THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 237207. June 14, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. RAYMUNDO MOLINA y RAGA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 14, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 237207 (People of the Philippines v. Raymundo Molina y Raga). — This is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Raymundo Molina y Raga (accused-appellant) seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated September 25, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07754, affirming the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, of Dagupan City (RTC), dated May 12, 2015, which found accused-appellant guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
As culled from the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, the facts surrounding this case are as follows: 3
On February 16, 2011, acting on a tip from a civilian asset, Police Chief Inspector Rizaldy Dalope (PCI Dalope), under the direct supervision of Police Superintendent Romeo Caramat, Jr. (PSupt. Caramat), conducted a briefing among the members of the Dagupan City Police Station for a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant Raymundo Molina y Raga, (accused-appellant) who was allegedly selling illegal drugs. 4
During the briefing, Police Officer III Francisco Meniano (PO3 Meniano) was designated as the poseur-buyer and thus, prepared the amount of P300.00 consisting of three P100.00 bills, with serial numbers MM038890, H984435, and CF381888, as the buy-bust money. 5
After the preliminary preparations, at around 9 o'clock in the evening of February 16, 2011, the team proceeded to Fernandez Street, Dagupan City. PO3 Meniano, then in civilian attire, together with the civilian asset, approached accused-appellant, who was in front of the Philippine Progressive Mason Club, Inc. 6 During the transaction, it was agreed that PO3 Meniano will purchase shabu from accused-appellant worth P300.00. PO3 Meniano then handed accused-appellant the payment for the shabu, and, in exchange, accused-appellant handed him one heat-sealed plastic sachet containing suspected shabu. 7
After the transaction, PO3 Meniano effected the arrest of accused-appellant and raised his hand, which was the pre-arranged signal for the other team members to assist in the arrest. PO3 Meniano then placed in his pocket the suspected shabu confiscated from accused-appellant. Thereafter, accused-appellant was brought to the Region 1 Medical Center for medical examination and, subsequently, to the police station. 8
At the police station, PO3 Meniano prepared the Confiscation Receipt, marked the heat-sealed plastic sachet containing suspected shabu with his initials "FSM 02-16-11," and took photographs, which was partially witnessed by a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), Rebecca Cabading (Cabading). 9
The following day, or on February 17, 2011, the confiscated shabu was then brought to the Pangasinan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, together with the Request for Laboratory Examination prepared by PSupt. Caramat. The contraband was received by Police Senior Inspector Myrna C. Malojo (PSI Malojo), a Forensic Chemical Officer, at around 10:30 a.m. PSI Malojo proceeded to conduct a qualitative examination on the specimen submitted and the same tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, as stated in the Initial Laboratory Report and in the Final Laboratory Report. 10
On February 18, 2011, an Information was filed against accused-appellant for violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 for the sale of dangerous drugs, which reads as follows: CAIHTE
That on or about the 16th day of February 2011, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, RAYMUNDO MOLINA y RAGA, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, sell and deliver to a customer Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) contained in one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet, weighing more or less 0.116 gram in exchange for P300.00, without authority to do so.
Contrary to Article II, Section 5, R.A. 9165. 11
At his arraignment on March 22, 2011, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the offense he was charged with. Thereafter, trial ensued. 12
The testimonial evidence for the prosecution consisted of the examination of four witnesses: (a) PSI Malojo, (b) PO3 Meniano, (c) Police Officer III Madonna Decena (PO3 Decena), and (d) Senior Police Officer I Alfonso Villamil (SPO1 Villamil) 13 who testified on the manner by which accused-appellant was arrested selling dangerous drugs, as above described.
On the part of the defense, accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and stated that on February 16, 2011, he was in his house at Fernandez St. together with his child, having a battle of red horse when suddenly, more or less, 10 police officers entered their house and poked their guns at him, accusing him of selling shabu. As he knew that he had not done anything wrong, he went with the police officers to the police station at Philippine National Police Babaliwan. While at the police station, police officer Marlon Decano accused him of selling drugs and he was, thereafter, put to jail. 14
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision dated May 12, 2015 finding accused-appellant guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused RAYMUNDO MOLINA y RAGA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of selling 0.116 gram of shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, without authority, in Violation of Section 5 or [sic] ArticleII of RA 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.
