SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233832. July 1, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JONIES NAIFE y REYES, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated01 July 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 233832 (People of the Philippines v. Jonies Naife y Reyes)
Appellant Jonies Naife y Reyes assails the Decision 1 dated April 19, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06864 affirming the trial court's verdict of conviction for murder against him.
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: HTcADC
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxx xxx xxx
Murder requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) the killing does not amount to parricide or infanticide. 2
Appellant admits the first two elements of the crime but justifies the killing by invoking self-defense. For the defense to prosper, appellant must establish: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. 3
Unlawful aggression from the victim against the accused remains the primordial requisite of self-defense. 4 Without it, the accused would not be entitled to justify the crime or mitigate its penalty. 5 The test for its presence is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. 6
Here, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Marlon Marilao, Estanislao Herrera and Jefferson Allanigue established the absence of unlawful aggression from Arturo Terrible when appellant suddenly went up to him and shot him in the chest. Terrible in fact was merely standing at the tricycle station waiting for passengers.
Terrible posed no threat to anyone at all when he got slain. As the courts below aptly observed, Terrible exhibited neither act nor gesture that would suggest an imminent infliction of harm or injury on appellant. This negates the presence of unlawful aggression from the victim's end. In the absence of unlawful aggression, it becomes superfluous to determine whether the two other requisites are attendant. Consequently, appellant's claim of self-defense must fail.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave full credence to the testimonies of Terrible's fellow tricycle drivers who were physically present at the locus criminis when the slaying took place. Suffice it to state that the assessment of credibility is best undertaken by the trial court since it has the opportunity to observe evidence beyond what is written or spoken, such as the deportment of the witness while testifying on the stand. 7 Hence, the trial court's factual findings on the credibility of witnesses are binding and conclusive on the reviewing court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case. 8
In this light, appellant's version of self-defense could not prevail over the first-hand account of the eyewitnesses. To be sure, he did not even impute any ill-motive which could have impelled them to falsely testify against him. Thus, their testimonies were correctly accorded full weight and credit by both the trial and appellate courts. 9
As for the third element of murder, we likewise concur with the courts a quo that treachery attended the killing. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the victim no chance to resist or escape. 10 CAIHTE
In describing the means of attack appellant employed against Terrible, the eyewitnesses testified that they, together with Terrible, were simply on queue at the tricycle station waiting for passengers when appellant suddenly appeared and shot the victim. 11
Surely, the suddenness of the shooting made it impossible for the victim to defend himself. The means employed by appellant ensured the commission of the crime without exposing him to any risk which may come from the victim's act of retaliation or defense. The fact that the gunshot wound was frontal does not negate the existence of treachery. For it remains that the victim was without opportunity to guard against the attack.
As for evident premeditation, We note that although the same was alleged in the Information, it was not passed upon by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Since this is an appeal in a criminal case which throws the entire of it open for review, We deem it proper to discuss the circumstance of evident premeditation as alleged in the Information.
We are convinced that evident premeditation did not attend the slaying of Terrible. There is simply no evidence on record to establish its elements, i.e., (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution enough to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts.
The prosecution failed to establish how or when appellant's plan to kill was hatched and how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Neither do the records show that appellant's decision to commit the crime was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt. Hence, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case.
Going now to the last element of murder, there is no dispute that the killing did not amount to either parricide or infanticide.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming appellant's conviction for murder. And in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
On the monetary awards, the Court of Appeals properly increased the grant of civil indemnity from Php50,000.00 to Php75,000.00, and moral damages from Php50,000.00 to Php75,000.00. As for exemplary damages, the same should be increased from Php30,000.00 to Php75,000.00. 12 And since jurisprudence now fixes the amount of temperate damages in murder cases at Php50,000.00, 13 the earlier award of Php20,000.00, too, must be increased accordingly. These amounts shall earn interest at six (6) percent per annum from finality of the ruling until fully paid. aScITE
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated April 19, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06864 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
JONIES NAIFE y REYES is found GUILTY of Murder and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. He is further required to pay Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages, Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and Php50,000.00 as temperate damages. These amounts shall earn six percent interest per annum from finality of this resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. CA rollo, p. 128.
2. See People v. Villanueva, 807 Phil. 245, 252 (2017).
3. Article 11 (1), Revised Penal Code.
4.People v. Olarbe, G.R. No. 227421, July 23, 2018.
5.People v. Samuya, 758 Phil. 584, 591-592 (2015).
6.People v. Olarbe, G.R. No. 227421, July 23, 2018.
7. See People v. Ocdol, 741 Phil. 701, 710-711 (2014).
8. See People v. Regaspi, 768 Phil. 593, 598 (2015).
9. CA Decision, p. 7.
10. See People v. Castro, G.R. No. 211053, November 29, 2017, 847 SCRA 232, 246.
11. CA Decision, pp. 8-11.
12.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 839 (2016).
13.People v. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017, 838 SCRA 476, 498.