THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 242266. May 10, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROLANDO OPULENCIA @ LANDO, RICARDO OPULENCIA @ Ricky, accused-appellants,
JIMMY MADALI y WATIWAT, ALEJANDRO "DAYO" MADALI y WATIWAT AND NELSON "ILONG" ARCILLA y AMARO, accused.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMay 10, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 242266 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. ROLANDO OPULENCIA @ Lando, RICARDO OPULENCIA @ Ricky, accused-appellants; JIMMY MADALI y WATIWAT, ALEJANDRO "Dayo" MADALI y WATIWAT AND NELSON "Ilong" ARCILLA y AMARO, accused). — The inconsistency between an affidavit executed ex parte and a testimony in open court, does not necessarily taint a witness' credibility. A positive, clear, and convincing testimony identifying accused-appellants as assailants necessarily defeats the inherently weak defenses of alibi and denial.
This Court resolves an appeal assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision 1 which partially modified the Regional Trial Court's Decision 2 convicting Rolando Opulencia (Rolando) and Ricardo Opulencia (Ricky) of two counts of murder.
An Information for double murder charges was filed against Rolando, Ricky, Marcelo Opulencia (Marcelo), Rafael Cortas (Cortas), Nelson Arcilla (Arcilla), Baltazar Abugao (Abugao), Bernardo Ebueza (Bernardo), Jimmy Madali (Jimmy) and Alejandro Madali (Alejandro):
That on or about the 31st day of January 2001, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, at Barangay San Andres, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with a decided purpose to kill, and while armed with unlicensed firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said unlicensed firearms LEONARDO MARALIT and ROMEO DELA CRUZ, inflicting upon them gunshot wounds in different parts of their body causing their untimely and instantaneous deaths.
That in the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were attendant.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The case against Abugao was dismissed because of an affidavit of desistance by the victim's mother, Maria dela Cruz (Maria). Cortas remains at-large. 4
The prosecution presented Romeo's mother, Maria, his nephew, Roberto dela Cruz (Roberto), and his brother, Anselmo dela Cruz (Anselmo) as its witnesses. 5 Their version of the events are as follows:
Around 10:00 a.m. of January 31, 2001, Romeo, along with Leonardo Maralit (Maralit) and several others, were about to board a boat at the Aglubang River on their way to Villa Cerveza, Victoria, Oriental Mindoro, when they were shot. 6
Maria testified hearing gunshots from the direction of the river. She then saw the perpetrators hiding behind tall grasses and firing at her son. She also saw Maralit wounded and lying on the ground. 7 She identified Rolando, Ricky, Marcelo, Bernardo, and others who were not yet apprehended, as the assailants. However, she clarified that not all of them were armed. Only Rolando, Ricky, Arcilla, 8 and a certain "Paeng" were the ones carrying three M-14 firearms and a carbine. 9 She further clarified that it was only Rolando, Ricky, and Arcilla who fired at the victims. 10
Maria's son was dead when she managed to approach him. She then reported the incident to the barangay captain. She testified that she and some other people were only able to recover the bodies around 3:00 in the afternoon since the assailants continued to shoot those who attempted to recover the bodies. 11
Roberto testified that he was a ferryman at Mindex. 12 Around 10:00 a.m. on January 31, 2001, he was on a boat with his uncle Romeo Leonardo, Danilo Ramos, and another employee. 13 They were preparing to leave for work when they were shot at. 14 From a distance of 50 meters away he identified his co-workers, Marcelo, Rolando, Ricky, Alejandro, and Jimmy as the assailants. 15 He said that they were carrying a Garand carbine, a .22 caliber, and a shotgun. 16 He identified the Opulencia brothers, Marcelo, Rolando, and Ricky, as the armed assailants. 17 During the shooting, he laid down with his face on the ground. 18 He then saw his uncle Romeo get hit on his left armpit, chest and back, while Maralit was hit on his thigh. 19 On cross-examination, Roberto admitted that he could not determine the kind of firearms the assailants were carrying because they were 50 meters away. 20
Meanwhile Anselmo testified that on January 29, 2001, the Opulencia brothers also attempted to kill him. He was in Calapan City when he found out about what happened to his brother. 21
The accused testified for the defense. Their testimonies consisted mainly of denial and alibi, insisting that they were in their respective workplaces when the incident happened.