Let the shabu subject matter of this case be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, accused-appellant elevated the matter before the CA arguing that the physical inventory of the seized items was not conducted at the place of arrest and no representative from the local government or from the media were around during the conduct of the said inventory. Accused-appellant further argues that the inventory was conducted at a time when he was not present, or at such time when he was endorsed to the investigator on duty. He adds that the photographing itself was done inside the police station wherein no marking of the specimen could be seen in the picture. 15 Accused-appellant, likewise, claimed that the prosecution evidence failed to establish the identity of the receiving officer of the item/specimen in behalf of the crime laboratory. In support thereof, accused-appellant pointed out that the forensic chemist testified that she turned over the specimen to evidence custodian Senior Police Officer II Elmer Manuel, but the latter never appeared in court to testify regarding the fact of his handling of the exhibits before the same reached the trial court. She also testified that before turning over the specimen, she put the same inside a sealed envelope, yet this envelope and its seal were never shown to the court for its autoptic proference and never identified as exhibits in this case. 16
Representing the People of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that accused-appellant cannot raise the issue on the police officer's non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. Also, contrary to the claim of accused-appellant, the prosecution was able to establish the crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized shabu from the time they were confiscated until they were presented in court during the trial. 17
After due proceedings, the CA rendered a Decision dated September 25, 2017, which affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. DETACa
In ruling against accused-appellant, the CA found that the absence of an elected public official and a representative from the media, and the supposed lack of diligent efforts to secure their attendance, were not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The CA deemed as sufficient the explanation of PO3 Meniano when he testified that they called representatives from the media and barangay officials, but they were not around. The CA noted that the buy-bust operation was conducted at 9 o'clock in the evening and, thus, there was a plausible explanation why, even after having attempted to secure the attendance of a media representative and an elected public official, the team was not able to do so as at that late hour. It is only to be expected that these officials were no longer at work, well beyond normal office hours. 18
The CA also found that during his cross-examination, PO3 Meniano clarified that while he marked the confiscated items at the police station, his statements did not detract from the testimony taken during his direct examination; and that from the time he confiscated the shabu from accused-appellant, he was the only one in possession of the same until its submission to the Pangasinan Provincial Crime Laboratory, which upon examination, was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The chain of custody was thus properly preserved. 19
Aggrieved, accused-appellant brought the instant appeal. 20 In a Resolution 21 dated March 19, 2018, this Court required the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Upon compliance, the parties manifested that they are adopting their respective briefs filed before the CA. 22
Assignment of Error
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the arresting police officers violated Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and, thus, are not presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner as there is broken chain of custody of the allegedly seized specimen in this case.
Ruling
One of the grounds raised by accused-appellant is his reiteration of the failure of the prosecution to comply with the witness requirement under R.A. No. 9165, thereby causing an irregularity under the chain of custody rule. The OSG counters that accused-appellant cannot raise such irregularity for the first time on appeal.
Before delving into the requirements of the chain of custody rule involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, it is apt to point out that the scope of reviewing criminal cases on appeal authorizes this Court to look into matters of evidence that have been presented by the parties, and to resolve errors in the appreciation thereof that the trial court may have committed, even if unassigned by the accused. In the case of prosecution for dangerous drugs, this includes an examination of the manner by which the said dangerous drugs, which is the corpus delicti, has been preserved and its integrity safeguarded. The prevailing rule was stated in the case of People v. Miranda 23 as follows:
At this juncture, it is important to clarify that the fact that Miranda raised his objections against the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs purportedly seized from him only for the first time before the CA does not preclude it or even this Court from passing upon the same.
To recount, the CA held that "[any] [l]apses in the safekeeping of the seized illegal drugs[,] [which affect] their integrity and evidentiary value should be raised at the trial court level." As basis, the CA cited the case of People v. Mendoza (Mendoza), which in turn, cited the case of People v. Sta. Maria (Sta. Maria) wherein it was opined that:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Based on this premise, the Court, in Mendoza, thus ruled that when an accused fails to raise any issues on the chain of custody before the trial court and yet questioned the same only upon appeal, whatever justifiable ground which may excuse the police officers from complying with Section 21 of RA 9165 will remain in obscurity but will not adversely affect the prosecution's case.
