THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 243637. October 7, 2020.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. HERBERT PASTIRA y MERGO @ BERT, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated October 7, 2020, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 243637 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. HERBERT PASTIRA y MERGO @ BERT, accused-appellant.) — In crimes involving dangerous drugs, justification for noncompliance with the chain of custody rule must be alleged and proved. Failure to do so casts serious doubts on the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti, warranting an accused's acquittal on reasonable doubt.
This Court resolves the appeal 1 challenging the Court of Appeals Decision, 2 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision 3 convicting Herbert Pastira y Megro (Pastira) of the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Pastira was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The two (2) separate Informations read:
R-MKT-16-00906-CR
On the 24th day of June 2016, in the city of Makati, the Philippines, accused [sic], not being authorized by law and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control zero point one three (0.13) gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law. 4
R-MKT-16-00907-CR
On the 24th day of June 2016, in the city of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, distribute and transport zero point zero six (0.06) gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the afore-cited law. 5
On arraignment, Pastira pleaded not guilty to the charges. Joint trial then ensued. 6
During trial, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses: (1) Police Officer 2 Sherwin Limbauan (PO2 Limbauan); (2) Police Senior Inspector Rendielyn Sahagun (PSI Sahagun); (3) Senior Police Officer 2 Ramon Esperanzate (SPO2 Esperanzate); and (4) Police Officer 2 Joemar Cahanding (PO2 Cahanding). The parties agreed to stipulate on the testimonies of PSI Sahagun, SPO2 Esperanzate, and PO2 Cahanding. 7
According to PO2 Limbauan, at around 6:00 p.m. on June 22, 2016, an asset and a barangay official of Barangay Cembo reported that a certain Herbert "Bert" Pastira was selling illegal drugs in Barangay Cembo, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, and nearby areas. Police Senior Inspector Tallud (PSI Tallud) then ordered the conduct of a buy-bust operation. That same day, the officers proceeded to conduct surveillance of the area. 8
In the evening of June 23, 2016, the police officers formed a buy-bust team with PO2 Limbauan as poseur-buyer and PO2 Cahandig as backup. They also prepared a P500.00 bill for the sale. 9
On June 24, 2016, at around 12:20 a.m., the team, along with the confidential informant, went to the target area in Barangay Cembo, Makati City. As they passed by an alley while walking to Guiho Extension, PO2 Limbauan and the informant met Pastira. Upon meeting, the asset introduced PO2 Limbauan as an interested buyer. Pastira then asked how much he wanted to buy, to which PO2 Limbauan responded P500.00 worth. He then took out one (1) sachet of shabu from his pocket and in exchange, PO2 Limbauan handed him the marked money. 10
Thereafter, PO2 Limbauan gave the pre-arranged signal, prompting the rest of the team to arrest Pastira. The police officers searched Pastira's pockets and recovered the buy-bust money, as well as two (2) plastic sachets of shabu. They waited for about an hour for the arrival of an elected official, media personnel, and a representative from the Department of Justice to witness the marking and inventory of the seized items. However, no one allegedly appeared. 11
The buy-bust team then proceeded to Barangay West Rembo's barangay hall where they inventoried the items, which a barangay kagawad witnessed at around 3:30 a.m. The seized items were then marked, sealed, and turned over to SPO2 Esperanzate for further investigation. 12
In Chemistry Report No. D-695-16, PSI Sahagun confirmed that the three (3) items yielded positive results for shabu. 13
Pastira testified in his defense. He recalled that on the day of the incident, at around 1:00 a.m. on July 24, 2016, he was on his way to a friend's house when a group of men in civilian attire stopped, handcuffed, and forced him to board a motorcycle. He was then taken to the Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Task Group (SAID-SOTG) office. The men allegedly demanded P30,000.00 in exchange for his liberty. 14