Marcelo died during the pendency of the case but he was able to testify before his demise. 22 He claimed that he was working in the mountain in Villa Cerveza, Victoria, Oriental Mindoro when the incident happened 23 and he only learned about Romeo's death the next day when Roberto confronted him about his alleged involvement. 24 He was allegedly threatened that Herman dela Cruz (Herman), Roberto's father, would kill him if he fails to implicate his brothers and accomplices for the death of Romeo and Maralit. 25 He then informed his brother, Domingo Opulencia (Domingo), about the accusation. They followed the suggestion of an ex-councilman and went to Herman to settle the case for P200,000.00. 26
However, the settlement did not proceed because the victim's family demanded an additional P100,000.00. Marcelo explained that he only agreed to settle to avoid a lengthy trial. He also testified that Domingo even offered his passenger jeepney for settlement and Maria executed an affidavit of desistance. He then left Mindoro to work in Batangas and later on got involved in an arson case in 2003. 27
Ricky also claimed that he was working at Mindex when the incident occurred. He claimed that as overseer of equipment, he was not allowed to leave the premises which was allegedly 15 kilometers away from the place of incident. It was only in May 2001 that he was able to return home. He claimed he had no knowledge of the incident and was only apprised of his involvement after he went home. Domingo, his brother, assured him that the case will be settled. After negotiations, Maria executed an affidavit of desistance. 28
For his part, Rolando testified that he was working at Mindex as an assistant of an engineer and was part of a survey team at Mt. Capawa, which was at the boundary of Occidental Mindoro and Oriental Mindoro, when the killing took place. Allegedly, it would take a whole day to walk on foot from his place of work to the town of Naujan where the incident happened. After a month, he went home and found out that he was one of the suspects in the shooting incident. After the case settlement, he moved to Tanauan, Batangas and only came back to Mindoro because of an arson case. 29
Madali also denied the charges and alleged that he was also working at Mindex in the mountain of Victoria, Oriental Mindoro. It would also allegedly take him one day to reach the place of incident on foot. He said he knew the victims as they worked as boatmen in the river. He then testified that Anselmo apologized to him for implicating him in the case. 30
Alejandro testified that he was a stay-in employee at Mindex, which was about 4 kilometers away from the place of incident and at least an hour on foot. He claimed that he was only named as one of the suspects out of envy because he was given a permanent position in the company. 31
Lastly, Nelson also denied the charges against him and claimed that "he was also working at Mindex on the said date and time[,]" which is about eight hours away from the crime scene on foot. He testified that he had been an employee of Mindex for three years prior to the incident. 32
The trial court convicted Rolando, Ricky, Jimmy, Alejandro, and Arcilla of Double Murder. 33 The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, finding herein accused Rolando Opulencia @ "Lando["], Ricardo Opulencia @ "Ricky," Jimmy Madali y Watiwat, Alejandro "Dayo" Madali y Watiwat; and, Nelson Arcilla y Amaro @ "Ilong" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Murder, punishable under Article 248 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and with the attendance of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties as provided for by law and without the benefit of parole. Said accused are hereby directed to indemnify each of the heirs of the victims Leonardo Maralit and Romeo dela Cruz the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 ss exemplary damages.
This case against herein accused Rafael Cortas who is still at large still [sic], stands.
