People v. Palaña

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 243547-48. June 16, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ANGELO ANG PALAÑA, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 16, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. Nos. 243547-48 (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angelo Ang Palaña, Accused-Appellant.) — In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to confront the witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine them. A conviction based alone on proof that violates the constitutional right of an accused is a nullity and the court that rendered it acted without jurisdiction in its rendition. 1 An acquittal shall follow if the prosecution fails to present as witness the individual with personal knowledge of the facts necessary to establish an element of the crime charged.

The Case

This appeal 2 assails the Decision 3 dated 15 November 2018 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-16-CRM-0687 and SB-16-CRM-0688 finding accused-appellant Angelo Ang Palaña (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 4 and Section 7 (d) of RA 6713. 5

Antecedents

The Informations dated 05 July 2016 filed against accused-appellant read:

SB-16-CRM-0678

That on or about 21 December 2011, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ANGELO ANG PALAÑA, a high-ranking public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Fourth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage thereof, acting with evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to ATTY. REBENE C. CARRERA (ATTY. CARRERA), a practicing lawyer who was then handling cases before the Fourth Division of the NLRC where accused was a member, by soliciting and accepting a loan from said ATTY. CARRERA, in the amount of P100,000.00 but, thereafter, refused to pay it back claiming that the same was in the nature of a "good will money" for the cases which ATTY. CARRERA was then handling before his Division or for the cases which had been resolved in favour of ATTY. CARRERA's clients.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

SB-16-CRM-0688

That on or about 21 December 2011, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ANGELO ANG PALAÑA, a high-ranking public officer, being then a Commissioner of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in the course of his official duties and committing the offense in relation thereto, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally solicit and accept a loan in the amount of P100,000.00 from ATTY. REBENE C. CARRERA (ATTY. CARRERA), a practicing lawyer who was then handling cases before the Fourth Division of the NLRC where accused was a member, and that despite demand by ATTY. CARRERA, accused refused to pay the same claiming that it was in the nature of a "good will money" for the cases which ATTY. CARRERA was then handling before his Division or for those which were resolved in favour of ATTY. CARRERA's clients.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. After conclusion of pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. 8

Version of the Prosecution

During direct examination, Rebene C. Carrera 9 (complainant) identified his verified complaint dated 28 May 2013 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. 10

Complainant claimed he was a practicing lawyer specializing in maritime and labor laws. In his complaint, he averred accused-appellant made insinuations that the latter had discretion, authority, and influence on the outcome of his cases pending before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). According to complainant, they would meet at the lobby of the NLRC and sometimes accused-appellant would invite him for coffee at accused-appellant's office. In the process, accused-appellant informed complainant that some of the latter's cases were before him and he could give favourable resolution to these pending cases. 11

During trial, complainant testified that on December 21, 2011, accused-appellant, through a telephone call, asked him for a One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) loan due to an emergency. At the time, complainant had no money to loan because he was out of the office when he received the call. Despite this, accused-appellant insisted. Considering that accused-appellant was a Commissioner of the NLRC and there might be some consequences if he does not accede the request, complainant called his secretary, Joanna D. Vianzon (Ms. Vianzon), to deposit the amount of Php100,000.00 to the bank account given by accused-appellant. Thereafter, his secretary directed their messenger, Maria Johanna Andora (Ms. Andora), to deposit the money to the furnished bank account. 12 During cross-examination, however, complainant admitted he has no personal knowledge on whether the messenger actually went to the bank, as he merely relied on the information relayed by Ms. Vianzon. 13

Thereafter, the prosecution presented Ms. Vianzon as its witness. She corroborated complainant's claim that she was instructed to deposit Php100,000.00 in accused-appellant's BDO account. Since she had many things to do, Ms. Vianzon instructed their janitress/messenger, Ms. Andora, to deposit the sum of money. After an hour, their janitress arrived and handed to Ms. Vianzon the original deposit slip. 14

Upon cross-examination, Ms. Vianzon admitted she did not personally deposit the amount but merely gave instructions to Ms. Andora, their messenger. Likewise, the deposit form was filled-up by said messenger. Ms. Vianzon only wrote the account number on a piece of paper and handed it to their messenger. 15

