THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233745. May 10, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. RYAN PASCUA y BULAQUEÑA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated May 10, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 233745 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. RYAN PASCUA Y BULAQUEÑA, accused-appellant). The credibility of witnesses is not affected by minor inconsistencies in their testimonies. Rather than undermine, these inconsistencies can even reinforce the testimonies' credibility. 1
This Court resolves an Appeal 2 filed by Ryan Pascua y Bulaqueña (Ryan) from the Decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 which affirmed his conviction 4 for murder and attempted murder but modified the penalty imposed and damages awarded.
Under three Informations, Ryan was charged with one count of murder for the death of Jessie Cortes (Jessie), and two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by Leandro Agnes (Leandro) and Crisostomo Subiaga (Crisostomo). They read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-13-180544
"That on or about the 20th day of January 2013, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with the qualifying aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one JESSIE CORTES y ARAREJADO, by then and there shooting him, thereby inflicting upon the said JESSIE CORTES y ARAREJADO serious and mortal gun wounds which [were] the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said offended party.
The accused planned the commission of the crime prior to its execution and deliberately adopted sudden and unexpected attack in assaulting his victim to ensure the commission of the crime without risk to himself, thereby committing the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-13-180545
"That on or about the 20th day of January, 2013, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and the qualifying aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of LEANDRO M. AGNES, by then and there shooting him, thereby inflicting upon him serious fatal injuries which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is the able and timely medical assistance to the said complainant which prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
The accused planned the commission of the crime prior to its execution and deliberately adopted sudden and unexpected attack in assaulting his victim to ensure the commission of the crime without risk to himself, thereby committing the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-13-180546
"That on or about the 20th day of January, 2013, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and with the qualifying aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of CHRISOSTOMO (sic) D. SUBIAGA, by then and there shooting him, thereby inflicting upon him serious fatal injuries which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is the able and timely medical assistance to the said complainant which prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
The accused planned the commission of the crime prior to its execution and deliberately adopted sudden and unexpected attack in assaulting his victim to ensure the commission of the crime without risk to himself, thereby committing the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 5 (Emphasis supplied)
On February 18, 2013, Ryan pleaded not guilty to the charges. After pre-trial on February 26, 2013, trial on the merits commenced. 6
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Federico Milleza (Federico); (2) Jessie's widow, Lydia Cortes (Lydia); (3) medico-legal officer, Police Chief Inspector Annalee Palima (PCI Palima); (4) Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Eric Lazo (SPO1 Lazo); (5) Police Senior Inspector Virgilio Miguel Carodan (PSI Carodan); and (6) Dr. Ismael Guiling (Dr. Guiling). 7
From their testimonies, the prosecution alleged that at around 5:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. on January 20, 2013, June Ray Dellava (June Ray) 8 was driving a motorcycle along Dakila Street, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with Ryan as back ride. 9
Federico, who was then smoking in front of his house, saw the motorcycle move in a zigzag and stop at Jessie's son, Jaymar 10 Cortes (Jaymar). 11 Ryan scolded Jaymar and asked if he was the one who shouted. Suddenly, several unnamed persons approached and ganged up on them. The two got hurt but were able to run off. 12
An hour later, Ryan and June Ray returned to Jaymar's neighborhood. Ryan passed behind Federico's house and advanced to the other side of the street. He then "inserted his head in the 1x1-meter window of Jessie's house, pulled a sumpak from his back, pointed to the persons inside the house and fired his gun three (3) times." 13
Federico, whose nieces and nephews were with him, could not move in fear. Nevertheless, he knew that Jessie was hit as he was the only person inside the house. 14
A woman named Beth opened the door and secured a GI sheet. 15 It turned out that Leandro 16 and Crisostomo, who were then outside Jessie's house, were also hurt. Allegedly, one of them was able to run away, but the other failed to do so for being seriously hurt. Federico only came to know about Jessie's demise when he was at the police station. 17
PCI Palima, the medico-legal officer, testified on Jessie's injuries that caused his death:
. . . Jessie sustained gunshot wounds on the right armpit which caused his death. There were at least five (5) multiple entries and there is no exit point hence all the pellets which entered the body were recovered on the different parts of the body." 18 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
As to Crisostomo, Dr. Guiling attested on the following findings:
. . . on 20 January 2013[,] . . . he attended to the patient named Crisostomo Subiaga who sustained multiple gunshot wounds on the left thigh. He did not extract the bullet from the victim at that time because the same would have to be extracted in a different procedure after the body has naturally displaced the foreign object. Since the victim was immediately attended to, the wound sustained by the victim would be no reason to cause death unless the same is not managed properly and cause sepsis. Dr. Guiling recommended the confinement of Crisostomo Subiaga for nine (9) days. 19 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
PSI Carodan testified that for being involved in a shooting incident, Ryan was escorted by SPO4 Abbubacar Maglangit 20 to their office. Ryan asked for a confession and waited for a lawyer to assist. When no lawyer appeared after a day of waiting, PSI Carodan turned the matter over to the Chief of CDU, Inspector Monsalve. 21
The parties dispensed with the testimonies of SPO1 Lazo and Lydia, but stipulated on the expenses incurred for Jessie which amounted to P48,626.00, as shown by pertinent receipts. 22
Ryan and his mother, Mildred Pascua (Mildred), appeared for the defense.
