People v. Paloma y Feguiroa

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 251988. September 29, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. RASAN PALOMA y FEGUIROA, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 29, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 251988 — People of the Philippines v. Rasan Paloma y Feguiroa

The Case

Appellant Rasan Paloma y Feguiroa assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02741 entitled The People of the Philippines v. Rasan Paloma y Feguiroa2 dated September 27, 2019 affirming his conviction for murder.

Antecedents

The Charge

By Information dated April 29, 2011, appellant was charged with murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz.:

That on or about April 21, 2011 at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon in Barangay Lantad, Silay City, Negros Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there, knowingly, unlawfully[,] and criminally shoot Julius Dayon y Turbanos twice using a firearm thereby causing the latter multiple shotgun wounds[;] all mortal wounds which are the direct and immediate cause of the death of said Julius Dayon y Turbanos to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 40, Silay City, Negros Occidental.

On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

The Prosecution's Version

Luisa Espinosa4 (Espinosa) was a househelp working for the family of one Mr. Delfinado whose residence was adjacent to the basketball court of Lantad Elementary School. On April 21, 2011, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, she stood patiently waiting for a visitor at the gate of her employer. At that time, the victim Julius Dayon (Julius) was watching a basketball game in the court. He was seated with his back against her. She was about two (2) arm's length from him. Appellant, on the other hand, stood behind the victim about a meter away. Out of nowhere, appellant suddenly shot the victim with a sulpak, hitting the latter in his lower back. The victim stood up in pain, asking appellant "ouch, why did you shoot me?". The victim ran for his life toward the direction of Purok Mainuswagon but appellant gave chase. Moments later, she heard another gunshot. Thereafter, appellant rode behind his uncle 5 in a motorcycle and fled. TCAScE

The victim's friend, Joel Calvo6 (Joel), testified that he saw appellant shoot the victim in front of the old church on April 21, 2011. He was standing at the corner of Purok Mainuswagon when he saw appellant then armed with a sulpak chasing the victim. Appellant eventually caught up with Julius near the old church and there, fired another shot at the victim from behind. He clearly saw the shooting incident as he stood only five (5) to six (6) meters away from the victim. Out of fear, he left and entered their house. When the commotion subsided, he decided to check on the victim after learning that the latter sought refuge in the house of another friend. 7 He saw the victim soaked in his own blood. With the assistance of his (Joel's) older brother and two (2) other friends, 8 they brought the victim to the Teresita Jalandoni Provincial Hospital where he expired.

PO3 Milo H. Aliposa9 (PO3 Aliposa) investigated the shooting incident on April 21, 2011 around 3 o'clock in the afternoon in the locus criminis and thereafter, filed the complaint for murder against appellant before the Silay City Prosecutor's Office.

Dr. Daniel T. Paez10 of the Silay City Health Office did the autopsy on the victim. His Necropsy Report dated April 22, 2011 noted that the victim sustained multiple gunshot wounds in the right posterior axillary line, 11 with multiple perforation of the right lung, right liver, right kidney, and large intestines. The victim died of "hypovolemic shock hemorrhages massive type and gunshot wounds." 12

Estarlina T. Dayon, the victim's mother, testified that the family spent P35,000.00 during the wake.

The Defense's Version

Appellant13 admitted the killing but claimed self-defense. He testified that around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of April 21, 2011, he was at the basketball court of Lantad Elementary School patiently waiting for his turn to play when the victim suddenly aimed a sulpak at him. He grappled for its possession to defend himself. As soon as he gained possession of the gun, he got nervous and accidentally pulled the trigger. Thereafter, he ran towards the direction of Guinhalaran to avoid revenge from the victim's family.

Four (4) days later, he voluntarily surrendered to PO3 Aliposa. 14 He asked that the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, 15 voluntary plea, and praeter intentionem be appreciated in his favor.

Ruling of the Trial Court

By Order dated June 23, 2017, the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction, viz.:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding the accused RASAN PALOMA y FEGUIROA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, or twenty years and one day to forty years of imprisonment.

Accused is ordered to pay Civil Indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00; temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00, to the heirs of Julius "Buldog" Dayon, Jr.; and an interest of 6% per annum on all items of civil liability imposed herein, computed from the date of finality of decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED. 16

The trial court found that no unlawful aggression may be imputed on the victim to support appellant's claim of self-defense. On the contrary, appellant even employed treachery in killing the victim. Prosecution witness Espinosa saw appellant appear out of nowhere and shoot the victim at the basketball court. The victim consequently ran for his life, but appellant gave chase and caught up with the former in front of the old church. There, appellant shot the victim again. The prosecution clearly established appellant's determined intent to kill the victim.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, 17 appellant faulted the trial court for rendering the verdict of conviction despite his plea of self-defense. He insisted he was just watching a basketball game when, out of nowhere, the victim aggressively aimed a sulpak at him. Caught by surprise, he grappled for and eventually got hold of it. Although he only intended to subdue the victim, he got so nervous and accidentally pulled the trigger.

At any rate, the trial court erred in not crediting him the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, 18 voluntary plea, and praeter intentionem.

