THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 230976. May 3, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. DONATO OCHOA y ESPAÑA, ALIAS "DONNIE" AND JEREMIAS PEÑA y CRUZ, ALIAS "JOEY", accused,
JEREMIAS PEÑA y CRUZ, ALIAS "JOEY", accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMay 3, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 230976 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. DONATO OCHOA Y ESPAÑA, ALIAS "DONNIE" AND JEREMIAS PEÑA Y CRUZ, ALIAS "JOEY," accused; JEREMIAS PEÑA Y CRUZ, ALIAS "JOEY," accused-appellant). — In three separate informations, Donato Ochoa (Ochoa) and Jeremias Peña (Peña) were charged with violating Sections 5, 1 11, 2 and 15 3 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. These informations read:
CRIM. CASE No. 03-4027
That on or about the 01st day of October 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver to another, zero point zero three (0.03) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug in exchange of two hundred pesos [P200.00].
Contrary to law.
CRIM. CASE No. 03-4028
That on or about the 01st day of October 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction or this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to use dangerous drug, and having been arrested and found positive for use of Methamphetamine after a confirmatory test, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use Methamphetamine, a dangerous drugs [sic], in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.
CRIM. CASE No. 03-4029
That on or about the 01st day of October 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control zero point zero two (0.02) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 4
The prosecution alleged that on October 1, 2003, an informant went to the office of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC), Cluster 5 and reported to Cluster Head, Brgy. Chairperson, Ramoncito Verecio (Verecio), that a certain "Joey" was selling shabu along 11th Street, Brgy. West Rembo, Makati City. Verecio coordinated with the Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operations Task Force to form a buy-bust team with PO2 Rodrigo Igno (PO2 Igno) as team leader and Giovanni Anlap (Anlap) as poseur-buyer. 5
The buy-bust team arrived at 11th Street at about 6:15 p.m. There, they saw Peña standing in front of his residence with Ochoa. The back-up operatives took their position, some 10-15 meters away. Anlap and the informant proceeded to approach Peña. 6
The informant introduced Anlap to Peña as an interested buyer. Peña then asked how much he needed, to which Anlap replied P200.00 worth. Ochoa asked for the money, which Anlap handed to him. Ochoa then passed the money to Peña who handed a sachet of shabu to Ochoa, who passed it on to Anlap. After, Anlap lit a cigarette, the pre-arranged signal, and the rest of the team approached Anlap, Ochoa, Peña, and the informant. 7
The prosecution narrated that as Anlap was introducing himself, Peña rushed inside his house. The other operatives ran after Peña while Anlap accosted Ochoa. Anlap then opened the door to Peña's house and arrested him. Thereafter, another operative, Juan Siborboro (Siborboro) frisked Peña, retrieving from him the marked money used for the sale, and one more sachet of shabu. Anlap marked the sachet purchased from Peña "JPC," and the other sachet "JPC-1." 8
Ochoa and Peña were then brought to the MADAC office. The contents of the sachets retrieved from Ochoa and Peña later tested positive for shabu. Their urine tests also yielded positive results for shabu. 9
Ochoa and Peña denied the charges against them. They recalled that on October 1, 2003, Ochoa along with a friend, were at Peña's house to discuss the baptism of Peña's son and Ochoa's role as a godfather. While inside, MADAC operatives arrived. They spoke with Peña's sister, Edna Malasig, who let them into the yard. An operative, Carlito Vargas (Vargas), spoke with Peña through a window and told him to go to the barangay hall for questioning. Peña refused, angering Vargas and the other operatives. Peña insisted that he will not go without the advice of a lawyer. He then called a lawyer who advised him to accede and promised to follow him. 10
When Peña finally let the operatives in, they handcuffed him and Ochoa. They also took several items including their wallets, a mobile phone, a watch, and several pieces of jewelry. 11
The operatives brought Peña and Ochoa to the West Rembo barangay hall. There, they claim that they were tortured, their heads covered with plastic bags, and their bodies struck, as they were coerced into admitting that they were peddling shabu. 12
Later, they were brought to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. Their urine samples were taken in the parking lot. A lady in the office then took down their names and simply told them things were finished, after which they were made to throw their urine samples. 13
In a Decision, 14 the Regional Trial Court convicted Peña for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, but acquitted Ochoa of all charges against him. The trial court lent credence to the prosecution's version of events as to Peña and emphasized that the operatives' actions enjoyed the presumption of regularity. 15 It exonerated Ochoa on the basis of inadequate evidence pointing to a conspiracy. 16
The dispositive portion of this Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is rendered in these cases as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-4027, finding accused Jeremias Peña y Cruz alias Joey, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165 (drug sale) and sentencing him to suffer the Penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00. Accused Donato Ochoa y España alias Donnie is Acquitted from the same charge upon a reasonable doubt.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-4029, finding Jeremias Peña y Cruz alias Joey of Sec. 11, Art. II, RA 9165 (Illegal possession of dangerous drugs), and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.