The Sta. Maria pronouncement may further be traced to People v. Uy(Uy), which, for its part, cited the annotation of "FRANCISCO, VICENTE J., 1 The Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 1, Part II, 1997 ed., 405," stating the general principle on evidence that:
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Notably, Mendoza, Sta. Maria, and Uy, are all criminal cases for violation of RA 9165, particularly involving objections to the chain of custody of seized drugs, which were then ultimately rejected by the Court since the same were raised only for the first time on appeal.
After a thorough study of these cases, however, this Court holds that that the aforesaid declarations espouse misplaced rulings, as the same clearly run counter to the fundamental rule that "an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review."
It is axiomatic that an appeal in criminal cases confers upon the court full jurisdiction and renders it competent to examine the record and revise the judgment appealed from. Accordingly, "errors in an appealed judgment [of a criminal case], even if not specifically assigned, may be corrected motu proprio by the court if the consideration of these errors is necessary to arrive at a just resolution of the case." The rationale behind this rule stems from the recognition that an accused waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy once he appeals from the sentence of the trial court. As such, it is incumbent upon the appellate court to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether it be favorable or unfavorable to him.
Thus, in People v. Gatlabayan, this Court considered every glaring deficiency in each link of the custody, even if the same was not raised as an error on appeal, and reversed the judgment of conviction, given that what was at stake was no less than the liberty of the accused.
In Villareal v. People, this Court clarified that unlike in civil cases, the assignment of errors in criminal cases is not essential to invoke the court's appellate review, considering that it will nevertheless review the record, and accordingly, reverse or modify the appealed judgment if it finds that errors which are prejudicial to the rights of the accused have been committed, including those errors "which go to the sufficiency of evidence to convict":
The rule means that, notwithstanding the absence of an assignment of errors, the appellate court will review the record and reverse or modify the appealed judgment, not only on grounds that the court had no jurisdiction or that the acts proved do not constitute the offense charged, but also on prejudicial errors to the right of accused which are plain, fundamental, vital, or serious, or on errors which go to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.
In this case, the Court cannot simply turn a blind eye against the unjustified deviations in the chain of custody on the sole ground that the defense failed to raise such errors in detail before the trial court. Considering the nature of appeals in criminal cases as above-discussed, it is then only proper to review the said errors even if not specifically assigned. Verily, these errors, which go to the sufficiency of the evidence of the corpus delicti itself, would indeed affect the court's judgment in ultimately ascertaining whether or not the accused should be convicted and hence, languish in prison for possibly a significant portion of his life. In the final analysis, a conviction must prudently rest on the moral certainty that guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, if doubt surfaces on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, regardless that it does only at the stage of an appeal, our courts of justice should nonetheless rule in favor of the accused, lost it betray its duty to protect individual liberties within the bounds of law. 24
Apropos, this Court could properly determine whether the police officers complied with the requirements of the law to produce a moral certainty sufficient to convict a person in the commission of a crime and overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence. aDSIHc
Now on the merits.
For a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that the object of the transaction is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused. 25 Towards this end, the law establishes the procedure for the prosecution to prove that the dangerous drugs presented in court is the very same substance that was recovered from the accused. This is known as the chain of custody rule. The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) has expressly defined chain of custody involving dangerous drugs and other substances in the following terms in Section 1 (b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In relation to this, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 pertinently provides the following:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Furthermore, Section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 relevantly states:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Streamlining the witness requirement and incorporating the exception to noncompliance with the chain of custody rule under the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, the law was amended by R.A. No. 10640, 26 which took effect on July 23, 2014, 27 pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essentials Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
As such, R.A. No. 10640 now only requires two witnesses to be present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items: (1) an elected public official; and (2) either a representative from the National Prosecution Service or the media. Hence, the witnesses required are: (a) prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official; or (b) after the amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640, an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media. 28
Considering that accused-appellant was arrested on February 16, 2011, it is the provisions of R.A. No. 9165 that should be observed in the instant case. Pursuant to Section 21 of the said law, the inventory and photograph of the drugs seized from an accused must be done in the presence of a representative from the media, a representative from the DOJ, and any elected public official. It would appear, however, in this case that the inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items were only witnessed by a DOJ representative. The absence of a representative from the media and an elected public official is admitted by the prosecution. Thus, the lapse committed by the police officers is apparent. ETHIDa
Nevertheless, in several cases, it has been acknowledged that strict observance of the procedure under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is nearly impossible. In such an instance, it is the prosecution that bears the burden of proving a justifiable ground for non-compliance thereof and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. 29 It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It should take note that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. 30
With regard to the requirement of the presence of three witnesses, People v. Lim 31 dictates that the prosecution must allege and prove that the required witnesses were not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area;
(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf;
(3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended;
(4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or
(5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely any tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. 32
None of the aforementioned instances apply to the case at bar. The witnesses for the prosecution failed to provide a justifiable reason for their failure to comply with the said witness requirement under Section 21, R.A. No. 9165. When asked by the absence of a representative from the media and an elected official, PO3 Meniano simply stated that these personalities were not around. As quoted in the CA Decision:
Q (Prosecutor Alma P. Torio):
In the Confiscation Receipt I noticed that there [are] no representatives from the Media and the Barangay Officials, why is that so?