SO ORDERED. 34
The trial court did not give credence to the accused's defense of denial against Maria's positive, clear, and convincing testimony identifying them as the assailants. 35 This was also corroborated by the testimony of Roberto who survived the attack. 36 It also held that the accused failed to substantiate their alibis and prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when the killings transpired. 37
However, the trial court acquitted Bernardo due to lack of evidence that he conspired with the accused. 38 It also dismissed the case against Marcelo, who died during the pendency of the case, without determination of his culpability. 39
The trial court likewise appreciated treachery which qualified the killing to murder because the attack was sudden and unexpected, rendering the victims unable to defend themselves. It also found evident premeditation as the accused were armed when they ambushed their victims while boarding a boat. 40
The accused appealed their conviction. Their appeal was initially dismissed for their failure 41 to file their appellants' brief. 42 On July 14, 2015, the Public Attorney's Office-Special and Appealed Cases Service filed a notice of appearance and motion to reinstate the appeal. 43 Thus, their appeal was reinstated pursuant to a July 12, 2016 Resolution. 44
On June 21, 2018, 45 the Court of Appeals partially granted their appeal. It gave full credence to the testimonies of Maria and Roberto despite the inconsistencies in the affidavits they previously executed. 46 The Court of Appeals held that the witnesses' relationship with the victim bolstered their credibility because their desire to vindicate their relative would compel them to not falsely testify and implicate the innocent. 47
The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of Rolando and Ricky but acquitted Jimmy, Alejandro and Arcilla for reasonable doubt as the testimonies of Maria and Roberto only placed them at the scene without proof of their participation in the killing. It did not give credence to Roberto's identification because he was lying face down to avoid being shot. 48 Thus, he could not have identified all of the assailants properly.
It also modified the trial court's finding of evident premeditation because there was no evidence showing that the accused planned to kill the victims or that they clung to such determination. 49 However, it sustained the presence of treachery because the victims were suddenly attacked without warning, with shots coming from multiple directions. This prevented the victims from fleeing or retaliating. 50
Finally, the Court of Appeals modified the nomenclature of the crime from double murder to two counts of murder, citing People v. Jugueta. 51 It held that Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply because the death of the victims was the result of two different shots, and thus, two separate murders were committed. 52
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro dated 22 November 2012, in Criminal Case No. C-6381 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1) That accused-appellants Rolando Opulencia and Ricardo Opulencia are each found guilty of the crime of two (2) counts of murder for the deaths of Leonardo Maralit and Romeo dela Cruz. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. Further, each of the accused-appellants Rolando Opulencia and Ricardo Opulencia are ordered to indemnify the respective heirs of the victims Romeo dela Cruz and Leonardo Maralit the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages, and Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% from the date of the finality of this decision; and
2) Accused-appellants Jimmy Madali, Alejandro Madali and Nelson Arcilla are ACQUITTED on the ground that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Unless convicted for any other crime or detained for some lawful reason, accused-appellants are ordered RELEASED immediately. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to immediately implement this Decision and to report to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, the action he has taken.
Let a Partial Entry of Judgment be issued to Jimmy Madali, Alejandro Madali and Nelson Arcilla.
SO ORDERED.53 (Emphasis in the original)
On June 21, 2018, the Court of Appeals ordered the release of Jimmy, Alejandro, and Arcilla. 54 It also issued a partial entry of judgment for their acquittal. 55
Aggrieved, Rolando and Ricky filed a Notice of Appeal 56 which was granted 57 on July 16, 2018. The Court of Appeals then elevated the records of the case before this Court.
On November 12, 2018, this Court noted the receipt of the records and required the parties to file their supplemental briefs. 58 The accused-appellants 59 and the plaintiff-appellee 60 filed their respective manifestations adopting their appeal briefs in lieu of supplemental briefs.
