People v. Onnia y Santiago

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 252887. October 6, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.IMELDA ONNIA y SANTIAGO @ "BUDANG" AND SONNY MERINO y VASQUEZ @ "SAKO", accused-appellants.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 6, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 252887 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff appellee, v. IMELDA ONNIA y SANTIAGO @ "BUDANG" and SONNY MERINO y VASQUEZ @ "SAKO," accused-appellants). — The Court resolves to NOTE:

(1) the Letter dated November 6, 2020 of CTSupt. Virginia S. Mangawit, Acting Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women, Bureau of Corrections (BuCor), Mandaluyong City, confirming the confinement therein of accused-appellant Imelda Onnia y Santiago @ "Budang" since April 26, 2017;

(2) the Letters dated November 10, 2020 and December 17, 2020 of CInsp. Jeremy L. Argonza, Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison, East Correctional Facility, BuCor, Muntinlupa City, confirming the confinement therein of accused-appellant Sonny Merino y Vasquez since May 26, 2017;

(3) accused-appellants' Manifestation (in Lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated November 19, 2020, stating that they adopt the brief for accused-appellants as their supplemental brief, considering that said brief had holistically discussed all the matters pertinent to their defense; and

(4) the Office of the Solicitor General's Manifestation (in Lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated December 15, 2020, stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief considering that the facts, issues, and applicable laws and jurisprudence had already been thoroughly and exhaustively discussed in the Brief for the Appellee dated March 16, 2018, and praying that it be excused from filing one.

This Court resolves the Notices of Appeal 1 assailing the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the convictions 3 of Imelda Onnia y Santiago (Onnia) for illegal sale, and Sonny Merino y Vasquez (Merino) for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, punished under Sections 5 4 and 11 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Two Informations were filed, one charging both Onnia and Merino with illegal sale and the other charging Merino with illegal possession. The Informations read:

Criminal Case No. 16323888

That on or about March 4, 2016, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, not being then authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and jointly sell to one PO2 MARK JAYSON PAEZ, a police poseur buyer, ONE (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "IOS" containing ZERO POINT ZERO SEVEN EIGHT (0.078) GRAMS (sic) of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "SHABU," a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 16323889

That on or about March 4, 2016, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control ONE (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "SMV" containing ZERO POINT ZERO SEVEN TWO (0.072) GRAMS (sic) of white crystalline substance containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as 'SHABU,' a dangerous drug.

Contrary to Law. 6 (Citations omitted)

When arraigned, both Onnia and Merino pleaded not guilty to the charges. 7 After pre-trial, a joint trial on the merits ensued. 8

Senior Police Officer 2 Luis C. Rufo, Jr. (SPO2 Rufo), Police Officer 2 Mark Jayson Paez (PO2 Paez), and Senior Police Officer 1 Jeffrey Delos Reyes (SPO1 Delos Reyes) testified for the prosecution. 9

Based on their testimonies, at around 7:00 a.m. on March 4, 2016, the Manila Police District Pandacan Police Station 10, Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit, received a tip from a confidential informant that a certain Budang, later identified as Onnia, was doing illegal drug activities. The informant reported having arranged a drug deal with Onnia at 9:00 a.m. that day along Lorenzo Dela Paz Street, Pandacan. 10

A buy-bust team was then formed comprising PO2 Paez, as the designated poseur-buyer, and SPO1 Delos Reyes and Police Officer 3 Cristelito Evangelista (PO3 Evangelista), as the back-up operatives. A marked P500.00 bill was given to PO2 Paez as buy-bust money. The police officers then coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and prepared a Pre-Operation Report and an Authority to Operate. 11

At the target area, the informant and PO2 Paez saw Onnia talking to a man they would later know as Merino. The two approached Onnia and Merino while the rest of team strategically positioned themselves in the area. The informant told Onnia that PO2 Paez wanted to buy P500.00 worth of shabu. Onnia then demanded payment and ordered Merino to receive the money from PO2 Paez. After getting the money, Onnia discreetly handed PO2 Paez one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Paez then removed the towel from his back to signal the sale's consummation to the rest of the team. 12

