FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 248782. June 14, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.JENNYLYN ORATE y ARANDA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 14, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 248782 (People of the Philippines v. Jennylyn Orate y Aranda).
This resolves the appeal from the August 30, 2018 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09291 which affirmed with modification the April 4, 2017 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 (RTC), finding Jennylyn Orate y Aranda (accused-appellant) guilty of Qualified Trafficking under Section 6 (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208, 3 as amended by R.A. No. 10364.
Antecedents
Accused-appellant was charged with qualified trafficking under the following Information:
That on or about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 13, 2014 at Binmaley, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit, transfer, seventeen (17)-year old minor AAA 4 (DOB: December 25, 1996) from Brgy. Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan to Luna, Poblacion, Binmaley, Pangasinan by means of deceit and with force and intimidation, for the purpose of gain and sexual exploitation and prostitution, against the will and consent of minor AAA to her detriment and prejudice.
Contrary to Sec. 6(a) of R.A. [No.] 9208 as amended by R.A. [No.] 10364. 5
Accused-appellant entered a plea of "not guilty" during arraignment. At the trial, the prosecution presented AAA as lone witness, while accused-appellant and Marjo Gutierrez (Marjo) testified for the defense.
Version of the Prosecution
The CA quoted in its decision the following testimony of AAA as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG):
On February 13, 2014, at about 6 o'clock in the evening, AAA went to the house of her auntie in Bgy. Linoc, Binmaley, Pangasinan, when she chanced upon her neighbor, the herein appellant, who asked her to go to Binmaley Magic Mall at the town proper. As AAA refused to go with her, appellant forcibly held her by the hand. At this juncture, two (2) men on board a tricycle arrived and, together with appellant, forced her to board the tricycle as they also threatened to kill her family if she would refuse to do so. (pp. 10-15, TSN, May 5, 2015)
Thereafter, appellant and the men brought AAA to an abandoned place in Luna Laet, Binmaley, Pangasinan, where she saw Mark Villanueva [hand] some money to appellant. Thereupon, appellant left, but she made a promise to AAA that she would return, but she never did. (pp. 10-20, Ibid.)
As soon as appellant left, Mark and his father, Antonio, and five (5) other men took turns in kissing AAA. Then the father and son tandem undressed her. It was Antonio who first mounted on top of her, inserted his penis [in] her vagina, and made a push and pull movement. After Antonio, Mark succeeded his father in sexually molesting AAA. When Mark was done, he injected some drugs [in] her that made her feel numb and [weak]. Despite her condition, AAA was forcibly boarded onto a motorbike in between two male persons who brought her [to] the park in front of the church of Binmaley to deliver to an unidentified person some white substance contained in a plastic in exchange for P1,500.00. (pp. 21-33, Ibid.)
As soon as AAA received the amount of P1,500.00, she tried to escape by running away, but her attempt proved futile since she was grabbed and held by one of the men who even poked a knife at her. (Ibid.)
When AAA was brought back to the place in Luna Laet, [Antonio] and Mark mauled and punched her inside a room, after which she was sexually assaulted again. When Antonio and Mark were done, three (3) others came in and took turns in raping her. In between those rapes, Mark Villanueva injected some substance [in] her to keep her weak; her hands were tied, and her mouth was gagged. (pp. 34-40, Ibid.)
