People v. Masdal y Thailand

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 236594. March 6, 2019.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.DATU KARIM MASDAL y THAILAND @ "ALIBARA MASDAL & WARRIOR", accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated March 6, 2019, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 236594 (People of the Philippines vs. Datu Karim Masdal y Thailand @ "Alibara Masdal & Warrior"). — This treats of the Notice of Appeal 1 under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure filed by herein accused-appellant Datu Karim Masdal y Thailand (Masdal), seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated September 22, 2017, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01466-MIN, convicting him of Double Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Antecedents

An Information for Double Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder and Damage to Property was filed against Masdal, committed as follows:

That on or about 3:20 o'clock in the afternoon of August 15, 2011, along Alunan Highway fronting United Methodist Church, Barangay Poblacion, Tacurong City, Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in conspiracy with Jay-R Reyes and John Doe, whose case is still pending preliminary investigation, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and with the use of an explosive, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously plant an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) inside the white KIA Avella parked in front of the United Methodist Church, and cause the aforementioned explosive to explode, thereby resulted to [sic] the death of two (2) persons, namely: Raffy L. Parreñas and Board Member Russman Q. Sinsuat, Sr., as well as serious physical injuries to six (6) other persons, namely: Russman Q. Sinsuat, Jr., Bebot L. Barabarang, Noble G. Abdullah, Robert P. Formacion, Richard S. Sonza and Antonio A. Mabang, and damage to the Toyota Fortuner driven by Antonio Mabang.

CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 48 in relation to Articles 248, 6 and 50 of the [RPC] as amended by Republic Act 7659. 3

On February 13, 2012, Masdal pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. 4 acEHCD

The antecedent facts show that at around 1:30 p.m. of August 15, 2011, prosecution witness Melvin Alba (Alba), a tricycle driver, was waiting for passengers in front of Honda Power Cycle, Alunan Highway. Alba noticed a white Kia Avella sedan parked on the right side of the highway. Thereafter, he saw two men alight from the said vehicle. One of the men wore a black jacket, black pants and black shoes, while the other was clad in a white jacket, white pants and white shoes. The two men crossed the highway and proceeded to Akoy Pata. 5

Meanwhile, Alba left the area and returned at around 3:10 p.m. During this time, Alba noticed that the man in black and his companion in white were still hanging around Akoy Pata. The man in black proceeded to where Alba's tricycle was parked, and then rested his foot on Alba's tricycle, while calling someone on his cellphone. 6

After around seven minutes, a black Fortuner and several other vehicles passed by. Suddenly, the man in black covered his ears with both his hands, while clutching his cellphone. Then he went in front of Alba's tricycle and warned the latter, "sibat na, pakyawin kita." Thereafter, a loud explosion erupted. Alba hurriedly took the keys from his tricycle and ran towards COMPAC to ask for help. The man in black ran across the highway, and went to Tacurong Fit Mart. 7

Upon reaching COMPAC, Alba immediately reported the incident to the police officers. He informed the officers that the man in a black jacket caused the explosion. The man in a black jacket was arrested, and was identified as Masdal. 8

On the other hand, Masdal vehemently denied the charges leveled against him. He claimed that at around 8:00 a.m. of August 15, 2011, a man named Montasir contacted him and told him to go to Tacurong City. Masdal was obliged. 9

Masdal arrived in Tacurong City at around 11:30 a.m., and met with Montasir, who was accompanied by two other men. Montasir informed Masdal that their mission was to detonate a bomb aimed at the convoy of Governor Mangudadatu. 10

Masdal did not believe Montasir, so he approached the white Kia Avella sedan to check if there really was a bomb inside the said vehicle. He did not find one. Still uncertain about Montasir's statements, he again asked the latter if he was telling the truth. Montasir replied in the affirmative. Then, Montasir handed Masdal a cellphone, and told him in a low voice in Maguindanaoan dialect, that Masdal should just agree with their plan, or else his life will be placed in danger. 11 Montasir likewise told Masdal that they will receive PhP5 Million from Datu Unsat. Out of fear, Masdal obeyed Montasir's orders. 12

Masdal stood in front of Fit Mart, and waited for the convoy of Governor Mangudadatu to pass. As soon as the convoy arrived, Masdal sent a text message to Montasir saying "nandiyan na ang convoy." Seconds after sending the text message, Masdal heard a loud explosion. He was standing by Fit Mart, watching the commotion when two police officers suddenly arrested him. 13

Ruling of the Trial Court

On February 19, 2015, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision 14 finding Masdal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Murder. Anent the charge of serious physical injuries, the trial court observed that the victims therein did not participate in the proceedings, and thus, surmised that they (victims) may have preferred to file their claim for damages in the appropriate civil action.

