People v. Mojello

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 145566. March 9, 2004.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DINDO "BEBOT" MOJELLO, appellant.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, finding appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death. 1

Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in an Information dated May 22, 1997, as follows: 2

That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, at Sitio Kota, Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years of age and with mental deficiency, against her will and consent, and by reason and/or on the occasion thereof, purposely to conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance of his criminal design, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, treacherously and employing personal violence, attack, assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on the different parts of her body which caused her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of "not guilty." Trial followed.

On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.

From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that on December 15, 1996, at or around 9:00 p.m., Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a group which included Roger Capacito and his wife and the spouses Borah and Arsolin Illustrismo at the Capacito residence located at Barangay Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu. 3

Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On his way home, he saw his niece, Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo Mojello, a nephew of Roger Capacito, walking together some thirty meters away towards the direction of Sitio Kota. 4 Since he was used to seeing them together on other occasions, he did not find anything strange about this. He proceeded to his house. 5

On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco family was informed that the body of Lenlen was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota. Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the site and saw the lifeless, naked and bruised body of his niece. Rogelio was devastated by what he saw. A remorse of conscience enveloped him for his failure to protect his niece. He even attempted to take his own life several days after the incident. 6

Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound for Cadiz City. On an investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator of the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo Batobalonos and Manolo Landao. Batobalonos testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were read to appellant who later on voluntarily signed it. 7 Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan. 8 On December 21, 1996, an autopsy was conducted on the victim's cadaver by Dr. Nestor Sator of the Medico-Legal Branch of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region VII. 9

Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the labia majora and hymenal lacerations positively indicate that the victim was raped. 10 He observed that froth in the lungs of the victim and contusions on her neck show that she was strangled and died of asphyxia. 11 He indicated the cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and physical injuries to the head and the trunk. 12

In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in evidence; and whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.

We now resolve.

Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the alleged extrajudicial confession which he executed on December 23, 1996. In his Brief, appellant avers that the confession which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into. 13 He argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights before the confession was taken from him. 14 Hence, his confession, and admissions made therein, should be deemed inadmissible in evidence, under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

We are not convinced.

At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on custodial investigation enshrined in Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what jurisprudence has termed as "Miranda rights" stemming from the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona. 15 It has been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and the ultimate refuge of individuals against the coercive power of the State.

The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.

In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine was based on the leading case of People v. Galit 16 and Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 17 rulings subsequently incorporated into the present Constitution. The Miranda doctrine under the 1987 Charter took on a modified form where the right to counsel was specifically qualified to mean competent and independent counsel preferably of the suspect’s own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter requirements compared to its American counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in the presence of counsel.

Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial investigation has evolved to provide for more stringent standards than what was originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona. The purpose of the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as the process shifts from the investigatory to the accusatory seems to be to accord even the lowliest and most despicable criminal suspects a measure of dignity and respect. The main focus is the suspect, and the underlying mission of custodial investigation — to elicit a confession.

The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was undoubtedly apprised of his Miranda rights under the Constitution. 18 The court a quo observed that the confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights. 19 As further proof of the same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant. 20 Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the investigation was conducted and appellant’s statement taken, he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the questions he understood freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer. 21 Atty. Giduquio represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case.

Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence and independence in representing appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover, appellant manifested for the record that Atty. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings.

The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. 22

We ruled in People v. Continente 23 that while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel — or where the preferred lawyer is not available — is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. 24

The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In People v. Dumalahay, 25 this Court held:

The sworn confessions of the three accused show that they were properly apprised of their right to remain silent and right to counsel, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee.

At 8:00 in the morning of the next day, the three accused proceeded to the office of Atty. Rexel Pacuribot, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. All of the three accused, still accompanied by Atty. Ubay-ubay, subscribed and swore to their respective written confessions. Before administering the oaths, Atty. Pacuribot reminded the three accused of their constitutional rights under the Miranda doctrine and verified that their statements were voluntarily given. Atty. Pacuribot also translated the contents of each confession in the Visayan dialect, to ensure that each accused understood the same before signing it. aIcSED

No ill-motive was imputed on these two lawyers to testify falsely against the accused. Their participation in these cases merely involved the performance of their legal duties as officers of the court. Accused-appellant Dumalahay’s allegation to the contrary, being self-serving, cannot prevail over the testimonies of these impartial and disinterested witnesses.

More importantly, the confessions are replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied. These factors are clear indicia that the confessions were voluntarily given.

When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession.

The confessions dovetail in all their material respects. Each of the accused gave the same detailed narration of the manner by which Layagon and Escalante were killed. This clearly shows that their confessions could not have been contrived. Surely, the three accused could not have given such identical accounts of their participation and culpability in the crime were it not the truth.