Finally, the prosecution presented Atty. Corinne Joie Miranda Garillo (Atty. Garillo) as its last witness. Atty. Garillo was the Ombudsman's Associate Graft Investigation Officer who conducted an investigation to verify the complaint against accused-appellant. During investigation, complainant personally appeared before Atty. Garillo to affirm and confirm the veracity of the claims in his verified complaint. In the same way, Ms. Vianzon, the secretary of complainant's law office, appeared before Atty. Garillo to submit an affidavit in support of the complaint. Atty. Garillo also verified the veracity of the BDO deposit slip. 16

Version of the Defense

The defense presented Commissioner Nieves De Castro (Commissioner De Castro), a retired Commissioner of the NLRC, and Shirley Sia Palaña (Mrs. Palaña), the wife of accused-appellant, as witnesses. 17

Commissioner De Castro testified she was introduced to accused-appellant sometime in 2008 when he was newly appointed to the NLRC. She also met accused-appellant's wife, Mrs. Palaña, when they visited her office and asked if she was interested in seeing some pieces of jewelry which were for sale. Commissioner De Castro obliged the invitation and sometime in 2010, bought some jewelry from Mrs. Palaña. This incident happened several times. 18

According to Commissioner De Castro, sometime in December 2011, Mrs. Palaña called for the payment of her balance. As Mrs. Palaña was not in Manila, Commissioner De Castro asked for her bank account and thereafter deposited Php100,000.00 in BDO Account No. 002770043524 on 21 December 2011. 19

During cross-examination, Commissioner De Castro admitted her mode of payment for jewelry was usually through post-dated checks or in cash. The bank deposit on 21 December 2011 was the first and only time she made payment through a bank deposit. Also, she was unable to keep an original copy of the deposit slip and could not recall if she handed the bank deposit slip to accused-appellant. She also did not have a personal record of all payments made to Mrs. Palaña. It was only Mrs. Palaña who had a list and she only confirmed the same. 20

Thereafter, Mrs. Palaña testified she was a businesswoman engaged in selling jewelry. She had been in the jewelry business for many years, even before her husband's assumption of office at the NLRC. She was introduced to Commissioner De Castro by her husband in 2010, as she intended to sell some jewelry to her husband's colleagues. Mrs. Palaña recalled that Commissioner De Castro made a bank deposit on 21 December 2011 as the latter's final payment for jewelry. This was the only payment made by Commissioner De Castro through a bank deposit, since most of the time the latter's payment would be in cash and sometimes coursed through her husband. 21

Upon cross-examination, Mrs. Palaña admitted that cash payments received from Commissioner De Castro ranged from Php50,000.00 to Php200,000.00. The supposed deposit was the first and last payment made by Commissioner De Castro made through bank deposit. However, Mrs. Palaña did not have an original copy of the bank deposit slip. 22

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In the assailed Decision, 23 the Sandiganbayan found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes charged. The dispositive provides:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. Accused Angelo Ang Palaña is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and pursuant Section 9 thereof he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and to pay herein complainant, Atty. Rebene Carrera, the amount of P100,000.00; and

2. Likewise, he is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 7(d) of RA No. 6713 and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years.

SO ORDERED.24

According to the Sandiganbayan, all elements for both crimes were established by the prosecution. Accused-appellant was a public officer serving as a Commissioner of the NLRC. 25 He committed a scheme with evident bad faith by means of soliciting and requesting a loan from complainant. Said loan was evidenced by the original copy of the BDO cash deposit slip presented by the complainant. In fact, the BDO account number, printed on the face of the deposit slip was admitted to be owned by the accused-appellant and his wife, Mrs. Palaña. The Sandiganbayan explained that such personal information could not be accessible to another individual if it was not given by the owner. And how can an individual get hold of a cash deposit slip, if he was not the depositor. Further, it would have been very difficult for the complainant to devise a way to know the accused-appellant's account number. 26

Hence, the appeal.