The following day, Pastira failed to hand them the money. The police officers then transported him to Barangay West Cembo where three (3) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and a P500.00 bill were presented to a barangay kagawad. 15
In its September 27, 2016 Judgment, 16 the Regional Trial Court convicted Pastira of the offenses charged and gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. Applying the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, it reasoned that the integrity of the corpus delicti is presumably preserved, unless there is proof that the police officers tampered with the evidence. 17 The dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. R-MKT-16-00906-CR, finding accused [Herbert] Pastira y Mergo, GUILTY of the charge for violation of Section 11[,] Article II of [Republic Act No.] 9165 and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P300,000.00] without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
2. In Criminal Cases [sic] No. R-MKT-16-00907-CR, finding the accused [Herbert] Pastira y Mergo, GUILTY of the charge for violation of Section 5. Article II of [Republic Act No.] 9165 and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED. 18
In its November 29, 2017 Decision, 19 the Court of Appeals affirmed Pastira's conviction. On Pastira's contention that the witnesses required by law were not present during the marking and inventory of the confiscated items, the Court of Appeals ruled that noncompliance with the chain of custody rule does not render the seized items inadmissible. It added that the prosecution only needs to show that the integrity of the seized items were preserved. 20
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed September 27, 2016 Decision of the Makati City Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, in Criminal Case Nos. R-MKT-16-00906-CR and R-MKT-16-00907-CR finding the herein accused-appellant Herbert Pastira y Mergo @ Bert guilty for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the fine to be imposed in Criminal Case No. R-MKT-16-00907-CR for violation of Section 5, Article II of [Republic Act No.] 9165 must be Php500,000.00. We, however, affirm in all other aspects.
SO ORDERED. 21 (Emphasis in the original)
Pastira filed a Notice of Appeal, 22 to which the Court of Appeals gave due course in its January 11, 2018 Resolution. 23
In its February 13, 2019 Resolution, 24 this Court noted the case records and required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief, adopting the Brief it filed before the Court of Appeals instead. 25 Accused-appellant then filed a Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Supplemental Brief. 26
In its Brief 27 before the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the lower court correctly found PO2 Limbauan's testimony "credible and worthy of belief." 28 It stresses that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved. It further posits that the essence of the chain of custody rule is simply to ensure that the prohibited drugs presented in court are the same prohibited drugs seized from the accused-appellant. 29 Since the prosecution sufficiently established the crucial links in the chain of custody, it maintains that the conviction of accused-appellant should not be disturbed. 30
On July 5, 2019, accused-appellant filed his Supplemental Brief. 31 He asserts that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty does not apply when there are evident lapses in the chain of custody. 32
Moreover, he assails the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, pointing out that the prosecution failed to justify the absence of a representative from the Department of Justice or a media personnel during the physical inventory and photographing of the items. He claims that this failure results to serious doubts on the corpus delicti, which is an "essential element of the offenses[.]" 33
Accused-appellant contends that the required witnesses must be present not only during the inventory and taking of photographs, but also during the time of arrest and seizure of the evidence. 34 He notes that none of the required witnesses were present at the time he was apprehended. 35 Thus, he prays for his acquittal. 36
In its July 29, 2019 Resolution, 37 this Court granted accused-appellant's motion, and noted the parties' pleadings.
For this Court's resolution is the lone issue of whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant Herbert Pastira y Mergo was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
This Court grants the appeal and acquits accused-appellant.