Concededly, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon appellant's apprehension by the police authorities violated the Miranda doctrine on two grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and (2) improper waiver of the right to counsel as it was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the December 23, 1996 custodial investigation which elicited the appellant’s confession should nevertheless be upheld for having complied with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1. Even though improper interrogation methods were used at the outset, there is still a possibility of obtaining a legally valid confession later on by properly interrogating the subject under different conditions and circumstances than those which prevailed originally. 26

The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. SPO2 Wilfredo Abello Giducos, prior to conducting his investigation, explained to appellant his constitutional rights in the Visayan dialect, notably Cebuano, a language known to the appellant, viz: 27

PASIUNA (PRELIMINARY):

 Ikaw karon Dindo Mojello ubos sa usa ka inbestigasyon diin ikaw gituhon nga adunay kalabutan sa kamatayon ni LENLEN RAYCO ug nahitabong paglugos kaniya. Ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod, ikaw adunay katungod sa pagpakahilom ning maong inbestigasyon karon kanimo ug aduna usab ikaw ug katungod nga katabangan ug usa ka abogado nga motabang karon kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon. Imo ba nasabtan kining tanan? (DINDO MOJELLO, you are hereby reminded that you are under investigation in which you were suspected about the death and raping of LENLEN RAYCO. Under the Constitution you have the right to remain silent about this investigation on you now and you have also the right to have counsel of your own choice to assist you in this investigation now. Have you understood everything?)

TUBAG (ANSWER):

 Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)

PANGUTANA (QUESTION):

 Human ikaw sayri sa imong katungod ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod sa pagpakahilom, gusto ba nimo nga ipadayon nato kining inbestigasyon karon kanimo? (After you have been apprised of your rights under our Constitution to remain silent, do you want to proceed this investigation on you now?)

TUBAG (QUESTION):

 Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)

PANGUTANA (QUESTION):

 Gusto ba usab nimo ug abogado nga makatabang kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon? (Do you want counsel to assist you in this said investigation?)

TUBAG (ANSWER):

 Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)

APPEARANCE:

 Atty. Isaias Giduquio is appearing as counsel of the affiant.

PANGUTANA (QUESTION):

 Ako usab ikaw pahinumdoman nga unsa man ang imo isulti karon dinhi magamit pabor o batok kanimo sa Hukmanan, nasabtan ba nimo kining tanan mo nga mga katungod nga walay naghulga, nagpugos o nagdagmal kanimo o nagsaad ba ug ganti sa kaulihan? (You are also hereby reminded that all your statements now will be used as evidence against or in your favor in any court of justice. Have you understood all your rights with nobody coercing or forcing you, or mauling or promising a reward in the end?)

TUBAG (ANSWER):

 Oo (Yes.)

PANGUTANA (QUESTION):

 Andam ka nga mohatag ug libre ug boluntaryo nga pamahayag? (Are you now ready to give your free and voluntary statement?)

TUBAG (ANSWER):

 Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)

xxx xxx xxx

(START OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)

xxx xxx xxx

The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to counsel, as contained in such confession. 28 Appellant was properly assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial confession of appellant was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and Madredijos. Judge Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. He subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to his statement, Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of Court were present as well as other people. 29

The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid requirements of the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as evidence. The lower court was correct in giving credence to the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.

On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who threatened him, nor did he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.

In People v. Pia, 30 we held that “where appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged maltreatment; where there appears no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.” The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. 31 To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere allegation of threat, torture, coercion, intimidation or inducement, without any proof whatsoever. People v. Enanoria further declared that another indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession which could have been known only to the declarant. 32

The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. 33 Bare assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption. 34

The test for determining if a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed. 35 In cases where the Miranda warnings have been given, the test of voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight of the confession.

Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant’s confession remains unrebutted by his failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced.

It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement officers is to ensure that a suspect has been properly apprised of his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel. It is in the paramount public interest that the foundation of an effective administration of criminal justice relies on the faithful adherence to the Miranda doctrine. Compliance with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by police authorities is central to the criminal justice system; Miranda rights must in every case be respected, without exception.

Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission of culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore not '"fruit of the poisonous tree" since the tree itself is not poisonous.

Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, thereby sentencing him to suffer the death penalty despite the glaring insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against him. In his Brief, he argues that the evidence against him is insufficient to warrant his conviction of rape with homicide.

The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled with the corpus delicti as established by the Medico-Legal Report and the testimony of Rogelio Rayco, leads us to no other conclusion than that of appellant’s guilt for the rape of Lenlen Rayco on December 15, 1996. It passes the test of moral certainty and must therefore be sustained.