Both accused-appellant and the prosecution submitted their respective Briefs. 27 According to accused-appellant, the Sandiganbayan erred in sustaining the Information and convicting him for violation of Sec. 7 (d) of RA 6713 28 despite the provisions of Sec. 11 (a) of RA 6713. 29 Also, the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting accused-appellant for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019. 30

As for the prosecution, they averred the Sandiganbayan correctly found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for both violations of Sec. 7 (d) of RA 6713 and Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019. In addition, the prosecution submitted that the Sandiganbayan's judgment had already attained finality because accused-appellant availed of the wrong mode of appeal. 31

Thereafter, accused-appellant filed a manifestation 32 informing the Court of complainant's disbarment for gross immorality. 33 Complainant was also previously suspended for six (6) months for serious misconduct. 34 In fact, even after his disbarment, the Court still found complainant administratively liable for previous negligence in handling a client's case. 35 According to accused-appellant, complainant's numerous administrative infractions exhibited his predilection for hiding the truth, misdeclarations, and for manufacturing stories or scenarios. 36

Issue

Accused-appellant raised the sole issue of whether the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. 37

Ruling of the Court

We grant the appeal.

Accused-appellant availed of

At the outset, the Court shall address the procedural issue raised by the prosecution. The prosecution submits the proper remedy for accused-appellant should have been to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Since accused-appellant supposedly availed of the wrong mode of appeal, the prosecution opined that the Sandiganbayan's judgment already attained finality. 38

The prosecution is mistaken. Under the 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan (2018 Rules), 39 an appeal to the Supreme Court from criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of original jurisdiction shall be made by filing a notice of appeal. Rule XI Sec. 1 of the 2018 Rules provides:

SECTION 1.  Methods of Review. —

(a) In General. — The appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be by notice of appeal filed with the Sandiganbayan and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

The appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and in civil cases shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

(b) Automatic appeal. — Whenever the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction imposes the death penalty, the records of the case, together with the transcript of stenographic notes, shall be forwarded within five (5) days after the fifteenth (15th) day following the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment. (Emphasis supplied.)

Since the assailed Decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, accused-appellant's mode of appeal was correct. Pursuant to its 2018 Rules, the Sandiganbayan aptly gave due course to the notice of appeal in the Resolution 40 dated 10 December 2018. Consequently, the Court in its Resolution 41 dated 18 February 2019, acted on a proper appeal and directed both parties to file their respective briefs.

Sec. 11 (a) of RA 6713 provides

Accused-appellant assailed the Information charging him with violation of Sec. 7 (d) of RA 6713 based on Sec. 11 (a) of RA 6713 which provides that if the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, then he shall be prosecuted under the said statute. However, the Sandiganbayan struck down accused-appellant's argument, ruling that accused-appellant should have raised this issue at the earliest possible opportunity and before he was arraigned. 42 Since accused-appellant failed to file a motion to quash before arraignment, the Sandiganbayan deemed accused-appellant's objections to the Information as waived and convicted accused-appellant for both crimes. 43

The Sandiganbayan erred in failing to apply the clear mandate of Sec. 11 (a) of RA 6713. The relevant provision states:

Section 11. Penalties. — (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of Section 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office. [Emphasis supplied.]

In this case, accused-appellant was charged under two (2) separate Informations. The Information for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 reads in part:

x x x by soliciting and accepting a loan from said ATTY. CARRERA, in the amount of P100,000.00 but, thereafter, refused to pay it back claiming that the same was in the nature of a "good will money" for the cases which ATTY. CARRERA was then handling before his Division or for the cases which had been resolved in favour of ATTY. CARRERA's clients. 44

On the other hand, the Information for violation of Sec. 7 (d) of RA 6713 alleges substantially the same ultimate facts and is virtually identical to the other charge, viz.:

x x x solicit and accept a loan in the amount of P100,000.00 from ATTY. REBENE C. CARRERA (ATTY. CARRERA), a practicing lawyer who was then handling cases before the Fourth Division of the NLRC where accused was a member, and that despite demand by ATTY. CARRERA, accused refused to pay the same claiming that it was in the nature of a "good will money" for the cases which ATTY. CARRERA was then handling before his Division or for those which were resolved in favour of ATTY. CARRERA's clients. 45

A comparison of the two (2) Informations readily shows that both violations consist of the same alleged act/s, i.e., to solicit and accept a loan from complainant and the refusal to pay it back by claiming it was "good will money."

Notably, the prescribed penalty for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 is imprisonment for not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years. 46 As for violation of Sec. 7 (d) of RA 6713, the penalty is imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (Php5,000.00), or both. 47 Hence, the heavier penalty is meted for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.