Ryan interposed denial. He claimed that on that day, June Ray had nearly run over a minor and stopped to apologize, but people mauled him. They managed to escape, and June Ray dropped him off at his house, about 15 minutes away from the mob. 23
At around 6:30 p.m., Ryan claimed that he was either eating or watching television. Allegedly, it was only the next day that he heard about Jessie's killing. He denied surrendering to the authorities and claimed that he sought Sergeant Manlangit's assistance just to clear his name. 24
For her part, Mildred insisted that she was watching television with Ryan and his family at the time of the shooting incident. She denied that Ryan surrendered to the authorities and claimed that when she came to know about the accusations against him the next day, she asked help from a friend who was a police officer. As advised, she voluntarily brought her son to the police station and then went home. She waited for her son, but he did not return because he was already apprehended. 25
On January 15, 2016, the Regional Trial Court convicted Ryan for the murder of Jessie and the attempted murder of Crisostomo. However, it dismissed the other charge of frustrated murder for lack of proof that Leandro sustained injuries as a result of the shooting. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: cHDAIS
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. [Q]-13-180544, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RYAN PASCUA y Bulaqueña GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and he is sentenced to a jail term of Reclusion Perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Jessie Cortes the amount of Php48,626.00 as actual damages, Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 temperate damages.
2. In Crim. Case No. [Q]-13-[1]80546, judgment is hereby rendered finding RYAN PASCUA y Bulaquena and [sic]GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder and he is sentenced to a jail term of four (4) years [,] two (2) months [,] one (1) day of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years [,] one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.
3. Crim. Case No. [Q]-13-180545 is dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 26 (Emphasis in the original)
The trial court found that the prosecution has proved Ryan's guilt with moral certainty. Against his denial and alibi, it gave more credence to Federico's candid testimony on the details of the shooting incident, which pointed to Ryan as the perpetrator. That Ryan claimed not being familiar with the people in Jaymar's community only convinced the trial court more that Federico had no motive to falsely impute such grave offense. Besides, for the trial court, Ryan failed to prove that it was physically improbable for him to be at the scene of the crime as his house was only 10 to 15 meters away. 27
The trial court also underscored that Federico's narration was corroborated by witnesses who testified on the victims' injuries. Rejecting the defense witnesses' inconsistent testimonies, the trial court concluded that Ryan returned to the neighborhood to take vengeance on Jaymar, but mistakenly shot Jessie. 28 Citing Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended[,]" 29 the trial court declared that Ryan cannot be exonerated. 30
The trial court also found that there was evident premeditation and treachery. 31 It also declared that the use of the improvised weapon showed Ryan's intent to kill Jessie whom he mistook to be Jaymar. As for Crisostomo, it cited Dr. Guiling's finding that his injuries "would not have caused his death," and ruled that this was only attempted murder. 32
On appeal, 33 Ryan assailed the trial court's finding of evident premeditation and treachery. 34 He also questioned Federico's credibility, pointing out alleged inconsistencies as to the exact time when Jaymar was reprimanded and the number of gunshots he had perceived. Moreover, he claimed that Federico's depiction of "[n]ag-aagaw po ang dilim sa [l]iwanag" might have affected his identification. He then insisted on his denial, as the prosecution supposedly failed to overcome the presumption of innocence. 35
On February 23, 2017, the Court of Appeals denied Ryan's appeal and affirmed the trial court's decision with modifications. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision in Criminal Case Nos. [Q]-13-180544 and [Q]-13-[1]80546 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. [Q]-13-180544, appellant having found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jessie Cortes the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of actual damages in the amount of P48,626.00 is sustained but the temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is deleted.