However, the records do not adequately show that appellant admitted to killing the victim. Neither is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that by reason or on the occasion of the rape a homicide was committed by the appellant. The lack of physical evidence further precludes us from connecting the slaying of the victim to her sexual assault, given the quantum of proof required by law for conviction. No estimated time of death was given, which is essential in making a connection with the appellant's story that he went home after a night of drinking. The time when he and the victim were headed towards the seashore at or about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. of December 15, 1996 until the time when the victim’s lifeless body was found at or about 4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1996 had a time variance of between six to seven hours. Although the circumstances may point to the appellant as the most likely perpetrator of the homicide, the same do not constitute an unbroken chain of events which would lead us to a reasonable conclusion that appellant was guilty of killing the victim. In other words, there are gaps in the reconstruction of facts and inferences surrounding the death of Lenlen. Appellant only admitted to boxing the victim when she shouted, then hurriedly ran away. The cause of death of Lenlen was cardio-respiratory attack due to asphyxiation and physical injuries; she was strangled to death and left on the seashore as manifested by the frothing in her lungs. No physical, scientific or DNA evidence was presented to pinpoint appellant as the person who killed the victim. Fingerprints, if available, would have determined who committed the homicide. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of rape with homicide considering the insufficiency of evidence which thereby created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt for the said special complex crime.

Appellant should instead be held liable only for the crime of statutory rape, the victim Lenlen Rayco being then eleven years old. The sexual assault was necessarily included in the special complex crime charged in the Information dated May 22, 1997.

The trial court should have awarded damages to the heirs of the victim. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded upon the finding of the fact of rape. 36 Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 may likewise be given to the heirs of the victim without need of proof in accordance with current jurisprudence. 37

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61 in Criminal Case No. B-00224 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Dindo Mojello is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Lenlen Rayco, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., is on leave.

Vitug, J., joins the dissent.

Panganiban, J., is on official leave.

Quisumbing, J., see dissenting opinion.

Tinga, J., joins the dissent of Justice Quisumbing.

Separate Opinions

QUISUMBING, J., dissenting:

With due respect, we are unable to concur in the majority opinion, penned ably by Justice Ynares-Santiago. For here appellant's conviction is being anchored on evidence that must be deemed inadmissible by constitutional fiat. Considering that this case involves the death penalty imposed on appellant by the trial court for the crime of rape with homicide, we must apply the strictest standard of reviews. Failing to meet this yardstick, the trial court's decision should be reversed, and the appellant should be acquitted on grounds of insufficiency of evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

For clarity of exposition, we set forth the facts of the case as we see them, based on the records.

Appellant Dindo Mojello is unmarried. At the time of his trial in Criminal Case No. B-00224, he was 22 years old. His educational attainment 1 is Grade IV. He had worked as a chainsaw operator. 2 At the time of the incident, he lived with his uncle, Roger Capacite, in Talisay, Santa Fe, Cebu. 3

The victim Lenlen 4 Rayco was eleven (11) years old 5 when she died. She lived in the same neighborhood as appellant and his uncle. Appellant and Lenlen knew each other. According to the prosecution, she was last seen alive in the company of the appellant.

In an Information dated May 22, 1997, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu charged appellant of rape with homicide committed as follows:

That on the 15th day of December, 1996, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Kota, Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with (sic) Lenlen Rayco, under twelve (12) years of age and with mental deficiency, against her will and consent, and by reason and/or on the occasion thereof, purposely to conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance of his criminal design, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, treacherously and employing personal violence, attack, assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on the different parts of her body within caused her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

When arraigned, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 7 Thereafter, trial ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that:

At around 9:00 p.m. of December 15, 1996, Lenlen's uncle, Rogelio Rayco was at the house in Talisay, Santa Fe, Cebu, of his neighbor, Roger Capacite, the appellant's uncle. Rogelio was in a drinking spree with Roger and several male and female companions. 8 The group was drinking Tanduay rum. At about 10:00. p.m., Rogelio went home. 9 He had just reached his house, when he saw Roger's nephew, herein appellant, conversing with Lenlen. 10 The two were some 30 meters away from him and thus, he could not hear what they were talking about. The two then walked towards the road. 11 Rogelio paid no further attention to the pair since he was used to seeing them walking together. 12

The following morning, Lenlen's naked and bruised corpse was found along the seashore of Sitio Kota. On hearing the news, Rogelio immediately proceeded to the area. He saw that the child had sustained several bruises all over her body. 13

On December 21, 1996, Dr. Nestor Sator, head medico-legal of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Region VII conducted a post-mortem examination on Lenlen's remains. His findings were as follows:

GENERAL:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished, previously embalmed, female child cadaver. Stomach is ½ full of partially digested food particles. Both lungs are congested, which on cross section revealed froth. Subdural hemorrhage is noted at the right side of the cranial cavity.

HEAD:

There are contusions at the left face, both upper eyelids, chin, nose, both sides of the neck and at the back of the head.

TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES:

1. Abrasion at the chest, left side, measuring 14 x 13 cm., 6 cm. away from the anterior midline.

2. Contusion at the right chest, lower portion, measuring 2 x 2 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior midline.

3. Multiple linear abrasions at the right antecubital region, measuring 5 x 5 cm.

4. Abrasions at the left antecubital region, measuring 4 x 2 cm.

5. Contusions are also noted at both axillary regions, anterior aspect.

GENITALIA:

There is swelling at the right labia majora. Deep hymenal laceration is noted at 6 o'clock position and shallow laceration at 3 o'clock position. 14

Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the victim's labia majora and the hymenal lacerations were positive indications that she had been raped. 15 He stated that based on the froth in the lungs of the victim and the contusions on her neck, she was most likely strangled, and she died of asphyxia. The death certificate of Lenlen Rayco showed her cause of death to be "cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and physical injuries to the head and trunk (rape-positive)." 16

Meanwhile, appellant left Talisay, Santa Fe, Cebu. He had already boarded a motor launch at Bantayan, Cebu, bound for Cadiz City, when he was apprehended by the authorities and brought in for investigation.

In his statement of December 17, 1996, 17 taken without the assistance of counsel, before SPO2 Wilfredo A. Giducos in the presence of SPO2 Tomas A. Gerra, Jr. at the Santa Fe police station, appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that on the night of the incident, he was drinking with his uncle, Roger Capacite, at the latter's house. Appellant declared that he last saw Lenlen at around 9:00 p.m. of December 15, 1996, when she went to Roger Capacite's house and told the appellant that his cousin, Rigie 18 Capacite, wanted him to quit drinking and get some sleep. The appellant allegedly told Lenlen that he would just go home after they were done with their carousing. The appellant stated that the drinking ended at around 10:00 p.m. after which he went to the "bodega" of one Titing Esgana and slept there. He woke up at around 2:00 a.m. the following day and proceeded to the house of Rigie Capacite, had an early breakfast, after which he proceeded to Sillon, Santa Fe with a certain Benjie to get spare parts for the chainsaw.

However, appellant executed another statement dated December 23, 1996, 19 in the presence allegedly of one Atty. Isaias P. Giduquio and Barangay Captain Wilfredo Batobalonos. In this statement, appellant changed his tune. He admitted raping Lenlen Rayco, boxing her in the stomach which caused her to lose consciousness, and leaving her unconscious on the shoreline some 350 meters away from the house of Rigie Capacite. He stated that he had sexual congress with Lenlen Rayco at around 11:00 p.m. on December 15, 1996 in Sitio Kota, Talisay, Santa Fe, Cebu. On January 16, 1997, the appellant's statement, amounting to an extrajudicial confession, was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting judge of the MCTC of Santa Fe-Bantayan-Madredijos. 20 Judge Jaca later on stated that all that he asked of appellant before the abovecited statement was subscribed and sworn to before him was whether the appellant understood its contents and whether he executed the statement voluntarily. 21

Atty. Isaias Giduquio, who assisted the appellant at the time appellant's statement was taken, there being no other lawyer available, was requested by the Chief of Police of Santa Fe to assist Mojello. At that time, Atty. Giduquio was attending a session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Fe. 22 Atty. Giduquio later on testified that he witnessed the appellant sign his statement, also called an extrajudicial confession, but failed to give details on how he assisted the appellant when the appellant confessed to the crime. On cross-examination, Atty. Giduquio declared that he told the appellant "to answer questions freely" and to confer with him if he was not sure of his answer. 23

Wilfredo S. Batobalonos, the barangay captain of Talisay, Santa Fe declared that he was present when the appellant made his extrajudicial confession and that he saw him voluntarily affix his signature to the statement admitting authorship of the crime. 24

The appellant was the sole witness for the defense during the trial. He admitted knowing the victim, as she was one of the neighbors of his uncle, Roger Capacite. 25 However, he denied having anything to do with the rape-slay of the victim. He claimed that on the night of December 15, 1996, from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., he was drinking with friends and neighbors at the house of his uncle. 26 He denied seeing and meeting the victim that night. 27 He claimed that after their drinking session, he went to sleep at the house of his cousin, Rigie Capacite. The house was some 40 meters away from the house of his uncle. 28 He woke up at 4:00 a.m. and departed for Cadiz City, but was arrested by two policemen while aboard a motorized launch. The appellant claimed that he was mauled and boxed by the policemen at the Santa Fe municipal hall, where he was made under duress to sign an extrajudicial confession. 29 He claimed that he was not given a chance to read the statement he signed nor was it explained to him. 30

The trial court found the prosecution's version of the incident credible. It disbelieved appellant's denial and alibi. It held appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping and killing Lenlen Rayco, and sentenced him to death by lethal injection.

The core issue now presented to the Court is whether the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken by the police authorities could be validly admitted in evidence to convict appellant of a capital offense.