In their Brief, 61 accused-appellants invoke the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus62 claiming that the testimonies of Maria and Roberto should have been rejected in their entirety because its inconsistencies with the affidavits they have previously executed tainted the testimonies. 63 They assail Maria's credibility because she stated in her first affidavit that it was difficult to determine the identities of the perpetrators since there were a lot of people at the place of the incident. 64 She also stated initially that she was not present at scene of the crime but in a subsequent affidavit, she changed her narration of events. 65 They claim that the defense was able to impeach Maria's credibility because she was confronted with the affidavit and she failed to deny its existence. 66
Similarly, accused-appellants claim that Roberto's testimony should be disregarded. 67 During cross-examination, it was established that Roberto was facing the ground and was surrounded by tall grass during the incident. Thus, he could not tell where the shots were coming from. 68 They claimed that he ought to have been startled due to the suddenness of the attack, and could not have identified the perpetrators. 69 They also point out that Roberto's testimony in court also contradicts his sinumpaang salaysay stating that their relative Anselmo was also at the scene of the crime. 70 Given these inconsistencies, the prosecution allegedly failed to prove the accused-appellants' identities as assailants of the victims. 71
Moreover, they aver that the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery 72 or that they deliberately and consciously adopted the manner of attack. 73 The incident also happened in the morning, and in a crowded place, with other employees of Mindex 74 which would expose accused-appellants to risks of being identified and prosecuted. 75 There was also no direct evidence showing evident premeditation as there was no showing that they resolved to commit the crime or that they clung to such resolution. 76 Hence, they stress that they must be acquitted.
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee contends that the identities of accused-appellants as assailants have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It points out that the incident happened at 10:00 in the morning, which allowed the witnesses to clearly see the faces of the assailants. Moreover, Roberto's sufficient familiarity with his co-workers allowed him to immediately recognize them. 77 Hence, the defense of alibi deserves scant consideration against their positive identification. 78 Finally, it claims that the trial court correctly appreciated the existence of treachery considering that the victims were caught off guard and were attacked without a warning on their way to work. The method employed also ensured that their victims would be fatally wounded without risk of retaliation. 79
The issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
First, whether or not the guilt of accused-appellants has been established beyond reasonable doubt;
Second, whether or not the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation have been established; and
Lastly, whether or not the complex crime of double murder exists.
We dismiss the appeal and affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
I
Accused-appellants were charged with the complex crime of double murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 80 The provision reads:
ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
There is murder when the following elements have been proven:
(a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 81
In this case, there is no question that the first and last requisites were established. Accused-appellants now question the prosecution's evidence in proving their identities as the assailants. 82 They also question the trial courts' appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. 83
The accused-appellants assail the credibility of Maria due to the inconsistencies found in the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay she executed on August 12, 2002. 84 Supposedly, Maria previously stated that she was not present when the incident happened:
"Na matapos na magpahayag ang aming mga testigo ng kanilang pag-aalinlangan kung sino nga ang tunay na pumatay sa aming anak sapagka't sang-ayon sa kanila ay lubhang maraming tao ng mapatay ang aming anak at hindi sila nakatitiyak kung sino nga ang tunay na mga salarin. . . . Na kami naman ay wala sa pinangyarihan ng krimen kung kaya't di rin naming masasabi kung sino nga ang tunay na pumaslang sa aming anak."85 (Emphasis in the original)
Despite such admission, she executed another affidavit on December 5, 2003 where she completely changed her narration and indicted accused-appellants. 86 Since Maria did not deny the existence of these affidavits, accused-appellants argue that they successfully impeached her credibility. They also attempt to impeach Roberto's credibility because in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated February 5, 2001, he stated that Anselmo was present when the incident happened. 87 This differs from Anselmo's testimony during direct examination that he was at a hospital in Calapan City. 88 Given these inconsistencies, they argue that their entire testimonies be disregarded under the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. 89
We do not agree.