PO2 Paez arrested and searched Onnia, though he got nothing. As this was happening, SPO1 Delos Reyes and PO3 Evangelista rushed to arrest Merino. SPO1 Delos Reyes frisked Merino and recovered the marked money, along with one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance that was in his pocket. Both Onnia and Merino were apprised of their constitutional rights and arrested. 13

The team brought the two to the barangay hall, but found it empty and locked. Meanwhile, the "aggressive" relatives of Onnia and Merino had started to cause a commotion, prompting the team to proceed to the police station. There, PO2 Paez signed and marked the plastic sachet bought from Onnia with "IOS 3/4/16 9:30 AM." SPO1 Delos Reyes signed and marked the other sachet seized from Merino with "SMV 3/4/16 9:30 AM." 14

Afterward, an inventory of the seized items was conducted in the presence of Onnia, Merino, and media representative Danny Garendola (Garendola). PO2 Paez and SPO1 Delos Reyes each prepared and signed an inventory of seized items, which Garendola also signed. 15

During their routine medical and physical examination, Onnia and Merino showed no external signs of physical injuries, as certified by Dr. Darius M. Cruz, the attending physician. 16

The arresting officers then turned over the seized items to the case investigator, SPO2 Rufo, who in turn personally forwarded the marked plastic sachets to the Manila Police District Crime Laboratory. Upon a chemical analysis, the seized items tested positive for shabu, a dangerous drug. 17

Onnia and Merino denied the allegations. They claimed that the items allegedly recovered from them were planted evidence. They recounted that on the morning of March 4, 2016, they were visiting Onnia's sick aunt when police officers in civilian clothes blocked their path and apprehended them. When they asked why, the officers said that they would only be asked questions. Onnia and Merino were brought to Manila Police Station 10 and were detained arbitrarily without any formal charges or warrants shown to them. They saw SPO1 Delos Reyes take out plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, claiming that those had been taken from the two. They protested, saying that nothing was confiscated from them. 18

In its March 24, 2017 Decision, 19 the Regional Trial Court found both Onnia and Merino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It decreed that the prosecution established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu, as well as the conspiracy between Onnia and Merino. It brushed aside the defenses of denial and frame-up, noting that the police officers were presumed to have regularly performed their official duties. It gave full faith to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, finding no ill motive on their part. 20 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 16-323888 finding accused IMELDA ONNIA y SANTIAGO @ "BUDANG" and SONNY MERINO y VASQUEZ @ "SAKO," GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation [of] Section 5 [Article] II of Republic Act 9165, and hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment; to pay a fine a (sic) of P400,000.00 each; and to pay the costs; and

2. In Criminal Case No. 16-323889 finding accused SONNY MERINO y VASQUEZ @ "SAKO," GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, and since the dangerous drug involved is (0.072) gram, hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, as minimum to fourteen (14) years as the maximum penalty, to pay a fine of P300,000.00; and to pay the costs.

The drugs subject matter of these cases are confiscated in favor of the Government, the same to be [turned over] to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.21 (Emphasis in the original)

Aggrieved, Onnia and Merino appealed to the Court of Appeals. 22

They argued that the Regional Trial Court erred in convicting them. They reiterated that no buy-bust operation was conducted, as shown by the prosecution witnesses' contradicting testimonies. They stressed that the buy-bust money presented by the prosecution was neat and smooth when, based on SPO1 Delos Reyes's testimony, he recovered the money from Merino's right fist which would have crumpled it. 23

Onnia and Merino further claimed that the police officers failed to comply with the Revised Philippine National Police Manual, which requires the seized items to be marked with the seizing officer's initials, coupled with the date, time, and place of seizure. This failure allegedly increased the likelihood of evidence tampering. 24