2. In Criminal Case No. [Q]-13-[1]80546, appellant having found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ATTEMPTED MURDER is hereby adjudged to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Appellant is ordered to pay Crisostomo D. Subiaga civil indemnity in the amount of P25,000.00, temperate damages of P20,000.00, moral damages of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
All monetary awards shall earn yearly interest of 6% from the finality of this Decision until full payment is made.
SO ORDERED. 36 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals found the inconsistencies in Federico's statements as trivial, which do not discredit him as witness. It emphasized that despite such contradictions, Federico remained firm that Ryan was the assailant 37 and that he could not have erred in so doing because a streetlight made the crime scene well-lit. In any case, the Court of Appeals gave his testimony full credit in the absence of any ill motive. 38 ISHCcT
Against this positive identification, the Court of Appeals found the defense of denial weak. It declared that Ryan failed to establish the physical improbability for him to be at the shooting incident, since he admitted that his residence was just a 15-minute motorcycle ride away. 39 Furthermore, to the Court of Appeals, Mildred cannot completely be a disinterested witness since "[h]er maternal instincts may impel her to protect her son at all costs, even to the point of prevarication." 40 It accorded weight to the trial court's finding of witnesses' credibility for having the opportunity to observe their conduct during the proceedings. 41
However, the Court of Appeals found no evident premeditation, ruling that "an hour was too short a time for [Ryan] to meditate or reflect upon the consequences of his decision to kill." 42 It did rule that treachery qualified the crime to murder, as the unarmed victims were unmindful of the imminent danger, and had no chance to guard themselves or to retaliate. 43
The Court of Appeals deleted the award of P25,000.00 temperate damages since actual damages were already awarded in favor of Jessie's heirs and increased the moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Ryan was similarly held liable to pay civil indemnity and exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each. 44
As for Crisostomo, the Court of Appeals also affirmed Ryan's conviction for attempted murder. It found a lack of convincing evidence that Crisostomo's injury was fatal and "would have caused his death had medical help not been provided." 45 Nevertheless, it modified the penalty imposed to it and explained:
The penalty for attempted murder is two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Article 51 of the [Revised Penal Code]. Accordingly, the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision correccional, and the maximum penalty to be imposed should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period. Hence, for the crime of attempted murder, appellant should suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. 46 (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the Court of Appeals awarded P25,000.00 each for exemplary, moral, and civil damages, plus temperate damages of P20,000.00 in Crisostomo's favor. 47
Hence, Ryan filed a Notice of Appeal. After giving it due course, the Court of Appeals forwarded 48 the case records to this Court. 49
On November 8, 2017, this Court noted the records forwarded by the Court of Appeals, notified the parties to file their supplemental briefs, and directed the Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison to confirm accused-appellant's confinement there. 50
Both parties manifested that they no longer intend to file supplemental briefs. 51 Meanwhile, on January 21, 2018, the Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison verified that accused-appellant was detained. 52
Accused-appellant, in his Brief, 53 assails the rejection of his alibi predicated on its alleged reliance on Federico's testimony which, at some important points, was purportedly contradictory.
First, accused-appellant notes the discrepancy as to the time when he approached Jaymar on the day of the shooting incident. In Federico's direct examination, he allegedly mentioned that the same happened around 6:30 p.m., but later said 5:30 p.m.
