FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 203474. November 21, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ERWIN PATISTES y MALINAO AND PEPE PAYLA y LIDETH, accused-appellants.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 21, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 203474 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERWIN PATISTES y MALINAO and PEPE PAYLA y LIDETH, Accused-Appellants.) — In this appeal, the accused-appellants assail the decision promulgated on December 28, 2011, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed their conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 173, in Manila for the crime of carnapping committed in violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Law) through the decision rendered on June 18, 2010 in Criminal Case No. 07-255506. 2
The accused-appellants were charged under separate informations for robbery (Criminal Case No. 07-255505) and carnapping (Criminal Case No. 07-255506). The Court adopts the summary of the evidence of the parties rendered by the CA in the assailed decision, to wit:
According to the victim, Jose Dario Condesa (Condesa), on 04 August 2007 at about 10:30 in the evening, while he was driving a Romudal taxi at Park Avenue, corner EDSA, Pasay City, the appellants boarded his taxi and asked him to bring them to the Macro impounding area along Smokey Mountain allegedly to redeem a wrecked jeepney. When they arrived at the said place, they discovered that the impounding area was not there anymore and so they proceeded to the Traffic Bureau along Port Area, Manila. Thereat, Payla alighted from the taxi and asked a policeman regarding the jeepney and was told that they could not redeem the jeepney because the secretary of the Bureau had already left. Payla then instructed Condesa to go to Malate, Manila to which the latter obliged.
While in front of the Manila Zoo, Payla suddenly asked Condesa to stop, pulled a gun and pointed it at the latter's chest. Patistes, who was seated at the back seat, poked a knife at Condesa's neck. The appellants then declared a hold-up and asked for his earnings. Patistes immediately took the money amounting to P2,400.00, forcibly transferred Condesa to the back seat and drove the taxi himself. When they reached Mataas na Lupa, Paco, Manila, the appellants pushed him out of the taxi and threatened him; that he should not make any scandalous act. CAIHTE
Condesa at once reported the incident to the barangay hall of Barangay 37, Zone 80 of Manila. Accompanied by a barangaykagawad, Condesa proceeded to the Police Station 9-Anti-Carnapping Unit and was informed by the policeman thereat that a carnapped taxi was intercepted.
Senior Police Officer 4 Patrick de Leon testified that while he, together with Police Officer 2 Jesus de Leon and Police Officer 2 Abel Sadiosa, were conducting foot patrol along Alejo Aquino corner F. Torres Streets, Singalong, Manila at about 12:48 in the morning of 05 August 2007, they saw Payla urinating in full public view with a gun protruding at the right side of the latter's body. Parked beside Payla was a white Toyota Corolla Romudal taxi, with Plate No. TYG 703 and inside the taxi was Patistes. After Payla failed to produce the necessary documents for his possession of the gun, they apprehended him and PO2 Jesus de Leon confiscated the gun of Payla.
After the apprehension of Payla, the policemen heard through their radio about a carnapped vehicle/taxi and it matched the description of the vehicle in front of them. Thus, they immediately ordered Patistes to alight from the taxi, subjected him to a routine body search and recovered from his possession a fan knife. They then brought the two appellants to the Singalong Police Station.
The defense presented a different version of the story. On 04 August 2007, the appellants were in Baclaran waiting for a taxi to go to San Andres Bukid to look for Payla's friend who can help Patistes in looking for a job as "panadero." While on board the taxi, the driver offered to bring the appellants to Pandacan at a fixed price of One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P150.00) to which the latter agreed. The appellants were, however, not able to reach their destination since an argument ensued between them and the driver, when the latter asked for an additional Fifty Pesos (P50.00). Payla then told the driver to stop the vehicle. Both appellants alighted from the taxi and paid the driver One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), which angered the latter. At this point, Payla was also infuriated and was being pacified by Patistes. The driver alighted from the taxi and without warning hit Patistes with an iron pipe, causing his head to bleed. Thereafter, the driver immediately fled.
