificate of Coordination from the said agency thru fax. IDESTH
When cross-examined, witness Arellano testified they had conducted surveillance on accused Peral before they launched an entrapment operation. However, no test-buy was made. Accused-appellant Peral had previously been arrested for possession of dangerous drug and the case is still pending. Witness further testified that he was behind PO3 Tougan at the time of the operation and did not see when the operation was taking place. 1
A divergent version of the events, as retold by the defense, was likewise stated in the assailed Court of Appeals judgment, thus:
On May 17, 2005, Relly Paayongayong went to the house of her cousin, accused-appellant Peñafrancia Peral at Ibayo, Maly, San Mateo, Rizal, to deliver the clothes that the former had washed. She and the accused-appellant were surprised when four men arrived, went inside and started searching the house. After the search, the witness and the accused-appellant were invited to come with them. They were brought to a place called "Conrock". Thereat, a police officer talked to Peral. Although Relly was near them, she did not hear what their conversation was. Thereafter, the same police officer approached the witness and asked her to go home and look for the mother of the accused-appellant. The police officer instructed her to communicate with the mother of the accused-appellant that they need money to bring it to Conrock. Heeding said instruction, the witness went to see the mother of the accused-appellant. She only came to know that the accused was already in the police station the day after.
According to the accused-appellant herself, on May 17, 2005, she was at home resting and recuperating after giving birth. Her cousin Relly arrived at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to deliver the clothes that she had washed. The accused-appellant prevailed upon Relly to stay and remove lice from her hair. After about ten minutes, they were surprised when four men arrived and started searching the house. She recognized the two of them as SPO1 Arellano and PO3 Tougan and came to know the identity of the other two companions at the police station. Finding nothing, the police officers invited the accused-appellant and Relly to come with them. They went voluntarily, thinking that she did not do anything wrong. They rode on an owner-type jeep and proceeded to Conrock. Thereat, they occupied a nipa hut and the policemen started asking money from her. She retorted that she has no money. At that instance, the police officers called Relly and instructed her to see the mother of the accused in order for Relly to bring them money. After an hour, they rode again on the owner-type jeep and brought Peñafrancia to the police station. Thereat, the police officers informed her that she was selling prohibited drugs. 2
At the conclusion of the trial, appellant was convicted by the trial court of the charge of sale of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the assailed January 4, 2008 Decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Peñafrancia Peral GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Sale of Dangerous Drug (Violation, of Section 5, 1st par., Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
The plastic sachets of "shabu" subject matter of these cases are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to safely deliver the same to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.
The accused is credited for the time spent in her preventive imprisonment.
Accused Peñafrancia Peral y Cerenado is hereby ordered committed to the Correction Institute for Women, National Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa City for service of sentence.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for his information and guidance.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals for review. Unfortunately for appellant, the appellate court merely affirmed in toto her conviction by the trial court. Hence, she filed the present appeal essentially reiterating the same arguments she made before the appellate court.
Appellant faults both the trial court and the Court of Appeals for giving full faith and credence to the evidence of the prosecution which was based primarily on the testimony of Police Officer III (PO3) Juanito Tougan and the presentation of the confiscated shabu and buy-bust money. She maintains that, as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, she enjoys the presumption of innocence which is rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, she further contends that the burden of proof rests with the prosecution which must not be upheld on the basis of the weakness of the defense but must succeed solely on the strength of its own evidence. Lastly, she highlights the fact that the arresting officers did not strictly follow the requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and, most especially, Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the same statute. Because of this serious procedural oversight, she reckons that she should be acquitted of the charge against her.
We are not persuaded.
Jurisprudence tells us that the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration, and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 3 We have likewise emphasized that the prosecution must show that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti as evidence. 4TCaEAD
After a thorough review of the records of this case, we conclude that the prosecution successfully established the aforementioned elements. PO3 Juanito Tougan's testimony was clear and concise in describing how they executed the buy-bust operation during which appellant was nabbed. There was a buyer and seller who were both identified and that the object of the transaction was shabu in exchange for the buy-bust money that was handed over by the civilian informant to appellant who, in turn, delivered the sachet of dangerous drugs which was later on presented in court as evidence. All these activity was personally witnessed by PO3 Tougan who admitted to have occupied a clear vantage point nearby. It could be argued that the best witness to the transaction would be the buyer himself and should be presented in court to testify. However, the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is not fatal to the successful prosecution of a case such as this since it is settled that, in the presentation of evidence, the prosecution or the defense has the discretion on what to present as or choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses in order to establish its cause of action. 5
Nevertheless, the crucial eyewitness testimony of PO3 Tougan was consistent enough to have survived cross-examination by the defense counsel. Not surprisingly, the trial court considered his testimony to be credible and worthy of belief. Likewise, after a careful perusal of the court transcripts, we declare that we share the same view held by the trial court with regard to the credibility of PO3 Tougan's testimony since the factual findings of the trial court deserve great respect. In People v. Soriano, 6 we reiterated "[t]he reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals."