An affidavit is the product of an administering officer's line of questioning and subjective interpretation of the events as narrated by a witness. Taken ex parte, it is:
. . . incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject. 90
As compared to a testimony given in open court where the witness undergoes rigorous direct examination from his or her counsel to elicit a complete narration of relevant facts. 91 Thereafter, the witness is subjected to cross-examination where his or her testimony is tested for accuracy, truthfulness, and bias. 92 A judge may also ask additional questions to the witness to further elicit relevant facts. 93 Thus, it is settled that when there is inconsistency between an affidavit executed ex parte and the open court testimony of a witness, the latter prevails. 94
Neither can the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus be applied in this case. In People v. Dasig, 95 this Court discussed the requirements and limitations of this doctrine:
We take advantage of this opportunity to explain the true scope of this much invoked and abused rule of (Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus.) Professor Wigmore states that this rule ceased to be the rule in England as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. He criticizes the board rule as unsound, because not true to human nature; that because a person tells a single lie, he is lying throughout his whole testimony, or that there is strong possibility that he is so lying. The reason for it is that once a person knowingly and deliberately states a falsehood in one material aspect, he must have done so as to the rest. But it is also clear that the rule has its limitations, for when the mistaken statement is consistent with good faith and is not conclusively indicative of a deliberate perversion, the believable portion of the testimony should be admitted. Because though a person may err in memory or in observation in one or more respects, he may have told the truth as to others. There are, therefore, these requirements for the application of the rule, i.e., that the false testimony is as to a material point, and that there should be a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify. 96 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Here, accused-appellants failed to prove the existence of a false testimony. Maria was able to explain the inconsistency when she was confronted with her Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay. She stated she was told to affix her thumbmark on the affidavit even though its contents were not read to her as she did not know how to read and write. 97
Thus, accused-appellants were not able to impeach Maria's credibility. As regards Roberto, the inconsistency in his affidavit does not pertain to a material fact. The presence of Anselmo during the incident does not have anything to do with the killing of Romeo and Maralit. There being no proven false testimony of a material fact, the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not apply in this case.
Moreover, the determination of the credibility of witnesses is best left with the trial courts. Without a clear showing of facts overlooked which could change the outcome of the case, this Court will defer to the trial court's findings. 98 Further, the accused-appellants did not prove any ill motive for Maria and Roberto to testify falsely. Instead, the Court of Appeals observed that their relationship with the victim adds to their credibility:
In this regard, it is well to consider that a witness' relationship to the victim of a crime makes his testimony even more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a crime done to their family to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. Kinship by blood or marriage to the victim would deter one from implicating innocent persons as one's natural interest would be to secure conviction of the real culprit. As has been held, "Being the aggrieved parties, they all desire justice for what had happened to them, thus, it is unnatural for them to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprits. Otherwise stated, it is very unlikely for these prosecution witnesses to implicate an innocent person to the crime. It has been correctly observed that the natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victims, more so, the victims themselves, in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity." 99
From the credible testimonies of Maria and Roberto, the prosecution was able to positively identify the Opulencia brothers as the assailants. Hence, the Court of Appeals was correct in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 100
Finally, the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded accused-appellants' denial and alibi. Without clear and convincing evidence of non-culpability, denial and alibi, as inherently weak defenses, will not outweigh a positive and categorical testimony of a witness. 101 For alibi to prosper, the accused must "demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed." 102
Here, the accused-appellants claim that they were in their respective places of work at the time of the incident. However, they failed to prove that it was impossible for them to be at the scene of the incident when the victims were killed. 103 They did not present any other evidence proving their non-culpability. Moreover, the clear, positive, and categorical testimonies of Maria and Roberto place accused-appellants at the scene of the crime. Thus, the prosecution was able to prove their identities as assailants of Maralit and Romeo.
II
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder when the following are established with clear and convincing evidence: "(1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (2) that said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted." 104 The essence of the first element of treachery is:
[S]udden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. A swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim that insures its execution without risk to the assailant arising from the defense of his victim is an indication that treachery is present. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. In that sense, even attacks that occur from the front may be considered treacherous if the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for self-defense. The mode of attack must also be consciously adopted. The accused must make some preparation to kill the deceased in a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. The attack, then, must not spring from the unexpected turn of events. 105 (Citations omitted)
As regards the second element, there must be a showing that "the means adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the crime." 106
We agree with the Court of Appeals that treachery qualified the killing of the victims in this case. 107 The time of the attack, even if done in the morning or in a crowded place, does not negate treachery. The accused attacked their victims suddenly and unexpectedly, while boarding a boat on their way to work. 108 They adopted means to ensure the success of their ambush by hiding themselves in tall grass, using multiple firearms, 109 and positioning themselves to make it appear that the bullets were being fired from all directions. 110 Thus, treachery qualified the killings in this case.