The Constitution, in Article III, Section 12, embodies the mandatory safeguards afforded a person under custodial investigation for the commission of a crime and the concomitant duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate. It declares that:

SEC. 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Numerous decisions of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must be: (1) voluntary; (2) made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) express; and (4) in writing. 31

Lacking these fundamental requisites, appellant's conviction under review could not be sustained.

DURING INITIAL CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION APPELLANT HAD NO COUNSEL, NOR WAS HE INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting confession that leads the accused to admit something false, so as to incriminate himself. What is sought to be avoided is the "evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him." 32

The facts show that the appellant Dindo Mojello was actually arrested by police authorities on December 16, 1996, while he was on his way to Cadiz City, for the purpose of purchasing a chainsaw he needed for his job as chainsaw operator. Subsequent to his arrest, the police conducted custodial investigation of accused-appellant twice. In the first instance, he was NOT assisted by counsel at all. In the second instance, wherein his alleged confession was secured, it took 7 days of DELAY before he was provided legal counsel on December 23, 1996. 33

The majority opinion concedes that the first custodial interrogation was constitutionally infirm because of the absence of counsel. But the ponencia considers the succeeding interrogation lawful, without any infirmity, despite appellant's claim that he was boxed and mauled by the police. The ponencia holds that the police complied with the Miranda requirements, given the fact that the presence of a counsel was finally secured, and that the content of the extrajudicial confession which appellant signed was translated into Visayan dialect, which he understood, before he affixed his signature thereon. On this point, we cannot agree. To our mind, facts on record do not show compliance with the Miranda mandates aforecited. On the contrary, the facts unmistakably show a violation by the police of Section 17 of the Bill of Rights that, "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."

As the record shows, at the very start of custodial investigation, counsel was not assisted by counsel. Nor was he informed of his right to counsel from the time the police started to extract information from him regarding the crime that he was charged of. Much less did he waive his right to counsel in writing. What happened was contrary to the prevailing doctrine that the accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Thus, the recent case of People v. Delmo, G.R. Nos. 130078-82, October 4, 2002, we said:

Based on the records of these cases, we find that police investigators violated Danilo's constitutional right to competent and independent counsel. As early as September 16, 1995, Danilo was already taken into custody by the police for investigation on his possible role in the Payumo slayings. Yet, there is no showing on record that Danilo was furnished the services of competent and independent counsel in accordance with Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights. Danilo was only offered the services of Atty. Hilbero on the night of September 18, 1995, or after two days of custodial investigation. The records further show that Atty. Hilbero's services were tapped only to assist Danilo in making a confession. Established is the rule that the moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, he should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such waiver by Danilo is on record. Nor is there any showing that Atty. Hilbero was present at the very start of Danilo's custodial investigation. In our view, the process that resulted in Danilo's extrajudicial confession is flawed. The constitutional requirement is not met properly where the lawyer is called in only when the accused is about to put his confession in writing. Danilo Lapiz was not assisted by counsel from the start of custodial investigation, when his right to competent and independent counsel had already attached. Hence, pursuant to Article III, Section 12(3) of the Constitution, we declare his confession inadmissible not only against him, but even against his co-appellants as well. (Emphasis supplied.)

COUNSEL PROVIDED BY THE POLICE LATER WAS NEITHER INDEPENDENT NOR COMPETENT, BUT BIASED AGAINST APPELLANT'S INTEREST.

The right to counsel means the right to competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. It is doubtful whether the counsel given to Mojello at second instance of custodial investigation was of his own choice. Atty. Giduquio's testified on how he came to know appellant as follows —

FISCAL CAMOMOT:

Q: Atty. Giduquio, do you remember having assisted, do you know the accused Dindo Mojello?

A. Yes, I know him.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How did you come to know the accused?

 

A: One time while I was attending the Sangguniang Bayan session, I was requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist one of the accused a certain Dindo Mojello, as there was no other lawyer in connection with a rape case that happened in the town.

Q: You have claimed that you have assisted him in the mak[ing] of an extrajudicial confession?

A: Yes. 34

What emerges from a perusal of Atty. Giduquio's testimony in the present case is that the lawyer was merely picked out from a Sangguniang Bayan meeting by the law enforcers themselves, for the sole purpose of making it appear that appellant was assisted by a counsel in making his confession. All these put into serious doubt his independence and competence as counsel for appellant for purposes of complying with Miranda rights of the accused under custodial investigation. He had no sufficient time to interview the appellant, much less to intelligently assess his case, and it did not even occur to him to explore any theory for the defense of his client. Counsel merely lent his presence so as to validate the alleged confession of appellant.