The Sandiganbayan cannot simply disregard the express proscription under Sec. 11 (a) of RA 6713 because accused-appellant failed to raise the issue in a motion to quash. First, such issue is not even among the limited grounds for a motion to quash under Rule 117 Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 48 Thus, accused-appellant cannot be faulted for failing to raise the same before arraignment. Second, the use of the word "shall" in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory. 49 As such, the obligatory language of Sec. 11 (a) of RA 6713 should have been observed and followed by the Sandiganbayan. And third, if it had any doubts in the interpretation of the law, the Sandiganbayan should have applied the basic criminal law precept in dubiis reus est absolvendus — all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Any criminal law showing ambiguity will always be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused. 50

To stress, penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. 51

Considering the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan committed reversible error in convicting accused-appellant for violations under both Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Sec. 7 (d) RA 6713. Pursuant to Sec. 11 (a) of RA 6713, there is already sufficient basis to acquit accused-appellant for violation of Sec. 7 (d) of 6713. As mandated by RA 6713, accused-appellant shall be prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, the offense with the heavier imposable penalty.

The prosecution failed to

Contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, the Court finds the evidence insufficient to hold accused-appellant criminally liable for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section 7 (d) of RA 6713.

Findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court are accorded great weight and respect. However, in cases where there is a misappreciation of facts, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the conclusions reached by the trial court. At all times, the Court must be satisfied that in convicting the accused, the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court meet the exacting standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 52

It is settled that the burden is on the prosecution to prove an accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution, which protects an accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Unless the prosecution is able to discharge its burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his/her behalf, and he/she would be entitled to an acquittal. 53

Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 reads:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

To sustain a conviction under this provision, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. 54

On the first element, as an appointed Commissioner of the NLRC, there is no dispute that accused-appellant was a public officer. 55

As for the second element, the same was not sufficiently established by the prosecution. The Court finds no proof of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. 56

In this case, the Sandiganbayan based its finding of evident bad faith through the supposed solicitation and request for a loan from complainant. 57 The proceeds of this loan were purportedly delivered through a cash deposit to a BDO savings account jointly owned by accused-appellant and his wife, Mrs. Palaña. 58 According to the complainant, he instructed his secretary, Ms. Vianzon, to deposit the Php100,000.00 to accused-appellant's bank account. In turn, Ms. Vianzon passed the responsibility of actually going to the bank and making the deposit to their janitress/messenger, Ms. Andora. 59

Clearly, the lone individual with personal knowledge of the supposed act of depositing Php100,000.00 to the bank was Ms. Andora. However, the prosecution failed to present her as a witness. Neither did Ms. Andora execute any sworn statement. 60

The Court cannot simply accept the statements of complainant and his secretary that the cash deposit was indeed made upon their instructions. Their statements are merely hearsay as they have no personal knowledge of the actual cash deposit made at the bank. More importantly, their lack of personal knowledge on the deposit was even admitted during cross-examination. Complainant acknowledged he only relied on the information relayed by Ms. Vianzon. 61 On the other hand, Ms. Vianzon confessed she did not personally deposit the amount or even fill-up the deposit form. All these purported acts were all done by their messenger, Ms. Andora 62 whose testimony was not even offered in court. Ultimately, both complainant and Ms. Vianzon lacked personal knowledge of the deposit since they merely relied on information relayed by Ms. Andora.

During cross-examination, complainant testified:

Q: Now, you testified earlier also that it was your Secretary who deposited the amount of One Hundred Thousand?

A: I instructed my Secretary to deposit but my Secretary gave the One Hundred Thousand cash to our messenger to deposit it, ma'am.

Q: So, when this messenger went to the bank, which Banco de Oro branch?

A: With the BDO near our office, ma'am.

Q: So this messenger went to the bank of the BDO near your office which is West Avenue, correct?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: She was carrying the amount of One Hundred Thousand in cash?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And she was the one who wrote in the Deposit Slip?

A: Maybe I was not present when he deposited it ma'am, I don't know if he is the one who wrote or the teller wrote for it, I don't know, ma'am.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: So you have no personal knowledge if this messenger went to the bank, you just know it because your Secretary told you?

A: Yes, ma'am. 63

Likewise, Ms. Vianzon testified:

Q: Madam Witness, you will agree with me that you did not personally deposit the amount but you instructed it, am I correct?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: You merely instructed a certain Maria Johanna Andora?

A: Yes, ma'am, I was the one who instructed Maria Johanna Andora.

xxx xxx xxx

Chairperson:

Did you fill up the deposit form?

