FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 252304. November 11, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. MICHAEL MATIAS, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 11, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 252304 — People of the Philippines v. Michael Matias
The appeal utterly lacks merit.
Appellant is guilty of simple rape
At the outset, we note that there is a discrepancy in the designation of the crime which appellant Michael Matias was found to have committed as borne in the body of the trial court's Joint Decision, on one hand, and in the fallo itself, on the other. In the body, the trial court concluded that appellant was liable for "statutory rape," thus:
AAA was born on September 6, 2000[,] as shown by her Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit "D"). She was [nine] 9 years and [eleven] 11 months old if the rape incident in September 2010 happened before her birthday or she was [ten] 10 years old when the rape incident happened after her birthday. Either of the two circumstances, Accused had sexual intercourse with AAA who was then below twelve [12] years old. He is therefore liable for statutory rape. 1
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In the fallo, however, the trial court pronounced appellant guilty of "rape as charged," viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court in Criminal Case No. 4381-Bg finds the Accused Michael Matias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as charged. He is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay AAA Php100,000.00 as civil indemnity subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid, and Php100,000.00 as moral damages subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid. 2
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It is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. 3
Appellant was charged with rape by sexual intercourse under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (RA 8353), 4 which reads:
Art. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
The Information charged appellant with rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, as it specifically alleged that he "willfully, unlawfully through force, threat or intimidation, had sexual intercourse with one AAA, 5 a twelve (12)-year old minor, against her will by inserting his penis into her vagina." The evidence, however, proved that AAA was only around ten (10) years old at the time the crime was committed, which prompted the trial court to conclude that appellant was liable for statutory rape, under paragraph 1 (d).
It is settled though that criminal Information must accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime with which the accused are being charged. The purpose is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against them and enable them to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 6 The allegations of fact constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and the right of the accused to question their conviction based on facts not alleged in the Information cannot be waived. 7
To convict the accused of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or Information would be violative of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the Information filed against them. 8
To be sure, appellant cannot be convicted of "statutory rape," even if it was duly proven. For one, an essential element thereof, i.e., that the victim was under twelve (12) years old, was not alleged in the Information. What the Information alleged was AAA was then a "twelve-year-old minor." For another, statutory rape dispenses with proof of force, threat or intimidation which is an essential element of rape under paragraph 1 (a). Notably, in the fallo of its decision, the trial court did not change the designation of the crime committed to "statutory rape." Instead, it convicted appellant of the crime charged, i.e., rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended. The Court of Appeals found all the elements thereof present here, and thus, affirmed appellant's conviction for rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 226-A of the RPC, as amended.
To support a conviction for rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 226-A of the RPC, as amended, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) the offender accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation. 9
Here, the prosecution had sufficiently established that sometime in September 2010, appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent and against her will through force, threat or intimidation. AAA clearly and categorically testified that she was then playing hide and seek with her playmate and appellant when the latter, after finding her inside the bodega, suddenly covered her mouth, lifted and carried her, made her sit on his lap, removed her clothes and underwear, inserted his penis in her vagina, and repeatedly made an upward and downward motion. It caused her pain and made her cry, thus:
Q. You mentioned that you were raped by Kuya Maty (appellant) when you were still [ten] 10 years old, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you remember where did Kuya Maty rape[d] you when you were still 10 years old?
A. Near the kitchen and near the room of lolo BBB, 10 sir.
Q. You are referring to the house where Kuya Maty is staying in 2012?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Again, how did Kuya Maty rape you?
A. I cannot recall, sir.
Q. Kuya Maty did not insert his penis in your vagina at that time?
A. He inserted it, sir.
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Q. So, what was your position then at that time when he inserted his penis?
A. I was standing, sir.
Q. How about Kuya Maty, what was his position at that time?
A. He was sitting, sir.
Q. Will you please demonstrate because — (sic) Before that, [AAA], where was Kuya Maty sitting at that time?
A. He was sitting on the clothes, sir.
Q. And you were then standing?
A. Yes, sir.
THE COURT:
Q. You were facing him?
A. No, Your Honor, because he was covering my mouth.
PROS. LAMONG:
Q. So, it was your back facing him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you were standing straight at that time?