Barangay Captain Wifredo Batobalonos, a prosecution witness who obviously belongs to the side of the police, testified on his relationship by affinity with Atty. Giduquio. He stated —

Q: Also in Exhibit "B-5" also a typewritten name of Isaias Giduquio, whose signature is this?

A: Atty. Giduquio because I'm very familiar with his signature in fact the wife of his nephew is my nephew also and he was also there when he sign it. (sic) 35

The foregoing revelation on the close ties between prosecution witness Batobalonos and Atty. Giduquio fortifies the conclusion that he was the chosen counsel by the prosecution and the police for their own purposes, contrary to the interest of appellant, and to his great prejudice.

Notably, after Atty. Giduquio later withdrew as his counsel, appellant recoiled from and promptly disowned his alleged confession of guilt. During his arraignment where he was assisted by Atty. De Jesus as counsel de oficio, appellant gave a categorical plea of not guilty.

Further, it appears that Atty. Giduquio had no real commitment to appellant's defense. This is evident from the manifestation 36 dated May 20, 1998, which he filed before the lower court. In response to the subpoena issued by the trial court commanding him to testify on the case, he filed the aforesaid manifestation, stating that he had already withdrawn his appearance as counsel for appellant due to "irreconcilable matters" and prayed that he be relieved of any obligation and responsibility as counsel for the accused. His manifestation suggests two things: (1) he did not fully comprehend what a subpoena to testify means, in which case his competence as a lawyer becomes highly suspect, or (2) he is nonchalant about the case due to "irreconcilable matters" with appellant, which suggests adverse relationship or conflict of interest between counsel and client. These put to question counsel's competence as well as independence when the confession was wheedled out of appellant by the police.

Given the circumstances of this case, we cannot rest easy with the assertion of the majority that at the time appellant admitted his alleged culpability for a crime where the penalty at stake is possibly death, Atty. Giduquio served his client with competence and diligence and championed the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 37 A huge doubt assails us on this score.

THE CONFESSION OF APPELLANT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BUT EXTORTED, "A FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE."

The mantle of protection afforded by the aforecited constitutional provision, otherwise known as the "exclusionary rule," is premised on the presumption that the accused is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical or psychological, is forcefully apparent. 38

The negative environment at the time the confession was wrung from appellant is at once apparent from the following testimony of Atty. Giduquio:

COURT:

Q: Were there people around at the time while the accused was signing the confession?

A: There were people around and of course there was a window inside the room where the investigation was conducted. I remembered it was only the investigating Chief of Police and there were 4 or five policemen and myself.

Q: Outside were there people?

A: Yes, including the officials of the town. 39

There is no doubt in our mind that appellant's confession was extracted and therefore involuntary. Custodial investigation in the police office at the municipal hall was in a highly charged atmosphere due to the presence of the Chief of Police, several policemen, the Barangay Captain, and local officials. Obviously they were on the same side as the police whose tasks include carrying out peace and order duties at the behest of local authorities. The need for competent and independent counsel to aid appellant during this time and under those adverse condition to him is vital to his defense. The physical and moral compulsion exerted by the police and municipal officials weighed heavily on appellant, vitiating his free will and defeating his morale at the moment critical to preserve his equanimity and good sense.

Further bolstering the impact of adverse conditions when appellant's confession was extracted was the fact that it took three weeks before it was sworn to before the MCTC trial judge of Bantayan-Sta. Fe. The judge himself conducted the preliminary investigation, obviously biased already against the appellant, and hurrying to fulfill his task by turning him over to the higher rung of the prosecution ladder. EDHTAI

In People vs. Januario, 40 this Court had the opportunity to reiterate the rule that evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained confession is inadmissible. In that case, appellants first orally admitted participation in the commission of the crime in Naga City and later executed written confessions in Manila. This Court held that inasmuch as their initial confessions are unconstitutional for being uncounselled, the latter one becomes inadmissible as well for it was a product of the first. Thus —

That appellants indeed admitted participation in the commission of the crime in Naga City is shown by the fact that the NBI agents brought them to Manila to facilitate apprehension of the other culprits who could be either in Cavite or Manila. Because their uncounselled oral admissions in Naga City resulted in the execution of their written confessions in Manila, the latter had become as constitutionally infirm as the former. In People vs. Alicando, 41 this Court explained the ramifications of an irregularly counselled confession or admission:

"We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rules known as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the 'tree') is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the 'fruit') derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The 'fruit of the poisonous tree is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained." (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, appellant Mojello's first signed statement on December 17, 1996, taken illegally and involuntarily, without the presence of counsel could not be admitted in evidence. Neither should his flawed second statement taken without assistance of his chosen counsel on December 23, 1996, be used against him. For the alleged confession of appellant is the undeniably unlawful consequence of the first instance of custodial interrogation without counsel, a classic case of a fruit of the poisonous tree.