The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, judgment is rendered finding accused DATU KARIM MASDAL Y THAILAND alias Alibara Masdal and Warrior guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of double murder. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and is not eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

To pay the costs.

Meantime, the Warden of Sultan Kudarat District Jail, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, is directed to immediately convey the aforenamed accused to Davao Penal Colony in Dujali, Davao del Norte for service of sentence imposed upon the latter.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

Aggrieved, Masdal filed an appeal with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

On September 22, 2017, the CA rendered the assailed Decision 16 affirming the conviction handed down by the RTC. The CA held that the prosecution sufficiently established the guilt of Masdal beyond reasonable doubt, through circumstantial evidence. SDHTEC

The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated February 19, 2015 of the [RTC], Branch 20, Tacurong City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant, in line with recent jurisprudence, is ORDERED to pay:

1. the heirs of Raffy L. Parreñas (a) Php100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php100,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) Php100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

2. the heirs of Board Member Russman Q. Sinsuat, Sr. (a) Php100,000.00 as Civil indemnity; (b) Php100,000.00 as Moral damages; and (c) Php100,000.00 as Exemplary damages.

The damages awarded shall earn interest at a legal rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED. 17

Dissatisfied with the ruling, Masdal filed a Notice of Appeal under Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Issue

The main issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the prosecution proved Masdal's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Double Murder.

In asserting his innocence, Masdal claims that the prosecution failed to present evidence on how the bomb was detonated. Without this essential element, he should not be convicted of double murder. He likewise asserts that he was merely impelled by a reasonable fear to obey the instructions of Montasir to send a message as soon as the convoy of Governor Mangudadatu arrives. He never intended to kill the victims, Raffy Parreñas (Parreñas) and Board Member Russman Sinsuat, Sr., (BM Sinsuat) nor inflict injuries upon anyone. 18

On the other hand, the People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that the prosecution proved the guilt of Masdal beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG maintains that the circumstantial evidence shows that Masdal planted the bomb inside the white KIA sedan. Masdal cannot feign innocence from the charges, as he was well aware of the plan to detonate the bomb. Neither may he claim that he was impelled by a reasonable fear to follow the instructions of Montasir. His act of texting Montasir to notify them that the convoy of Governor Mangudadatu has arrived proves his complicity in the scheme. 19

Ruling of the Court

The instant appeal is bereft of merit.

The Prosecution Established that

Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, defines and penalizes the crime of Murder as follows:

ART. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

Significantly, to sustain a conviction for murder, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements, to wit: (i) that a person was killed; (ii) that the accused killed the victim; (iii) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (iv) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 20 AScHCD

In People v. Barde, 21 the Court held that the killing of the victims with the use of explosives qualifies the crime to murder. 22

It is equally important to note that a conviction for Murder need not be proven solely through direct evidence of the malefactor's culpability. Rather, the offender's guilt may likewise be proven through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (i) there must be more than one circumstance; (ii) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. 23 Imperatively, all the circumstances taken together must form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. 24 To rule otherwise would lead to the pernicious situation wherein felons would be set free to the detriment of the judicial system, and thereby cause great danger to the community. 25

In the case at bar, the circumstances surrounding the fateful day of August 15, 2011, when the explosion at Alunan Highway led to the death of Parreñas and BM Sinsuat, show an unbroken chain of facts, which establish beyond reasonable doubt Masdal's culpability, to wit:

i. Alba saw Masdal together with a man in a white jacket, white pants and white shoes alight from a white Kia Avella sedan parked by the side of the highway;

ii. Masdal and the man in white crossed the national highway and proceeded to Akoy Pata;

iii. Masdal approached Alba's tricycle, and stayed there while talking to someone on the cellphone;

iv. A black Fortuner passed along the highway, with a convoy of cars trailing behind;

v. Masdal suddenly covered his ears with his two hands;

vi. Immediately thereafter, an explosion occurred;

vii. The explosion came from the white Kia Avella sedan; and

viii. After the explosion, Masdal went inside Alba's tricycle and said "sibat na, pakyawin kita."

These unbroken chain of events prove Masdal's participation and responsibility in the murder of Parreñas and BM Sinsuat. His act of talking to someone on the cellphone minutes prior to the explosion, covering his ears right before the explosion, and ordering Alba to leave, all show that he was not only complicit, but a necessary conduit in the devious plan to murder Governor Mangudadatu and his companions.

In addition to the aforementioned circumstances, Masdal actually admitted that he had known of the plan to explode Governor Mangudadatu's car. In fact, he even admitted to notifying Montasir that the convoy had arrived.