On the other hand, the elements of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation are as follows:
(1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution enough to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. 111
These elements must be proven "as clear as the evidence of the crime itself." 112 Moreover, there must be external acts showing deliberate planning and resolution to commit the crime:
Evident premeditation must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected, which indicate deliberate planning. There must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim. Criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing a determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation." 113
The trial court held that there was evident premeditation because the accused-appellants were armed and ambushed their victims on their way to work. 114 However, there is nothing in the records proving any of the elements of evident premeditation. There was no evidence that the accused-appellants planned to kill the victims or that they clung to this determination after the lapse of time. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that evident premeditation is not present in this case.
III
Lastly, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the nomenclature of the crimes committed. The Information charged accused-appellants with double murder. However, the body of the Information describes two counts of murder for the death of Maralit and Romeo:
"That on or about the 31st day of January 2001, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, at Barangay San Andres, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with a decided purpose to kill, and while armed with unlicensed firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said unlicensed firearms LEONARDO MARALIT and ROMEO DELA CRUZ, inflicting upon them gunshot wounds in different parts of their body causing their untimely and instantaneous deaths. That in the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation were attendant.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 115
In People v. Tabaco, 116 this Court explained the instances when a charge of the compound crime of double murder is proper:
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. He fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:
"In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every single act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them with its companion offenses."
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was not applied in the said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo we held that:
"Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed." 117 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In this case, the factual allegations in the Information do not constitute the compound crime of double murder. There is no showing that a single bullet killed two victims. This was also not proven during trial. While the Information charged accused-appellants with the complex crime of double murder, the prosecution was able to prove two counts of murder through the concerted action of accused-appellants in the killing of Romeo and Maralit.
In People v. Jugueta, 118 this Court allowed the conviction of the accused for two counts of murder in lieu a double murder charge since it was deemed that the accused waived the defect in the information by failing to move for the quashal of the defective information:
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al., 30 thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 or Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial. 119
In this case, there was no showing that accused-appellants filed a motion to quash the Information before they entered their plea of not guilty. 120 Thus, they have waived the defect in the information. Consequently, the Court of Appeals properly convicted them of two counts of murder and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each offense. 121
Finally, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the award of damages in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. 122
WHEREFORE, the June 21, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06283, finding accused-appellants Rolando Opulencia and Ricardo Opulencia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each offense.
Accused-appellants are further DIRECTED to pay the heirs of their victims, Romeo dela Cruz and Leonardo Maralit the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until its full satisfaction. 123
SO ORDERED." (Perlas-Bernabe, J., viceInting, J., per Raffle dated May 5, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-18. The June 21, 2018 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06283 was penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of this Court) of the Special First Division, Court of Appeals.
2. CA rollo, pp. 140-156. The November 22, 2012 Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Tomas C. Leynes of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro.
3.Rollo, p. 3.
4.Id.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id. Alias "Ilong."
9.Id. at 4.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12. CA rollo, p. 142.
13.Id.
14.Id.
15.Id.
16.Rollo, pp. 4-5.
17.Id. at 5.
18.Id.
19.Id.
20. CA rollo, p. 143.
21.Rollo, p. 5.
22.Id. at 3.
23.Id. at 5.
24.Id.
25.Id.
26.Id.
27.Id. at 4-5.
28.Id. at 6.
29.Id.
30.Id. at 6-7.
31.Id. at 7.
32.Id.
33. CA rollo, pp. 140-156, RTC Decision.
34.Id. at 155-156.
35.Id. at 153.
36.Id.
37.Id. at 153.
38.Id. at 154.
39.Id. at 155.
40.Id. at 154.
41.Id. at 77.
