People v. Oite

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 238867. June 23, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ALDRIN OITE, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 23, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 238867 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,versus ALDRIN OITE, accused-appellant.

The appeal must fail.

The determination of the guilt of an accused hinges on how a court appreciates evidentiary matters in relation to the requisites of an offense. Determination of guilt is, thus, a fundamentally factual issue, the determination of which is generally not the province of this Court. 1 More specifically, factual findings and evaluation of witnesses' credibility and testimony should be entitled to great respect unless it is shown that the trial court may have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance. 2 This is so because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. 3 The rule is even more strictly applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court, as in here. 4 A careful review of the records and the issues submitted by the parties in this case convinces the Court that there is no strong and compelling reason warranting a departure from this general rule.

In the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, both the Rape and the Homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, the Court has held that the crime of Rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for herself. 5 In cases such as the one at bench where the victim was of such a tender age, it is highly doubtful that there could have been any guarantee that an intelligible testimony could have even been elicited from her. Moreover, the duty of the prosecution to prove the crime becomes doubly difficult when the complex crime of Rape with Homicide is committed because the victim could no longer testify at all. Thus, in these crimes, resort to circumstantial evidence is usually unavoidable. 6

For the charge of Rape, the prosecution has the burden to conclusively prove the two elements of the crime, viz.: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. 7 When the sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age is committed, the same is classified as statutory rape, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. 8 It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. 9 The law conclusively presumes that at such a young age, the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. 10

Admittedly in this case, there was no eyewitness account of what happened to AAA. 11 Aldrin Oite (Oite), however, may still be proven as the culprit despite the absence of eyewitnesses. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. 12 In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden, provided (a) there was more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences were derived were proved; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances was such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. What is essential is that the unbroken chain of the established circumstances leads to no other logical conclusion except the appellant's guilt. 13 HEITAD

Here, the Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) that the clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses created an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence that, when taken together, leads an unprejudiced mind to conclude that Oite had carnal knowledge of AAA. These are:

1. BBB heard the cries of AAA coming from the room of Oite.

2. Upon entering the room, BBB saw AAA crying, with her mouth full of papaya. He also saw her panties pulled down just above her knees and was pointing at Oite.

3. Oite's erect penis was protruding from the malong wrapped around his waist.

4. Oite angrily threatened to kill BBB if he would report what he saw.

5. When CCC took AAA from BBB, she noticed that she was pale and crying in pain. AAA was also clutching at her stomach, repeatedly exclaiming "yayay, yayay," and pointing at Oite's room.

6. At the hospital the next day, CCC noticed lacerations on AAA's vagina and anus. She also noticed that AAA's vagina was bleeding profusely. 14

The foregoing testimonies were bolstered by the testimony of Dr. Ma. Antoinetta Odi (Dr. Odi) and her post-mortem examination on AAA. Dr. Odi found abrasions and lacerations on the vagina and anus of AAA. The abrasion on the vagina of AAA was approximately 2 centimeters, while that on her anus was approximately 2.5 centimeters. There was also a laceration on AAA's anus at 6:00 to 9:00 o'clock position. Dr. Odi testified that these injuries may have been caused by a hard object or a fully erect penis. 15 The testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution have, indeed, proven that AAA was violated.

Furthermore, there is no showing that the RTC and the CA erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, especially BBB. Oite neither raised any inconsistency in BBB's testimony nor imputed an ill motive for BBB to falsely testify against him. In his Supplemental Brief 16 before the Court, Oite insists that BBB did not categorically say he had sexual intercourse with AAA or that BBB found him, at the very least, on top of the child. This argument, while true, does not discredit the clear inference logically drawn from the scene that BBB was able to witness. It bears repeating and stressing that BBB found AAA inside the room of Oite. She was crying hard, as if in pain, and her panties were pulled down just above her knees. AAA was holding on to her stomach and pointing at Oite when BBB saw her. Moreover, what was very incriminating was the fact that Oite's stiff penis was jutting out of the malong tied to his waist. Oite was also visibly angry upon seeing BBB and threatened the latter if he would dare report what he just saw.

Against the above categorical testimony of BBB, Oite can only proffer the defenses of denial and alibi. First, he testified that he was somewhere else at the time the rape of AAA occurred. However, as correctly held by the RTC and the CA, Oite failed to demonstrate the physical impossibility of him being at the crime scene at the time crucial to its commission. His own testimony, in fact, shows that he was within the vicinity of the crime scene. Also, no other evidence was presented to corroborate his story that he was at an eatery at a known rotunda in Barangay Bula, General Santos City early that afternoon to wait for Regine Olaer and much later, at the Salimbagat Store. No one testified on Oite's behalf to prove his presence in these establishments.

Second, Oite also claimed seeing BBB carry AAA, apparently attempting to paint the possibility that it was BBB who raped AAA. Again, however, this is nothing but a barefaced and uncorroborated claim, especially considering that it supposedly happened when Oite was in a public place at the Salimbagat Store. While the long-standing rule is that the accused does not have the obligation to prove his innocence, he is nonetheless called to present clear and convincing evidence to support his defenses of denial and alibi, which are, by themselves, inherently weak. Failing in this regard, the defenses must be brushed aside when, as in this case, the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. 17