Masdal cannot claim that he was

Seeking exoneration from the charges, Masdal claims that he was merely impelled by a reasonable fear to obey Montasir's orders.

The Court is not persuaded.

Notably, Article 12 of the RPC states that a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. 26 This stems from the recognition that such person does not act with freedom. AcICHD

However, the Court has held on numerous occasions that for such exempting circumstances to apply, "the duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. 27 In the same vein, the person invoking uncontrollable fear must prove that the compulsion was of such nature that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without a will, but even against his will. It is also necessary that the compulsion is of such character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 28

The Court finds that none of the above-mentioned circumstances obtain in the case at bar.

To begin with, although Masdal claims that Montasir threatened him into submission, the former failed to specify the extent of the threat given by the latter. He did not mention any serious bodily harm that would have befallen him. Worse, he did not even claim that Montasir will kill him, should he refuse to obey the latter's alleged orders. In fact, Masdal had all the opportunity to escape the scene in order to avoid submitting to Montasir's command. This shows that Masdal's allegation of fear or duress is untenable. Clearly, under the circumstances, Masdal's alleged fear, arising from the threat of Montasir, would not suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability.

The Penalty for the Complex Crime

Notably, Article 48 of the RPC, as amended, states that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, in its maximum period. This is in recognition of the fact that in a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Accordingly, the law imposes only one penalty for the commission of a complex crime. 29

Parenthetically, in People v. Guillen, 30 the Court held that the single act of throwing a grenade at President Roxas resulting to the death of another person, and injuring four others produced the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murders. 31

In the same vein, in People v. Carpo, et al., 32 the Court held that the single act of hurling a grenade into the bedroom of the victims causing the death of three persons and injuries to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple murder and attempted murder.

Finally, in People v. Gaffud, Jr., 33 the Court stressed that although the single act of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, these component criminal offenses should only be regarded as a single crime in law, for which a single penalty shall be imposed because the offender was impelled by a "single criminal impulse" which shows his lesser degree of perversity.

Guided by the foregoing tenets, the Court concludes that Masdal's single act of causing an explosion that led to the death of Parreñas and BM Sinsuat, constituted the complex crime of double murder. The maximum penalty for murder should, thus, be imposed against Masdal.

However, in view of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines), the Court shall reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.

In addition, the CA correctly ordered the payment of Php100,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php100,000.00 as moral damages; and Php100,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each victim, pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in People v. Jugueta. 34 The damages awarded shall earn a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court's ruling, until full satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated September 22, 2017 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01466-MIN, convicting accused-appellant Datu Karim Masdal y Thailand for the crime of Double Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED. TAIaHE

SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J., designated as additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. CA rollo, p. 155.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas, with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Oscar V. Badelles, concurring; id. at 135-149.

3.Id. at 136.

4.Id.

5.Id. at 137.

6.Id.

7.Id.

8.Id. at 138.

9.Id. at 140.

10.Id.

11."Makisama ka lang baka madisgrasya ka;"id. at 141.

12.Id.

13.Rollo, pp. 8-9.

14. Rendered by Judge Milanio M. Guerrero; CA rollo, pp. 48-89.

15.Id. at 88-89.

16.Rollo, pp. 3-17.

17.Id. at 16.

18. CA rollo, p. 33.

19.Id. at 122-125.

20.People v. Lagman, 685 Phil. 733, 743 (2012), citing People v. Gabrino, 660 Phil. 485, 495 (2011); citing People v. Dela Cruz, 626 Phil. 631, 639 (2010).

21. 645 Phil. 434 (2010).

22. Id. at 460.

23. REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 133, Section 4.

24. People of the Philippines v. Hermie Paris y Nicolas and Ronel Fernandez y De la Vega, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018, citing Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630, 679 (2015).

25. People v. Quitola, 790 Phil. 75, 87-88 (2016), citing People v. Uy, 664 Phil. 483, 499-500 (2011).

26. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 12, paragraphs 5 and 6.

27. People v. Fieldad, et al., 744 Phil. 790, 812-813 (2014), citing People v. Del Rosario, 365 Phil. 292, 300 (1999); People v. Anod, 613 Phil. 565, 571 (2009).

28. People v. Fieldad, et al., supra, citing People v. Tami, 313 Phil. 665, 703 (1995).

29. People v. Gaffud, Jr., 587 Phil. 521, 533 (2008), citing Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Revised Fifteenth Edition, Book One, 650 (2001).

30. 85 Phil. 307 (1950).

31. Id. at 319-320.

32. 408 Phil. 355 (2001).

33. 587 Phil. 521 (2008).

34. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).