I
The offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs are penalized under Sections 5 38 and 11 39 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. People v. Morales40 spelled out the elements that must be established to sustain conviction:
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 41 (Citations omitted)
The corpus delicti, the actual illegal drug seized from the accused, must be presented during trial:
"[I]t is of paramount importance that the existence of the drug, the corpus delicti of the crime, be established beyond doubt." Its identity and integrity must be proven to have been safeguarded. Aside from proving the elements of the charges, "the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold [was] the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict." The chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." 42 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
On the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, outlines the procedural requirements that must be followed when handling the seized illegal drugs:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Fidelity to these procedural requirements reduces the risk of tampering, loss, or mistake due to the fungible character of prohibited drugs and the covertness of drug operations. 43 It also guarantees the observance of the four (4) links established in People v. Nandi: 44
The following links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 45 (Citation omitted)
Failure, on the part of the prosecution, to establish these links "casts serious doubts on the identity of the seized item and its actual connection with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto." 46 When without any justifiable reason, this noncompliance with the law's requirements and the chain of custody rule amounts to failing to preserve the corpus delicti's integrity and evidentiary value. "Without the corpus delicti, there is no offense of illegal sale [and possession] of dangerous drug committed." 47
Moreover, considering that it is not immediately apparent to the naked eye whether the evidence presented are indeed dangerous drugs, especially when an accused is prosecuted on minuscule amounts, courts must take a more stringent approach when evaluating proof. 48 The policy considerations were elaborated in Mallillin v. People: 49
[T]he likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. . . .
A uniqué characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases — by accident or otherwise — in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. 50 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Here, accused-appellant was charged with possessing 0.13 gram and for selling 0.06 gram of shabu. As Mallillin directed, this Court employs heightened scrutiny in cases involving dangerous drugs.
This Court notes that it was neither clear which two (2) of the three (3) sachets allegedly confiscated from accused-appellant were the basis in charging accused-appellant, nor was it clear which were presented in evidence. We scoured the records to no avail. This signifies how the basic rules on evidence were completely disregarded here.
II
Lescano v. People51 summarized the statutory requirements in the seizure, marking, and inventory of the illegal drugs:
Section 21 (1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2) actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section 21 (1) is specific as to when and where these actions must be done. As to when, it must be "immediately after seizure and confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable."
Moreover, Section 21 (1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from whom the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the National Prosecution Service. There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the media may be present in his or her place. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
The text of Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act commands that the law enforcers inventory and take photographs of the confiscated article. These must be conducted in the presence of the accused or counsel, along with the third-party witnesses: (1) any elected public official; (2) a representative the Department of Justice; or (3) the media.
People v. Adobar53 stressed that these witnesses must be present not only during the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs of the items, but also during "the time of and at or near the place of apprehension and seizure[,]" especially in buy-busts:
By the same intent of the law behind the mandate that the initial custody requirements be done "immediately after seizure and confiscation," the aforesaid witnesses must already be physically present at the time of apprehension and seizure — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its very nature, a planned activity. Simply put, the buy-bust team had enough time and opportunity to bring with them these witnesses.
In other words, while the physical inventory and photographing is allowed to be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure," this does not dispense with the requirement of having the DOJ and media representative and the elected public official to be physically present at the time of and at or near the place of apprehension and seizure so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation." 54 (Citation omitted)
Mandating the presence of disinterested witnesses reduces the likelihood of tampering, planting or switching of evidence, and ensures that the chain of custody rule is strictly followed. People v. Mendoza55 discussed the effects of their "insulating presence[:]"
Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody. 56 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the prosecution established that only a barangay kagawad was present during the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs at the barangay hall. 57 Not one witness, as required by law, was in attendance. The police officers claimed that they conducted the inventory after waiting for more than an hour at the place of arrest for an elected official, media personnel, and a representative from the Department of Justice but to no avail. 58 However, there was no mention whether or not their presence was sought to witness the warrantless arrest.
Indeed, Section 21, as amended, sanctions noncompliance with respect to the presence of third-party witnesses "under justifiable grounds" and "as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team[.]" 59
However, People v. Lim60 discussed that the prosecution must show that the apprehending officers exerted earnest efforts to comply with the law. It cannot solely rely on sweeping guarantees, and it must allege and prove that the law enforcers took positive measures to substantially comply. Jurisprudence cited some excusable grounds:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. 61 (Citation omitted)
Here, the prosecution did not proffer any explanation, let alone any justification, on the complete absence of the required witnesses during the apprehension of the accused-appellant and during the marking, taking of photographs, and inventory of the confiscated articles. An unsubstantiated allegation of waiting for more than an hour for witnesses, without any showing that earnest efforts were exerted to secure their presence, cannot justify the police officers' glaring lapses.
