People v. Musa y Sawabi

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 240450. December 6, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ALNAJIER MUSA y SAWABI AND JULIE KISSAE y AMANI, accused-appellants.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 06 December 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. 240450 (People of the Philippines v. Alnajier Musa y Sawabi and Julie Kissae y Amani). — This is an appeal 1 from the January 31, 2018 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07784, that affirmed the January 13, 2015 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Batangas City, finding Alnajier Musa (Musa) and Julie Kissae (Kissae; collectively, accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as amended.

Accused-appellants were indicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in an Information 5 dated March 17, 2010. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about March 15, 2010 at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Brgy. Balagtas, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, not being authorized by law, did then and there knowingly, willfully, criminally transport, dispense or deliver the following:

ten (10) large white plastic containers containing Acetone, an essential chemical;

seven (7) wooden crates each containing twenty (20) 500 ml. bottles of Thionyl Chloride, a controlled precursor and chemicals;

one (1) newspaper-wrapped large transparent plastic bag containing 290 grams of Methyl Ephedrine, a dangerous drug; and

one (1) plastic bag containing brownish substance, weighing 889 grams, which is still being subjected to further analysis, loaded inside a Hyundai Starex van with Plate No. WSU-678, which is a clear violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

On arraignment, accused-appellants entered a plea of "not guilty." 7

Version of the Prosecution:

The prosecution alleged that on March 15, 2010, the team of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Alex Baylon (SPO2 Baylon), headed by Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Cesar Bagui Geron (PCI Geron), set up a checkpoint at Barangay Balagtas, Batangas City. A Starex van bearing an expired Philippine National Police commemorative plate in front and without plate at the back caught SPO2 Baylon's attention that prompted him to flag down the said vehicle. When SPO2 Baylon asked the driver, later identified as Musa, for his driver's license, he noticed several boxes and containers inside emitting an unpleasant odor. 8 When asked about the contents of the said boxes and containers, Musa and his companion, Kissae, denied knowledge thereof. Neither did they know who the owner of the van was. They also failed to present documents relative thereto. 9

Consequently, accused-appellants were brought to the Batangas City Police Station upon the directive of PCI Geron. Upon reaching the police station, PCI Geron endorsed the case to SPO1 Pepito Adelantar (SPO1 Adelantar) who immediately coordinated with the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory for the examination of the contents of the suspected containers and boxes. SPO1 Adelantar likewise called representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), media, and a barangay official to secure their presence. While waiting, the van remained closed and nobody was allowed to touch it. 10

When the members of the crime laboratory — SPO3 Lito Vargas (SPO3 Vargas) and Police Officer (PO2) Harold Landicho (PO2 Landicho), and the witnesses 11 to the inventory arrived, Musa opened the van. According to the prosecution witnesses, 12 the smell inside the van was comparable to a rotten egg. Upon inspection, SPO2 Baylon found the following items: 10 white plastic containers and seven wooden crates each containing 20 bottles later found to contain thionyl chloride; one large pack of folded newspaper inside the van's glove compartment containing suspected shabu which later turned out to be methyl ephedrine; and one white plastic bag with an undetermined object. 13 SPO3 Vargas and PO2 Landicho informed the apprehending officers that the items inside the van were controlled precursors and chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs. Thereupon, the police officers arrested the accused-appellants, apprising them of their constitutional rights. 14

Thereafter, SPO2 Baylon marked the folded newspaper with "AEB 03-15-10," the 10 white plastic containers with "AEB 03-15-10"; and each of the 20 bottles with "AEB 01 03-15-10" to "AEB 07 03-15-10" 15 SPO1 Adelantar conducted an actual physical inventory of the seized items, witnessed by the DOJ representative, Prosecutor Evelyn Jovellanos (Prosecutor Jovellanos), the media personality Dhess Aclan (Aclan), and Barangay Councilor Simplicio Wallace (Wallace). Photographs of the seized items, accused-appellants, and the witnesses signing the inventory were taken. 16

Subsequently, the law enforcers escorted the van to the crime laboratory and turned over the van as well as its contents to SPO3 Vargas. SPO3 Vargas, in turn, entrusted the van to PCI Jupri Delantar (PCI Delantar), the forensic chemist who conducted the laboratory examination. The contents of the folded newspaper tested positive for methyl ephedrine, a dangerous drug; the liquid inside the plastic containers were positive for acetone, an essential chemical; and the bottles contained thionyl chloride, a controlled precursor, essential for the manufacture of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu. The result of the laboratory examination was embodied in Chemistry Report No. BD-033-2010 17 issued by PCI Delantar. After the examination, PCI Delantar turned over the van and its contents to SPO3 Vargas, the evidence custodian. 18