The People, 19 through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), defended the verdict of conviction. It argued that contrary to appellant's claim, the unlawful aggression in truth originated from him. Espinosa saw appellant shoot the victim from behind while the victim was watching basketball match. The victim ran for his life but appellant chased and eventually caught up with him in front of the old church. There, another witness, Joel, saw appellant shoot the victim anew.

Even assuming that the unlawful aggression initially came from the victim, appellant later became the aggressor when he chased the fleeing victim and shot the latter in front of the old church. The trial court, therefore, properly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Lastly, the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot offset the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By Decision, 20 dated September 27, 2019, the appellate court affirmed.

The Present Petition

Appellant now seeks affirmative relief and prays anew for his acquittal. In compliance with Resolution dated September 3, 2020, 21 both appellant 22 and the OSG 23 manifested that in lieu of supplemental briefs, they were adopting their respective briefs before the Court of Appeals. cTDaEH

Ruling

The verdict of conviction stands.

Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity; x x x

To sustain conviction for murder, the prosecution must establish the following elements:

1. A person was killed;

2. The accused killed him;

3. The killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and

4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide. 24

In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the commission of the crime, but to establish as well, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains with the prosecution throughout the trial. 25

When the accused, however, admits to the killing but nonetheless invokes self-defense, the basic rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies on the prosecution is reversed and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused to prove the elements of his defense. It then becomes incumbent upon him to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he had admitted the killing. 26

By invoking self-defense here, appellant assumed the burden to establish the same by credible, clear, and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed Julius. 27

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish the following:

(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;

(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and

(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. 28

The most important element is unlawful aggression because there can be no self-defense unless the victim first committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. 29 Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. 30

The test for the presence of unlawful aggression is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. 31

Here, there was no unlawful aggression emanating from the victim himself.

First, appellant's claim of unlawful aggression was belied by Espinosa's account of the incident:

Q Can you recall where was the location of Julius during that time?

A He was sitting with his back against me and was watching basketball, Sir.

Q So you were standing at the back of Rasan. With respect to the location of Julius Dayon, where was the location of Rasan?

A This Rasan is at the back of Julius, Sir.

Q Will you please describe the actual incident which happened while Rasan was behind or was at the back of Julius?

A He was at the back and the gate of this basketball court has a cyclone wire. He was standing at the back of Julius and Julius was seated, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q How about Rasan?

A Rasan is outside the cyclone wire, outside the basketball court, Sir.

Q Upon seeing Rasan, what did you recall, if any?

A He was standing there and his weapon, he pointed it at the cyclone and he suddenly shot this Julius, Sir.

Q So, when you saw Rasan shot Julius, was Julius hit?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And what part of the body was he hit?

A On his right side, Sir.

Q So, immediately after Rasan shot Julius, what did Julius do if any?

A He stood up and shouted ouch, why did you [shoot] me, Sir. 32

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, the victim, then unarmed, was simply sitting inside the basketball court when appellant suddenly shot him from behind. cSaATC

But even assuming the unlawful aggression did originate from the victim, the alleged aggression ceased after appellant was able to wrest the sulpak from the victim. When appellant, thereafter, using the same sulpak, shot the victim from behind, appellant had then become the aggressor. As it was, appellant continued to launch his attack on the victim when, even after firing the first shot at the basketball court, he still chased the victim, then already fleeing the situs. Appellant did not stop running after the victim until he finally caught up with the latter in front of the old church where he shot the victim again.

In People v. Caguing, 33 the Court ruled out Caguing's plea of self-defense, complete or incomplete because there was no longer any unlawful aggression when appellant Caguing shot the victim. His admission that he shot the victim in the forehead itself belied his claim that he merely acted to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression allegedly coming from the victim. Assuming arguendo that the victim attempted to shoot appellant with a handgun, this aggression had ceased by the time he was able to take possession of the gun. In other words, when appellant successfully grabbed the gun from the victim, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel. When the unlawful aggression which has begun no longer existed, the one making the defense had no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.

In any event, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds appellant inflicted on the victim negate appellant's claim of self-defense. In Calim v. Court of Appeals, 34 the Court rejected Calim's plea of self-defense considering the nature and number of gunshot wounds inflicted on the victim. The deceased suffered five (5) gunshot wounds in the head, face, chest, right arm, and the right leg. According to the Court, if Calim shot the victim just to defend himself, Calim should not have inflicted multiple fatal wounds on the victim.

Similarly, if appellant's intent was only to subdue the victim's alleged initial aggression, such aggression already ceased when he (appellant) got hold of the sulpak. From then on, appellant had become the aggressor. For even after claiming that he just accidentally pulled the trigger while both of them were inside the basketball court, why did he still pursue the victim up to the front of the church and shot him a second time around?

Appellant's conviction for murder must therefore stand for his failure to prove that the victim himself was the unlawful aggressor.

There is treachery where the unarmed35

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take. 36 For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. 37

As stated, prosecution witness Espinosa categorically testified that the victim was peacefully seated watching the basketball game when, out of nowhere, appellant shot him from behind. As the attack came unexpectedly and got initiated from behind, the lower courts properly appreciated the attendance of treachery.