A (PO3 Francisco S. Meniano, Jr.):
We called them but they are not around, ma'am.
Q: It was only the representative from the DOJ [who] was present?
A: Yes, ma'am. 33
Mere statements of unavailability, absent showing of the steps taken in order to properly secure the attendance of the required witnesses, are severely insufficient to justify non-compliance with the requirements of the law. While the CA noted that it was already late in the evening when the buy-bust team proceeded to the place of operation, it is baffling how a DOJ representative, who works during office hours, could be the only one present, whereas the presence of a representative from the media and a barangay official, who are usually on roaming duty at night, could not have been secured. If at all, it is the presence of a barangay official during nighttime, which could be easily secured, but which the police officers failed to do.
It bears noting that the police officers resorted to a warrantless arrest by conducting a buy-bust operation. Under such a circumstance, the law requires the conduct of inventory and photographing immediately after seizure or confiscation, in the presence of the required number of witnesses. The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intruded by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. 34
In line therewith, it is a general rule that police officers must be prepared to conduct an inventory and take photos at the place of apprehension. As part of the preparation for the conduct of a buy-bust operation, it is not only the buy-bust money and pre-arranged signal for the buy-bust that must be agreed upon by the police officers. They must also prepare the necessary materials and compliance for the conduct of inventory and photograph. As police officers cannot rely on assumptions that it will be impracticable to make the inventory at the place of apprehension and instead make the inventory at the nearest police station, they should be prepared to make the inventory at the place of arrest. In their preparation for the conduct of inventory, police officers should not only have in their possession writing materials and camera for the taking of photographs; the presence of the required witnesses must also be secured, and if they were not able to secure their attendance, genuine efforts or exigent circumstances must be shown to justify non-compliance therewith.
Worth reiterating is this Court's pronouncement in People v. Ramos, 35 as follows: cSEDTC
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not perse render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their noncompliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 36
Thus, the failure to provide a justifiable reason for non-compliance with the witness requirement is fatal to the cause of the prosecution. As part of the requirement for inventory and taking of photographs under the chain of custody rule, the unjustified absence of the required witnesses constitutes a break in the chain of custody, as explained in People v. Macud, 37 as follows:
The presence of the persons who should witness the post-operation procedures is necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity. The insulating presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody. We have noted in several cases that a buy-bust operation is susceptible to abuse, and the only way to prevent this is to ensure that the procedural safeguards provided by the law are strictly observed. In the present case, not only have the prescribed procedures not been followed, but also (and more importantly) the lapses not justifiably explained. In People v. Dela Cruz where there was a similar failure to comply with Section 21 of RA No. 9165, the Court declared:
x x x This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates their seizure of and custody over the seized drugs, thus, compromising the identity and integrity of the same. We resolve the doubt in the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti in favor of appellant as every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Considering that the prosecution failed to present the required quantum of evidence, appellants acquittal is in order. 38
Considering the doubts engendered by the paucity of the prosecution's evidence, this Court has no recourse but to give accused-appellant the benefit of the law. Law enforcers should not only be mindful of the procedures required in the seizure, handling and safekeeping of confiscated drugs, but the prosecution should also prove every material detail in court. Observance of these is necessary to avoid wasting the efforts and the resources in the apprehension and prosecution of violators of our drug laws. 39
As a final note, this Court reiterates the rule that the procedure under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. 40 Seeing that the identity of the corpus delicti is jeopardized by the arresting officers' non-compliance with Section 21, critical elements of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs remain wanting. It follows then, that this non-compliance justifies accused-appellant's acquittal. 41 It would then be apt to quote the recurring pronouncements of this Court on the subject matter:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. x x x
In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21[, Article II] of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with the procedure is determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been completely, complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction. 42
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court resolves to GRANT the instant appeal. The Decision dated September 25, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07754 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Raymundo Molina y Raga is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE accused-appellant Raymundo Molina y Raga from custody, unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED." (Hernando. J., on leave)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Edwin D. Sorongon concurring; rollo, pp. 2-20.