AAA was detained in Luna Laet for several days until an unidentified woman helped her escape on March 23, 2014. (pp. 41-45, Ibid.) 6
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant testified that AAA was her neighbor and friend. On February 13, 2014, at around six o'clock in the evening, while she was looking after her young children, AAA came to her house in order to use her (accused-appellant's) cellphone as AAA had to text someone who was later identified as Marjo. Thereafter, AAA asked accused-appellant to accompany her to the plaza at Binmaley, Pangasinan. When they arrived there, AAA's boyfriend, Mark, approached them and instructed them to proceed to a house in Luna Laet, Pangasinan. Accused-appellant knew that Mark was AAA's boyfriend because she saw them together at AAA's house even before the incident. Upon arriving in Luna, she was ordered to buy liquor for AAA and Mark. She left without joining the drinking session because she was pregnant. 7
Accused-appellant further testified that four days later, AAA's sister and mother came to her house looking for AAA. She told them that she did not know where AAA was. They asked her to accompany them in searching for AAA. They went to Luna but AAA was no longer there. They proceeded to Canaoalan because she knew that AAA had texted a certain Marjo who is from that place. In Canaoalan, they asked around until they were able to talk to said Marjo who told them that he did not know the whereabouts of AAA. As they failed to find AAA, they just went home. 8
Thereafter, accused-appellant claimed that she went back to work as a house helper in Bulacan. After four days, she received a text message from AAA's aunt asking her to go home because they were looking for AAA. She acceded to their request but upon reaching Dagupan City, she was arrested. She was released after one day in detention. She denied knowing Antonio Villanueva and Mark Villanueva. 9
Marjo testified that he met AAA in December 2013, during a Christmas party at San Isidro Sur, Pangasinan. AAA introduced herself to his friends who were then having a drinking spree. Sometime in February 2014, he learned that AAA's mother reported to the barangay hall of San Isidro Sur that AAA was raped by one Macky Doria. He claimed that he only met accused-appellant when the latter, together with AAA's mother and uncle, came to his house looking for AAA. 10
RTC Ruling
After trial, the RTC promulgated its decision finding accused-appellant guilty, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Jennylyn Orate y Aranda is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified trafficking under Section 6(a) and penalized under Section 10(c) of R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking of Persons Act of 2003") as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012") and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two million pesos.
The accused shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.
SO ORDERED. 11
The trial court held that the prosecution had satisfactorily established that accused-appellant transported AAA to the town proper, and finally to a house in Luna, Binmaley by coercion and threat for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Considering that AAA was still a minor at the time, the crime committed is qualified trafficking. 12
CA Ruling
In the now assailed decision, the CA concurred with the RTC but modified the decision awarding damages to AAA, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The April 4, 2017 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. L-10236 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Jennylyn Orate y Aranda is ORDERED to pay AAA P500,000.00 moral damages and P100,000.00 exemplary damages, subject to 6% interest per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 13
Accused-appellant contends that AAA's testimony is illogical, contrary to common human experience, and full of inconsistencies. 14 She argues that if the alleged trafficking had indeed taken place, AAA would not have been confused on how they met; that it was unclear whether she accosted AAA or that the abduction occurred after accused-appellant agreed to accompany AAA to Magic Mall in Binmaley; that it would have been illogical if she had invited AAA to go to Magic Mall at six o'clock in the evening where there would be several witnesses to the alleged abduction; and that AAA did not shout for help when she was allegedly being forced to board the tricycle. Accused-appellant also faults the prosecution for failing to present any corroborating witness since there should have been other persons who may have witnessed the alleged abduction. 15
The OSG, representing the People, maintains that the inconsistencies cited by accused-appellant are immaterial and of no consequence. What is necessary and essential is that AAA refused to go with accused-appellant to ride in the tricycle, but accused-appellant and the two men forced and threatened her into doing so against her will. It was at that precise moment that the recruitment, forced transfer, and transport had been successfully carried out. Moreover, inconsistencies between the testimony in court and statements in the victim's sworn affidavit, referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect her credibility. 16
Issue
Did the CA commit reversible error in finding accused-appellant guilty of violating Sec. 6 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, as amended by R.A. No. 10364.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is without merit.
Sec. 3 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, 17 as amended by R.A. No. 10364 18 defines the crime of trafficking of persons, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 6 (a) of the law further provides that there is qualified trafficking when the victim is a "child." A "child" is defined by the law as "a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition." 19
In People v. Casio, 20 this Court enumerated the elements of the crime of trafficking of persons under the expanded definition:
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders";
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person[;]"
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs[.]" 21
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution had satisfactorily established the presence of all the elements constituting trafficking in persons. Both courts also correctly found the offense to be qualified in view of AAA's minority which has been alleged in the information and proven during trial. Their common factual findings were based on the credible, positive, and categorical testimony of AAA that accused-appellant, together with two male persons, forced her to board a tricycle; brought her to Luna Laet, Binmaley; turned her over to Mark and Antonio; and left AAA alone after receiving money from Mark.