A. He was making me sit, sir.
Q. So, you sat on his lap?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, it was at that position when Kuya Maty was able to insert his penis in your vagina?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That was the first time your Kuya Maty raped you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, when he inserted his penis in your vagina, what did you feel?
A. It hurts, sir.
Q. So, when you felt pain at that time, what did you do?
A. I cried, sir.
Q. You cried loudly?
A. No, because my mouth is (sic) covered. 11 (Emphases supplied)
AAA further testified that she was not able to shout because of fear since appellant threatened her that something will happen to her should she tell anyone about the incident. 12
In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the victim's sole testimony provided it is credible, consistent, and convincing. 13 Testimonies of child victims are generally given full weight and credit especially when it concerns the crime of rape, the details of which a child due to her tender age would not have normally known had she not actually experienced them. 14
Here, AAA's credible, convincing, and consistent testimony was further corroborated by Dr. Irish B. Tangco's (Dr. Tangco) testimony and medical finding of old healed complete lacerations at 6 o'clock and 12 o'clock positions. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. When the victim's consistent and forthright testimony is consistent with medical findings, as here, the essential requisites of carnal knowledge are deemed to have been sufficiently established. 15
On the other hand, appellant's defenses consist of denial and alibi. These are the weakest of all defenses for they are easy to contrive but difficult to disprove. 16 Appellant claimed he could not have committed the offense for he was then in San Fernando City, La Union selling mineral water, candies, and cigarettes. He however, failed to present any evidence to support his theories of denial and alibi. Notably, the trial court found that it was not physically impossible for appellant to go to ZZZ, 17 La Union where the rape was committed since it was only about thirty (30) minutes ride from San Fernando City, La Union. More, appellant himself admitted that in selling his merchandise inside the buses plying the route of Ilocos-Baguio, he can have free rides from San Fernando City to ZZZ and vice-versa. 18
The alleged inconsistency in AAA's testimony pertaining to whether she was facing towards or away from appellant when the latter was raping her refers to a trivial matter which does not affect AAA's credibility as a witness. What remains paramount is AAA's consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and her positive and categorical identification of appellant as the perpetrator thereof. 19 Surely, if the testimonial inconsistency does not hinge on any essential element of the crime, the same is deemed insignificant and will not have any bearing on the essential fact or facts testified to. The inconsistency, if at all, even indicates that the witness was not rehearsed. 20
Too, AAA was only ten (10) years old when the first rape incident occurred. She took the stand when she was thirteen (13) years old. Surely, she is not expected to recount with exactitude every detail of the incident which happened three (3) years ago. Minor inconsistencies are not unnatural and may be expected of persons of such tender years. 21 Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. 22 Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness, least of all a child, especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape. What is important is that the victim's declarations are consistent on basic matters constituting the elements of rape and her positive identification of the person who did it to her. 23
The fact that AAA and appellant were not alone in the house where the rape took place is immaterial. It is settled that the presence or close proximity of other people or even relatives at the rape scene does not disprove the commission of rape. For lust is no respecter of time and place. Rape can be committed in places where people congregate or inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are present. 24
AAA's belated disclosure of the rape incident does not negate the commission of rape or cast doubt on her credibility. 25 As a rule, long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape have not always been construed as indications of a false accusation. A rape charge becomes doubtful only when the delay in revealing its commission is unreasonable and unexplained. 26 Here, AAA testified that appellant threatened her into silence which explains her delay in reporting the incident. 27
Appellant is guilty of simple rape by
A conviction for rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, requires the following elements, viz.: the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and the offender accomplished such act through force, threat or intimidation. 28
The prosecution here sufficiently established that on December 31, 2012, appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent and against her will through force, threat or intimidation. AAA made a clear, candid, and positive narration of how appellant lifted and carried her away while she was sleeping in the sala, brought her under the pias tree at the back of the house, made her lie down, took off her shorts, and panty and then his brief, mounted her, inserted his penis in her vagina, and made repeated upward and downward motion. It caused her pain and made her cry, thus:
PROS. LAMONG:
Q. [AAA], the last time you testified you mentioned that while you were sleeping you heard a sound coming from your kitchen. After that, you were awakened when someone carried you while you were sleeping on the sala at the house of your grandmother, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, after this person carried you, where did he bring you?