Version of the Defense:

The accused-appellants interposed the defense of denial. Musa averred that he was hired by his friend, Carlos, to drive the subject vehicle from Zambales to Cagayan de Oro with a compensation of P60,000.00. Carlos instructed Musa to turn over the vehicle to a certain Mohammad as soon as they arrive in Cagayan de Oro, Musa, in turn, asked his co-accused Kissae to accompany him to Cagayan de Oro. Both accused-appellants did not know Mohammad nor the owner of the van. 19

Musa claimed that when Carlos delivered the van to him, it was already loaded with cartons but he did not ask their contents out of trust to Carlos. On March 15, 2010, while they were travelling along Batangas, police officers flagged down their vehicle at a checkpoint. After the police officers peeked through the van, they were led to the police station where they were investigated and detained, allegedly for transporting illegal drugs. 20

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

In a Decision 21 dated January 13, 2015, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, for transporting illegal drugs, essential chemical, and controlled precursor. The decretal portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ALNAJIER MUSA y SAWABI and JULIE KISSAE y AMANO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of transporting illegal drugs in violation of Section 5 of Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and are each sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

As the two accused were also caught in the act of transporting acetone, an essential chemical and thionyl chloride, a controlled precursor, accused ALNAJIER MUSA y SAWABI and JULIE KISSAE y AMANO are hereby also found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of transporting essential chemicals and controlled precursors, also in violation of Section 5, R.A. No. 9165. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment for twelve years (12) and one (1) day as minimum up to fourteen (14) years as maximum, and to pay a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, shall likewise be imposed on each of them.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED. 22

The RTC found that the prosecution had successfully established all the elements of the crimes charged. It also upheld the warrantless search made by the law enforcers on the subject van considering that the same was a search of a moving vehicle, an exception to the rule against warrantless searches. Further, the RTC found that there was an unbroken chain of custody, thus, the integrity of the corpus delicti had been duly preserved. 23

Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed 24 to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

In the assailed Decision dated January 31, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling, holding that there was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle, considering that SPO2 Baylon had reasonable ground of suspicion on account of the expired PNP commemorative plate in front of the van, the lack of plate at the back coupled with the foul odor emanating therefrom. Further, the CA found that all the elements constituting the crime of transporting illegal drugs, essential chemicals, and controlled precursors were present. Finally, it ruled that the prosecution duly established the chain of custody, thus, there is no doubt that the items seized from accused-appellants were the same items presented in court. 25

Hence, this appeal. 26

Issue

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.

In their Brief before the CA, accused-appellants, primarily challenged the legality of their arrest alleging that the same was anchored on mere suspicion. Since no valid warrantless arrest took place, the subsequent search of their vehicle is unlawful, hence, the items supposedly seized therefrom are inadmissible in evidence. Accused-appellants further argued that there was non-compliance with the chain of custody rule that raised doubt as to the identity and integrity of the seized items. 27

Our Ruling

The appeal must fail.

Legality and regularity of

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. 28

One of the recognized exceptions to dispense with the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a search of a moving vehicle. The rules governing searches and seizures have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical purposes. Police officers cannot be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search warrant when time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating transactions involving contraband or dangerous articles. However, the inherent mobility of vehicles cannot justify all kinds of searches. Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause. 29

In Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 30 the Court explained the concept of warrantless searches on moving vehicles:

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or "constructive borders" like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. 31

A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setup of military or police checkpoints — as in this case — which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. 32 Thus, the extent of routine inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches. 33 However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an offense. 34

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that generally, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed provided that they are limited to a visual search. The exception is when they are founded upon probable cause, in which case, an extensive search is permissible.

In determining the existence of probable cause, bare suspicion is never enough. While probable cause does not demand moral certainty or evidence sufficient to justify conviction, it requires the existence of "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.'' 35

There have been a number of cases where this Court considered warrantless searches made in moving vehicles to be valid. In these cases, probable cause was founded on more than just a solitary suspicious circumstance.

People v. Cogaed, 36 citing Chief Justice Lucas Bersamin's Dissent in Esquillo v. People, 37 emphasized that in warrantless searches, law enforcers ''must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance." What is required is the "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."