Second, accused-appellant posits that Federico failed to reconcile his contradictory statements on the number of gunshots. He stresses that in Federico's direct examination, he mentioned that there were three, but on cross-examination, stated that there were five. 54 Moreover, Federico's claim that accused-appellant fired three gunshots was allegedly inconsistent with the finding that "at least five bullets were recovered from [Jessie's] body." 55
Accused-appellant also argues that the lighting condition might have precluded Federico from identifying who the perpetrator was since be depicted that moment as "[n]ag-aagaw po ang dilim sa [l]iwanag."56 Accused-appellant insists on his denial for the prosecution's alleged failure to overcome his presumption of innocence. 57
Citing People v. Discalsota, 58 accused-appellant likewise claims that there can be no evident premeditation as an hour "would not have been enough for him to have a cool thought and reflection on whether to have revenge or not." 59 He also refutes the finding of treachery for lack of evidence establishing that he intentionally adopted the means to guarantee the accomplishment of the crime without any risk of retaliation against him. 60
Plaintiff-appellee, in its Brief, 61 counters that accused-appellant's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt as all the elements of murder were established. 62 Moreover, accused-appellant's overt act of shooting Crisostomo with a sumpak which caused his non-fatal injury allegedly points to the crime of attempted murder. 63
Plaintiff-appellee also insists that the inconsistencies in Federico's statements were merely trivial and do not destroy the veracity of the evidence for the prosecution, but even "erase suspicion that the testimony was rehearsed and concocted." 64 CAacTH
Plaintiff-appellee also posits that Federico cannot be expected to be aware of the precise time when accused-appellant approached Jaymar. Allegedly, his differing statements as to the number of gun shots fired are also insignificant, especially so, as in this case, that accused-appellant was positively identified to be the perpetrator. 65
Furthermore, plaintiff-appellee reinforces the respect accorded to factual findings of the trial court in the absence of misinterpretation and grave abuse of discretion. It argues that matters involving witnesses' credibility "is best addressed by the trial court, having heard the witnesses and observed his [or her] demeanor, conduct and attitude under the grueling examination." 66
Plaintiff-appellee also maintained that treachery was present, because accused-appellant intentionally selected his means of committing the crime, just as he intentionally adhered to its commission. Allegedly, the assault was unforeseen which effectively robbed the victim, who at that moment was in his own home, any opportunity to protect himself. 67
Finally, plaintiff-appellee insists that there was evident premeditation. It counters that Discalsota is inapplicable, because the accused there "stayed in the street waiting for the victim to come out of the house. 68 Unlike that case, plaintiff-appellee points out, accused-appellant went home and changed clothes before he returned to Jaymar's neighborhood for revenge. Plaintiff-appellee also pointed to the following overt acts that manifested coherence to this determination: "(1) he went to the house of the victim; and (2) he brought a sumpak to shoot the victim's son." 69
For resolution is the issue of whether or not accused-appellant Ryan Pascua y Bulaqueña's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal lacks merit.
An appeal in criminal cases subjects the whole case for review. The reviewing body undertakes to rectify, cite, and consider errors in the assailed ruling, whether imputed or not. Having complete jurisdiction over the case, the appellate court can "examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 70
In this case, we make clear the attendant circumstances of the offenses committed and modify the awarded damages.
I
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 71 provides:
ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provision of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Murder is perpetrated when one is killed under any of the circumstances stated above. 72 To secure a conviction, the following elements should be established:
(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused-appellants killed the victim; (3) that the killing was not parricide or infanticide; and (4) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248. 73 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, it is uncontested that the crime, which was neither infanticide nor parricide, resulted in Jessie's death and Crisostomo's injuries. Assailed however are the certainty of Federico's positive identification that accused-appellant was the perpetrator, and whether the killing was attended by evident premeditation and treachery.
I(A)
The prosecution was able to prove that accused-appellant was the assailant.
Citing the following inconsistencies in Federico's statements, accused-appellant insists on his denial. He asserts that the noted contradictions pertained to important matters which cannot be simply ignored as the same not only affects the witness' credibility, but similarly generates uncertainty to his guilt. 74 He states: IAETDc
14. During his direct examination, Federico testified that the incident between the accused-appellant and Jaymar Cortes occurred at around 6:30 o'clock in the evening, viz.:
Q: On January 20, 2013 at around 6:30 in the afternoon or evening, do you recall where you were?
A: I was in front of our house, sir.
Q: What were you doing at that time?
A: I was smoking, sir.
Q: When you were in front of your house smoking, do you know what happened?
A: Two male persons were board on the unregistered motor and Ryan is back riding the vehicle, sir.
Q: What unusual incident did you see?
A: As they were travelling the vehicle in zigzag manner and they stopped right in front of Jaymar, sir.
Q: Who is Jaymar?
A: (Witness pointing to somebody in the courtroom who was asked by this court to send out.)
Q: This Jaymar[,] how is he related to Jessie Cortes?
A: Jaymar is the son of Jessie, sir.
Q: You said two persons boarded a motorcycle who stopped in front of Jaymar, what happened next?
A: Ryan reprimanded Jaymar if he was the one who shouted, sir.
15. However, later on, in the same testimony, Federico stated that the incident occurred at 5:30 in the afternoon, viz.:
Q: Do you recall when the incident between Ryan Pascua and the complainant took place?
A: 5:30 in the afternoon, sir. . . .
16. Likewise, during his direct examination, Federico stated that he saw the accused-appellant fire his gun three (3) times at Jessie inside the latter's house, viz.:
Q: When he went to the other side of the street[,] what happened next?
A: He inserted his head inside the window, sir.