A. At the back of our house in (sic) the pias tree, sir.
Q. Again, [AAA], do you still recall around what time was this?
A. It was 1 o'clock, sir.
Q. When this person as you claimed brought you under the tree, where did you pass?
A. I can no longer recall, sir.
Q. But you mentioned that you were awakened when this person carried you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, after you were awakened, you fell asleep again?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, when you woke up, you were already under the tree at the back of your house?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you able to recognize who this person is (sic)?
A. Kuya Maty, sir.
Q. What is the real name of Kuya Maty, if you know?
A. Michael Matias, sir.
Q. By the way, how long have you known Kuya Maty?
A. I don't know, sir.
Q. Do you know where Kuya Maty is (sic) staying?
A. The sibling of my grandmother, sir.
Q. Kuya Maty is an adopted child of the sibling of your grandmother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And their house is just near the house of your grandmother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, when you were again awakened and you were already under the pias tree, what happened, [AAA]?
A. He made me lied (sic) down in (sic) the pias tree, sir.
Q. You are referring to Kuya Maty?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, he made you lied (sic) down on the ground under this tree?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you were already lying down, what did he do?
A. He took off my shorts, sir.
Q. And after he took off your shorts, what next did he do?
A. He raped me, sir.
Q. What do you mean by "he raped you?"
A. I know, sir.
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Q. After Kuya Maty removed your shorts and your panty, what did he do with his brief?
A. He also took it off, sir.
Q. After Kuya Maty took off his brief, you said he raped you. So, how did Kuya Maty rape you?
A. He inserted his penis in my vagina, sir.
Q. So, when he made you lied (sic) down, he went on top of you and inserted his penis in your vagina?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you feel when he inserted his penis in your vagina?
A. It's (sic) painful, sir.
Q. What did you do when you felt pain when Kuya Maty inserted his penis in your vagina?
A. I cried, sir.
Q. After Kuya Maty inserted his penis in your vagina, what did he do?
A. He carried me and brought me back in (sic) the couch, sir.
Q. [AAA], how long was his (sic) penis of Kuya Maty inserted in your vagina
A. I don't know, sir.
Q. But you were crying at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. By the way, [AAA], that happened at around 1:00 a.m.?
A. Yes, sir. 29 (Emphasis supplied)
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AAA could not have fabricated the harrowing details of the rape incident had she not actually experienced them in appellant's hands. For no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. 30 Notably, no ill motive was shown which could have impelled AAA to falsely accuse appellant of such heinous crime of rape.