Witness:

Hindi po ako ang nag-fill up ng deposit form, Your Honors, iyon pong inutusan ko si Maria Johanna po ang nag-fill up ng form, Your Honors. 64

One of the most basic rules on the admissibility of evidence states that a witness can testify only to those facts which he or she knows of his or her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his or her own perception. Accordingly, anything that is not based on a witness' own personal knowledge shall be based as hearsay. 65 The admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to confront the witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine them. A conviction based alone on proof that violates the constitutional right of an accused is a nullity and the court that rendered it acted without jurisdiction in its rendition. Such a judgment cannot be given any effect whatsoever especially on the liberty of an individual. 66

For failure to present Ms. Andora, who was the individual with personal knowledge of the claimed bank deposit, the prosecution failed to establish an essential element of the crime charged. The prosecution should have sought the testimony of Ms. Andora, especially since the defense vehemently disputed the supposed deposit by instead claiming it was a payment made by Commissioner De Castro on 21 December 2011.

Finally on the third element, the prosecution likewise failed to establish any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a party.

Here, the Sandiganbayan erred in finding there was undue injury caused to complainant, whether it be it form of a loan which was not returned or in the form of solicitation, as goodwill money. 67 As previously discussed, the cash deposit supposedly made upon instructions of complainant was not duly established by the prosecution. For failure to present the witness with personal knowledge of the deposit, the element of undue injury is also deemed inexistent. Moreover, there was no proof of any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference given to any private party. Aside from the bare allegations of the complainant, no other evidence was presented pertaining to the claimed cordial relationship with accused-appellant or the supposed phone call wherein accused-appellant sought a loan. 68

Further, the Court notes that Commissioner De Castro took the stand and testified that sometime in December 2011, she made a bank deposit amounting to Php100,000.00 to accused-appellant's BDO account on 21 December 2011 as payment for the jewelry she bought from the latter's wife, Mrs. Palaña. The date coincides with the day when allegedly, complainant directed his secretary to deposit the same amount to accused-appellant's bank account. While the defense failed to produce the bank deposit for the said transaction, We find no reason to consider Commissioner De Castro's testimony as anything but the truth. After all, as a retired NLRC Commissioner, Commissioner De Castro had placed not only her integrity, but likewise, her reputation as well, on the line. She had everything to lose and nothing to gain when she testified on her claims.

Likewise, the elements for

Even assuming that accused-appellant may still be charged for violation of Sec. 7 (d) of RA 6713, the elements for the crime have not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Section 7 (d) of RA 6713 provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. — Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.

In order to sustain a conviction for violation of Section 7 (d) of RA 6713, the following elements must be proved with moral certainty: (a) that the accused is a public official or employee; (b) that the accused solicited or accepted any loan or anything of monetary value from any person; and (c) that the said act was done in the course of the accused's official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of his office. 69

Again, the first element is undisputed. However, the second and third elements are wanting. It bears stressing that aside from mere allegations and hearsay, no evidence was submitted to prove accused-appellant's solicitation or acceptance of the alleged loan. The Sandiganbayan misappreciated evidence by relying on mere hearsay. To emphasize, the testimonies of the complainant and his secretary regarding the alleged cash deposit are inadmissible for lack of personal knowledge.

Ultimately, the evidence presented against the accused-appellant is severely diminished by its reliance on hearsay and unsupported allegations. It is a basic rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. 70 As such, accused-appellant cannot be convicted for either violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 or Sec. 7 (d) of RA 6713.

The consistent teaching in our jurisprudence is that evidence adduced must be closely examined under the lens of judicial scrutiny and that conviction must flow only from the moral certainty that guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence of an accused is a basic constitutional principle fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest no less than on hard evidence showing that the accused, with moral certainty, is guilty of the crime charged. Short of these constitutional mandate and statutory safeguard — that a person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved — the Court is then left without discretion and is duty bound to render a judgment of acquittal. 71

On a final note, the Court finds it necessary to address the Sandiganbayan's pronouncement that it could not fathom how complainant could have known accused-appellant's bank account number, and that such personal information could only be accessible to an individual if given by the account's owner. 72 The Sandiganbayan makes a dangerous assumption. On the contrary, bank account numbers are often freely disclosed and made easily accessible for both personal and business transactions. If the Sandiganbayan's view is maintained or upheld, it may lead to unscrupulous individuals taking advantage by depositing random amounts to bank accounts of public officers for the purpose of filing harassment cases. It may also unfairly expose public officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions to baseless suits from disgruntled lawyers or litigants. It would be impossible to prevent third persons with malicious intent from depositing certain amounts of money into their bank accounts, and thereafter fabricate stories of corruption. This we cannot countenance.

