FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 255614. July 28, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. FLORENCIO MIRANDA y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 28, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 255614 (People of the Philippines v. Florencio Miranda y Mendoza)
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, viz.:
"Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxx xxx xxx
5. With evident premeditation.
xxx xxx xxx."
To sustain a conviction, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 1
We focus on the second and third elements.
Villanueva positively identified
Prosecution eyewitness Perlita Villanueva (Villanueva) positively identified appellant as the person who inflicted the multiple fatal hack wounds on Montoya y Sandoval (Montoya):
"Q: While at that time[,] at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon in Brgy. Bilibinwang [,] while you said you are attending fiesta at the house of the spouses Bathan, do you remember anything unusual which took place?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Will you kindly tell us what was that unusual incident?
A: I saw a man holding a bolo who approached Ronald Montoya, ma'am.
Q: This Ronald Montoya you are referring to[,] where he was (sic) exactly when you said you saw a man holding a bolo approaching (sic) him?
A: Down at the terrace, ma'am.
Q: What exactly was this Ronald Montoya doing while he was there according to you down at the terrace and approached by a man holding a bolo?
COURT
Q: Where was he facing at that time if he was facing . . .?
A: He was facing his back to the man approaching him, Your Honor.
ATTY. DIMAANO
Q: When you said a man approaching (sic) him, are you referring to the man whom you said earlier was holding a bolo?
A: Yes, Your Honor (sic).
ATTY. DIMAANO
Q: How far were you from Ronald Montoya when you saw the man holding a bolo approaching (sic) him?
COURT INTERPRETER
The witness pointed from the place he was seated up to the man wearing yellow shirt which is estimated to be 5 to 6 meters away.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, when this man holding a bolo according to you approached Ronald Montoya [who was] sitting down (sic), did anything happen?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Will you tell us what happened?
A: He hacked Ronald Montoya, ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you said you saw the man holding a bolo hacked Ronald Montoya, if you can still recall where did the bolo first hit him?
xxx xxx xxx
A: At the middle of the head near the forehead, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How would you describe the fatal appearance of the accused when you saw him approaching the person who was facing his back against the person who was approaching him? (sic)
A: He was very angry, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DIMAANO
Q: If you can still recall, how many times did he hit Ronald Montoya after the first hit?
A: Two (2) more, ma'am.
Q: If you can still recall[,] where (sic) in what particular part of the body of Ronald Montoya was he hit?
A: At (sic) the right arm just above the pulse, the other one was at (sic) the back of Ronald Montoya, ma'am.
Q: At what particular part of his back was he hit?
A: No answer.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DIMAANO
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Let us clarify. He was hit at the top of his forehead. What was Ronald's reaction when he was hit on his forehead?
A: Ronald Montoya turned around after the first hack blow, ma'am.
Q: You said he was seated, how was he able to turn around?
A: He stood up and ran away, ma'am.
Q: When he ran away, what did the man holding the bolo do?
A: The man holding the bolo ran after him, ma'am.
Q: At what particular point did the man holding the bolo hit Ronald Montoya when he as hit at (sic) the arm?
A: He turned around and ran away while the man holding a bolo followed him and when the man holding a bolo overtook him, he was hit at (sic) his arm, ma'am.
Q: Are you saying that Ronald Montoya was able to face the accused, the man holding the bolo?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: That was [when] he parried the second blow?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Again if you can still recall[,] when did Ronald Montoya receive the third hit?
A: After he was hacked at (sic) the right arm[,] he fell down at (sic) the bushes and then he was hacked at (sic) his back[;] that was the third time, ma'am.
Q: Let us clarify again[.] Ronald Montoya received the third hacked (sic) hit when he already fell down in the bushes?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: When did the man holding the bolo stop hacking Ronald Montoya?
A: After the third hack blow, the man holding the bolo left, ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx." 2
The trial court and the Court of Appeals uniformly gave credence to Villanueva's clear, straightforward, and categorical eyewitness account of the incident. More so because there was no imputation of any ill motive on Villanueva which could have impelled her to falsely testify against Miranda. In fact, they did not even know each other prior to the incident. 3
Notably, against Villanueva's positive identification of appellant, the latter only interposed alibi and denial. But positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying thereon, prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. 4
On the alleged inconsistency between the testimony of Villanueva and the medical report of Dr. Ramon Sixto Castillo pertaining to the exact location of one of the hack wounds, whether in the nape or in the neck, suffice it to state that this inconsistency, if at all, refers to a trivial matter which does not at all affect the credibility of Villanueva. The fact remains that it was appellant who inflicted the fatal hack wounds which directly caused the death of the victim. Besides, not being a medical doctor, Villanueva could not have known where exactly in the victim's body appellant's deadly blows actually landed.