Even standing alone, the victim's testimony withstands scrutiny sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction. It assumes even more probative weight when it is corroborated by physical evidence. 31
Here, AAA's allegation of rape conforms with the physical evidence. At the dawn of December 31, 2012, AAA was brought to the hospital where Dr. Tangco examined her and found inside her private part old healed hymenal lacerations and spermatozoa. Dr. Tangco testified that the presence of spermatozoa "means that the patient [AAA] had sexual contact for at least seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the examination." 32 Again, hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. The essential requisites of carnal knowledge are deemed to have been sufficiently established since AAA's testimony is consistent with medical findings. 33
The Court respects the trial court's factual assessment and conclusion that AAA's testimony was credible and convincing 34 since it had the opportunity to observe firsthand AAA's conduct and demeanor while testifying. More so because such findings carry the full concurrence of the Court of Appeals. 35
On this score, AAA's alleged failure to shout for help and to escape do not undermine her credibility since appellant intimated, forced or threatened her into submission. AAA could not have voluntarily had sex with the man who previously raped her. Out of fear that appellant might hurt her, she was forced to pretend that she was still sleeping. 36 Also, she did not shout because appellant threatened her in Ilocano, ''padasemti agidarum, addaaramidek nga madi" (Try to tell this or I will do something bad). Rape victims react differently. 37 There is no standard form of reaction for a woman when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as rape. Some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may openly welcome the intrusion. None of these reactions, however, impair the credibility of a rape victim. 38
The fact that the second rape incident occurred just outside the house where appellant could be exposed to the public and get caught does not disprove the commission of rape. Again, lust does not respect time and place. Rape can be committed anywhere, even in open spaces where public exposure is high, as in this case, or in places where people congregate. People v. Balora39 decrees:
The court has time and again held that "the evil in man has no conscience. The beast in him bears no respect for time and place, driving him to commit rape anywhere — even in places where people congregate such as in parks, along the roadside, within school premises[,] and inside a house where there are other occupants." "Rape does not necessarily have to be committed in an isolated place and can[,] in fact[,] be committed in places which to many would appear to be unlikely and high-risk venues for sexual advances." Indeed, no one would think that rape could happen in a public place like the comfort room of a movie house and in broad daylight.
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In any event, as between AAA's credible and positive identification of appellant as the person who, using force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her against her will, on one hand, and appellant's unsubstantiated denial and alibi, on the other, the former indubitably prevails. 40
Where nothing supports the alibi except the testimonies of close relatives, appellant's sisters Krischel Ann Rillera and Michell Matias in this case, it deserves but scant consideration. 41 For such testimonies are suspect and cannot prevail over the unequivocal declaration of the complaining witness. The Court of Appeals observed that neither of appellant's sisters knew of his actual whereabouts during the first and second rape incidents as to credibly disprove the physical impossibility of his presence at the crime scene. His sisters merely assumed that he came from a party during the second rape incident. 42 He did not even present his so-called friend who brought him home from the alleged party.
Following People v. Tulagan, 43 the proper nomenclature to be applied in both Criminal Case Nos. 4381-Bg and 4384-Bg is simple rape. For when the offended party is twelve (12) years old or below eighteen (18) years old and the charge against the accused is carnal knowledge through "force, threat or intimidation," then he will be prosecuted for rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended. Although the State had proven that AAA was only ten (10) years old when appellant committed the first rape incident, he may only be convicted for simple rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, because the Information alleged she was twelve (12) years old, not ten (10) years old when she first got raped. Surely, appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is inviolable. 44
Penalties
Article 266-B 45 of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, prescribes reclusion perpetua for simple rape committed under Article 266-A (1). 46 Pursuant to A.M. 15-08-02-SC, 47 the phrase "without eligibility for parole" shall be used to qualify the penalty of reclusion perpetua only if the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346). 48
It is settled that aggravating and qualifying circumstances, to be appreciated, must be alleged in the Information and proved during trial. 49 Here, there was no allegation of any aggravating or qualifying circumstances in the two (2) Informations. Neither did the trial court or the Court of Appeals make any discussion showing the existence of any aggravating or qualifying circumstance which would have otherwise warranted the imposition of death penalty were it not for RA 9346. Hence, the phrase "without eligibility for parole" need not be borne in the decision to qualify appellant's sentence of reclusion perpetua. 50
As for appellant's civil liability, the Court held in People v. Jugueta51 and People v. Tulagan52 that when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Further, the amounts of damages awarded shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.
Accordingly, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in both Criminal Case Nos. 4381-Bg and 4384-Bg should be reduced from P100,000.00 each to P75,000.00 each, and an additional P75,000.00 should be awarded as exemplary damages in each case. These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 25, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 11149 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:
a. In Criminal Case No. 4381-Bg, appellant MICHAEL MATIAS is found GUILTY OF SIMPLE RAPE and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to PAY AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of P75,000.00 each. These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid; and
b. In Criminal Case No. 4384-Bg, appellant MICHAEL MATIAS is found GUILTY OF SIMPLE RAPE and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to PAY AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of P75,000.00 each. These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
The accused-appellant's manifestation in lieu of supplemental brief, pursuant to the Resolution dated October 7, 2020; the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation in lieu of supplemental brief, pursuant to the Resolution dated October 7, 2020; and the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation stating that its premises were on partial lockdown from March 12, to May 14, 2021, hence, it is constrained to serve and file the manifestation in lieu of supplemental brief via electronic mail, are all NOTED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. CA rollo, p. 60.