In People v. Nacario, 38 appellant therein shot the unarmed victim thrice from behind. The Court held that treachery attended the killing for there is alevosia when a person is unexpectedly attacked from behind, depriving him or her, of any opportunity to defend himself or herself. The Court added that where the victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind and had no weapon to resist the aggression, the shooting cannot but be considered as treacherous.

All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming appellant's conviction for murder.

Penalty and Damages

Under Article 248 39 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act 7659, murder is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death. 40

Here, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in appellant's favor. As shown in the Endorsement Voluntary Surrender form, appellant gave himself up to PO3 Rolando S. Suela on April 25, 2011. Sans any aggravating circumstance but with one (1) attendant mitigating circumstance, appellant should suffer reclusion perpetua41 pursuant to Article 63 of the RPC. 42

As regards appellant's plea of voluntary plea and praeter intentionem, however, the same cannot be credited in his favor in the absence of any substantiating evidence on record. In any case, reclusion perpetua43 is an indivisible penalty. 44

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of P75,000.00 each pursuant to People v. Jugueta, 45 Temperate damages of P50,000.00 is also proper since the evidence adduced by the heirs of the victim only covered the amount of P22,451.05. 46

These monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this resolution until fully paid. 47 cHDAIS

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated September 27, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02741 is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Rasan Paloma y Feguiroa is found GUILTY of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Julius Dayon y Turbanos, the following amounts:

(1) P75,000.00 as Civil Indemnity;

(2) P75,000.00 as Moral Damages;

(3) P75,000.00 as Exemplary Damages; and

(4) P50,000.00 as Temperate Damages.

These monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 5-15.

2. Sometimes spelled as Figuiroa in the records.

3. RTC Records, p. 1.

4. TSN dated September 27, 2011.

5. Unnamed in the records.

6. TSN dated March 8, 2012.

7. Unnamed in the records.

8. Unnamed in the records.

9. TSN dated February 11, 2014.

10. TSN dated January 24, 2013.

11. The back portion of the body.

12. CA rollo, p. 7.

13. TSN dated April 14, 2015.

14. Endorsement Voluntary Surrender re Shooting Incident. RTC Records, p. 11.

15. He voluntarily surrendered to PO3 Aliposa on April 25, 2011 as shown by the Endorsement Voluntary Surrender, id.

16. CA rollo, p. 41.

17.Id. at 16-29.

18. He voluntarily surrendered to PO3 Aliposa on April 25, 2011 as shown by the Endorsement Voluntary Surrender. RTC records, p. 11.

19. CA rollo, pp. 46-61.

20.Rollo, pp. 5-15.

21.Id. at 22-23.

22.Id. at 30-33.

23.Id. at 25-26.

24. See People v. Dela Cruz y Balobal, 626 Phil. 631, 639 (2010).

25. See People v. Villanueva, 536 Phil. 998, 1003 (2006).

26.People v. Damitan y Mantawel, 423 Phil. 113, 116 (2001).

27. See Belbis, Jr. y Competente v. People, 698 Phil. 706, 719 (2012).

28. See Velasquez v. People, 807 Phil. 438, 450 (2017).

29. See People v. Costin, G.R. No. 202186, January 25, 2016.

30. See Ubaldo y Muyot v. People, G.R. No. 215626, June 17, 2015.

31. See People v. Fontanilla y Obaldo, 680 Phil. 155, 165 (2012).

32. TSN dated September 27, 2011.

33. 400 Phil. 1161, 1169 (2000).

34. 404 Phil. 391, 399 (2001).

35. See People v. Nacario, 400 Phil. 299, 305 (2000).

36.People v. Fieldad, 744 Phil. 790, 803 (2014).

37. See People v. Gelera, 343 Phil. 225, 233 (1997).

38.Supra 35.

39. Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

xxx xxx xxx (Death Penalty Law, Republic Act No. 7659, [December 13, 1993])

40. See People v. Corpuz y Daguio, G.R. No. 220486, June 26, 2019.

41. See People v. Estoya, G.R. No. 222650, December 5, 2018.

42. ARTICLE 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxx xxx xxx

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. (Revised Penal Code, Act No. 3815, December 8, 1930).

43. The form is unaffected by any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

44. See People v. Blanza, Jr., G.R. No. 247005, July 1, 2020.

45. 2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity — P75,000.00

b. Moral damages — P75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages — P75,000.00, People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 849 (2016).

46. The settled rule is that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than the sum allowed by the Court as temperate damages, the award of temperate damages is justified in lieu of actual damages which is of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven exceeds, then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial should instead be granted. The rationale for this rule is that it would be anomalous and unfair for the victim's heirs, who tried and succeeded in presenting receipts and other evidence to prove actual damages, to receive an amount which is less than that given as temperate damages to those who are not able to present any evidence at all. People v. Racal, 817 Phil. 665, 685 (2017).

47. See People v. Pigar y Ambayanan, G.R. No. 247658, February 17, 2020.