Q: Who owns this house where he inserted his head?
A: Jessie's house, sir.
Q: Please demonstrate to us how did he insert his head on the window?
A: The window is about this big, sir. (Witness demonstrates stipulated to be 1x1 meters).
Q: How about Ryan Pascua[,] how did he [insert] his head?
A: (Witness demonstrates through swinging motion.).
Q: When he inserted his head, what did he do?
A: He pointed to the persons inside the house, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: He fired a gun, sir.
Q: How many times?
A: Three (3) times, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: As you [stated,] you saw Jaymar fired his gun three times. How did you know that it was Jessie who was the victim?
A: Because he was the only person in that house, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How many times did he fire a gun in shooting Jessie?
A: Three times, sir.
17. However, during cross-examination, Federico gave contradictory statements and failed to reconcile the same, viz.:
Q: You said that Ryan Pascua inserted his head at the window of the house of Jessie Cortes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And he gets his 'sumpak' and fired a gun?
A: One shot was addressed to Jessie Cortes and the two other shots were for two [other] persons, sir.
Q: But you said that he fired five times in the window?
A: He fired five times to three persons, sir.
Q: What are you trying to say now is you made a mistake a while ago?
A: Those three shots were meant for three persons, sir.75 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
We sustain the uniform 76 findings of the lower courts upholding Federico's credibility. CTIEac
Having the benefit to directly examine the conduct of witnesses during the proceedings, 77 the trial court found Federico to be "candid, straightforward[,] and forthright" 78 while testifying. Equipped with such unique advantage, the trial court's findings of fact and appreciation of witnesses' testimonies are afforded much value, especially when upheld by the Court of Appeals, as in this case. Since the records are bereft of any showing that it has disregarded or misconstrued important matters, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule. 79
Furthermore, contrary to what accused-appellant claims, the inconsistencies in Federico's testimony do not pertain to "substantial or significant matters[.]" 80 "An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction." 81
Federico's contradictory statements as to the time when accused-appellant called Jaymar's attention and the number of gunshots perceived during the shooting episode were merely trivial. They do not materially affect the nature of the transgression. What is important is that Federico remained firm throughout his clear account of the main incident, and in his positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator. 82 He testified:
Q: And after they left what happened next?
A: After one (1) hour Ryan came passing at the back of our house, sir.
Q: At that time where were you?
A: I was in front of our house, sir.
Q: When you saw this Ryan Pascua after one (1) hour where did you proceed?
A: He proceeded to the other side of the street, sir.
Q: When he went to the other side of the street what happened next?
A: He inserted his head inside the window, sir.
Q: Who owns this house where he inserted his head?
A: Jessie's house, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How about Ryan Pascua[,] how did he [insert] his head?
A: (Witness demonstrates through swinging motion.)
Q: When he inserted his head, what did he do?
A: He pulled a sumpak from his back, sir.
Q: After he pulled out this improvised weapon[,] what did he do?
A: He pointed to the persons inside the house, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: He fired a gun, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How far were you from the accused when you saw him [fire] a gun?
A: About five [arm's length], sir.
Q: That would be from the place where you were seated up to the door of the courtroom?
A: Yes, sir. (More or less 8 meters per stipulation).
ACP TORRALBA:
Q: How about the lightning condition at that time, can you describe to us?
A: "Nag-aagaw po ang dilim sa [l]iwanag[,"] but the light at the post is lighted, sir.
Q: How far is the lighted post to the place?
A: About 8 meters, sir.
Q: When you first saw the accused and his companion when they accosted Jaymar what were they doing at that time?
A: They were wearing caps, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How about the helmet[,] do they have?
A: None, sir.
Q: After Ryan Pascua came back after one hour[,] what was he wearing at that time?
A: He was wearing black and white short, sir.
Q: How sure are you that this Ryan Pascua was the one wearing helmet who came back?
A: Because I was looking at them from the time they reprimanded Jaymar and after the time they came back, sir.
Q: After inserting his head to the window[,] what were you doing at that time?