Finally, Onnia and Merino contended that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody. 25

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, countered that the buy-bust money being smooth and not crumpled did not matter, as this was not an element of the crimes charged. It said that what was important was presenting proof of the transaction and the corpus delicti. 26 It likewise contended that the arresting officers substantially complied with the chain of custody rule and preserved the integrity and identity of the seized items. 27

In its assailed June 7, 2019 Decision, 28 the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's Decision in toto.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the buy-bust money's identity was a non-issue, and in any case, the prosecution did present it in court. 29 It likewise decreed that the prosecution adequately established the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. It held that the arresting officers substantially complied with the chain of custody rule, and were justified in not conducting the inventory and photographing at the place of arrest. 30 It gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of Onnia and Merino than the duo's uncorroborated and weak defenses of denial and frame-up. 31

Dissatisfied, Onnia 32 and Merino 33 filed separate Notices of Appeal.

The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief. 34 Likewise, both Onnia and Merino manifested that they would adopt the Briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals. 35

For this Court's resolution are the following issues:

First, whether or not accused-appellant Imelda Onnia y Santiago @ "Budang" is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs; and

Second, whether or not accused-appellant Sonny Merino y Vasquez @ "Sako" is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

This Court acquits accused-appellants.

The conduct of the buy-bust operation is tainted with violations of the mandatory chain of custody rule under Section 21 (1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The arresting officers' noncompliance casts reasonable doubt on an essential element, the corpus delicti of the offense.

The elements to sustain a conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs are: "(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence." 36

As for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: "(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and, (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug." 37

In both crimes, it is necessary to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti. The prosecution must show that the items presented in court are the same items recovered from the accused. 38 In this regard, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, provides the procedural safeguards that must be observed in the handling and disposition of seized drugs. It states:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

Section 21 (1) requires, among others, the presence of two third-party witnesses during the conduct of the inventory and taking of photographs. In People v. Tomawis, 39 this Court emphasized the importance of the third-party witnesses, whose presence should be secured as early as the arrest:

The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza, without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, planting or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [Republic Act] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.

The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of [Republic Act] 9165.

The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.

To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation." 40 (Citations omitted)

Per the prosecution witnesses' testimonies themselves, only a media representative, Garendola, was present — and only during the items' inventory, not the arrest. 41 The officers failed to secure the presence of an elected official. This alone casts reasonable doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti, warranting accused-appellants' acquittals.

Nonetheless, the prosecution argues that failing to strictly comply with the chain of custody rule did not take away from the seized items' integrity and evidentiary value being preserved. 42 The Court of Appeals echoes this view in affirming the convictions. 43 Both are mistaken.

True, a saving clause exists in Section 21 (1) of Republic Act No. 9165, providing that "noncompliance [with] these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." This Court has said:

The Court is well aware that a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve and so it has previously ruled that minor lapses or deviations from the prescribed procedure are excused so long as it can be shown by the prosecution that the arresting officers put in their best effort to comply with the same and the justifiable ground for non-compliance is proven as a fact. 44

Yet, as stressed in Tolentino v. People, 45 "the prosecution cannot simply invoke the saving clause found in Section 21 — that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved — without justifying their failure to comply with the requirements stated therein." 46

People v. Reyes47 enumerated some of the justifiable grounds:

It must be emphasized that the prosecution must be able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain requirements provided in [Section] 21 such as, but not limited to the following: (1) media representatives are not available at that time or that the police operatives had no time to alert the media due to the immediacy of the operation they were about to undertake, especially if it is done in more remote areas; (2) the police operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available representative of the National Prosecution Service; (3) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of the operation to be undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with all the requisites set forth in Section 21 of [Republic Act No.] 9165. 48 (Citation omitted)

People v. Sipin49 expounded on this list:

(1) [T]heir attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. 50 (Citation omitted)