Third, Oite also claimed that in accusing him of the crime, CCC was motivated by her anger towards his mother. According to Oite, his mother owns the property CCC and her family were renting and had wanted to eject them from it. As aptly observed by the RTC, however, Oite contradicted this claim with his statement that CCC and his mother were close and that it was his mother who carried AAA when CCC and her daughter returned from the General Santos City District Hospital. To be sure, the Court has observed in the past that not a few persons convicted of rape have attributed the charges against them to family feuds, resentment or revenge. Ill motives, however, become inconsequential where there are affirmative or categorical declarations establishing appellant's accountability for the felony. 18 It would take a certain degree of perversity on the part of a parent, especially a mother, to concoct a false charge of rape and then use her deceased daughter as an instrument to settle her grudge. 19

As regards the minority of AAA, the Court also agrees with the RTC and the CA that the same has been indubitably established, notwithstanding the non-presentation of AAA's birth certificate in court. In People v. Bolo, 20 the Court held that in the interest of justice and fairness, the pieces of evidence and the circumstances of the case may be appreciated in determining whether the age of the victim was actually established by the prosecution. 21 In this particular case, AAA's mother, CCC, testified that her daughter was only two years old at the time of the commission of the crime. Dr. Odi likewise testified that AAA was only two years old at the time of the post-mortem examination. This was also reflected in Dr. Odi's post-mortem examination certificate. Surely, it would have been uncomplicated for Dr. Odi to observe and conclude that AAA was below 12 or seven years old. Without a doubt, the physical difference between a two-year old and a 12-year old, as well as a two-year old and a seven-year old, is easily discernible. ATICcS

Finally, with regard to the charge of Homicide, the RTC and the CA are correct in their findings that the offense has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. In a special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, it must be proven that the victim died by reason or on the occasion of rape. However, the testimony of Dr. Odi that the injuries sustained by AAA were "contributory" to her death leaves much to be desired and invites the question as to whether there could have been another possible and more direct reason of her death. Significantly, too, Dr. Odi's post-mortem examination does not state the cause of death of AAA.

All told, the Court affirms the conviction of Oite for Statutory Rape. To reiterate, sexual intercourse with a woman who is below 12 years of age constitutes Statutory Rape. Additionally, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed "when the victim is a child below seven (7) years old." 22 However, following Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, 23 the CA correctly modified the penalty imposed upon Oite to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of death. 24

The Court further modifies the amounts awarded to the heirs of AAA. In line with People v. Jugueta, 25 there is a now an increase in the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages in cases of simple or qualified rape, among others. Where the imposable penalty is death but the same is reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA No. 9346, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages are pegged uniformly at P100,000.00. Thus, the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages in this case should be increased to P100,000.00 each. 26

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Decision 27 dated February 22, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01383, 28 which found accused-appellant Aldrin Oite GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape as defined and punished under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (b) in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, and to pay the heirs of the victim P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. See Macayan, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015, 753 SCRA 445, 458.

2.People v. Agalot, G.R. No. 220884, February 21, 2018, 856 SCRA 317, 327. Citations omitted.

3.People v. Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, 831 SCRA 469, 479.

4.People v. Agalot, supra note 2, at 327. Citations omitted.

5.People v. Broniola, G.R. No. 211027, June 29, 2015, 760 SCRA 597, 605. Citations omitted.

6.Id. at 605-606. Citations omitted.

7.People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 234947, June 19, 2019, 905 SCRA 455, 463. Citations omitted.

8. See People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 242276, February 18, 2020, p. 7, citing People v. Manson, 801 Phil. 130, 137 (2016).

9.People v. XXX, G.R. No. 244047, December 10, 2019, p. 4, citing REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 266-A, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353; People v. Francica, G.R. No. 208625, September 6, 2017, 839 SCRA 113, 129.

10.People v. Gaa, G.R. No. 212934, June 7, 2017, 826 SCRA 626, 634. Citation omitted.

11. The identity of the victims or any information which could establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992; RA 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN," November 15, 2004. See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 (2014), citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 (2013). See also Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN THE PROMULGATION, PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF DECISIONS, FINAL RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USING FICTITIOUS NAMES/PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017; and People v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018.

12.People v. YYY, G.R. No. 234825, September 5, 2018, 880 SCRA 1, 14.

13. See People v. Umapas, G.R. No. 215742, March 22, 2017, 821 SCRA 421, 436. Citations omitted.

14. See rollo, pp. 5-6, 10; CA rollo, pp. 130-131, 133-134, 136-137.

15.Id. at 6, 10; id. at 132, 134.

16.Id. at 26-32.

17. See People v. Barberan, G.R. No. 208759, June 22, 2016, 794 SCRA 348, 360. Citations omitted.

18. See People v. Abiña, G.R. No. 250430, January 25, 2021 (Unsigned Resolution), citing People v. Suedad, G.R. No. 211026, June 8, 2016, 793 SCRA 31, 43.

19.People v. Suedad, id. at 43. Citation omitted.

20. G.R. No. 217024, August 15, 2016, 800 SCRA 276.

21.Id. at 291-292.

22. See People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 219863, March 6, 2018, 857 SCRA 435, 449. Citations omitted.

23. AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES, June 24, 2006.

24. Section II of A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase "Without Eligibility for Parole" in Indivisible Penalties, states:

xxx xxx xxx

II. In these lights, the following guidelines shall be observed in the imposition of penalties and in the use of the phrase "without eligibility for parole":

(1) x x x

(2) When circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed because of R.A. 9346, the qualification of "without eligibility for parole" shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for R.A. No. 9346.

25. G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331, 382-383.

26. See People v. Brioso, G.R. No. 209344, June 27, 2016, 794 SCRA 562, 588.

27.Rollo, pp. 3-15. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate Justices Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas and Walter S. Ong, concurring.

28. Also CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01383-MIN in some parts of the rollo.