A: I was just looking at them. I was scared because my nephews who were small were right beside me, sir.83 (Emphasis supplied)
Besides, Federico could not have erred in his identification of accused-appellant because prior to the shooting, he has already known him as the one who reprimanded Jaymar. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, "the scene of the crime was well-lighted, illuminated by a streetlight from a nearby electric post." 84
Consequently, the discrepancy between Federico's statements as to the three gunshots vis-à-vis the expert's finding that "at least five bullets were recovered from [Jessie's] body" 85 does not render his testimony unworthy of belief. The inconsistencies in the statements of prosecution witnesses relating "to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony." 86
Remarkably, such inconsistencies even reinforce the value of their testimony, for they protect against rehearsed falsities. 87 Equally telling in this case, the absences 88 of ill motive for Federico to falsely impute such grave offense against accused-appellant heightens his credibility as a witness. 89
Above all, accused-appellant's denial and alibi fail in light of Federico's candid testimony and affirmative identification of the perpetrator. 90
For a plausible defense of alibi, both the requisites as to time and place should be strictly complied with. Not only is there a need to establish that the accused was in some other place when the crime occurred, but it should likewise be proven through clear and convincing proof that it would be physically improbable for him to be there at the time of its commission. 91
Here, accused-appellant maintains that he was either eating or watching television at home at the time of the incident. On the declaration that his house was just 15 minutes away, 92 there exists no physical impossibility for him to be at Jessie's house when the shooting happened. DcHSEa
This Court also remains unconvinced even if accused-appellant's alibi was corroborated by his mother. Being a relative, her testimony becomes suspect as their relationship amplifies the likelihood that she would easily perjure herself in his favor. 93 As in this case, the defense of alibi becomes less believable when raised and pursued to be chiefly fashioned by the accused and an immediate relative. 94 The Court of Appeals correctly said:
This Court is not unmindful of the testimony of appellant's mother, Mildred Pascua, that her son was at home watching television when the incident happened. However, WE give little weight to it because of the positive identification of [Federico] that her son is the offender. More importantly, as a mother, she cannot totally be considered as a disinterested witness. Her maternal instincts may impel her to protect her son at all costs, even to the point of prevarication. 95 (Citation omitted)
I(B)
Albeit on a different reason, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that there was no evident premeditation.
The crux of evident premeditation is that the crime's commission is "preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment." 96 Hence, the following must be established beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his [or her] determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him [or her] to reflect upon the circumstances of his [or her] act. 97 (Citation omitted)
Here, it is evident that accused-appellant's act of reprimanding Jaymar caused the commotion between them and the unidentified individuals from the community. Despite having escaped, accused-appellant still decided to return in the neighborhood an hour after. Already armed with a sumpak, he went to Jessie's house, inserted his head inside the window, and fired his improvised gun, producing casualties among those who were within and near the premises.
Aside from accused-appellant's mother insinuating that she did not personally know Jessie, 98 accused-appellant also "den[ied] having known the persons in the neighborhood where they were ganged up on [.]" 99 Clearly, there appears no reason as to why accused-appellant had to kill Jessie, unless, as aptly found by the trial court, he was mistaken to be Jaymar:
To the mind of this court, when [Ryan] came back to [Federico's] neighborhood, his purpose was to get back at Jaymar, since he was the only person who [Ryan] could remember was among those who ganged up on him and [June Ray] since according to [Federico], he heard Ryan ask Jaymar "who shouted" before people inflicted injuries on Ryan and June Ray. However, the person who was shot inside their house was not Jaymar but his father Jessie. 100
With this, we apply this Court's ruling in People v. Hilario101 that there can be no evident premeditation when the assailant erroneously killed another instead of the person intended:
The fact that the accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment. According to Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado, or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. The accused performed voluntary acts. Their purpose was to kill. Hence, notwithstanding the mistake in the identity of the victim, the accused are still criminally liable.
It is to be noted that the lower court, in finding the appellant guilty of murder, qualified the killing by evident premeditation. Evident premeditation, however, may not properly be taken into account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim. When the person decided to kill a different person and premeditated on the killing of the latter, but when he carried out his plan he actually killed another person, it cannot properly be said that he premeditated on the killing of the actual victim. Thus[,] premeditation was not aggravating in the case of People vs. Guillen, where the accused had deliberately intended to assassinate former President Manuel Roxas but he killed instead Simeon Varela and wounded others. This doctrinal rule applies here. 102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
While evident premeditation cannot be considered against accused-appellant, treachery nevertheless qualified the killing to murder. 103 Article 14 (16) of the Revised Penal Code provides for the conditions where treachery or alevosia exists:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
"The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his [or her] part." 104 For it to be appreciated, the following conditions must concur: SCaITA
(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself [or herself], and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him [or her]. 105 (Citation omitted)
Here, Federico was specific on the manner by how accused-appellant perpetrated the crime. 106 The sequence of acts was surreptitious since accused-appellant passed behind Federico's house and advanced to the other side of the street. Moreover, the attack was sudden. By inserting his head inside Jessie's 1x1-meter window and drawing out a sumpak from his back, accused-appellant knowingly resorted to such means that would guarantee the assault's execution, affording no opportunity for the victims to either retaliate or protect themselves. Treachery, thus, attended the killing.