While deviations from Section 21's chain of custody requirements may be allowed, the prosecution must acknowledge their procedural lapses and plead a justifiable reason for these lapses. It must also recount the measures taken to safeguard the seized items' identity and integrity. 51

When the mandatory witnesses are absent, the prosecution must allege and prove that earnest efforts were undertaken to secure their attendance. Justifications will not be countenanced when there is no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law. 52

Here, the prosecution's justification in failing to secure the presence of an elected official was that "the barangay hall was locked and that there were no barangay officials on duty." 53 Their explanation falls short of the earnest efforts that jurisprudence requires. It does not fall under any of the mentioned exceptions in Reyes or Sipin. On the contrary, this situation is exactly what Tomawis aimed to avoid.

Had the buy-bust team complied with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of Republic Act No. 9165, it could have made the necessary arrangements with an elected official before conducting the operation.

Even if this Court were to consider their explanation a justifiable ground, accused-appellants would still be acquitted.

Law and jurisprudence require that in addition to the presence of third-party witnesses, the marking, inventory, and taking of photographs of the seized items must be conducted at the place of arrest. Here, they were done only at the police station. 54 Worse, the marking appears to have been done without any of the mandatory third-party witnesses present. 55

In People v. Nandi, 56 this Court ruled that four links must be established to prove an unbroken chain of custody:

Thus, the following links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 57 (Citation omitted)

"Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link." 58 Thus, when PO2 Paez marked the items in a place other than the place of arrest and without the presence of an elected official and a media or National Prosecution Service representative, the chain of custody had already been broken at the first link.

The prosecution justifies the police officers' noncompliance by saying that they were "forced to immediately proceed to the station since the aggressive relatives of [accused-appellants] started arriving and were already causing a commotion." 59

This Court is not persuaded. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in relying on People v. Lim60 when it excused the delayed physical inventory and photographing of the confiscated items at the place of arrest. 61

In Sipin, this Court considered justifiable the deviations from Section 21 (1) when the police officers' safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs has been threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or others acting on their behalf. 62 However, with no proof of the alleged danger, this claim becomes self-serving. This Court does not see how "causing a commotion" amounts to a threat in the officers' safety. No proof was offered to back the claim that their lives were in danger.

Police officers are properly equipped to handle such situations in case they escalated. They are not expected to run away from heated arguments with aggrieved relatives. The public relies on police protection or intervention should the need arise. Police officers commit a disservice to the public if at the first sign of trouble, they retreat to their stations.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals cited the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers in lending credence to their version of events. It found that the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by ill will in testifying against accused-appellants. 63 However, in People v. Andaya, 64 this Court held:

In affirming the RTC's conviction of the accused, the CA observed that the defense of frame-up put up by the accused was discredited by the absence of proof of "any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands." Such outright rejection by the lower courts of Andaya's defense of frame-up is not outrightly binding. For sure, the frame-up defense has been commonly used in prosecutions based on buy-bust operations that have led to the arrest of the suspects. Its use might be seen as excessive, but the failure of the accused to impute any ill motives to falsely incriminate them should not deter us from scrutinizing the circumstances of the cases brought to us for review. We should remind ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused committed the crimes they have been charged with. The State must fully establish that for us. If the imputation of ill motive to the lawmen is the only means of impeaching them, then that would be the end of our dutiful vigilance to protect our citizenry from false arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are aware that there have been in the past many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that should heighten our resolve to strengthen the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.

Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our citizenry just because the lawmen are shielded by the presumption of the regularity of their performance of duty. The presumed regularity is nothing but a purely evidentiary tool intended to avoid the impossible and time-consuming task of establishing every detail of the performance by officials and functionaries of the Government. Conversion by no means defeat the much stronger and much firmer presumption of innocence in favor of every person whose life, property and liberty comes under the risk of forfeiture on the strength of a false accusation of committing some crime. 65 (Citations omitted)

Accordingly, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot apply when proof of clear and deliberate disregard of procedural safeguards has been adduced. 66

Finally, this Court reiterates that in drugs cases, especially those involving minuscule amounts of drugs, law enforcers must strictly comply with the chain of custody rule. This requirement is based on the unique characteristic of narcotics "that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution[.]" 67 In People v. Holgado, 68 we stressed:

Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving min[u]scule amounts of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered. 69

The significant lapses in handling the dangerous drugs cast serious doubt on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. Necessarily, accused-appellants' acquittal must follow. 70

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' June 7, 2019 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09366 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Imelda Onnia y Santiago @ "Budang" is ACQUITTED of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and accused-appellant Sonny Merino y Vasquez @ "Sako" is ACQUITTED of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. They are ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are being held for some other legal grounds.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections and the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women for immediate implementation. They are directed to report to this Court the action they have taken within five days from receipt of this Resolution. For their information, copies shall also be furnished to the Police General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the seized sachets of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED." (Dimaampao, J., designated additional member per Special Order No. 2839)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 18-21. See also CA rollo, pp. 132-133.

2. Id. at 3-17. The June 7, 2019 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09366 was penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Pablito A. Perez of the Fifth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3. CA rollo, pp. 58-67. The March 24, 2017 Joint Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Teresa Patrimonio-Soriaso of Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Manila.

4. Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 5 provides:

SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

5. Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11 provides:

SECTION 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:

(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;

(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;

(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;

(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";

(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and

(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:

(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;

(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.

6. Rollo, pp. 3-4.

7. Id. at 4.

8. CA rollo, p. 59.

9. Rollo, p. 6.

10. Id. at 4.

11. Id.

12. Id. at 4-5.

13. Id. at 5.

14. Id. at 5.

15. Id.

16. Id.

17. Id. at 6.

18. Id. at 7.

19. CA rollo, pp. 58-67.

20. Id. at 65-66.

21. Id. at 66.

22. Id. at 14-15.

23. Id. at 45-46.

24. Id. at 47.

25. Id. at 48-51.

26. Id. at 98.

27. Id. at 99-103.

28. Rollo, pp. 3-17.

29. Id. at 11.

30. Id. at 13-15.

31. Id. at 15-16.

32. CA rollo, pp. 132-133.

33. Rollo, pp. 18-21.

33. Not attached to the rollo.

35. Not attached to the rollo.

36. Lescano v. People, 778 Phil. 460, 468 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing People v. Morales, 630 Phil. 215, 228 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

37. People v. Bio, 753 Phil. 730, 736 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

38. People v. Denoman, 612 Phil. 1165, 1175 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

39. 830 Phil. 385 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].

40. Id. at 408-409.

41. Rollo, p. 5.

42. CA rollo, pp. 101-102.

43. Rollo, p. 15.

44. Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 227217, February 12, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66108> [Per J. A. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].

45. Id.

46. Id.

47. 830 Phil. 619 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

48. Id. at 633.

49. 833 Phil. 67 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

50. Id. at 93.

51. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65610> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

52. People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64400> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

53. Rollo, p. 5.

54. Id.

55. Id.

56. 639 Phil. 134 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

57. Id. at 144-145.

58. People v. Omamos, G.R. No. 233036, July 10, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65476> [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, Second Division].

59. CA rollo, p. 101.

60. G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64400> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc]. The CA Decision erroneously named the case as Lim v. People.

61. Rollo, p. 14.

62. 833 Phil. 67 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

63. Rollo, p. 16.

64. 735 Phil. 237 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

65. Id. at 250-251.

66. G.R. No. 227217, February 12, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66108> [Per J. A. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].

67. People v. Alcuizar, 662 Phil. 794, 801 (2011) [Per J. Perez, First Division].

68. 741 Phil. 78 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

69. Id. at 100.

70. People v. Coreche, 612 Phil. 1238, 1245-1246 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].