In People v. Malmstedt, 38 Narcotics Command officers set up a temporary checkpoint in response to ''persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.'' These included information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. At the checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus and inspected it, starting from the front, going towards the rear. The bus turned out to be the vehicle boarded by the accused. Upon reaching the accused, an officer noticed a bulge on his waist. This prompted the officer to ask for the accused's passport and identification papers, which the accused failed to provide. The accused was then made to reveal what was bulging on his waist. It turned out to be hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

In People v. Claudio, 39 the accused, a passenger on a bus bound for Baguio City, was arrested by a police officer on the same bus because of the distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from the plastic bag she was carrying. The Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified, and the evidence thus discovered admissible in evidence.

In People v. Mariacos, 40 a police officer received information that a bag containing illegal drugs was about to be transported on a passenger jeepney. The bag was marked with "O.K." On the basis of the tip, a police officer conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney. Upon seeing the bag described to him, he peeked inside and smelled the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from the bag. The information and the police officer's personal observations gave rise to probable cause that rendered the warrantless search valid.

In all these cases, there were facts which were found by the Court to provide probable cause justifying warrantless arrests and searches, i.e., distinct odor of marijuana, reports about drug transporting, suspicious behaviour, failure to produce identification papers, and so on. Besides, urgency attended the arrests and searches because each of the above-mentioned cases involved the use of motor vehicles and thus, the great likelihood that the accused would get away long before a warrant can be procured.

In the case at bar, there were several circumstances that roused the suspicion of SPO2 Baylon which led him to flag down accused-appellants' vehicle and subject them to questioning. First, the vehicle did not bear a plate at the back except for an expired PNP commemorative plate at the front. Second, when SPO2 Baylon instructed the driver to halt, he saw several containers inside the van and smelt a distinctive foul odor emanating therefrom. Third, accused-appellants denied knowledge as to the contents of the containers they were carrying as well as the identity of the owner of the van. Lastly, accused-appellants failed to present any document to the police officers to show their authority to transport the foul-smelling containers.

Indeed, the totality of these circumstances certainly engendered a reasonable degree of suspicion on the part of the law enforcers that accused-appellants were carrying contraband which eventually turned out to be illegal drugs, controlled precursors, and essential chemicals used for its manufacture. Simply stated, the authorities in this case had a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the circumstances then obtaining, that a criminal activity may be afoot. To stress, accused-appellants' claim that they did not know the owner of the van nor the contents of the containers they were then transporting is incredible and unbelievable. Moreover, the foul odor emanating from the vehicle strengthened the police officers' suspicion such that they had to verify the same by means of searching the vehicle. These personal observations gave rise to probable cause that rendered the warrantless search valid.

In fine, accused-appellants' warrantless arrest and the search of the moving vehicle were reasonable and lawful. Thus, the illegal drugs, controlled precursors, and essential chemicals seized from them are admissible in evidence.

The prosecution duly proved the

The essential element of the charge of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. "Transport" means "to carry or convey from one place to another." 41

There is no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. 42

In the instant case, records established beyond any doubt that accused-appellants were in the act of transporting methyl ephedrine, acetone, and thionyl chloride when the police officers flagged them down at checkpoint. In fact, they had already moved the illegal substances from their place of origin in Zambales as they drove the vehicle up until they reached the checkpoint in Batangas City where the contraband were seized and they were arrested. Through the accused-appellants' own admission, they had no authority under the law to deliver the said illegal substances. Accordingly, the prosecution had duly proven during trial the fact of transportation itself.

Chain of custody rule wascorpus delicti were preserved.

In illegal drugs cases, the drugs seized from the accused constitute the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be clearly shown to have been duly preserved with moral certainty. "This means that on top of the elements of possession or illegal sale, the fact that the substance illegally sold or possessed is, in the first instance, the very substance adduced in court must likewise be established with the same exacting degree of certitude as that required in sustaining a conviction." 43 "The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." 44

The links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation are: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the dangerous drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the dangerous drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the dangerous drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked dangerous drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. 45

A careful review of the records of this case shows that there was an unbroken chain of custody of the seized contraband. In his testimony, SPO2 Baylon averred that he marked the seized items with his initials before accused-appellants, and the members of the DOJ and the media and a barangay official. Thereafter, he turned them over to SPO1 Adelantar, the investigator assigned to the case, who, in turn, conducted an inventory thereof in the presence of accused-appellants and the above-mentioned witnesses, whose signatures appear on the certificate of inventory. 46 Photographs of the actual marking and inventory, along with accused-appellants and the three witnesses, were also taken and attached to the records. 47 After the inventory, SPO1 Adelantar prepared the letter 48 request for laboratory examination of the confiscated items and escorted the van with its contents to the crime laboratory.