The appellants went to the sidewalk, trying to look for another taxi. Suddenly, three (3) policemen approached and interrogated them. They told the policemen about their altercation with the taxi driver. They were then ordered to board the same taxi and were brought to the police station. While on their way one of the policemen took the money from the dashboard. Upon arrival thereat, they were detained. Later on, the taxi driver arrived and told one of the policemen that his taxi was carnapped. He was then told to identify whether the two (2) male persons that they had just apprehended were the same ones who took his taxi. To their surprise, the driver identified them as the malefactors. 3 DETACa
As stated, the RTC convicted the accused-appellants for carnapping but acquitted them of robbery, viz.: 4
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused Pepe Payla and Edwin Patistes GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 07-255506 for conspiring to commit carnapping and (sic) accordingly sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In the other Criminal Case No. 07-255505, the Court hereby ACQUITS them form (sic) the criminal charge of Robbery for insufficiency of evidence.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC with modification of the penalty, 5 ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 07-255506 is AFFIRMED with the only modification that the appellants Erwin Patistes y Malinao and Pepe Payla y Lideth be sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6
In this appeal, the accused-appellants and the Office of the Solicitor General submitted their respective manifestations in lieu of supplemental briefs. On their part, the accused-appellants expressly reiterated their assignment of errors in the CA, as follows:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
GRANTING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6539, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA. 7
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit. The CA did not commit any error in affirming with modifications the conviction of the accused-appellants for carnapping.
In this connection, we adopt the factual findings and conclusions of the CA in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, to wit:
Here, the appellants contend that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of the last element, which is, the intent to gain. They argue that since they have not sold or disposed the vehicle or any part thereof, intent to gain was not established.
We are not persuaded.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent constitutes gain. aDSIHc
In fact in Villacorta v. Insurance Commission which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., the High Court, through Justice Claudio Teehankee, held that even if the taking was "temporary" and for a "joy ride," intent to gain is evident since the accused derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Hence, the argument relied upon by the appellants must simply fail because for the element of intent to gain to be present it is not necessary that the appellants had actually converted to cash or sold the carnapped vehicle.
We note that the appellants did not anymore dispute the trial court's finding of the existence of unlawful taking of the subject vehicle. Jurisprudence dictates that unlawful taking is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose the same. As earlier said, intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, and is presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.
There is no merit in the appellants' argument that the out-of-court identification made by Condesa was irregular because they were the only ones presented for identification. First, the regularity of the appellants' identification was never questioned before the trial court. It is therefore too late in the day for the appellants to raise such an issue for the first time on appeal. Second, out-of-court identification is not only conducted thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. It may be done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification or thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. In this case, the victim himself positively identified the appellants as the carnappers at the Singalong Precinct just a few hours after the carnapping was committed. Condesa testified:
FISCAL DANTA:
Q: And after you were informed by the police officer that the taxi you were driving was intercepted what did you do?
WITNESS:
A: We went to PCP 9.
Q: And did you arrive at the Singalong precinct?
A: Yes, Ma'am, together with the kagawad.
Q: And when you arrived there at the Singalong precinct what transpired thereat?
A: I saw the taxi there and the two suspects.
Q: And when you saw the taxi and the two suspects what then did you do?
A: We were brought to Station 9 together with the two suspects and the police.
In such a situation, we find nothing irregular in the identification made by Condesa. Even assuming arguendo that Condesa's out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it. Third, there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim to testify falsely against the accused or to implicate them falsely in the commission of the crime; hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony of Condesa is worthy of full faith and credence. 8 ETHIDa
We adopt the foregoing findings and conclusions. The taking at gunpoint by the accused-appellants of the taxicab constituted the crime of carnapping, which is defined in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, to be "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are, namely: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle that belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. The State competently established these elements beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA modified the penalty, giving the following reason for doing so, to wit:
Considering that the Information charging the appellants with violation of RA 6539, as amended, only alleged that the appellants committed the crime by means of violence and intimidation upon person and did not allege that the victim was killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on occasion thereof, the penalty should have been imprisonment of not less than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months and not more than thirty (30) years.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the said law, and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find it reasonable to impose an indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum. 9
The modification was in accord with Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, which states:
x x x Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, of force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on December 28, 2011; and ORDERS the accused-appellants to pay the costs of suit. cSEDTC
SO ORDERED."Bersamin, J., designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2606 dated October 10, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as Additional Member per Special Order No. 2607 dated October 10, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 116-125; penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios.
2. CA rollo, pp. 61-77; penned by Judge Armando A. Yanga.
3.Rollo, pp. 3-6.
4. CA rollo, p. 77.
5.Rollo, pp. 9-10.
6.Id. at 11.
7. CA rollo, p. 46.
8.Rollo, pp. 7-9.
9.Id. at 10.