Contrary to accused-appellant's contention, the alleged minor inconsistencies in AAA's testimony did not affect her credibility. Such minor details do not detract from the established fact that accused-appellant, together with two men, transported AAA to an abandoned house and left her there to be sexually abused and used as a drug mule. AAA's narration of her harrowing ordeal was given utmost faith and credence by the trial and appellate courts which sensed no malice or dishonest motive in implicating accused-appellant as the one who trafficked her to her captors. That the prosecution presented no other witness did not impair the probative value of her testimony.
Repeatedly, this Court has ruled that "discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness' affidavit and testimony do not necessarily impair his credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer." 22 The reason for this rule is that "[a]ffidavits taken ex parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court." 23 Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters — not to the central fact of the crime — do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses' declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. 24
Moreover, the testimony of a single witness, if straightforward and categorical, is sufficient to convict. 25 A finding of guilt based on the testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon. 26 For although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary 'only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate.' 27
The trial court's factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from those factual findings, are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect. 28 Such factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight once affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 29 "The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand." 30 The exception is when either or both lower courts have "overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts which could have affected the outcome of the case." 31 No exceptional circumstance obtains in this case.
As to the proper penalty to be imposed, We find the same to be in conformity with the law 32 and current jurisprudence. 33
In sum, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the ruling of the CA. Accordingly, accused-appellant's conviction for qualified trafficking in persons must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, We DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM the August 30, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09291. Accused-appellant Jennylyn Orate y Aranda is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking under Section 6 (a) in relation to Section 10 (c) of Republic Act No. 9208, as amended by Republic Act No. 10364, and is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to PAY a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages, and One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages, subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. CA rollo, pp. 90-101; penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Gabriel T. Robeniol, concurring.
2.Id. at 45-53; penned by Judge Maria Laarni R. Parayno.
3. Otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."
4. Pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9208, as amended by R.A. No. 10364, the name and personal circumstances of the trafficked person or any other information tending to establish the identity of the trafficked person and his or her family shall not be disclosed to the public.
5. CA rollo, p. 45.
6.Id. at 92-93.
7.Id. at 47; 93.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 47-48; 93.
10.Id. at 48; 93-94.
11.Id. at 52-53.
12.Id. at 51-52.
13.Id. at 101.
14.Id. at 37-40.
15.Id. at 39.
16.Id. at 79-81.
17. "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003," approved on May 26, 2003.
18. "Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012," approved on 06 February 2013.
19. Sec. 3 (b), R.A. No. 9208, as amended by R.A. No. 10364.
20. 749 Phil. 458 (2014).
21.Id. at 474.
22.People v. Gonzales, Jr., 781 Phil. 149, 159 (2016).
23.People v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 227880, November 6, 2019, citing People v. Dabon, 290-A Phil. 449, 456 (1992).
24.People v. Laog, 674 Phil. 444, 463 (2011).
25.People v. Callao, 828 Phil. 372, 385 (2018), citing People v. Navarro, 357 Phil. 1010, 1030 (1998), People v. Pat. Cruz, 348 Phil. 539, 547 (1998), and People v. Hayahay, 345 Phil. 69, 81 (1997).
26.People v. Jalbonian, 713 Phil. 93, 103-104 (2013).
27.Id. at 104.
28.People v. Dela Rosa, supra note 23, citing People v. Diu, 708 Phil. 218, 232 (2013).
29.Id.
30.Santiago, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 213760, July 1, 2019, citing Ditche v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 35, 46 (2000).
31.Id.; citation omitted.
32. Section 10 (c) of R.A. No. 9208 provides that persons found guilty of Qualified Trafficking shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00).
33. See People v. Bandojo, Jr., G.R. No. 234161, October 17, 2018; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 217978, January 30, 2019; People v. San Miguel, G.R. No. 247956, October 7, 2020.