At the crime laboratory, the vehicle and the pieces of evidence were turned over by SPO1 Adelantar to SPO3 Vargas, as evidenced by the latter's signature appearing on the request. 49 SPO3 Vargas, on the other hand, transmitted the evidence to PCI Delantar, the forensic chemist, for qualitative examination. 50 PCI Delantar's examination thereof yielded positive results for methyl ephedrine, a dangerous drug, acetone, an essential chemical, and thionyl chloride, a controlled precursor and chemical under RA 9165. His findings were reduced into writing through Chemistry Report No. BD-033-2010 51 dated March 17, 2010. After which, PCI Delantar turned over the specimens to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Vargas, for safekeeping. 52 To ensure that there would be no tampering or substitution of evidence, SPO3 Vargas locked the van and placed a police line around it. The key to the vehicle remained in the sole custody of SPO3 Vargas. 53

Verily, the Court holds that the chain of custody over the seized illegal substances remained unbroken, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been properly preserved. Perforce, accused-appellants' conviction must stand.

Penalty

Under the law, the penalty for the unauthorized transportation of dangerous drugs, regardless of its quantity and purity, is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10 Million). 54 However, with the enactment of RA 9346, 55 only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed. Thus, the penalty imposed by the trial court, i.e., life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00, on each of the accused for the unauthorized transportation of methyl ephedrine, is in order.

We likewise sustain the penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and one day as minimum to 14 years as maximum, and a fine of P100,000.00 meted on each of the accused-appellant for the unauthorized transportation of an essential chemical and controlled precursor, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated 31 January 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07784, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J., designated additional Member per September 29, 2021 raffle vice Dimaampao, J., who recused due to prior action in the Court of Appeals; Gaerlan, J., on official leave.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 12-13. Captioned as Notice of Appeal.

2.Id. at 2-11. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda (now a Member of the Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao (now a Member of the Court) and Renato C. Francisco.

3. CA rollo, pp. 86-118. Penned by Presiding Judge Aida C. Santos.

4. Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.'' Approved on June 7, 2002.

5. Records, pp. 1-2.

6.Id. at 1.

7.Id. at 22-23.

8. CA rollo, p. 92.

9.Id. at 92-93.

10.Id. at 93.

11. Namely Evelyn P. Jovellanos from the Department of Justice; Simplio F. Wallace-Balagtas, an elected public official; and Dhess Aclan from the media.

12. CA rollo, p. 93.

13.Id.

14.Id. at 94.

15.Id.

16.Id.

17. Records, p. 5.

18. CA rollo, p. 95.

19.Id. at 96.

20.Rollo, p. 6.

21. CA rollo, pp. 86-118.

22.Id. at 115-117.

23.Id. at 98-115.

24.Id. at 21-22.

25.Rollo, pp. 7-11.

26.Id. at 12-14.

27.Brief for the Appellant, CA rollo, pp. 34-48.

28.People v. Manago, 793 Phil. 505, 514 (2016).

29.Veridiano v. People, 810 Phil. 642, 666-667 (2017).

30.424 Phil. 263 (2002).

31.Id. at 278-279, citations omitted.

32.Supra note 28, p. 519. People v. Manago.

33.Supra note 29, p. 667. Veridiano v. People.

34.Id. at 668.

35.People v. Yanson, G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019.

36.740 Phil. 212, 233 (2014).

37.J. Bersamin, Dissenting Opinion in Esquillo v. People, 643 Phil. 577, 606 (2010).

38.275 Phil. 447 (1991).

39.243 Phil. 795 (1988).

40.635 Phil. 315 (2010).

41.Musa v. People, G.R. No. 242132, September 25, 2019.

42.Id.

43.People v. Adrid, 705 Phil. 654, 670 (2013).

44.Fajardo v. People, 691 Phil. 752, 758-759 (2012).

45.See People v. Hementiza, 807 Phil. 1017, 1030 (2017).

46.Records, p. 300.

47.Id. at 306, 310, 314, 318, and 322.

48.Id. at 4.

49.Id.

50.Id. at 298.

51.Id. at 297.

52.TSN, December 1, 2010, p. 48.

53.Id. at 49.

54.Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.

55.Entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Approved on June 24, 2006.