42.Id. at 76, 78. The November 20, 2014 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Ramon A. Cruz of the Court of Appeals, Fifth Division, Manila.
43.Id. at 101.
44.Id. at 101-104. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodil V. Zalameda (now a Member of this Court) and Ramon A. Cruz of the Court of Appeals, Special Former Fifth Division, Manila.
45.Id. at 208-224. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting of the Court of Appeals, Special First Division, Manila.
46.Id. at 215.
47.Rollo, pp. 8, 9.
48.Id. at 10.
49.Id. at 11.
50.Id. at 12.
51. 783 Phil. 806 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
52.Id. at 14.
53.Rollo, pp. 16-17.
54. CA rollo, p. 225.
55.Id. at 226-227.
56.Id. at 235, 237.
57.Id. at 238.
58.Rollo, pp. 24-25.
59.Id. at 30-31.
60.Id. at 35-36.
61. CA rollo, pp. 120, 138.
62.Id. at 131. This maxim translates to "False in one, false in everything." See Northwest Airlines v. Chiong, 567 Phil. 289 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
63.Id. at 131, 132.
64.Id. at 131.
65.Id.
66.Id.
67.Id.
68.Id. at 130.
69. CA Rollo, pp. 129-130.
70.Id. at 131.
71.Id. at 132.
72.Id.
73.Id. at 134.
74.Id.
75.Id.
76.Id. at 135.
77.Id. at 192.
78.Id.
79.Id. at 194.
80. Republic Act No. 7659 (1993).
81.People v. Kalipayan, 824 Phil. 173, 183 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division], citing People v. Bensig, 437 Phil. 748 (2002) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
82. CA rollo, pp. 238-132.
83.Id. at 134, 135.
84.Id. at 130.
85.Id. at 130-131.
86.Id. at 131.
87.Id.
88.Id.
89.Id. at 131-132.
90.People v. Siguin, 359 Phil. 450, 359 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division], citing People v. Marollano, 342 Phil. 38 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
91. RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 5.
92. RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 6.
93.People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc], citing People v. Manalo, G.R. No. L-55177, February 27, 1987 [Per J. Feliciano, First Division].
94.People v. Damayo, G.R. No. 232361, September 26, 2018 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64564> [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], citing People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
95. 93 Phil. 618 (1953) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
96.Id. at 627-628.
97. CA rollo, p. 142.
98.Medina v. People, G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/56593> [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
99.Rollo, pp. 9-10.
100.Id. at 9.
101.People v. Villanueva, 822 Phil. 735 (2017) [Per J. Tijam, First Division], citing People v. Mateo, 582 Phil. 369 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
102.People v. Dela Cruz, 299 Phil. 803, 815 (1994) [Per J. Davide, First Division], citing People vs. Penillos, 282 Phil. 563 (1992) [Per J. Davide, Third Division]; People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 68319, March 31, 1992 [Per J. Davide, Third Division]; People vs. Casinillo, 288 Phil. 688 (1992) [Per J. Davide, Third Division]; and People vs. Florida, 288 Phil. 1012 (1992) [Per J. Davide, Third Division].
103.Rollo, p. 8.
104.People v. Kalipayan, 824 Phil. 173, 186 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
105.Id.
106.Cirera v. People, 739 Phil. 25, 45 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
107.Rollo, p. 12.
108. CA rollo, p. 154.
109.Id. at 141.
110.Rollo, p. 12.
111.People v. Sebastian, 428 Phil. 622, 428 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division], citing People v. Salvador, 344 Phil. 580 (1997) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
112.People v. Academia, 366 Phil. 690, 366 (1999) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
113.People v. Abadies, 436 Phil. 98, 436 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
114. CA rollo, p. 154.
115.Rollo, p. 2.
116. 336 Phil. 771 (1997) [Per J. Hermosisima, First Division].
117.Id. at 801-803.
118. 783 Phil. 806 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
119.Id. at 822, 823.
120. CA rollo, p. 141.
121.Rollo, p. 15.
122.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
123.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].