THAT MOJELLO'S CONFESSION ALLEGEDLY MATCHES WITH THE MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT DOES NOT BOLSTER ITS VALIDITY

Contrary to the ponencia's disquisition, the fact that appellant Mojello's confession allegedly dovetails with the medico-legal report is irrelevant in determining its admissibility. To hold otherwise would result in what Justice Florenz Regalado in People v. dela Cruz, 42 phrased as "putting the cart before the horse." Justice Regalado explains —

The proposition that the medical findings jibe with the narration of appellant as to how he allegedly committed the crimes falls into the fatal error of figuratively putting the cart before the horse. Precisely, the validity and admissibility of the supposed extrajudicial confession are in question and the contents thereof are denied and of serious dubiety, hence the same cannot be used as the basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would assume that which has still to be proved, a situation of petitio principii or circulo en probando. Evidently, herein appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme penal consequences of the crimes on account of the shaky and decrepit circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied.)

PROSECUTION WITNESS' TESTIMONY FAILS TO ESTABLISH GUILT OF APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

The only other evidence of the prosecution linking him to the crime is the testimony of Rogelio Rayco who himself was a suspect initially as he could not explain the presence of a prominent wound in his throat which he sustained on or about the time of the fatal incident involving his niece, the victim in this case. In his first sworn statement of December 22, 1996, taken at about 10:45 in the evening before the police authorities at the Bantayan District Hospital where he was then confined for his neck wounds, Rogelio Rayco explained that he attempted to commit suicide because he learned that he was being suspected for the rape of his niece. The pertinent portion of his affidavit is quoted as follows:

Q: What is your name?

A: Rogelio Rayco.

Q: Why are here at the hospital?

A: I stabbed myself.

Q: What did you use in stabbing?

A: Kitchen knife (kutsilyo).

Q: What was the reason why you, stabbed yourself?

A: Because of the news that I was one of the suspects in the raping and killing of my niece, Lenlen . . . 43

Two weeks later or on January 6, 1997, Rogelio Rayco executed another affidavit at the Santa Fe police station, this time with a new explanation as to why he attempted to end his life — he felt a pang of conscience for not having warned the victim against appellant. He stated —

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What was the caused (sic) of the wounds on your neck?

A: Due to my own stabbing.

Q: Why?

A: Because I was bothered by my conscience for not having warned my niece, Lenlen Rayco in accompanying Dindo Mojello whom I believed was the one who raped and killed Lenlen Rayco . . . 44

It was also in the latter affidavit that he disclosed to the police authorities for the first time his account of events on the night the victim was slain, this time implicating appellant to the crime. Thus, on the basis of Rogelio Rayco's second affidavit, his brother and victim's father — Edilberto Rayco — gave a statement to the police the next day, or on January 7, 1997, charging appellant for Lenlen's rape and death. 45 From Rogelio's narration, the theory of the prosecution was formed almost five months after the fatal incident or on May 22, 1997, with the filing of information 46 against appellant for the rape and homicide of Lenlen.

Rogelio Rayco's testimony failed to clarify why he had a sudden change of heart. Neither did the prosecution show why it took Rogelio three weeks from the time he got wind of Lenlen's death before he reported to the police his knowledge that appellant was with the victim the night of the incident.

What the records do show is: (1) that Rogelio Rayco was initially a suspect himself for the rape of his niece, (2) that upon knowing that he was a suspect, he attempted to commit suicide, and (3) that two weeks later, he told the law enforcers that appellant did it. By itself, we are not prepared to accept Rayco's testimony, line, hook, and sinker.

Rogelio Rayco's testimony is merely circumstantial. It only seeks to establish the presence of the appellant near the vicinity of the crime scene on or about the time when the crime took place. It fails to meet the following requisites to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (1) there must be more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. 47 Rogelio Rayco's actuations after the incident were far from being the natural reaction of an innocent person but in fact invited suspicion and doubt. With doubt still lurking in our mind as to who is the real killer of the victim, we are not prepared to rely on Rayco's testimony to convict appellant.

Ultimately, appellant's conviction rested only upon the extrajudicial confession extorted by the police while he was under detention. He was compelled by the police to be a witness against himself, thereby violating the basic guarantee against self-incrimination. In the light of appellant's Miranda rights, this confession could not be admitted without grievously offending the Constitution. Despite the inherent weakness of denial and alibi as a defense, his innocence must be sustained. Not because he is not guilty, but because the evidence for the prosecution is even weaker for being inadmissible under the fundamental law. Hence, appellant Dindo Mojello ought to be acquitted.