Accused Jeremias Peña y Cruz shall be given credit for the period of his preventive detention.
3. And in Criminal Case No. 03-4028, accused Donato Ochoa y España alias Donnie is Acquitted from the charge of Violation of Section 15, Art. II, RA 9165, likewise upon reasonable doubt.
Said accused Ochoa is ordered released from custody by reason of his Acquittal UNLESS there are other valid grounds for his continued detention.
It is hereby further ordered that the dangerous drugs subject of these cases be transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the latter's appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED. 17
In its assailed Decision, 18 the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in toto. Its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Crim. Case Nos. 03-4027 and 03-4029 and the order denying reconsideration thereof are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 19
Thereafter, Peña filed his Notice of Appeal.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not accused-appellant Jeremias Peña y Cruz is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case, this Court acquits accused-appellant on account of the arresting operatives' failure to comply with the mandatory requirements provided in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 on the handling of allegedly seized illegal drugs. This leads to reasonable doubt on an essential element — the corpus delicti — of the offenses raised against accused appellant.
Jurisprudence has settled the elements for conviction of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs as penalized by Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act: 20
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 21
As regards illegal possession of dangerous drugs, penalized by Section 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, it must be shown that "(1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authority by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug." 22
In both illegal sale and illegal possession, jurisprudence has discussed the importance of corpus delicti, as follows:
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, "the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the charges." Thus, their identity and integrity must be established beyond reasonable doubt. It is the prosecution's duty "to ensure that the illegal drugs offered in court are the very same items seized from the accused." 23 (Citations omitted)
On the matter of corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the chain of custody requirements regarding confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Section 21 was subsequently amended by Republic Act No. 10640, approved on July 15, 2014. The incidents here occurred in 2003, well before July 15, 2014. Thus, this case is governed by Section 21 as originally formulated. The original provision reads:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This case is tainted with a plethora of unjustified deviations from Section 21 (1).
To begin with, not a single one of the required witnesses — an elected public official, a representative from the media and a representative of the Department of Justice — was present during accused-appellant's supposed arrest and seizure.
The importance of these witnesses' presence during actual arrest and seizure was explained in People v. Tomawis: 24
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza, without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they could easily do so and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation." 25 (Citations omitted)
Apart from the total absence of required witnesses, no inventory was ever conducted and no photographs of the seized items were ever taken.
This Court has firmly explained that the inventory and taking of photographs must be done immediately, right at the place of arrest:
. . . Section 21 mandates the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs "immediately after seizure and confiscation," which means that these must be done in the place of the arrest. Que explained:
What is critical in drug cases is not the bare conduct of inventory, marking, and photographing. Instead, it is the certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused retain their integrity, even as they make their way from the accused to an officer effecting the seizure, to an investigating officer, to a forensic chemist, and ultimately, to courts where they are introduced as evidence. . . .
Section 21 (1)'s requirements are designed to make the first and second links foolproof. Conducting the inventory and photographing immediately after seizure, exactly where the seizure was done, or at a location as practicably close to it, minimizes, if not eliminates, room for adulteration or the planting of evidence[.] 26 (Citation omitted)
In this case, the operatives' sole guarantee of the seized sachets' integrity is MADAC operative Anlap's mere act of writing "JPC" and "JPC-1" onto the sachets. This fails to impress.
It is damning to the prosecution's case that apart from the writing made by Anlap, it absolutely failed to account for whatever precautions the operatives took, from the moment of seizure all the way to turnover for examination, to preserve the integrity of the seized sachets.
This Court has decried the actions or a police officer in a case where the prosecution maintained a self-serving guarantee of integrity of seized items by claiming that a police officer kept them in his pockets. This Court emphasized the utter inadequacy and unreliability of such a guarantee. In People v. Sultan: 27
Here, the prosecution established that from the place of seizure to the barangay hall, PO2 Hechanova had sole custody of the supposedly confiscated items. But this alone cannot be taken as a guarantee of the items' integrity. On the contrary, an officer's act of personally and bodily keeping allegedly seized items, without any clear indication of safeguards other than his or her mere possession, has been viewed as prejudicial to the integrity of the items.
In People v. Dela Cruz, this Court reprehended the act of a police officer who, having custody of the sachets seized from a buy-bust operation, recklessly kept them in his pockets until they were supposedly turned over for examination:
The prosecution effectively admits that from the moment of the supposed buy-bust operation until the seized items' turnover for examination, these items had been in the sole possession of a police officer. In fact, not only had they been in his possession, they had been in such close proximity to him that they had been nowhere else but in his own pockets.