The killing was attended by treachery
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 5 It requires:
a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and
b) the said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 6
Here, appellant, armed with a bolo, suddenly, and sans any warning, attacked the unarmed and unsuspecting Montoya, from behind. The latter, who was just quietly sitting in the terrace got fatally hit at once right in the head. Montoya tried to run for his life but appellant easily caught up and hacked him again. Montoya tried to parry the second blow but he still got fatally hit in the arm, near the pulse area. As a result, appellant fell into the bushes. But Miranda further took advantage of Montoya's vulnerable situation and hacked the latter one last time in the back. There is no question that from beginning to end, appellant consciously adopted a mode of attack that ensured the killing of the victim without affording the latter any chance to defend himself. The victim tried to run, alright, but it was all in vain because at that time, he was already seriously wounded which was why appellant easily caught up. Then appellant was able to hack him again. As it was, appellant did not stop there. He hacked Montoya one last time in the back even when the latter had already fallen into the bushes.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning and is done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no chance to resist or escape. 7 A swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim that insures its execution without risk to the assailant arising from the defense of his victim is an indication that treachery is present. 8 What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. 9
In People v. Kalipayan, 10 the Court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the victim was rendered helpless and unprotected not only by the swiftness of the attack, but also because she was stabbed in the back before even becoming fully aware that a reprehensible act was being committed against her.
In People v. Lab-eo, 11 the Court also ruled that treachery is present when it was established that the appellant emerged from behind the victim when he stabbed her. Not only did the appellant deliberately attack from behind, he did it without any warning to the victim. The appellant executed the assault in a manner that left the victim defenseless and without any opportunity to even escape or flee, at the same time avoiding risk to himself from any defense the victim might make.
Evident premeditation did not
The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution enough to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. 12
Similar to treachery, evident premeditation must be clearly proven, established beyond reasonable doubt and based on external acts that are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning. 13 Absent any proof as to how and when the plan was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. 14
Here, we agree with the Court of Appeals that evident premeditation did not attend the killing of Montoya. The prosecution failed to establish the exact moment when Miranda devised to kill Montoya; that Miranda clung to his determination to commit the crime; and that a sufficient time had passed before he carried out his goal. The essence of the circumstance of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 15
Penalty
The crime of murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, viz.:
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery x x x.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance here, appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
As for the monetary award, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to P75,000.00 each in line with People v. Jugueta. 16 Too, the award of actual damages of P67,500.00 was supported by the evidence on record.
These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 17
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 24, 2020 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 12411 is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Florencio Miranda y Mendoza is guilty of MURDER and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Ronald Montoya y Sandoval:
1) Civil indemnity of P75,000.00;
2) Moral damages of P75,000.00;
3) Exemplary damages of P75,000.00; and
4) Actual damages of P67,500.00.
These monetary awards shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.People v. Toro, G.R. No. 245922, January 25, 2021.
2.Rollo, pp. 8-13.
3.Id. at 13.
4.People v. Gani, 710 Phil. 466, 474 (2013).
5.People v. Abina, 830 Phil. 352, 360-361 (2018).
6.People v. Toro, G.R. No. 245922, January 25, 2021.
7.People v. Albino, G.R. No. 229928, July 22, 2019.
8.People v. Caboquin, 420 Phil. 744, 750 (2001).
9.People v. Sebastian, 428 Phil. 662, 626-627 (2002).
10.People v. Kalipayan, 824 Phil. 173, 190 (2018).
11.People v. Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, 500-501 (2002).
12.People v. Toro, supra note 6.
13.People v. Vargas, G.R. No. 230356, September 18, 2019.
14.People v. Tortosa, 391 Phil. 497, 507 (2000).
15.People v. Moreno, 828 Phil. 293, 317 (2018).
16. 783 Phil. 806, 853 (2016).
17.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 283 (2013).