For her defense, appellant claims that no buy-bust operation took place and that she was merely framed by the arresting officers so that they could extort money from her.
On this point, appellant's self-serving testimony along with the corroboration of her cousin, Relly Paayongayong, hardly attains the level of evidentiary proof required to overcome the presumption of regularity of the performance of the police officers' duties. An examination of the aforementioned testimonies would yield several key points that would seriously put to question the veracity of their allegation. For instance, both appellant and Relly claimed that the arresting officers tried to extort money from them but, when they were asked in court how much was the amount of money demanded, both witnesses replied that no amount was mentioned. Furthermore, appellant claimed that, since appellant and Relly did not have any money with them, the latter was sent away by the police officers so that she could tell appellant's mother to bring the money demanded by the police officers. However, appellant also admitted that the police officers did not wait for her mother to arrive and instead brought her to the police station aboard an owner-type jeep. Additionally, despite being set free by her captors, Relly inexplicably did not even bother to report the incident to the barangay authorities or prepare an affidavit attesting to that fact.
Between the positive declarations coming from the prosecution witnesses and the dubious pronouncements made by appellant and her relative, the choice of the former as the narrative to be believed is imperative since it is supported by jurisprudence. We have held in a fairly recent drug case that the defense of denial, when not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving, and cannot prevail over the affirmative statements of a credible witness. 7 Similarly, we have consistently held that the defense of denial or frame-up has been viewed with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 8
It is worth noting that, despite her serious accusation of frame-up and extortion, appellant did not bring formal charges against PO3 Tougan and SPO1 Arellano. This seemingly lack of interest to vindicate herself belies the genuineness of her allegation. We have previously held that the failure to file appropriate criminal and administrative cases against the concerned police officers in light of allegations highly indicate that the claims are mere concocted afterthoughts. 9
Finally, appellant argues that she should be exonerated of the charge against her because the arresting officers did not strictly follow the requirements set forth by Section 21 (1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. We nonetheless observe that despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the aforementioned procedural rule, a perusal of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 would indicate that non-compliance with said procedural rule is not fatal to the prosecution of drug offenses as long as that it is justified and that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. EADSIa
However, whatever justification the members of the buy-bust team had to render in order to explain why they did not follow proper procedure will forever remain a mystery because appellant did not raise this important issue when the case was still being heard in the trial court. In People v. Torres, 10 we reiterated that failure to raise during trial the question of procedural fidelity by law enforcement is fatal to the appellant's case, to wit:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
In the end, the consistent and credible testimony of the police officers along with the prosecution's demonstration that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs were properly preserved has doomed the herein appeal. Coupled with appellant's failure to substantiate with clear and convincing evidence her denial and allegations of frame-up and extortion, we are convinced that appellant's conviction for the crime of illegally selling dangerous drugs should be upheld.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 31, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 03761 is AFFIRMED. REYES, J., took no part; BRION, J., additional member per Raffle dated April 23, 2014.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-5.
2. Id. at 5-6.
3. People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 191267, June 26, 2013, 700 SCRA 42, 49.
4. People v. Castro, G.R. No. 195777, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 252, 261.
5. People v. Lucio, G.R. No. 191391, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 173, 193.
6. G.R. No. 189843, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 168, 179, citing People v. Magundayao, G.R. No. 188132, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 310, 327-328.
7. People v. Linda, G.R. No. 200507, June 26, 2013, 700 SCRA 161, 172.
8. Ambre v. People, G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA 552, 566.
9. People v. Dansico, G.R. No. 178060, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 151, 160.
10. G.R. No. 191730, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 452, 468, citing People v. Sta. Maria, 545 Phil. 520, 534 (2007).