This Court reiterates that a buy-bust operation is not sporadic, but a pre-planned, organized activity. Had they intended to, the law enforcers had ample time and opportunity to comply with the simple statutory requirements. Yet, they failed miserably in their lame attempt of having a barangay kagawad witness the inventory, who is not even included in Section 21's list of required witnesses.
It also does not escape this Court's attention that the police officers marked, inventoried, and took photographs of the seized items more than an hour after apprehension, and not immediately upon possession. Moreover, they conducted these in Barangay West Rembo's barangay hall, which was not the place of arrest. 62 This is yet another deviation from the clear mandate of Section 21 (1), as amended, which requires that "the apprehending team . . . shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same[.]" 63
People v. Banding, 64 clarified that "the mandate to conduct inventory and take photographs 'immediately after seizure and confiscation' necessarily means that these shall be accomplished at the place of arrest." Citing People v. Que, 65 this Court emphasized the importance of the immediacy requirement in the custody and disposition of prohibited drugs:
What is critical in drug cases is not the bare conduct of inventory, marking, and photographing. Instead, it is the certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused retain their integrity, even as they make their way from the accused to an officer effecting the seizure, to an investigating officer, to a forensic chemist, and ultimately, to courts where they are introduced as evidence. . . .
Section 21 (1)'s requirements are designed to make the first and second links foolproof. Conducting the inventory and photographing immediately after seizure, exactly where the seizure was done, or at a location as practicably close to it, minimizes, if not eliminates, room for adulteration or the planting of evidence. 66 (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied)
We reiterate that the procedural requirements outlined in Section 21 (1) demand strict compliance. Failure to do so casts serious doubts on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, the essential element in cases of dangerous drugs. 67 Per jurisprudence, 68 this is fatal to the prosecution's cause. This Court must acquit accused-appellant.
III
Contrary to the Solicitor General's position, this Court cannot simply rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. The blatant evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody and the police officers' glaring irregularities preclude the application of the presumption. This Court mindfully weighs this as against the constitutionally enshrined presumption of innocence in accused-appellant's favor. Casonana v. People69 explained:
To begin with, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties should not even be relied upon because there was concrete and undeniable evidence of lapses committed by the arresting officers in their compliance with the affirmative safeguards. The presumption has been erected only for convenience, to excuse the State from the duty to adduce proof that official duties have been regularly performed by its agents, because of the physically impossible or time-consuming task of detailing all the steps establishing the regular performance of official duties. Moreover, it would be unconstitutional to place a higher value in the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties — a mere tool of evidence — than in the more substantial presumption of innocence favoring the petitioner as an accused — a right enshrined no less than in the Bill of Rights. Preferring the former would ignore the experience in the streets that actually bears witness to so many illegal arrests and unreasonable incriminations of the innocent. In People v. Andaya, therefore, we have precisely warned against judicially pronouncing guilty the person arrested by law enforcers just because he could not impute any ill motives to them for arresting him, and have cautioned against presuming the regularity of the arrest on that basis alone, stating:
We should remind ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused committed the crimes they have been charged with. The State must fully establish that for us. If the imputation of ill motive to the lawmen is the only means of impeaching them, then that would be the end of our dutiful vigilance to protect our citizenry from false arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are aware that there have been in the past many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that should heighten our resolve to strengthen the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.
Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our citizenry just because the lawmen are shielded by the presumption of the regularity of their performance of duty. The presumed regularity is nothing but a purely evidentiary tool intended to avoid the impossible and time-consuming task of establishing every detail of the performance by officials and functionaries of the Government. Conversion by no means defeat the much stronger and much firmer presumption of innocence in favor of every person whose life, property and liberty comes under the risk of forfeiture on the strength of a false accusation of committing some crime.