II
All told, we sustain accused-appellant's conviction for the murder of Jessie in Criminal Case No. Q-13-180544. Other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, no other aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attended the killing. Under Article 63, paragraph 2 107 of the Revised Penal Code, the appropriate penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to People v. Jugueta, 108 we uphold the Court of Appeals' grant of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages accounting to P75,000.00 each. However, we deem it necessary to delete the award of P48,626.00 as actual damages, and instead award temperate damages amounting to P50,000.00, pursuant to People v. Racal109 which provides:
As regards the trial court's award of actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00, the same must, likewise, be modified. The settled rule is that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than the sum allowed by the Court as temperate damages, the award of temperate damages is justified in lieu of actual damages which is of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven exceeds, then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial should instead be granted. The rationale for this rule is that it would be anomalous and unfair for the victim's heirs, who tried and succeeded in presenting receipts and other evidence to prove actual damages, to receive an amount which is less than that given as temperate damages to those who are not able to present any evidence at all. In the present case, Francisco's heirs were able to prove, and were awarded, actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00. Since, prevailing jurisprudence now fixes the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages in murder cases, the Court finds it proper to award temperate damages to Francisco's heirs, in lieu of actual damages.110 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
As to Criminal Case No. Q-13-180546, we affirm accused-appellant's conviction for attempted murder. It is established that when the injuries inflicted do not suffice to cause the victim's demise, the crime perpetrated is merely attempted murder since "the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the victim's death." 111 Here, both lower courts were unanimous 112 that based on the testimony of the attending doctor, Crisostomo's wounds were not fatal as to cause his death.
Applying Article 51 113 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for attempted murder is prision mayor, which is two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under Article 248. Without any other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period 114 or within the range of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision correccional115 in any of its periods, or within the range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' imposition of penalty pegged at two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is in order. 116
In line with Jugueta, we also affirm the Court of Appeals' awards of civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages in Crisostomo's favor amounting to P25,000.00 each. 117 aTHCSE
Finally, Crisostomo undoubtedly incurred hospital and medication expenses for the injuries he sustained from the shooting. Even in the absence of receipts, it cannot be refuted that he suffered some pecuniary loss. Accordingly, we deem it necessary to increase the award of temperate damages from P20,000.00 to P25,000.00. 118
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-13-180544, accused-appellant Ryan Pascua y Bulaqueña is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER for the death of Jessie Cortes. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and is directed to pay the victim's heirs civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages at P75,000.00 each, along with P50,000.00 as temperate damages. The award of actual damages is DELETED.
2. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-13-180546, accused-appellant Ryan Pascua y Bulaqueña is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ATTEMPTED MURDER. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. He is also directed to pay Crisostomo Subiaga civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages at P25,000.00 each.
All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 119
SO ORDERED." (Rosario, J., viceInting, J., per Raffle dated May 6, 2021)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.People v. Flora, 389 Phil. 601 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
2.Rollo, pp. 17-20, Notice of Appeal.
3.Id. at 2-16. The February 23, 2017 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 08213 was penned by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla and concurred into by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Socorro B. Inting of the Special Second (2nd) Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
4.CA Rollo, pp. 19-36. The Joint Decision in Crim. Case Nos. Q-13-180544 and Q-13-180545-46 was rendered by Presiding Judge Madonna C. Echiverri of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 81, Quezon City.
5.CA rollo, pp. 19-20. See also id. at pp. 15-16, Information in Crim. Case GL-Q-13-180544 & id. at 17-18, Information in Crim. Case GL-Q-13-180546.
6.Id. at 20.
7.Id. at 20-21.
8.Id. at 27. Federico also referred to June Ray as "Junny."
9.Id. at 21.
10.Id.
11.Id. at24.
12.Id.
13.Id. at 21.
14.Id.
15.Id. at 26.
16.Id. Federico also referred to Leandro as "Andy."
17.Id. at 21.
18.Id. at 22.
19.Id.
20.Id. SPO4 Maglangit was referred to by accused Ryan as "Sgt. Manlangit."
21.Id.