 

Footnotes

1. Decision penned by Judge Ildefonso G. Mantilla.

2. Original Records, pp. 1-2.

3. TSN, 20 August 1998, p. 4.

4 Id., p. 12.

5. Id., p. 6.

6. Id., p. 15.

7. Id., February 26, 1998, pp. 14-20.

8. Id., pp. 4-7. See also Exhibit “B”, Original Records; pp. 18-20.

9. Id., February 12, 1998, pp. 7-9.

10. Id., p. 9.

11. Id., pp. 11-12.

12. Original Records, p. 28.

13. Rollo, p. 59-60.

14. Id., p. 60-64.

15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

16. G.R. No. L-51770, 20 March 1985, 135 SCRA 465.

17. G.R. Nos. L-61016 and L-61107, 26 April 1983, 121 SCRA 538.

18. Rollo, p. 107.

19. Id.

20. TSN, July 14, 1998, p. 3.

21. Id. at 6-7.

22. G.R. No. 109993, 21 January 1994; People v. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450.

23. G.R. Nos. 100801-02, 25 August 2000, 339 SCRA 1.

24. Id.

25. G.R. Nos. 131837-38, 2 April 2002.

26. Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (2d Ed., 1967), p. 200 citing Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) and other cases.

27. Original Records, pp. 18-23.

28. Rollo, p. 211.

29. TSN, February 26, 1998, p. 10.

30. G.R. No. L-59604, 14 November 1986, 145 SCRA 581; See alsoPeople v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-32274, 2 April 1984, 128 SCRA 488.

31. People v. Continente, G.R. Nos. 100801-02, 25 August 2000, 339 SCRA 1.

32. People v. Enanoria, G.R. No. 92957, 8 June 1992, 209 SCRA 594.

33. Id.

34. Id. at 594-595.

35. 29 A Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 719, citing United States v. Leby (CA7 Wis) 955 F2d 1098, and other cases.

36. People v. Dumlao, G.R. Nos. 130409-10, 27 November 2001, 370 SCRA 571; People v. Caniezo, G.R. No. 136594, 13 March 2001, 354 SCRA 298; People v. Mangompit, Jr., G.R. Nos. 139962-63, 7 March 2001, 353 SCRA 833.

37. People v. Burgos, G.R. Nos. 139959-60, 22 November 2001, 370 SCRA 325; People v. Bismonte, G.R. No. 139563, 22 November 2001, 370 SCRA 305.

QUISUMBING, J., dissenting:

1. TSN, 6 October 1998, p. 15.

2. Id. at 8.

3. Id. at 9.

4. Also spelled "Lynlyn," "Linlen" or "Len-Len" in the records.

5. She was born January 21, 1985. See Exh. "E" and sub-markings, Records, p. 138. See also TSN, 30 July 1998, p. 9 (testimony of the victim's mother, Carmen Rayco); TSN, 20 August 1998, p. 18 (testimony of the victim's father, Edilberto Rayco).

6. Records, pp. 1-2.

7. Id., at 39.

8. TSN, 20 August 1998, pp. 4-5.

9. Id. at 5.

10. Ibid

11. Id., at 5-6.

12. Id., at 6, 11.

13. Id., at 8, 9.

14. Records, p. 28.

15. TSN, 12 February 1998, pp. 9-11.

16. Records, p. 133.

17. Id., at 14-15.

18. Also spelled "Reggie" in some parts of the records.

19. Records, pp. 18-20.

20. TSN, 26 February 1998, pp. 3; Records p. 20.

21. Id., at 11.

22. TSN, 14 July 1998, p. 3.

23. Id., at 7.

24. TSN, 26 February 1998, pp. 16-19.

25. TSN, 6 October 1998, pp. 8-9.

26. Id. at 10.

27. Id. at 10-11.

28. Id. at 11-12.

29. Id. at 14-15, 17. See also TSN, 5 November 1998, p. 26. Emphasis supplied.

30. Id. at 19-20. Id. at 27.

31. SeePeople v. Oranza, G.R. No. 127748, 25 July 2002; People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 129296. 25 September 2000; People v. Base, G.R. No. 109773, 30 March 2000; People v. Ugiaban, G.R. No. 132745, 9 March 2000; People v. Calvo, G.R. No. 91694, 14 March 1997.

32. People v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 77865, 4 December 1998.

33. Records, p. 18.

34. TSN, 14 July 1998, pp. 2-3.

35. TSN, 26 February 1998, p. 16.

36. Records, p. 110.

37. Abaqueta v. Florido, A.C. No. 5948, 22 January 2003.

38. People v. Base, G.R. No. 109773, 30 March 2000.

39. TSN, 14 July 1998, pp. 5-6.

40. G.R. No. 98252, 7 February 1997.

41. G.R. No. 117487, 12 December 1995. SeeNardone v. United States, 308 US 388, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. ed. 307 (1939).

42. G.R. Nos. 118866-68, 17 September 1997.

43. Records, p. 17.

44. Id., at 12.

45. Id.,at 10.

46. Id., at 2.

47. People v. Casitas, G.R. No. 137404, 14 February 2003.