The criminal accusation against a person must be substantiated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court should steadfastly safeguard his right to be presumed innocent. Although his innocence could be doubted, for his reputation in his community might not be lily-white or lustrous, he should not fear a conviction for any crime, least of all one as grave as drug pushing, unless the evidence against him was clear, competent and beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the presumption of innocence in his favor would be rendered empty. 70 (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied)
We remind our police that misplaced vigilance and overzealousness in arrests, especially when laden with unlawful practices, do not strengthen the rule of law. Rather, they burden the justice system with mistrust. Higher standards must be demanded from our law enforcement.
As we face the same problems, this Court reiterates our earlier pronouncement in Holgado:
It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels. 71
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt, and this warranted accused-appellant's acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' November 29, 2017 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09121 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Herbert Pastira y Mergo is ACQUITTED for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate implementation. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court the action he has taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. Copies shall also be furnished to the Police General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for their information.
The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the seized sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.
Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 22-23.
2.Id. at 2-20. The November 29, 2017 Decision in CA-G.R. No. 09121 was penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante and concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Fifth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3. CA rollo, pp. 60-65. The September 27, 2016 Decision in Criminal Case No. R-MKT-16-00906-CR and Criminal Case No. R-MKT-16-00907-CR was penned by Presiding Judge Gina M. Bibat-Palamos of Branch 64, Regional Trial Court, Makati City.
4.Id. at 60.
5.Id.
6.Id. at 61.
7.Id. at 61-62.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 62.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13.Id. at 61.
14.Rollo, p. 5.
15.Id. at 6.
16. CA rollo, pp. 60-65.
17.Id. at 64.
18.Id. at 64-65.
19.Rollo, pp. 2-20.
20.Id. at 16-17.
21.Id. at 20-21.
22.Id. at 22-23.
23.Id. at 24.
24.Id. at 26.
25. Id. at 30-33.
26. Id. at 34-38.
27. CA rollo, pp. 71-94.
28. Id. at 84.
29. Id. at 88.
30. Id. at 90-91.
31. Rollo, pp. 39-50.
32. Id. at 41-42.
33. Id. at 44.
34. Id. at 45.
35. Id. at 46.
36. Id. at 47.
37. Id. at 51-52.
38. Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 5 partly provides:
SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery Distribution, and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transaction.
39. Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11 (3) provides:
SECTION 11. Possession of dangerous drugs. —
xxx xxx xxx
Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements: or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
40. 630 Phil. 215 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
41. Id. at 228.
42. People v. Sagana, 815 Phil. 356, 367-368 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Lopez v. People, 725 Phil. 499, 507 (2014) [Per J. Perez, Second Division]; People v. Lagahit, 746 Phil. 896, 908 (2014) [Per J. Perez, First Division]; and People v. Ismael, 806 Phil. 21 (2017) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
43. People v. Royol, G.R. No. 224297, February 13, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65005> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
44. 639 Phil. 134 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
45. Id. at 144-145.
46. People v. Banding, G.R. No. 233470, August 14, 2019 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/7205/> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing People v. Nandi, 639 Phil. 134 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
47. Id.
48. People v. Holgado, 741 Phil. 78 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
49. 576 Phil. 576 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
50. Id. at 588.
51. 778 Phil. 460 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
52. Id. at 475.
53. G.R. No. 222559, June 06, 2018, https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64272 [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
54. Id.
55. 736 Phil. 749 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
56. Id. at 764.
57. CA rollo, p. 62.
58. Id.
59. Rep. Act. No. 10640 (2014), sec. 21.
60. G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64400> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
61. Id.
62. CA rollo, p. 62.
63. Republic Act No. 10640 (2014), sec. 1.
64. G.R. No. 233470, August 14, 2019 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/7205/> p. 10 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
65. G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2018/january2018/212994.pd> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
66. People v. Banding, G.R. No. 233470, August 14, 2019 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/7205/> p. 11 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
67. People v. Morales, 630 Phil. 215, 229 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
68. People v. Dela Cruz, 744 Phil. 816 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
69. 818 Phil. 76 (2017) [Per J. Bersamin, Third Division].
70. Id. at 90-91.
71. People v. Holgado, 741 Phil. 78, 100 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].