In sum, the prosecution's evidence in this case failed to pass the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant a conviction. While it is true that factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are even conclusive and binding to this Court, this principle does not apply here inasmuch as the Sandiganbayan misappreciated vital pieces of evidence, leaving serious doubts regarding the culpability of accused-appellant. 73 Thus, accused-appellant is entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the Decision promulgated on 15 November 2018 by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-16-CRM-0687 and SB-16-CRM-0688 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant ANGELO ANG PALAÑA is ACQUITTED of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and violation of Section 7 (d) of Republic Act No. 6713, on the ground that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

Let the corresponding entry of final judgment be immediately issued.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.People v. Cariño, G.R. No. 234155, 25 March 2019 [Per J. Gesmundo].

2.Rollo, pp. 19-20.

3.Id. at 3-18; penned by Associate Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega, and concurred in by Associate Justices Rafael R. Lagos and Maryann E. Corpus-Mañalac of the Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan.

4. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

5. Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

6.Rollo, pp. 3-4.

7.Id. at 4.

8.Id. at 5.

9. Disbarred in Chan v. Atty. Carrera, A.C. No. 10439, 03 September 2019 [Per Curiam].

10.Rollo, p. 6.

11.Id.

12.Id.

13.Id. at 7.

14.Id.

15.Id. at 7-8.

16.Id. at 8-9.

17.Id. at 10-12.

18.Id. at 10.

19.Id.

20.Id. at 11.

21.Id.

22.Id. at 12.

23.Id. at 3-18.

24.Id. at 17.

25.Id. at 13.

26.Id. at 14.

27.Id. at 30-48; 50-74.

28.Id. at 34.

29.Id. at 36.

30.Id. at 38.

31.Id. at 62.

32.Id. at 85-88.

33.Chan v. Atty Carrera, supra at note 9.

34.Agapito, Jr. v. Atty. Carrera, A.C. No. 10632, 10 December 2014 (Notice).

35.Katipunan, Jr. v. Atty. Carrera, A.C. No. 12661, 19 February 2020 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier].

36.Rollo, p. 86.

37.Id. at 34.

38.Id. at 67-68.

39. A.M. No. 13-07-05-SB, 09 October 2018.

40.Rollo, p. 21.

41.Id. at 22-23.

42.Id. at 16.

43.Id. at 16-17.

44.Id. at 4.

45.Id.

46. Sec. 9 (a) of RA 3019.

47. Sec. 11 (a) of RA 6713.

48. SECTION 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (3a)

49.Racca v. Echague, G.R. No. 237133, 20 January 2021 [Per J. Gesmundo].

50.People v. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, 12 March 2018 [Per J. Gesmundo].

51.Centeno v. Hon. Villalon-Pornillos, 306 Phil. 219 (1994); G.R. No. 113092, 01 September 1994, [Per J. Regalado].

52.Cruz v. People, G.R. Nos. 197142 & 197153, 09 October 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].

53.Suba v. Sandiganbayan First Division, G.R. No. 235418, 03 March 2021 [Per CJ. Peralta].

54.Cruz v. People, supra at note 52.

55.Rollo, p. 13.

56.Cruz v. People, supra at note 52.

57.Rollo, p. 14.

58.Id. at 5.

59.Id. at 6-7.

60.Id. at 40.

61.Id. at 7.

62.Id. at 7-8.

63. TSN, 18 January 2018, pp. 27-29.

64.Id. at 42-46.

65.People v. Tamano, G.R. No. 227866, 08 July 2020 [Per J. Gaerlan].

66.People v. Cariño, G.R. No. 234155, 25 March 2019 [Per J. Gesmundo].

67.Rollo, p. 15.

68.Id. at 39.

69.Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 237738, 10 June 2019 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].

70.Catubao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 227371, 02 October 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].

71.Suba v. Sandiganbayan First Division, supra at note 53.

72.Rollo, p. 14.

73.Cruz v. People, supra at note 52.