Keeping one of the seized items in his right pocket and the rest in his left pocket is a doubtful and suspicious way of ensuring the integrity of the items. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding that PO1 Bobon took the necessary precautions, we find his actions reckless, if not dubious.
Even without referring to the strict requirements of Section 21, common sense dictates that a single police officer's act of bodily-keeping the item(s) which is at the crux of offenses penalized under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is fraught with dangers. One need not engage in a meticulous counter-checking with the requirements of Section 21 to view with distrust the items coming out of PO1 Bobon's pockets. That the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both failed to see through this and fell — hook, line, and sinker — for PO1 Bobon's avowals is mind-boggling.
Moreover, PO1 Bobon did so without even offering the slightest justification for dispensing with the requirements of Section 21.
Section 21, paragraph 1, of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, includes a proviso to the effect that "noncompliance of (sic) these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." Plainly, the prosecution has not shown that — on September 14, 2004, when Dela Cruz was arrested and the sachets supposedly seized and marked — there were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with compliance with Section 21. All that the prosecution has done is insist on its self-serving assertion that the integrity of the seized sachets has, despite all its lapses, nevertheless been preserved.
In Dela Cruz, this Court did not approve of the incautious keeping of allegedly seized narcotics even as the prosecution averred separating them in different pockets as a supposed measure to preserve integrity. With greater reason should this Court, in this case, reject PO2 Hechanova's claim. The bare assertion that PO2 Hechanova had possession of the items, without so much as a simulation of safekeeping measures such as the segregation in Dela Cruz, is a blatant gap in the chain of custody. The dearth of specific and detailed descriptions of how the allegedly seized items had been preserved while in transit amounts to a broken, unreliable chain of custody. This is fatal to the prosecution's case. 28 (Citations omitted)
This case is significantly worse than Sultan. Here, this is not even a feigned guarantee by way of pocketing to speak of. There was no guarantee of integrity at all.
It is true that in appropriate occasions, exceptions to Section 21's chain of custody requirements may be entertained. For any such exception to be entertained however, "the prosecution bears the burden of first acknowledging procedural lapses and specifically plead justifiable grounds for these lapses. It must also plead specific safety measures taken in view of the deviations made from the chain of custody requirements." 29 Particularly concerning the absence of required witnesses, "it must be alleged and demonstrated that earnest efforts were undertaken to secure their attendance." 30 This Court has thus, explained:
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 31 (Citations omitted)
Here, the operatives utterly failed in offering any justifiable ground for the absence of all the required witnesses.
It was grievous error for the Regional Trial Court to merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by the MADAC operatives. It was equally grievous error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the Regional Trial Court's reliance on this presumption. It is settled that presumption of regularity cannot stand when there are manifest irregularities. 32 In People v. Kamad: 33
The presumption [of regularity in the performance of official duty] applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. 34 (Citation omitted)
The sheer disregard for and plethora of errors concerning chain of custody requirements render dubious the identity and integrity of the shabu, the corpus delicti, at the center of this case. On account of the prosecution's inability to establish beyond reasonable doubt the vital elements of the offenses, this Court is constrained to acquit accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03365 affirming the Regional Trial Court's Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 03-4027 and 03-4029 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jeremias Peña y Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Accused-appellant is ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate implementation. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. For their information, copies shall also be furnished to the Police General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.
The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride subject of this case to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) RUMAR D. PASIONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
2. SECTION 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
3. SECTION 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
4.Rollo, pp. 4-5.
5.Id. at 6.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 6-7.
9.Id. at 7.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 7.
13.Id.
14. CA rollo, pp. 39-48. The August 17, 2007 Decision was penned by Acting Presiding Judge Maria Cristina J. Cornejo of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64.
15.Id. at 44.
16.Id. at 46-47.
17.Id. at 48.
18.Rollo, pp. 2-25. The July 28, 2009 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, and concurred in Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Isaias P. Dicdican, of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
19.Id. at 21.
20. 630 Phil. 215 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
21.People v. Morales, 630 Phil. 215, 228 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division], citing People v. Darisan, et al., 597 Phil. 479, 485 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division]; and People v. Partoza, 605 Phil. 883 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
22.People v. Morales, 630 Phil. 215, 228 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
23.People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019, <https.//elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65610> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
24. G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018, 862 SCRA 131 [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
25.Id. at 149-150.
26.People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 225210, August 7, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65518> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
27. G.R. No. 225210, August 7, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65518> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
28.Id.
29.People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019. <http.//elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65610> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214, 234 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
30.Id.
31.People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, <http.//elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64400> [Per J. Peralta, En banc].
32.People v. De Guzman, 299 Phil. 849, 854 (1994) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
33. 624 Phil. 289 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
34.Id. at 311.