22.Id. at 21. Although Lydia allegedly spent P150,000.00 on Jessie's funeral, the other expenditures have no receipts.
23.Id. at 22.
24.Id. at 22.
25.Id. at 23.
26.Id. at 35-36.
27.Id. at 23-27.
28.Id. at 28-34.
29.Id. at 34.
30.Id.
31.Id. at 34-35.
32.Id. at 35.
33.Id. at 37. Notice of Appeal & Id. at 38, Records forwarded by the RTC to the CA.
34.Rollo, p. 10, CA Decision.
35.Id. at 7-8.
36.Id. at 15-16.
37.Id. at 8.
38.Id. at 9.
39.Id. at 9-10.
40.Id. at 10.
41.Id.
42.Id. at 11.
43.Id. at 13.
44.Id. at 13-14.
45.Id. at 14.
46.Id. at. 14-15.
47.Id. at 15.
48.Id. at 1.
49.Id. at 21.
50.Id. at 23-24.
51.Id. at 25-28. Plaintiff-appellee's Manifestation and id. at 32-36, accused-appellant's Manifestation.
52.Id. at 29.
53. CA rollo, 44-68. Accused-appellant's Brief.
54.Id. at 55-60.
55.Id. at 60.
56.Id.
57.Id. at 61.
58. 430 Phil. 406 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
59. CA rollo, p. 62.
60.Id. at 64.
61.Id. at 91-115, Appellee's Brief.
62.Id. at 100.
63.Id. at 100-110.
64.Id. at 111.
65.Id.
66.Id. at 112.
67.Id.
68.Id.
69.Id. at 113.
70.People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 232380, September 4, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65685> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
71. Death Penalty Law (1993).
72.People v. Magallano, Jr., G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64844> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
73.People v. Dimapilit, 816 Phil. 523 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
74. CA rollo, pp. 60-61. Accused-appellant's Brief.
75.Id. at 57-59.
76. CA rollo, p. 23. RTC Joint Decision, and rollo, p. 9, CA Decision.
77.People v. Dimapilit, 816 Phil. 523 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
78. CA rollo, p. 23.
79.See People. v. Magallano, Jr., G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64844> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
80.See CA rollo, p. 60, accused-appellant's Brief.
81.People v. Nelmida, 694 Phil. 529, 559 (2012) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
82.See People v. Mamaruncas, 680 Phil. 192 (2012) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
83. CA Rollo, pp. 25-26. RTC Joint Decision.
84.Rollo, p. 9. CA Decision.
85. CA Rollo, p. 60. Accused-appellant's Brief.
86.People v. Flora, 389 Phil. 601, 602 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
87.Id.
88.Rollo, p. 9, CA Decision, and CA rollo, p. 27, RTC Joint Decision.
89.See People v. Prado, 321 Phil. 1084 (1995) [Per J. Hermosisima, Jr., First Division].
90.See People v. Nelmida, 694 Phil. 529 (2012) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
91.Id.
92.Rollo, p. 6, CA Decision.
93.See People v. Nelmida, 694 Phil. 529 (2012) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
94.People v. Flora, 389 Phil. 601 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
95.Rollo, p. 10, CA Decision.
96.People v. Duavis, 678 Phil. 166, 176-177 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
97.Id. at 177.
98. CA rollo, p. 32, RTC Joint Decision.
99.Id. at 27.
100.Id. at 33-34.
101. 407 Phil. 15 (2001) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
102.Id.
103.See People v. Hilario, 407 Phil. 15 (2001) [Per J. Puno, First Division] and People v. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967 (1926) [Per J. Romualdez, En Banc].
104.People v. Abadies, 436 Phil. 98, 98 n (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
105.Id.
106.SeeCArollo, p. 21. RTC Joint Decision.
107. Art. 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. — . . .
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
108. 783 Phil. 806 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
109. 817 Phil. 665 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
110.Id. at 685-686.
111.People v. Gutierrez, 625 Phil. 471, 483 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
112.See CA rollo, p. 35, RTC Joint Decision, and rollo, p. 14, CA Decision.
113. Article 51. Penalty to Be Imposed upon Principals of Attempted Crimes. — The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
114.See Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. — In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
115.See People v. Prado y Marasigan, 792 Phil. 827 (2016) [Per J. Perez, Third Division].
116.See Rollo, p. 15, CA Decision.
117.See also People v. Prado y Marasigan, 792 Phil. 827 (2016) [Per J. Perez, Third Division].
118.See People v. Nelmida, 694 Phil. 529 (2012) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
119.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.