2.Id. at 61.
3.BBB v. People, G.R. No. 249307, August 27, 2020.
4.The Anti-Rape Law of 1997. Approved on September 30, 1997.
5. The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances[,] and other information which tend to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family, or household members, shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy, and fictitious initial shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People v. Cabalquinto [533 Phil. 703 (2006)] and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017.
6. See People v. Dimaano, 506 Phil. 630, 650 (2005); People v. Dasmarinas, 819 Phil. 357, 375 (2017).
7. See Quimvel v. People, 808 Phil. 889, 912-913 (2017).
8. See People v. Dasmarinas, 819 Phil. 357, 375 (2017).
9. See People v. XXX, G.R. No. 232308, October 7, 2020.
10. The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances[,] and other information which tend to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family, or household members, shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy, and fictitious initial shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People v. Cabalquinto [533 Phil. 703 (2006)] and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017.
11.Rollo, pp. 11-13.
12. CA rollo, p. 56.
13. See People v. XXX, G.R. No. 230904, January 8, 2020.
14. See People v. XXX, G.R. No. 218277, November 9, 2020.
15.Supra note 13.
16.Supra note 9.
17. Section 44 of the Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, requires confidentiality of all records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their children. Per said section, all public officers and employees are prohibited from publishing and causing to be published in any format the name and other identifying information of a victim or an immediate family member. The penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon those who violate the provision. Pursuant thereto, in the courts' promulgation of decisions, final resolutions and/or final orders, the names of women and children victims shall be replaced by fictitious initials, and their personal circumstances or any information, which tend to identify them, shall likewise not be disclosed. (Resolution in BBB v. AAA, G.R. No. 197225, February 9, 2015).
18.Rollo, p. 60.
19. See People v. Gerola, 813 Phil. 1055, 1066 (2017).
20. See People v. __________, G.R. No. 229836, July 17, 2019.
21.Supra note 19.
22.People v. Julito Divinagracia, Sr., 814 Phil. 730, 747 (2017).
23.Supra note 20.
24. See People v. Descartin, Jr., 810 Phil. 881, 892 (2017).
25. See People v. Brioso, 788 Phil. 292, 308-309 (2016).
26.People v. Bejim, G.R. No. 208835, January 19, 2018.
27.Rollo, p. 83.
28.Supra note 9.
29.Rollo, pp. 13-16.
30. See People v. VVV, G.R. No. 230222, June 22, 2020.
31.Supra note 13.
32. CA rollo, p. 61.
33.Supra note 13.
34.People v. Hirang, 803 Phil. 277, 290 (2017).
35.Castillano y Asutilyo v. People, G.R. No. 222210 (Notice), June 20, 2016.
36. CA rollo, p. 79.
37.People v. Barberan, 778 Phil. 103, 112 (2016).
38.Supra note 13.
39. 388 Phil. 193, 203 (2000).
40. See People v. XXX, G.R. No. 232308, October 7, 2020.
41. See People v. Sanchez, 419 Phil. 808, 814 (2001).
42.Rollo, pp. 19-20.
43. G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019.
44. See People v. Tuyor y Banderas, G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020.
45.Article 266-B. Penalty. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
46.Supra note 43.
47.Guidelines for the Proper Use of the Phrase "Without Eligibility for Parole" in Indivisible Penalties. Approved on August 4, 2015.
48.An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. Approved on June 24, 2006.
49.People v. Garbida, 639 Phil. 107, 113 (2010).
50. See People v. Saltarin, G.R. No. 223715, June 3, 2019.
51. 783 Phil. 807, 848 (2016).
52.Supra note 43.