2. Penned by Judge A. Florentino R. Dumlao, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 15-21.
3. As culled from the CA Decision dated September 25, 2017; id. at 2-23.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. CA rollo, p. 68.
15. Id. at 57.
16. Id. at 60-61.
17. Id. at 81-82.
18. See id. at 98-99.
19. See id. at 103-106.
20. CA rollo, p. 117.
21. Rollo, p. 27.
22. Rollo, pp. 29, 39, 44.
23. 824 Phil. 1042 (2018). (Citations omitted; underscoring and emphasis as the original).
24. Id. at 1055-1058.
25. People v. Ismael, 806 Phil. 21, 29 (2017).
26. Entitled "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,'" approved on July 15, 2014.
27. OCA Circular No. 77-2015 dated April 23, 2015 stated that R.A. 10640 became effective on July 23, 2014. However, it was noted in the case of People v. Santos, G.R. No. 236304, November 5, 2018 that under Section 5 of RA 10640, the "Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation" RA 10640 was published on July 23, 2014 in The Philippine Star (Vol. XXVIII, No. 359, Philippine Star Metro section, p. 21) and Manila Bulletin (Vol. 499, No. 23; World News section, p. 6) both considered as newspapers of general circulation. Thus, following Section 5 thereof, RA 10640 appears to have become effective on August 7, 2014 or fifteen days after its publication in The Philippine Star and Manila Bulletin.
Additionally, RA 10640 was filed with the Office of National Administration (ONAR) n at the University of the Philippines Law Center also on July 23, 2014. It was also published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 110, dated September 1, 2014.
28. People v. Maganon, G.R. No. 234040, June 26, 2019, citing People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, November 13, 2018 and People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 236304, November 5, 2018.
29. People v. Año, 828 Phil. 439, 450 (2018), citing People v. Almorfe, 631 Phil. 51 (2010) and People v. De Guzman, 630 Phil. 637 (2010) and People v. Goco, 797 Phil. 433 (2016).
30. People v. Sipin, 833 Phil. 67, 92 (2018).
31. G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018; People v. Sipin, supra; People v. Reyes, 830 Phil. 619 (2018); People v. Mola, 830 Phil. 364 (2018).
32. People v. Lim, supra.
33. CA rollo, p. 98; TSN, May 30, 2012, p. 9.
34. People v. Claudel, G.R. No. 219852, April 3, 2019.
35. 826 Phil. 981 (2018).
36. Id. at 996-997.
37. 822 Phil. 1016 (2017).
38. Id. at 1041.
39. See People v. Hementiza, 807 Phil. 1017, 1039 (2017).
40. People v. Año, supra note 28, at 452, citing People v. Macapundag, 807 Phil. 234 (2017).
41. See People v. Angeles, G.R. No. 224223, November 20, 2019; People v. Patacsil, G.R. No. 234052, August 6, 2018; People v. Que, 824 Phil. 882 (2018), citing People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil. 393, 401 (2010) and Valdez v. People, 563 Phil. 934 (2007).
42. People v. Patacsil, supra, citing People v. Mamangon, 824 Phil. 728 (2018); People v. Go, 457 Phil. 885, 925 (2003); and People v. Miranda, 824 Phil. 1042 (2018).
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from official document. "Office of National Administration (ONAR)" should be "Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR)."