People v. Miralles y Gilera

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 208717. February 24, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARION MIRALLES Y GILERA, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedFebruary 24, 2014,which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 208717(People of the Philippines v. Marion Miralles y Gilera). — The Court resolves to NOTE the letter dated November 27, 2013 of P/Supt. IV Venancio Tesoro of the New Bilibid Prison, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, confirming the confinement therein of accused-appellant since June 14, 2003.

The records of this case were elevated to this Court on September 12, 2013 pursuant to the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 3, 2013, which gave due course to the notice of appeal filed by accused-appellant Marion Miralles y Gilera (Miralles).

In compliance with the Court's Resolution, dated October 9, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General and the accused-appellant filed their respective manifestations stating that they were adopting their Appellee's and Appellant's Briefs, respectively, as their Supplemental Briefs.

After a careful perusal of the records of the case, the Court resolves to DISMISS the appeal for failure of the accused-appellant to sufficiently show reversible error in the challenged decision warranting the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.

The CA did not err in affirming the conviction of Miralles for the crime of rape.

Under Article 266-A of the revised Penal Code, the crime of rape by sexual intercourse is defined as follows:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. [Emphasis supplied]

Under the above-quoted provision, carnal knowledge is the central element of rape and it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. This is commonly denominated as "organ rape" or "penile rape" and must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph. 1

In the case at bench, as observed by the trial court and the CA, AAA was able to state categorically how she was raped on May 13, 2001. She testified that she was awakened at around midnight by somebody touching her breasts; that it was accused-appellant Miralles; that Miralles threatened to kill her and her brother who was sleeping in another room with a balisong if she would shout or resist; that Miralles succeeded in having intercourse with her; that she was able to categorically identify Miralles as her assailant because there was a lamp near her that illuminated the room; and that she knew Miralles because they were just neighbors, their houses being separated only by a fence.

The fact of rape was supported by the medical report issued by the attending physician, Dr. Fetalvero.

Miralles tried to discredit AAA's cry of rape by arguing that she did not show any resistance as what rape victims naturally do; that there were discrepancies between her sworn statement and her testimony at the stand; and that even if denial was a weak defense, the prosecution must still prove beyond reasonable doubt the fact of rape.

The Court is not convinced.

To begin with, it must be borne in mind that when the dastardly act was being committed, Miralles threatened to kill her if she would resist or shout. Under such circumstances, she could not be expected to put up a resistance to his attacks. The law, at any rate, does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for her life and personal safety. 2

Next, the alleged discrepancy between AAA's sworn statement and court testimony, as to whether the balisong was on the floor or Miralles was holding it, is a matter of minor importance. As has been repeatedly held, minor disparities do not detract from the essential credibility of testimonies that are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. This principle holds true particularly when, as in this case, there is consistency in the narration of the principal occurrence and in the positive identification of the accused. Mere inconsistencies on non-material points are not enough to deny weight to the entire testimony. Often, such discrepancies reassure against the likelihood of a rehearsed testimony. 3

On the other hand, Miralles, in an effort to thwart the prosecution's case raised in chief the defense of denial and alibi. Considering the positive testimony of AAA, it is a weak defense.

Miralles' claim that he was in his house sleeping when the crime was allegedly committed does not convince the Court. For the defense of alibi to prosper, Miralles must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but must also satisfactorily establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of commission. 4 Miralles failed in this point. The records of the case, in this regard, show that his house was just right beside that of AAA where the rape took place. The fact that his alibi was corroborated by his wife did little to help his case. As held by the CA, his defense of alibi was unworthy of merit because it was established by himself and his wife, and not by credible and disinterested persons. 5 Alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by a relative or a close friend of the accused. 6

Finally, as to the propriety of the penalties, the Court did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the CA which sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Under Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed when rape is committed through force, threat or intimidation. However, the imposable penalty becomes reclusion perpetua to death when rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon as provided in the second paragraph thereof. Although AAA testified that she was raped with a knife threateningly poked on her, this fact was not alleged in the Information. Thus, even if proved, Miralles' use of a knife cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance and cannot affect the penalty to be imposed upon him. 7

The Court also affirms the award by the CA of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages to AAA being in accordance with law and jurisprudence. An award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and moral damages may be automatically awarded in rape cases without need of proof of mental and physical suffering. The award of exemplary damages is also proper under the circumstances to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, to vindicate the undue suffering and wanton invasion of AAA's rights and to punish the highly reprehensible and outrageous conduct of the accused-appellant. 8 Thus, the CA was correct in awarding AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to conform to the prevailing jurisprudence. 9

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Court AFFIRMSin toto the May 21, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. H.C. No. 00330. (Abad, J., on official leave, Bersamin J., designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1640 dated February 19, 2014).

SO ORDERED." 

Very truly yours,

LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. People v. Soria, G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA 483, 497.

2. People v. Estoya, G.R. No. 200531, December 05, 2012, 687 SCRA 376, 386.

3. People v. Caraang, et al., 463 Phil. 715, 752 (2003).

4. People v. Broca, G.R. No. 201447, January 9, 2013.

5. Rollo, p. 14.

6. People v. Baroquillo and Mahilum, G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 250, 267.

7. People v. Saludo, G.R. No. 178406, April 06, 2011, 647 SCRA 374, 396-397.

8. People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 197815, February 08, 2012, 665 SCRA 639, 645.

9. People v. Orje, G.R. No. 189579, September 12, 2011, 657 SCRA 427, 442, citing People v. Combate, G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 797.